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This dissertation moves beyond traditional assessments of legal compliance. It offers a 
more complete understanding of how international law functions upon the use of force 
and during the conduct of hostilities. The dissertation consists of four case studies – each 
presented and published as standalone articles – that provide fuller descriptions of 
international law’s efficacy within fraught international contexts. By moving beyond the 
common evaluative standard of compliance, this dissertation presents a pluralistic 
conception of international law’s function and purpose.  
Accordingly, the first case study presents an account of the way that international 
humanitarian law is used to manage “prolonged occupation.” The second case study 
shows how the traditional language of legal legitimacy is being supplemented by states 
that now complement claims of legal compliance with assertions of investigative 
willingness. The third case study engages with the notion of lawfare and suggests that this 
term as become a means of limiting access to international justice. The fourth and final 
case study provides a communicative theory that describes the microprocesses that states 
employ when they use international law to argue and to advance military and diplomatic 
objectives.   
Collectively, these case studies understand international law as a multifunctional tool. 
They provide accounts of how international law functions, how it compels, how it 
facilitates, and how it is altered. Through a series of rhetorical moves the state identifies 
the forms of international law with which they adhere, it devalues or deflects certain 
obligations by accentuating others, it establishes and develops conceptions of 
international law with which it wishes to further, and it presents the resulting 
engagements as illustrative of a commitment to the international legal process and global 
order. This dissertation asks not whether states comply with international law but how 
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BEYOND THE HABITUAL: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT UPON THE USE OF 
FORCE AND DURING THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES  
DAVID HUGHES 
1. Situating the Dissertation through Commonality
The inaugural volume of the European Journal of International Law featured an 
exchange between James Crawford and Francis Boyle. Two leading international lawyers 
debated the merits of Palestinian statehood.1 They offered contrasting views in response 
to the legal questions that followed from the 1988 Algiers Declaration in which the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization proclaimed an independent state.2 Ostensibly, 
Crawford and Boyle queried the extent to which Palestinian statehood merited legal 
recognition. The two scholars drew upon legal sources, recalled historical documents and 
events, cited precedent, and offered doctrinal analysis. These methods of legal inquiry are 
familiar practices, common tools wielded by international lawyers. Yet the exchange 
between Crawford and Boyle exposed the exceptional character of the statehood debate’s 
unavoidable context – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
Crawford’s response to Boyle’s endorsement of Palestinian statehood appealed to a larger 
notion that surpassed the particularities of any identified legal question. This concerned 
the use and purpose of international law itself. Crawford observed:  
It seems to be difficult for most international lawyers to write in an impartial 
and balanced way about the Palestine issue. Most of the literature, some of it 
by respected figures, is violently partisan. Still, such a level of partisanship in 
legal discourse is disturbing…And the obstinate fact remains that the actors, 
most of the time, continue to use the language of law in making and assessing 
these claims…That the language of law is used implies that these claims can be 
assessed, on the basis of values which extend beyond allegiances to a 
particular, country, block, or religion.3  
The exchange continued, returning to legal considerations of statehood, yet the broader 
questions – regarding the role of law within fraught international contexts – are of 
enduring significance. Often, when international lawyers confront a legal question or 
evaluate a contested scenario, they seek to provide an answer. They assess legal 
compliance.4 Has the state acted in a way that constitutes a violation of international law? 
1 See, Francis A. Boyle, “The Creation of the State of Palestine” (1990) 1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 301. See also, James 
Crawford, “The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?” (1990) 1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 307 
[Crawford Too Much Too Soon].  
2 The Palestinian Declaration of Independence, Algiers, 15 November 1988, reprinted in: Yehuda Lukacs, 
ed, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record 1967-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992) at 411. 
3 Crawford Too Much Too Soon, supra note 1 at 307.  
4 For example, Sean D. Murphy, “Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq” (2003-2004) 92 Geo. L. J. 173.  
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Do the actions or contentions of the state conform with some legal interpretation and can 
thus be assumed permissible?  
Entrenched conflict provides countless scenarios that demand legal scrutiny. War, the use 
of armed force, and military occupation are governed by specific legal regimes. Regulated 
through intricate frameworks as defined in the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello (or the 
laws governing the use of force and international humanitarian law), states and other 
international actors are compelled to comply with a series of rules. These rules seek to 
administer the situations and circumstances that follow the breakdown of law’s “normal” 
function. International lawyers assess the compliance of states with these specialized legal 
regimes. An inherent assumption runs through this process. As James Crawford 
suggested above, there is a belief that international law will serve as a neutral arbiter, that 
it presents particular (desirable) values against which state behaviour may be assessed 
through an (ideally) apolitical process that produces a determination of right or wrong; 
of compliance or of violation.  
This dissertation moves beyond traditional assessments of legal compliance. It offers a 
more complete understanding of how international law functions upon the use of force 
and during the conduct of hostilities. The dissertation consists of four case studies that 
each provide a fuller description of international law’s function within fraught 
international contexts. By moving beyond traditional assessments of compliance, I 
present a pluralistic conception of international law’s function and purpose. This 
understands international law as a multifunctional tool. It provides a means to formalize 
and codify moral norms. It regulates inter-state relations and defines the duties and 
obligations that structure the state’s relationship with the individual. Also, international 
law provides a discourse through which states, other international actors, and individuals 
may all argue and assert competing claims. As noted by James Crawford and Martti 
Koskenniemi, international law presents as a “language of government in certain 
contexts, as a bundle of techniques, and as a framework within which 
several…constructivist projects are articulated.”5  
The case studies – presented through the four articles within this dissertation – provide 
accounts of these techniques and of these articulations. The first, Moving from 
Management to Termination, tells of the reinterpretation of legal provisions for 
purportedly benevolent reasons but with unintended, and intended, consequences that 
have resulted in a seemingly permanent temporary occupation.6 The state, bestowed the 
status of an occupying power under international law, seeks to employ law to manage its 
occupation of foreign territory. This has facilitated the state’s efforts to distract from or 
defer questions about the legality and form of its imposed control and policies within the 
occupied territory. The second case study, titled Investigation as Legitimization, 
identifies an emerging practice in which states employ the language of individual 
5 James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi, “Introduction” in James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi, eds, 
The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 2. 
6 See, David Hughes, “Moving from Management to Termination: A Case Study of Prolonged Occupation” 
(2018) 43(3) Brook. J. Int. L. 1.  
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accountability, under international criminal law, to demonstrate collective legitimacy.7 
Through the use of “informal complementarity,” the state showcases a willingness to 
investigate military undertakings to avoid unwanted international scrutiny. In the third 
case study, What Does Lawfare Mean?, actors work to define and privilege international 
law’s acceptable users.8 By imposing normative value on particular uses of law, they 
discount an array of legal engagements by, primarily, non-state actors. The fourth case 
study, titled How States Persuade, describes the ways, the practices and techniques, in 
which international law becomes a means to an end.9 An understanding of these processes 
shows how international law remains a contested practice and how state actors engage in 
rhetorical techniques to further particular accounts of what they contend to be the content 
of international law.  
Collectively, this dissertation and the case studies within suggest that when one looks 
beyond assessments of compliance, when one moves past anticipated assertions of 
legitimacy and legal conformity, a process of prioritization and preferencing occurs. 
Within the described contexts, states engage with certain aspects of international law – 
through interpretation and argument – to neglect other features of legal dictate. States 
select and accentuate the international law with which they comply. They endeavour to 
establish or secure the forms of international law that they desire. And they emphasize 
the resulting processes in pursuit of identifiable diplomatic and military objectives.10 The 
case studies within this dissertation tell these stories and describe these processes. 
Individually and collectively, they provide a more complete understanding of how 
international law functions, how it compels, how it facilitates, and how it is altered, within 
fraught international contexts.  
2. Moving Beyond Compliance  
The case studies within this dissertation each move beyond assessments of legal 
compliance. They interrogate how states engage with international law to assert, define, 
and demonstrate adherence to the requirements of international law and in advancement 
of particular objectives. International legal theorists have long fixated on compliance. 
Theories of compliance provide answers to the enduring question of why states, absent 
an obvious source of coercion, adhere to legal obligations that may not serve their 
immediate interests. A wealth of literature ponders the cause of seemingly adherent state 
behaviour. While the resulting accounts differ significantly, they generally ground their 
inquiries in Louis Henkin’s oft-quoted aphorism, that “almost all nations observe almost 
all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the 
time.”11 
                                                             
7 David Hughes, “Investigation as Legitimization: The Development, Use, and Misuse of Informal 
Complementarity” (2018) 19(1) Melb. J. Int. L. 84. 
8 David Hughes, “What Does Lawfare Mean?” 40 Ford. Int. L.J. 1.  
9 David Hughes, “How States Persuade” 50 Geo. J. Int. L. (forthcoming).  
10 A special thanks to Frédéric Mégret for his helpful articulation of this focus.  
11 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1979) at 47.  
3
 
The compliance question carries undeniable importance. As Harold Koh suggests, “if we 
cannot predict when nation-states will carry out their international legal obligations 
respecting trade retaliation, environmental protection, human rights, global security, and 
supranatural organizations, how can we count on multilateralism to replace the bipolar 
politics as the engine of the post-Cold War order?”12 As the Twentieth Century 
proliferation of treaty-based international law began to touch nearly all aspects of 
international society and relations, realist scholars like Kenneth Waltz deemphasized the 
significance of the emerging legal regimes.13  
In response to realist dismissals, compliance theories explain international law’s 
relevancy by providing a more purposeful account of why law compels states to alter or 
structure their behaviour. The resulting accounts differ. An influential series of theories 
suggest that state compliance is the result of international law’s normative pull. 
Accordingly, Thomas Franck contends that compliance is based on the perception by the 
obliging state that a particular rule or legal provision is in itself fair and legitimate.14 The 
“managerial approach,” offered by Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, suggests 
that the propensity of states to fulfill their international commitments stems from the 
legal principles generated through treaty regimes. For Chayes and Chayes, compliance is 
grounded in the states desire to ensure efficiency, to promote its interests, and to adhere 
to international norms.15 Building on the work of both Franck and Chayes and Chayes, 
Harold Koh asserts that compliance is best ensured through a transnational legal process 
that allows for the interpretation and domestic internalization of international norms.16  
Institutionalist scholars seek to explain the influence of international institutions on state 
behaviour. Steeped in the language of regimes, institutionalist theory views the self-
interested state as the principal international actor. Robert Keohane insists that states 
behave as rational utility-maximizers that view international regimes as devices to 
facilitate agreements that further the interests of states.17 Thus, compliance is a means of 
securing benefit. Also building on the notion of self-interest, Andrew Guzman claims that 
the question of compliance must be understood as a two-stage game. First, states 
negotiate over the content of law and the required level of commitment. Second, the state 
decides whether it will comply with international obligations by assessing the potential of 
                                                             
12 Harold H. Koh, “Why do Nations Obey International Law?” (1996-1997) 106 Yale L. Rev. 2599 at 2600.  
13 For realists like Waltz, legal compliance and state engagement with international institutions was an 
unimportant biproduct of powerful state interests. International law was not understood as possessing the 
ability to alter state behaviour or interest. See, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). See also, Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War” (2000) 25 
International Security 26.  
14 See, Thomas M. Franck, “Legitimacy in the International System” (1988) 82 Am. J. Int. L. 705.  
15 See, Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).  
16 See, Koh, supra note 12.  
17 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes” (1982) 36 Int. Org. 335. See also, Robert O. 
Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics” (1997) 38 Harv. Int. L. J. 489.  
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direct sanctions and the degree of reputational loss that is likely to be incurred should the 
state dismiss its commitments.18 
Liberal theory emphasizes the role of the individual actor within the international sphere. 
Where similar approaches, like Koh’s transnational legal process, accentuate law’s 
normative pull, liberal theory holds that states are the sum of many parts. These 
constitutive parts must be considered independently and collectively to “fully understand 
state action on the world stage.”19 Anne-Marie Slaughter contends that individuals and 
groups engaging with transnational civil society are essential to the international system. 
States interact with these actors in a process of representation and regulation. 
Compliance results from this interactive process when governments exhibit the 
preferences of these domestic forces.20 
International law now exists in what Thomas Franck has termed a “post-ontological 
phase.”21 It is intellectually assured, a “mature” and “established” legal system against 
which international lawyers and scholars can (and have) move beyond iterations of 
relevancy to embrace a holistic or pluralistic account of international law’s function, 
purpose, and efficacy. The case studies within this dissertation situate within a post-
realist environment that emphasizes the role of rhetoric in the conduct of international 
affairs.22 Each of the case studies tells an independent story with unifying themes about 
how states engage with international law.  
Compliance remains a desirable normative pursuit. However, situating international legal 
inquiries around a binary understanding of compliance-violation unnecessarily limits 
conceptions of international law. It constricts understandings of the means by which, and 
the purposes for which, states employ international law in pursuit of foreign policy 
objectives.23 A complete understanding of international law’s relevancy and effectiveness 
must do more than attribute significance to the fact that states pay rhetorical homage to 
legal dictate as they articulate and justify their policies.  
War, conflict, and the consequences of a state’s decision to use force are often portrayed 
through countless instances of legal violations. This is understandable. War is 
devastating. International law provides a vocabulary to condemn the mounting death tolls 
and wanton destruction. Also, however, international law provides a means to justify the 
use of force. David Kennedy has termed this “legally conditioning the battlefield.”24 
18 See, Andrew T. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law” (2002) 90 Calif. L. Rev. 
1826.  
19 See, Oona A. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” (2002) 111 Yale L. J. 1935 at 
1952.  
20 See, Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law in a World of Liberal States” (1995) 6 Eur. J. Int’l. L. 508. 
21 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at 
6.  
22 See generally, Francis A. Beer & Robert Hariman, eds, Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in 
International Relations (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1996).  
23 See generally, Lisa Martin, “Against Compliance” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, eds, 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 591.  
24 David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 8.  
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Through a discursive process, the humanitarian vocabulary of international law is 
mobilized by militaries as a strategic asset. Such an understanding of international legal 
engagement is frequently evidenced in accompaniment of the decision to use force and 
during the conduct of hostilities. Kennedy explains that “if law can increase friction by 
persuading relevant audiences of a campaign’s illegitimacy, it can also grease the wheels 
of combat. Law is a strategic partner for military commanders when it increases the 
perception of outsiders that what the military is doing is legitimate.”25 
Claims of legitimacy almost always accompany military action. The norm prohibiting the 
use of force – as articulated within Article 2(4) of the UN Charter – is so entrenched that 
states must justify their conduct through an established international legal vocabulary. 
As Dino Kritsiotis explains, the embrace of legal argument has become “one of the staple 
features of state practice on the use of force, so that when states use force against other 
states, they also use international law to define and defend, argue and counter-argue, 
explain and rationalise their actions.”26 This dissertation embraces the view that 
international law provides an argumentative platform. The case studies, however, attempt 
to go further then similar conceptions of law’s role within the international sphere. They 
do not suggest that the described legal interactions evidence a discursive process in which 
two sides debate the correct answer, the true meaning, or the proper interpretation of a 
legal prescription. Each of the case studies evidences how states engage in a process 
through which the state prioritizes the legal obligations that it wishes to comply with, 
deemphasizes those that it wishes to disregard, and endeavours to accentuate a particular 
vision of law, often through informal means, that allows the state to function within the 
international sphere. The following case studies, written as independent articles, each 
describe variants of this argumentative process.  
3. Introducing the Case Studies
This dissertation consists of four case studies. Each case study is presented as a 
standalone piece. They offer independent contentions and self-contained descriptions 
regarding the employment of legal argument by those states that take the decision to use 
force and partake in the conduct of hostilities. Yet, as described throughout, several 
strands run through and conjoin the case studies that constitute this dissertation. 
Collectively, they tell of the value in moving beyond strict considerations of legal 
conformity and of understanding state engagement with international law, upon the use 
of force, as a process of prioritization in which the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello are 
each divided, emphasized and deemphasized, in a continual process that seeks to 
influence, adapt, and apply the law in pursuit of military and diplomatic objectives. Each 
case study, their independent features and their common traits, will now be described.  
3.1. Moving from Management to Termination 
25 Ibid, at 41.  
26 Dino Kritsiotis, “When States Use Armed Force” in Christian Reus-Smit, ed, The Politics of International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 45 at 47.  
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The first article, titled Moving from Management to Termination describes and assesses 
the application of the law of occupation in a prolonged scenario that is uncontemplated 
by the applicable legal framework.27 In 2017, the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian 
territories reached a half-century in duration. The occasion reignited a conversation 
amongst legal scholars. A flurry of new publications questioned the efficacy of occupation 
law. They asked whether it had become an anachronism. Across Israel and the Palestinian 
territories, those that directly invoke the law of occupation sought a more effective means 
of adapting the law to meet the exigencies created by fifty years of imposed control. The 
accompanying debates recalled questions concerning the legal treatment of prolonged 
occupation.  
Built around a detailed case study of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, I argue that as 
commonly interpreted, international law does not regulate – but instead – facilitates 
prolonged occupation. Referencing various historical moments, I describe when and how 
international law has been employed to entrench an occupying power’s control. These 
legal engagements are justified as responses to the particular challenges produced by 
prolonged occupation. Such uses of international law, the article argues, are based on a 
common interpretative approach. This understands occupation as a fact or non-
normative phenomenon. As a result, international law is unable to alter occupation. 
Instead, it may only manage it. The state emphasizes certain aspects of the occupation 
framework to facilitate its control of, and to embed its presence within, the occupied 
territory. It neglects those features of the framework that question, or disallow, the form 
of control that the state now imposes.  
Identifying the motive of management as a causal factor, I argue that common responses 
to prolonged occupation – by occupying powers, other states, and international 
organizations – may be necessary but when taken within the occupation framework’s 
traditional, non-normative confines they risk perpetuating occupation. They entrench a 
legal framework that is understood to neglect duration and curtail the inherent 
requirement of temporality. This interpretation of the occupation framework becomes 
susceptible to manipulation. In response, the article proposes a novel interpretative 
approach. This shifts the focus of the occupation framework. It emphasizes a conception 
of occupation as temporary and facilitates efforts to end occupation. By recognizing that 
prolonged occupation constitutes an altered form of control, and grounding responses to 
this means of control in established legal principles, this amended normative approach 
identifies a legal basis under which an occupying power will be required to enable the 
termination of prolonged occupation. This reasserts the law of occupation’s relevancy and 
efficacy. It better aligns the purpose and functions of occupation law with diplomatic 
objectives and international norms. And it shifts the discourse that accompanies 
prolonged occupation from management to termination.  
 
 
                                                             
27 Hughes, Moving from Management to Termination, supra note 6.   
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3.2. Investigation as Legitimization 
The second article is methodologically similar. It describes how a state employs the 
language of international criminal law to confer the legitimacy of its actions upon the use 
of force. Titled, Investigation as Legitimisation, this article introduces the idea of 
informal complementarity.28 The Rome Statute employs complementarity to determine 
whether the International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction to prosecute 
international crimes. Informal complementarity, as it is coined within this article, is 
employed by states. It occurs independently (or pre-emptively) of an ICC investigation. 
Appeals to informal complementarity speak fluidly of individual criminal proceedings 
and state-level investigations or inquiries. When a state appeals to informal 
complementarity, it is not immediately concerned with individual criminal liability or the 
admissibility of a particular case. Instead, informal complementarity serves to deny the 
state’s own (non-criminal) responsibility. The state may offer examples of investigations, 
criminal proceedings, and efforts to ensure against impunity. These actions are displayed 
as evidence of legal compliance. Collectively, they are required and necessary but may 
also be duplicitous.  
Despite the formal distinction between individual criminal liability and state 
responsibility, appeals to informal complementarity constitute an emergent vocabulary. 
It increasingly features within the lexicon of states that engage in the use of force. This 
article identifies appeals to informal complementarity as an alternative or supplementary 
means of asserting legitimacy. Traditionally, when states employ force, they couple the 
initiation of hostilities with legal justifications that are designed to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of the state’s actions. Within armed conflict, states are supplementing 
traditional appeals to international law and assertions of legal fidelity with claims of post 
hoc legal accountability. The traditional refrain of ‘we respect and adhere to the law’ is 
increasingly coupled with the novel chorus of ‘we investigate the law’. 
This article begins by distinguishing the conventional conception of complementarity 
from its informal usage. It provides a detailed case study of Israel’s wars in Gaza to trace 
the development and use of informal complementarity. Through an analysis of Israel’s 
employment of international law (pre-and post Gaza operations), this article 
demonstrates that, following a succession of wars, the post-conflict discourse has moved 
from assertions of legal compliance exclusively to include pronouncements of 
investigative willingness. Framed around the metaphor of the proleptic show trial, the 
article introduces four broad phases of legal engagement that collectively constitute both 
an appeal to informal complementarity and an emergent means of asserting legitimacy.  
3.3. What Does Lawfare Mean? 
The forms of legal engagements described in these first two case studies may come under 
the ill-defined rubric of “lawfare.” The third article departs from the substantive and case-
driven approach assumed in Moving from Management to Termination and 
Investigation as Legitimization and considers the broader framing of these forms of 
28 David Hughes, Investigation as Legitimization, supra note 7. 
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strategic legal usage. It engages, critically, with the notion of lawfare by suggesting that 
its common application strays from its initial descriptive purpose. It serves as a means to 
preference who may employ international law.   
Titled, What Does Lawfare Mean? this article differentiates various usages of this 
increasingly common nomenclature.29 Since its introduction into public, political, and 
legal discourses, the term lawfare has captured the attention of both scholars and 
practitioners of international law. Initially, the term was used to describe the novel ways 
by which international law was being applied to achieve traditional military objectives. It 
has since transformed into a blanket term of competing meanings. Lawfare has been 
understood as the imposition or manipulation of international legal standards in order to 
confine military operations. Employing the precepts of international law to shame 
powerful countries has been described as lawfare. The use of human shields by non-state 
actors engaged in asymmetrical warfare has been held to constitute an act of lawfare. 
Lawfare has been used to label and decry the efforts of lawyers and organizations 
representing foreign nationals at the Guantánamo Bay detainment camp in Cuba. And the 
term lawfare has described the strategic use of international law by states for the purpose 
of achieving a particular, often military, objective.  
Despite the term’s ubiquity there is no consensus as to lawfare’s definition. Although 
lawfare has received wide treatment within academic literature, the majority of these 
discussions attempt to provide such a definition or evaluate the term’s normative 
underpinnings. This article recognizes that such a consensus definition will remain 
elusive and that this singular focus largely fails to explore the implications of lawfare’s 
most common uses. This article reframes the debate surrounding lawfare by moving 
beyond the definitional question and asking instead what the implications of lawfare’s 
usages for both the understanding and practice of international law are? Such 
consideration has been almost wholly absent from the legal literature. Built around seven 
prominent quotations that claim to either define lawfare or describe what the speaker 
deems an act of lawfare, this article argues that when one observes contemporary 
applications of the term lawfare and the associating debates about the legitimate function 
of international law, it becomes evident that most often applications of lawfare serve to 
decry a particular use of international law by a particular actor. Here, lawfare becomes 
a means of prioritizing certain forms of international legal engagements while 
deemphasizing others. When framing the lawfare debate or articulating a response to 
accusations of lawfare that are intended to delegitimize such specific uses of international 
law, this paper argues that it is prudent to understand the application of the lawfare label 
not as a general means of attacking or dismantling legal norms (as many critics do) but 




                                                             
29 David Hughes, Lawfare, supra note 8.  
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3.4. How States Persuade  
The final paper addresses the microprocesses of legal argument and considers how states 
employ persuasion to prioritize those features of international law that they desire and to 
disregard those facets that they deem disruptive. It follows a similar descriptive, case-
study driven approach as with the first two articles. And it is greatly informed by these 
first two studies. It is intended as the culmination of this work and of my consideration of 
how international law is employed by states in conflict situations. As with the previous 
case studies, this article wishes to further identify and understand law’s function. It offers 
a framework to conceptualize the nature of particular forms of legal argument. Titled, 
How States Persuade, this article acknowledges that states are increasingly responding 
to the perception of new threats and the altering nature of warfare by coupling military 
action with sophisticated legal appeals.30 This has shifted the discourse accompanying 
war beyond assertions of legal conformity. Commonly, the use of force is paired with 
appeals that attempt to persuade that inventive legal arguments constitute acceptable 
interpretations or applications of international law.  
Law is portrayed as a medium for debate. Within this debate, persuasion becomes a 
means to encourage legal fidelity. Persuasion is inexorably linked with questions of 
compliance. Yet this is only one side of the practice. Persuasion is a two-faceted discourse. 
It is both a means to ensure compliance and a method to define how international law 
should be understood. Efforts to alter the behaviour of a “non-compliant” state through 
cogent communication are often met with or pre-empted by legal argument put forth as 
ripostes by the state.  
Built around a series of case studies in which states offer legal arguments in support of 
actions that, prima facie, extend beyond the limits of legal permissibility, persuasion is 
understood differently than it is commonly represented. The state becomes not only the 
“engine and the target” of compliance but a participant actively engaged in defining 
compliance’s meaning. The article begins by asking: why do states persuade? It suggests 
that the non-compliant state may employ persuasive legal argument to supplement a lie 
(e.g. we did not do what you claim that we did). The state may appeal to persuasion in 
support of a particular legal interpretation (e.g. what you say happened but it is not illegal 
or the law is unclear). Or the state may invoke persuasive argument to generate legitimacy 
(e.g. military action is a necessary response to an emerging threat). The resulting 
arguments are directed toward either broad audiences (e.g. the international community; 
domestic constituencies) or narrow audiences (e.g. specific interpretative or epistemic 
communities). 
Finally, the article asks: how do states persuade? I present a communicative framework. 
First, the state constructs a Habermasian-like “common lifeworld.” Second, the state 
establishes itself as a general norm-acceptor. Third, the state demonstrates its authority 
to interpret the law. Fourth, it establishes a standard of compliance based on the 
“acceptable legal argument.” And fifth, the state draws upon precedent and 
                                                             
30 David Hughes, How States Persuade, supra note 9.   
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commonalities to apply law to fact. Nowhere is this argumentative structure more 
apparent than in relation to the use of force. Grounded in a series of case studies, the 
paper concludes by tracing the argumentative offerings posited by Russia following the 
annexation of Crimea; by the United States and the United Kingdom as they developed 
the “unwilling or unable” standard as applied in justification of the use of force against a 
non-state armed group; and by Israel following the 2014 Gaza war. By acknowledging this 
underexplored role of persuasion – as employed by states to lie, to interpret, or to 
legitimize – the article provides a communicative framework and a platform to better 
understand how international law becomes a means of both facilitating and restraining 
the use of force by states.  
4. Defending the Choices within the Dissertation 
The case studies within this dissertation explore how particular states engage with 
particular bodies of international law. The first two case studies – Moving from 
Management to Termination and Investigation as Legitimization – emphasize Israeli 
engagements with both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. This limited focus was 
deliberate. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict contains countless instances in which 
international law and international legal argument are afforded primacy. From widely 
endorsed UN resolutions to the activist’s placard, international law has long served as a 
significant feature of both the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians as well as 
the international community’s response to it. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
remarked: “there is no conflict in the world today whose solution is so clear, so widely 
agreed upon, and so necessary to world peace as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”31  
Annan’s address to the Arab League referenced a litany of UN resolutions that provide the 
legal basis for the commonly endorsed two-state solution. The late Secretary General, as 
with so many others, believed that progress vested, in some part, in that vast body of law 
that has incrementally developed throughout the second-half of the Twentieth Century.32 
By moving beyond commonplace assessments of compliance to explore the 
multifunctional uses of international law that Israel has employed throughout its conflict 
with the Palestinians, observers are well-placed to see that what the Secretary General 
described as the promise of international law is but one aspect of its function.  
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long-provided the backdrop to many inventive legal 
contentions. The conflict has served as a testing place for uncertain legal assertions. 
Accordingly, the engaged actors – both Israeli and Palestinian – have implemented 
numerous policies and undertaken various actions that are correctly identified as legal 
violations. Yet, the conflict has produced an environment in which legal argument is 
common place and taken seriously. It provides a fertile space for the study of international 
law’s function, development, uses, and misuses.  
                                                             
31 UNSG, Press Release, Leading their People back from the Brink is Duty of Israeli, Palestinian Leaders, 
UN Doc. SG/SM/8177 (27 March 2002). 
32 See, Susan M. Akram, et.al., “Introduction” in Susan M. Akram, et. al., eds, International Law and the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A rights-based approach to Middle East Peace (New York: Routledge Press, 
2011) at 2. 
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I began considering these broader forms of legal engagement while working in the East 
Jerusalem neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah. Here, I met the Al Kurd family shortly after 
they had been evicted from their home. Umm Kamal, the family matriarch, moved to 
Sheikh Jarrah with her husband as refugees in 1956. His family came from Jaffa, the 
biblical port city famously associated with tales of Solomon and Jonah. Her family were 
from Talbeyieh, a sloping, leafy neighbourhood in Jerusalem’s western sector. To the Al 
Kurds, like a great number of Israelis and Palestinians involuntarily embroiled within the 
contemporary conflict over this ancient city, Jerusalem is simply home. Yet, on 8 
November 2008, following a protracted legal battle, their family became the first to be 
evicted from their property in the contested East Jerusalem neighbourhood. 
Umm Kamal’s grandson, Mohammad Al Kurd, was fourteen when he told me that he 
wanted to become a human rights lawyer so that he could use the law to return his family 
to their home. Their story attracted international attention. World leaders – former 
President Jimmy Carter, Catherine Ashton, then the EU’s High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs, political and parliamentary delegations – visited the protest tent that was 
established on the street near their home. A social movement emerged. Palestinians, 
Israelis, and international activists attended weekly protests. NGOs and international 
organizations penned legal briefs and reports, distributed press releases, and filed 
complaints with UN bodies. I wrote many of these. All appealed to international law for a 
solution. But international law also facilitated the Al Kurds’ dispossession.  
The focus on international law’s employment within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tells 
of the particular means that a state may employ to prioritize certain forms of international 
law and to neglect alternative legal dictates. The focus on Israeli legal engagements – most 
prominently within the first two case studies – is guided by the rich examples that this 
conflict has produced about how international law can facilitate; how it can legitimize; 
how it can preference; and how it can persuade. Accordingly, much (though by no means 
all) of what follows, the case studies and the fact patterns, is informed by the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This, however, is not a dissertation about Israel and Palestine. It is 
about international humanitarian law, the use of force, international criminal law, the 
ways that legal engagements are framed, and the means by which actors employ law to 
argue and to advance agendas. It is about some of the lesser acknowledged ways that 
international law can affect and can evolve within conflict situations. It is, at the most 
basic level, a study about how international law works.  
There is a temptation when one writes about international humanitarian law or the use 
of force to fixate on either Israel or the United States. Many of the reasons for this are 
clear. Both Israel and the United States employ the use of force more frequently than most 
states. Throughout their histories Israel and the United States have been involved in 
various conflicts that attracted immense legal, media, and scholarly attention. Often, 
within these conflicts, their actions and legal justifications are highly controversial and 
result in polarizing debates. The controversial nature of these actions encourage inventive 
(and at times dubious) legal arguments. To the credit of both states, they often (though 
not always) provide detailed legal articulations in justification of their actions. This 
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provides a bounty of primary materials that may be interrogated and subjected to 
scholarly pursuits. The focus of the initial case studies is influenced by these realities.  
The final study, however, attempts to move beyond the predictable subjects that recur 
within these legal fields. How States Persuade introduces numerous examples of how 
various nations – Russia, the United Kingdom, India, Germany, Australia, and others – 
have engaged with international law in an effort to posit more generalizable claims.  
While I do not present this dissertation as a series of case studies about Israel, the United 
States, or any particular nation, it is very much a project about how states engage with 
international law. Historically, states have been deemed the primary subject and sole 
actor within the international sphere. This is, of course, no longer so. The state-centric 
approach presented within this dissertation and through these case studies does not 
endorse a limited, or realist, view of international standing. Non-state actors assume 
significant roles within the international sphere. The statist approach forwarded within 
these case studies does not discount the significance of these groups, individuals, and 
organizations. They are highly active within conflicts – as belligerents, mediators, 
monitors, and as assessors. Non-state actors contribute to the formulation of 
international law as well as to important efforts to ensure its implementation.33 Yet it 
remains states that retain the capacity to employ the most serious and sustained forms of 
force. They are the most likely to provide intricate legal rationales in accompaniment of 
such uses of force. These realities inform the scope and focus of the following articles. 
Collectively, the dissertation presents claims about how law functions within fraught 
international scenarios. This focus necessarily limits the forms of international law that 
are considered. Thus, this becomes a dissertation about specific bodies of international 
law. The case studies within focus primarily on the law governing the use of force and on 
international humanitarian law. They touch more briefly on international criminal law 
and allude to international human rights law. Other dissertations and further research 
may be undertaken about how different fields of international law function within diverse 
scenarios. Some findings will likely be comparable. Some claims will be generalizable. 
Others will diverge.   
The bodies of law and the contexts within which they are applied reflect the overarching 
commitment to theoretical pluralism that runs through the case studies. The choices and 
focuses presented throughout this dissertation result from my belief that international 
legal engagements are variable. The reasons why and how a state may engage with 
international law will likely alter between state and by body of law. The reasons for which 
a state may adhere to a bilateral trade agreement, a human rights commitment, of 
whether it may support a formalist or an expansionist reading of the self-defence 
33 See generally, Raffaele Marchetti & Nathalie Tocci, “Conflict society: understanding the role of civil 
society in conflict” (2009) 21 Glob. Change, Peace & Sec. 201. See also, Shany Payes, Palestinian NGOs in 
Israel: The Politics of Civil Society (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2005); Richard Rogers & Anat Ben-
David, “The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process and transnational issue networks: the complicated place of 
the Israeli NGO” (2008) 10 New Media & Soc. 497. 
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exception in the UN Charter, when or whether it may join an international regime like the 
International Criminal Court will diverge. Accordingly, understandings of international 
law are more effectively advanced when they move beyond efforts to provide unified 
theories. The temptation to provide such an account is clear and while I do embrace the 
foundational contention that almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law, it is those exceptions where compliance appears elusive that motivate 
these case studies and that benefit from exclusive focus.  
5. Conclusion  
It is commonly assumed that the dictates of international law are abandoned upon the 
commencement of hostilities. Cicero declared inter arma enim silent leges (in war law is 
silent).34 Since the mid-Nineteenth Century, intricate legal frameworks have developed 
that regulate both the grounds upon which force is permissible and the means by which 
it may be employed. But where war’s inevitabilities are tallied and articulated as legal 
violations, there remains an accompanying sense that instances of international law’s 
disregard evidence its irrelevance. Andrew Guzman, for example, notes that compliance 
mostly occurs, “in situations with many repeated interactions, each with relatively small 
stakes…the topics that have traditionally held center stage in international law – the laws 
of war, neutrality, arms control, and so on – are precisely those in which international law 
is least likely to be relevant.”35  
Observations of legal abandonment brought Hersch Lauterpacht to famously pronounce 
that “if international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, 
perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.”36 This 
dissertation resists dismissals of international law’s relevancy. Each of the case studies 
are situated within armed conflicts, they address instances where states couple the use of 
force with intricate legal arguments. They each advance a multivariant vision of 
international law. While a compelling story can be told about the ways that international 
law functions as a constraint and provides protection during armed conflict, these case 
studies describe other features of international legal engagement. They disassociate 
assessments of compliance from the notion of relevancy.  
Recalling David Kennedy’s contention that international law can increase perceptions of 
legitimacy each case study explores the ways that states move beyond habitual assertions 
of compliance and claims of legitimacy to prioritize particular legal engagements. The 
resulting international legal discourses – as evidenced throughout the following articles 
– are not contests that seek to establish whether an action or policy conforms with 
international law. They are, instead, a series of rhetorical moves that allow the state to 
identify the forms of international law with which they adhere, to devalue or deflect 
certain obligations by accentuating others, to establish and develop the conceptions of 
                                                             
34 M Tulli Ciceronis, “Pro T Annio Milone: Oratio ad Iudices” in F.H. Colson, ed, Cicero pro Milone (New 
York: MacMillan Press, 1893) 1 at 5.  
35 See, Guzman, supra note 18 at 1828.  
36 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Problem of the Review of the Law of War” (1952) 29 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L 360 at 
382.   
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international law that they wish to further, and to present the resulting engagements as 
illustrative of a commitment to the international legal process and global order. The 
question that each of the following case studies asks is not whether states comply with 
international law but how they comply. 
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MOVING FROM MANAGEMENT TO TERMINATION: A CASE STUDY OF PROLONGED 
OCCUPATION 
DAVID HUGHES* 
In 2017, the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories reached a half-century in 
duration. This reignited a conversation amongst legal scholars. In articles and books, 
lawyers questioned the efficacy of occupation law. They asked whether it had become 
an anachronism. Across Israel and the Palestinian territories, those that directly 
invoke the law of occupation sought a more effective means of adapting the law to meet 
the exigencies of a fifty-year-old occupation. The accompanying debates recalled 
questions concerning the legal treatment of prolonged occupation. This article seeks 
to fundamentally alter the recurring discourse.  
Built around a detailed case study of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, this article 
argues that as commonly interpreted, international law does not regulate – but instead 
– facilitates prolonged occupation. Referencing various historical moments, the article
describes when and how international law has been employed to entrench an
occupying power’s control. These legal engagements are justified as responses to the
exigencies of prolonged occupation. Such uses of international law, the article argues,
are based on a common interpretative approach. This approach understands
occupation as a fact or non-normative phenomenon. As a result, international law is
unable to alter occupation. Instead, it may only manage it.
Identifying the motive of management as a causal factor, this article argues that 
common responses to prolonged occupation may be necessary, but when taken within 
the occupation framework’s traditional, non-normative confines, they risk 
perpetuating occupation. They entrench a legal framework that is understood to 
neglect duration and curtail the inherent requirement of temporality. This 
interpretation of the occupation framework becomes susceptible to manipulation. In 
response, the article proposes a novel interpretative approach. This shifts the focus of 
the occupation framework. It emphasizes a conception of occupation as temporary and 
facilitates efforts to end the occupation. By recognizing that prolonged occupation 
constitutes an altered form of control, and grounding responses to this means of 
control in established legal principles, this amended normative approach identifies a 
legal basis under which an occupying power will be required to enable the conclusion 
of prolonged occupation. This reasserts the law of occupation’s relevancy and 
efficacy. It better aligns the purpose and function of occupation law with diplomatic 
objectives and international norms. And it shifts the discourse that accompanies 
prolonged occupation from management to termination.  
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“There are currently about 2.75 million Palestinians living under military 
occupation in the West Bank, most of them in Areas A and B – 40 percent of the West 
Bank – where they have limited autonomy. They are restricted in their daily 
movements by a web of checkpoints and unable to travel into or out of the West Bank 
without a permit from the Israelis. So if there is only one state, you would have 
millions of Palestinians permanently living in segregated enclaves in the middle of 
the West Bank, with no real political rights, separate legal, education and 
transportation systems, vast income disparities, under a permanent military 
occupation that deprives them of the most basic freedoms. Separate and unequal is 
what you would have. And nobody can explain how that works. Would an Israeli 
accept living that way? Would an American accept living that way? Will the world 
accept it?” 
-- John Kerry, 28 December 20161 
INTRODUCTION 
Route 5 begins at the Mediterranean coast, north of Tel Aviv, and journeys east through the 
Sharon Plain and toward the Jordan Valley. The scenery rapidly transforms from the affluent 
villas and dense apartment blocks of Ramat HaSharon and Petah Tikva to the arid, rolling hills 
that mark entry into the West Bank. The road is well-traveled by many who live in the growing 
communities outside of Israel’s commercial and economic core and who use the highway for 
direct access into and from the city. 
Continue east, twelve miles past the Green Line, and one arrives in Ariel. This large Israeli 
settlement is located in the heart of the West Bank. To many, the appeal of Ariel echoes that of 
the North American suburb. Its residents typically prioritize space and affordability above 
increasingly expensive urban lifestyles. The ostensible normality of daily life in Ariel is 
convoluted. Despite its proximity to Tel Aviv, Ariel was developed on occupied territory. It has 
since grown into one of the largest Israeli settlements in the West Bank.2 Most often, its residents 
do not evoke the image of the nationalist settler, whose ideological commitment to a Greater 
Israel is unwavering. Yet, its presence, beyond the Green Line, places Ariel near the geographic 
and symbolic center of the land Palestinians claim for a future state, which some Israeli leaders 
* Michigan Grotius Fellow, The University of Michigan Law School. I would like to sincerely thank Steven Ratner,
Yahli Shereshevsky, Michael Lynk, Teresa Tan Hsien-Li, and the participants at Cornell University’s Land Institute
Workshop for their beneficial reviews, comments, and suggestions. A special note of thanks is extended to the
editorial team at the Brooklyn Journal of International Law for their careful review of this work. Mistakes are my
own.
1 Speech by John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Middle East Peace (Dec. 28, 2016), available at
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/266119.htm.
2 GERSHON SHAFIR, A HALF CENTURY OF OCCUPATION: ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND THE WORLD’S MOST INTRACTABLE 
CONFLICT 1, 188–90 (2017).
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view as integral to their own, and which the international community recognizes as under 
belligerent occupation.3  
Accordingly, in Ariel and throughout Israel’s many West Bank settlements, the mundanities of 
daily life and local affairs can arouse global interest and ignite regional tension. Yet, Ariel 
remains a city, otherwise conventional. An Israeli can work, buy a home, attend university, and 
enjoy the comforts of a suburban life. While its legal status as a settlement, in violation of 
international law, has negligible influence on the daily routines of its residents, it is a primary 
facet of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is a space that embodies a prolonged occupation, where 
legal narratives unfold and bear witness to competing uses of international law. 
Settlements like Ariel present a paradox. Their existence, and the normality of daily life within, 
repudiates the very legal framework that is intended to govern the conflict and enable its 
resolution. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank has now surpassed its fiftieth year.4 As the 
conflict’s landscape becomes increasingly legalized, agreement as to how international law may 
effectively govern prolonged occupation eludes consensus. Traditionally, occupation is 
understood as a neutral phenomenon. Military control of foreign territory operationalizes the 
occupation framework—that is, the various legal instruments that regulate occupation.5 The 
framework’s application is commonly understood as a counteraction to the factual recognition of 
foreign control.6 As prominently interpreted, international law’s relationship with occupation is 
devoid of normative content.7  
Eyal Benvenisti explains that the drafters of the legal framework regulating occupation “took 
pains to emphasize that the regime of occupation is a de facto regime that conveys to the 
occupant only circumscribed rights and obligations for the limited duration of the occupation.”8 
The resulting legal treatment is premised upon the assumption that foreign control is temporary.9 
Although occupation was envisioned in brief intervals and regulated accordingly, the legal 
3 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 446, ¶ 3 (Mar. 22, 1979). See also G.A. Res. 32/20, ¶ 1 (Nov. 25 1977) (affirming that Israel’s 
presence within the West Bank constitutes a belligerent occupation). See also Grant T. Harris, Human Rights, Israel, 
and the Political Realities of Occupation, 41 ISR. L. REV. 87, 94–95 (2008). 
4 The occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip (as well as other territories) began in June 
1967. See generally IDITH ZERTAL & AKIVA ELDAR, LORDS OF THE LAND: THE WAR OVER ISRAEL’S SETTLEMENTS 
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, 1967–2007 (2007) [hereinafter ZERTAL & ELDAR]. 
5 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 539 T.S. 
631 [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV)]. The term occupation framework includes treaty-based provisions, 
primarily the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as the various interpretations that have 
evolved around these. See also Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied With Occupation: Critical Examinations of the 
Historical Development of the Law of Occupation, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 51 (2012) (For an overview of the 
occupation framework’s historical development) [hereinafter Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied With Occupation]. 
6 See Prosecutor v. Naletilic, IT-98-34-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 211 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003). See also Marco Sassòli, The Concept of Belligerent Occupation, in THE 1949 GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 1390, 1393 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015).  
7 AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE WALL: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3–4 (2017) 
[hereinafter GROSS, WRITING ON THE WALL]. 
8 See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 15–16 (2d ed. 2012) (Benvenisti 
notes that, “as part of the jus in bello, the lawfulness of the occupation regime or its authorities did not depend on 
the jus ad bellum issues that led to the invasion and the occupation.”).   
9 Nehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 721, 726 (2005).  
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framework does not set firm durational requirements. Instead, it protects the inalienability of 
sovereignty. It strictly regulates the occupying power’s ability to alter the territory’s legal or 
political status. Thus, the legal framework is structurally conservationist.10 
Prolonged occupation presents myriad challenges. These emanate from the occupation’s 
extended duration. They derive from the structural inability of the occupation framework to 
provide more than temporary consideration to a population that faces extended subjugation. The 
framework’s ephemeral conception of occupation is ill-suited to regulate the enduring needs of a 
population bereft of self-governance. This incompatibility between international law’s 
conservationist orientation and the reality of prolonged occupation has long provoked questions 
regarding the appropriateness of the legal framework.11 Throughout the West Bank, a legal 
regime that is understood as exceptional and temporal continues to regulate an occupation that 
has now exceeded a half-century in duration. International law is persistently employed to 
govern a fait accompli—evidenced by the prevailing normality of life in the settlements—whose 
continuation is partially facilitated by appeals to international law.   
As an occupation’s length increases, year-by-year, its challenges become further embedded and 
the associated framework further exposed. Most commonly, responses to these challenges are 
grounded within an interpretative approach that favors a factual or non-normative understanding 
of occupation.12 This prominent reading recognizes a temporary conception of occupation, but 
accepts that the framework’s application is not disrupted by duration. Although international 
humanitarian law (IHL) envisions occupation as a temporary state, both in accordance with its 
historical origins and as a requisite means of preserving sovereignty, the prominent interpretative 
approach accentuates the legal framework’s absence of a durational limitation. The resulting de-
emphasis of the framework’s innate temporality projects a conception of IHL that is constrained 
in its treatment of prolonged occupation. Temporariness, when juxtaposed with the framework’s 
lax durational requirements, becomes intangible. It becomes a concept devoid of meaning or 
precision.13  
Occupation is undesirable. Factually conceived and legally acknowledged, occupation is 
regulated because it is an inherent characteristic of war. Yet when an occupation becomes 
prolonged, it is less likely to serve a necessary military need. The means and character of the 
occupation alters. The interests of the occupying power depart from the purpose of the 
occupation framework. Commonly, however, the legal treatment of occupation does not respond 
to the altered form of foreign control. It continues to regulate a situation that threatens 
permanence through a legal framework that provides provisional respite. As prominently 
10 Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 199 (2005).  
11 See generally Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 
AM. J. INT’L L. 44, 47 (1990) [hereinafter Roberts, Prolonged Occupation]. 
12 See, e.g., U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 28–29 (2004) [hereinafter 
U.K. Military Manual]. See also Kristen E. Boon, The Future of the Law of Occupation, 46 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 107, 
116 (2008).  
13 The Hague Regulations did not consider the likelihood of a prolonged occupation and operated under the 
assumption that a peace treaty between the occupying power and the occupied government would be expedited. See 
BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 144–45.  
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interpreted, it fails to articulate a clear legal basis as to why occupation, despite its undesirability, 
must be terminated.  
Prolonged occupation should not be exclusively defined by an occupation’s duration. The 
principle of temporality is not only contingent upon the passage of time. It is also illustrative of 
the conditions that exist and the form that the occupation has assumed. An occupation will 
become prolonged when it shifts from a regulated phase that preserves sovereignty and ensures 
uninterrupted humanitarian consideration to a form of foreign control that threatens to become 
permanent. By adopting a non-normative interpretation of occupation and fixating on the 
challenges that stem from an occupation’s duration, the legal framework engages with the daily 
administration of the occupation but neglects the fundamental purposes of this legal regime.  
This article explores international law’s efficacy. Attempts to remedy the challenges emanating 
from the occupation framework’s inapposite relationship with prolonged occupation result from 
an interpretative choice. This is between the prominent, non-normative reading of the occupation 
framework, which responds to the challenges caused by a prolonged occupation’s duration, and a 
normative approach that wishes to engage with the causes of this altered form of foreign control. 
Corresponding efforts may be both benevolent and necessary. Yet, when grounded within the 
prominent interpretative approach, responses to prolonged occupation are limited. In accordance 
with this interpretative approach, the user seeks to better employ the law. The prominent 
interpretation purports to more effectively regulate the occupying power’s ability to respond to 
the challenges of prolonged occupation. Additionally, however, these efforts provide the 
occupying power with an opportunity to justify initiatives that entrench its control. Ostensibly, 
these are presented as compensating for the occupation framework’s incomplete conception of 
occupation.  
The following pages trace and engage with debates concerning the legal regulation of prolonged 
occupation. They query how the prominent, non-normative interpretation of the occupation 
framework influences or enables responses to the challenges posed by prolonged occupation. 
Though these challenges evoke a diverse array of responses, this article identifies a 
commonality. Collectively, responses premised upon a non-normative interpretation of the 
occupation framework are limited by an understanding of international law that only allows 
efforts promoting the better management of occupation. Whether the ‘manager’ is attempting to 
externally address the challenges presented by prolonged occupation or internally operate within 
the framework’s confines, this management approach is motivated by an unconstrained notion of 
occupation. It neglects the occupying power’s intentions. Ignoring the new form of control that 
the prolonged occupation establishes, the user seeks to better engage with various provisions of 
the legal framework to mitigate the results, but not the cause, of prolonged occupation.   
What is characterized here as the management approach is derived from a non-normative 
interpretation of the occupation framework. It refers to the diverse and preferred methods of 
regulating prolonged occupation. Commonly, the management approach is prioritized by state 
actors, courts, and international lawyers. It accompanies a shift from a formal occupation, 
premised in necessity and based on temporality, to a quasi-permanent administrative 
relationship. Various actors, each with distinct motivations, apply the management approach in 
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several forms. An occupying power or an international actor may appeal to this approach to 
justify a benevolent policy intended to serve the occupied population.14 The occupying power 
may also appeal to the management approach to legitimize measures that fortify its control of, or 
interests in, the occupied territory. This approach, however, derives from an interpretation of the 
legal framework that accentuates occupation’s factual character and lax temporal requirements. 
Upon an interpretation that accepts the framework’s application, and neglects a holistic 
conception of temporality, management becomes either the only or the preferred method of 
addressing prolonged occupation.  
This article begins from the assumption that in 1967, following war between Israel and 
neighboring Arab states, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and 
the Golan Heights came under Israeli control.15 These events triggered the application of the 
occupation framework. The following sections, however, do not directly address the occupation 
or legal status of the Gaza Strip. This omission is not a commentary on Gaza’s post-
disengagement status. Neither, is it an assertion that there is a legal or political distinction 
between Gaza and the West Bank.16 The focus of this article is on the legal framework governing 
instances of prolonged occupation. Gaza cannot be ignored within the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. But to understand the implications and inadequacies of the occupation 
framework for the purpose of governing prolonged occupation, this article limits its observations 
to the West Bank. It is here that the Israeli presence is greatest and most entrenched.17 Extensive 
settlement developments mark the West Bank and continue to expand.18 Again, this does not 
suggest that Gaza holds a separate territorial status, but instead recognizes that the issues 
regarding the current occupation of Gaza are less concerned with the particular challenges 
presented by prolonged occupation.     
The following considers how international law is employed in response to and in furtherance of 
prolonged occupation.  Part I provides a brief overview of the occupation framework. It reviews 
the well-established challenges that manifest during prolonged occupation. This begins with the 
pioneering work of Adam Roberts and describes how, due to the occupation framework’s 
14 JAMES PETTIFER & MIRANDA VICKERS, THE ALBANIAN QUESTION: RESHAPING THE BALKANS 236 (2007). 
15 See generally MICHAEL B. OREN, SIX DAYS OF WAR: JUNE 1967 AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST
(2003).  
16 Following Israel’s unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, there has been significant debate as to 
whether Gaza remains under formal Israeli occupation. In 2008, the Israeli Supreme Court held in Bassiouni that 
Gaza, following Israel’s disengagement, was no longer occupied (though it held that Israel still owed limited 
humanitarian duties to the Gazan population). See HCJ 9132/07 Gaber Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister (2008) (Isr.). 
For a variety of views on Gaza’s status, see Geoffrey Aronson, Issues Arising from the Implementation of Israel’s 
Disengagement from the Gaza Strip, 34 J. PALESTINE STUD. 49 (2004-2005); Elizabeth Samson, Is Gaza Occupied? 
Redefining the Status of Gaza Under International Law, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 915 (2010); Marko Milanovic, Is 
Gaza Still Occupied by Israel?, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 1 2009), http://www.ejiltalk.org/is-gaza-still-occupied-by-israel/; 
Yuval Shany, Faraway, So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza After Israel’s Disengagement, 8 Y.B. INT’L HUM. L. 
369 (2006).  
17 See generally GERSHOM GORENBERG, THE ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE: ISRAEL AND THE BIRTH OF THE SETTLEMENTS
1967–1977 (2006). [hereinafter GORENBERG, ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE]. 
18 See generally YEHEZKEL LEIN & EYAL WEIZMAN, LAND GRAB: ISRAEL’S SETTLEMENT POLICY IN THE WEST
BANK (Yael Stein ed., 2002). 
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conservationist structure, prolonged occupation is understood to require particular forms of 
administration.  
Part II traces the implications of these responses. It queries how the prominent, non-normative 
interpretation influences the regulation of prolonged occupation. This section demonstrates that 
widespread appeals to the occupation framework, as traditionally conceived, facilitate continued 
recourse to the management approach. Set within the West Bank, this section assesses state 
engagements, juridical interventions, and scholarly debates. Though the desire to better manage a 
prolonged occupation may be compelling, this section demonstrates how perpetual management 
threatens to entrench occupation and forsake the requirement of temporality.  
Part III considers alternative interpretations of the occupation framework. These reject the 
prominent, non-normative readings that permeate much of the discourse. They increasingly 
feature within debates regarding the effective legal treatment of prolonged occupation and raise 
important questions regarding the legal status of this form of occupation.  
Finally, Part IV offers a third interpretative approach. Drawing upon identified sources of 
international law, this article proposes a novel, normative interpretation of the occupation 
framework. This accentuates the requirement of temporality. Conceived holistically, this 
interpretation considers not only the length of an occupation, but also the form that an occupation 
has assumed. Engagements with the framework, responses to the challenges presented by 
prolonged occupation, may pivot from a limiting interpretative approach that professes neutrality 
and emphasizes durational neglect. This will nurture attempts to end, not simply manage or 
better endure, prolonged occupation. The proposed interpretative approach will require an 
occupying power to satisfy a good faith obligation to refrain from actions that facilitate or 
perpetuate occupation. Once an occupation can no longer be justified as a temporary necessity 
that preserves sovereignty and provides humanitarian consideration, it abandons its legal purpose 
and must terminate. The proposed interpretative approach is more consistent with the spirit of 
IHL. It better matches the ethos of the occupation framework. And it will better align the purpose 
of the occupation framework with diplomatic and state-building initiatives that are grounded in 
the principle of self-determination.  
Identifying the motive of management as a causal factor, this article argues that common 
responses to prolonged occupation may be necessary, but when taken within the occupation 
framework’s traditional, non-normative confines, they risk perpetuating occupation. They 
entrench a legal framework that is understood to neglect duration and curtail the requirement of 
temporality. This interpretation of the occupation framework becomes susceptible to 
manipulation. The proposed approach, offered here, shifts the interpretative focus of the 
occupation framework. It emphasizes a temporary conception of occupation and facilitates 
efforts to end the occupation. This is not a complete theory or reimagining of the law of 
occupation. Instead, this article offers an alternative point of departure and seeks to shift the 




I. THE OCCUPATION FRAMEWORK AND THE CHALLENGES OF PROLONGED OCCUPATION  
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations denotes when territory becomes occupied.19 It supports the 
widely-assumed position that since the 1967 War, the West Bank and other territory captured by 
Israel, was or remains under occupation. The article states that “[t]erritory is considered occupied 
when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to 
the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”20 Accordingly, as 
prominently interpreted, international law conceives of occupation as a neutral phenomenon. 
With scant consideration for the jus ad bellum, the legal framework accepts the existence of an 
occupation.21 The occupying power may be waging a war of aggression or it may be the victim 
of aggression. Although the jus ad bellum distinguishes between these origins and attaches the 
label of illegality to the former, the legal framework is commonly interpreted to accept the 
existence of occupation. Regardless of cause or duration, occupation is viewed as a neutral, non-
normative, fact.22   
War’s inevitability prompts occupation’s regulation. The occupation framework is founded upon 
the principle of the inalienability of sovereignty.23 Its early development and codification was 
influenced by a nineteenth century European desire to preserve sovereign prerogative.24 
International law became a placeholder. Upon the factual existence of an occupation, the 
occupation framework preserves the status quo ante bellum.25 Regardless of cause, it operates to 
manage the spatial problem that results from the suspension of sovereignty and the imposition of 
foreign control.26 Article 43 of the Hague Regulations compels the occupying power to, “restore 
and ensure, as far as possible, public order and civil life, while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country.”27  
The Hague Regulations, however, conveyed minimal regard for the interests of the occupied 
population. They sought to preserve state prerogatives, protect property rights, and deny 
sovereignty by conquest.28 Despite its selective Eurocentric origins, the occupation framework’s 
subsequent development corresponded with international law’s growing humanitarian 
19 Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5 art. 42.  
20 Id. art. 42.   
21 See Rotem Giladi, The Jus Ad Bellum/Jus in Bello Distinction and the Law of Occupation, 41 ISR. L. REV. 246, 
269–72 (2008). See also In re List and Others (Hostages Trial), 15 Ann. Dig. 632, 637 (U.S. Military Trib. at 
Nuremberg 1948) [hereinafter Hostages Trial]; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, 306, ¶ 58 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans). 
22 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 2–3 (2009) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, 
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION]. See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 15–16; YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF 
OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND ITS INTERACTION WITH 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 5 (2009) [hereinafter ARAI-TAKAHASHI, LAW OF OCCUPATION].  
23 BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 6.   
24 Bhuta, supra note 9, at 729–30.  
25 Fox, supra note 10, at 230. See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 1–2.  
26 Id. at 1. 
27 Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 43.   
28 BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 29. See also Jean L. Cohen, The Role of International Law in Post-Conflict 
Constitution-Making: Toward a Jus Post Bellum for “Interim Occupations”, 51 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV. 498, 506–507 
(2006–2007).  
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overtures.29 Alongside the Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention would form the 
core of IHL. Historically, upon the imposition of foreign control, territory was either subsumed 
or neglected.30 Resigned to war, the occupation framework acknowledges that foreign control 
often accompanies or succeeds hostilities.31 The occupation framework intends to protect 
sovereign interests from annexation and safeguard the local population from disregard.32 The 
Fourth Geneva Convention expanded upon the Hague formulation.33 Article 64 prescribes, that 
while subject to notable exceptions, “[t]he penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in 
force. . . .”34 This is understood to expand upon Article 43’s preservationist character. It shifts 
emphasis from political to humanitarian interests and provides the occupying power with a 
further, yet still limited, duty to proactively regulate the territory.35  
The occupation framework was now informed by humanitarian intentions. Yet, as codified by 
Articles 43 and 64, the legal framework’s primary purpose continued to ensure that an occupying 
power may not acquire sovereignty. With limited exceptions, the legal and political foundations 
of the occupied territory would be preserved.36 Collectively, these provisions establish the 
conservationist principle.37 The legal framework, however, maintained a nineteenth century 
conception of occupation. Within, “occupations were of relatively short duration, during which 
occupants, by and large, retained existing legislation as much as possible.”38  
Although occupation is clearly understood to be a temporary regime, international law is largely 
silent on questions of duration. The prominent interpretative approach seizes upon this. A 
meeting of legal experts, convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
agreed that IHL did not impose formal limits on the length of an occupation. Based upon a non-
normative reading—focused exclusively on duration and neglecting the altered form of control 
that accompanies prolonged occupation—the expert panel accentuated the framework’s failure to 
denote a temporal limitation. The group stated that, “nothing under IHL would prevent 
occupying powers from embarking on a long-term occupation and that occupation law would 
continue to provide the legal framework applicable in such circumstances.”39 
The framework’s efforts to regulate the tripartite relationship between local inhabitants, the 
displaced sovereign government, and the occupying power developed alongside the presumption 
29 Fox, supra note 10 at 229. See generally Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 239 (2000); Cohen, supra note 28, at 502–13.  
30 See generally SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT TO CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1988). 
31 Adam Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 249, 251 (1984) [hereinafter Roberts, 
Military Occupation]. 
32 Fox, supra note 10, at 229–30.  
33 Id. at 235.  
34 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time Of War art. 64, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
35 BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 72–74. 
36 Fox, supra note 10, at 236. 
37 Id. at 235–36.  
38 BENVENISTI, supra 8, at 70.  
39 Rep. of the Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Expert Meeting: Occupation and Other Forms of 
Administration of Foreign Territories, at 74 (2012). [hereinafter ICRC Expert Meeting].    
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that the triggering conflict would be of limited duration.40 Promptly, upon the establishment of 
peace, normality would revert.41 In accordance, an occupation was understood to end in one of 
two ways: (1) either the fortunes of war are altered and the occupying power loses military 
control of the territory it formally held, or (2) the occupation is brought to an end through a 
negotiated agreement.42 Often, however, both historical and contemporary occupations failed to 
match the paradigmatic vision that informed the legal framework.43  
As a result, protection gaps and structural discrepancies emerged. In as early as 1949, the 
inconsistencies between observed manifestations of occupation and the newly formulated 
occupation framework’s ability to effectively govern prolonged occupation were considered.  
The crux of the critique provided by Doris Appel Graber was direct. Graber plainly asserted that 
the existing legal treatment appeared fragmented. The legal framework had developed within and 
was influenced by a non-analogous historical period of relative peace. This was not suited to 
govern the complexity of contemporary occupations.44   
The conservationist principle prohibits an occupying power from imposing enduring or 
fundamental changes. Yet as any society evolves, effective regulation requires political, 
economic, social, and legal development. Often, these needs appeared in tension with the 
occupation framework’s preservationist character. Adam Roberts’s defining work on prolonged 
occupation advances this notion. Roberts demonstrated that an inherent inconsistency existed 
between the legal framework’s treatment of occupation as constituting a provisional state and 
contemporary manifestations of occupation.45 In response to this apparent incompatibility, 
Roberts asked, “To what extent are international legal rules formally applicable, and practically 
relevant, to a prolonged military occupation?”46 Writing over a quarter-century ago, Roberts 
argued that this question had assumed prominence due to the exceptional duration of Israel’s 
presence within the territory that came under its control in 1967.47  
40 Michael Bothe, The Administration of Occupied Territory, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 
1455, 1456 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015).  
41 BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 28. See Raymond T. Yingling & Robert W. Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 
1949, 46 AM. J. INT’L L. 393 (1952) (For a general history of the drafting and development of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.).   
42 Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11. See also DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 
271–72.   
43 See Roberts, Military Occupation, supra note 31, at 261–94 (Adam Roberts provided a list of seventeen forms of 
military occupation, the vast majority of which do not directly conform to the traditional legal framework’s 
conception of occupation).  
44 See D.A. GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 1863–1914: A HISTORICAL 
SURVEY 37 (1949). See also Iain Scobbie, International Law and the Prolonged Occupation of Palestine, U.N. 
ROUNDTABLE ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE 3 (2015), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277290147_International_law_and_the_prolonged_occupation_of_Palesti
ne. 
45 See Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 47 (Roberts cites the Allied occupations of Japan and 
Germany, the South African occupation of Namibia, the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, the Moroccan 
presence in Western Sahara, and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea as modern examples).   
46 Id. at 44.   
47 Id. See also ZERTAL & ELDAR, supra note 4; GORENBERG, ACCIDENTIAL EMPIRE, supra note 17 (For general 
historical accounts of Israel’s presence within the Palestinian territories.). 
25
The point at which an occupation becomes prolonged will, as Adam Roberts observed, remain a 
contentious issue.48 Commentators have proposed durational limits. An occupation is declared 
prolonged when it exceeds a predetermined timescale.49 This determination, however, is not 
suited to a fixed chronological limit. It must be cognizant of the form of control that an 
occupation has assumed. An occupation becomes prolonged when it no longer adheres to the 
principle of temporality. Temporality is understood holistically. It is informed by an occupation’s 
duration but also its condition.  
This article suggests that an occupation becomes prolonged when it constitutes a form of control 
that threatens to become permanent. A prolonged occupation is a quasi-permanent administrative 
relationship that constitutes something other than a temporarily imposed humanitarian 
arrangement. This is more of a competence and observational-based trigger than one focused on 
the precise temporal scope of an occupation. This proposed understanding recognizes that the 
hallmark of a prolonged occupation is apparent when the factual accounting of the occupation 
threatens the regulatory ability of international law. This risks an occupation becoming indefinite 
and eventually irreversible.  
Many of the challenges presented by prolonged occupation are widely understood. Roberts 
explained that the law of occupation is often interpreted to provide the occupying power with a 
large measure of authority. Although this may be justifiable in times of direct hostilities, Roberts 
believed this arrangement was not sustainable. It accentuated the likelihood, as the occupation’s 
duration increased, that the legal framework’s conservationist orientation would hinder the socio-
economic development of the occupied territory.50 Roberts argued that if the existing framework 
was not adapted to recognize the characteristics and challenges posed by prolonged occupation, 
the framework itself could leave a society politically and economically underdeveloped.51 
According to Roberts, responses to these challenges cannot be indefinitely neglected due to the 
conservationist nature of the occupation framework. Roberts, however, notes that providing an 
occupying power with additional latitude carries risk. The danger, said Roberts, “in making such 
a suggestion is that it may seem to imply the further suggestion that those parts of the law of war 
that deal with military occupations may not be fully applicable, and that departures from the law 
may be permissible.”52  
Resulting engagements with prolonged occupation are commonly structured by the prominent, 
interpretive approach. These legal engagements attempt to better utilize the legal framework. 
Efforts by states, courts, and scholars to address the challenges created by prolonged occupation 
are grounded within a factual notion of occupation. They avoid normative assessments. Instead, 
48 Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 47.  
49 Id. at 47 (Adam Robert, for example, defined prolonged occupation as lasting for more than five years and extend 
into a period when hostilities are sharply reduced). See also Richard Falk, Some Legal Reflections on Prolonged 
Israeli Occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, 2 J. REFUGEE STUD. 40, 45–47 (1989) (Alternatively, Richard Falk 
has suggested imposing specific obligations on an occupying power whose occupation has researched ten years in 
duration.). 
50 Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 96.   
51 Id. at 52.  
52 Id. at 51.     
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they accept that regardless of the occupation’s duration, a traditionally-interpreted occupation 
framework continues to govern prolonged occupation. To address the myriad challenges posed 
by this form of occupation, competing interests must be effectively managed.  
The critiques and premise offered by Roberts continue to provide a point of departure for 
subsequent responses. Although Roberts acknowledged the challenges posed by prolonged 
occupation—identifying the tension of addressing these challenges through a legal regime built 
upon the conservationist principle—subsequent responses have maintained fidelity to the 
prominent interpretation of the occupation framework. The ensuing debate fixates on the extent 
to which, and the means by which, an occupying power should or should not be accorded 
additional latitude to manage the intrinsic challenges presented by prolonged occupation.53  
Christine Chinkin explains that the “inherent dilemma” within this debate is that the prolonged 
nature of the occupation may be invoked both in favor of and in opposition to increasing the 
allowances that an occupying power receives.54 Certainly, there are instances where broadening 
the occupying power’s discretion will appear prudent. If the necessity of prolonged occupation 
inevitably breeds inherent challenges, if over time the failure to respond to demographic shifts 
and economic stagnation threatens the interests of the occupied population, the provision of 
expansive latitude will exhibit moral pull. Equally, however, one can envision numerous 
scenarios in which such latitude would convey a disproportionate focus on the rights of the 
occupying power. 
Chinkin neatly captures the confines of the discourse that surrounds prolonged occupation. The 
identified dilemma, however, is premised on the prominent interpretative approach. This 
common legal framing responds exclusively to managerial challenges that result from the 
occupation’s duration. Fixation on these governance challenges purport to ensure the occupied 
population’s long-term needs. These will demand attention. Yet, an exclusive managerial 
approach neglects the causes and consequences of the altered form of control embodied by 
prolonged occupation. Upon this interpretative approach, the challenges presented by prolonged 
occupation may only be managed. Management is facilitated and improved by either increasing 
or limiting the occupying power’s control of the seized territory. Upon this prominent 
interpretative approach, the elicited replies regularly elect management as the necessary, or only, 
response.  
This singular view of prolonged occupation allows duration to become either a guise or a 
justification for quasi-permanent control. Israel’s occupation of the West Bank provides 
numerous examples of an occupying power both appealing to and employing this approach to 
justify a novel form of regulation. Adhering to a non-normative reading of the occupation 
framework that links prolonged occupation to duration – not conditions – confines the forms of 
legal engagement that an actor may take when responding to the challenges posed by prolonged 
occupation. It allows an occupying power to justify initiatives that purport to remedy these 
53 Vaios Koutroulis, The Application of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in 
Situation of Prolonged Occupation: Only a Matter of Time?, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 165, 176 (2012).   
54 See Christine Chinkin, Laws of Occupation, in MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH WESTERN
SAHARA AS A CASE STUDY 167, 178 (Neville Botha, Michèle Olivier & Delarey van Tonder eds. 2010). 
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challenges. Such an approach—the reliance upon continual management to alleviate the effects 
of prolonged occupation—risks further entrenching or perpetuating occupation within the West 
Bank and beyond.  
II. THE PROMINENT INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH: THE FACILITATION AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE PERPETUAL MANAGEMENT OF PROLONGED OCCUPATION
Immediately following the 1967 War, legal considerations were overshadowed by the dawn of a 
new regional reality. Soon, however, international law became a prominent feature of Israel’s 
newfound control of the territory it assumed upon victory.55 This began gradually and proceeded 
haphazardly. Days after the cessation of hostilities, Israel pledged to apply the occupation 
framework. It emphasized its commitment to the well-being of the local Palestinian populace.56 
Israel, however, shifted from its initial pronouncement and began questioning the West Bank’s 
legal status. Weeks after the war had ended, Yaakov-Shimshon Shapira, then Minister of Justice, 
addressed the Knesset. Shapira argued that Israel should not assume the status of an occupying 
power within the recently “liberated territory.”57 Israel then passed an ordinance permitting its 
government to extend Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration “to any area of Eretz Israel 
(Palestine)” that it deemed necessary.58 
The ordinance was swiftly invoked.59 It extended Israeli jurisdiction into East Jerusalem but was 
not applied within the West Bank.60 Official references to the Fourth Geneva Convention were 
removed.61 The following year, Israel formally abandoned the term West Bank, reverting to the 
region’s historical Hebrew names, Judea and Samaria. Despite these changes, Israel refrained 
from formally extending jurisdiction to or claiming sovereignty of the West Bank. It did, 
however, continue to question the territory’s legal status.62 As Israel moved away from its initial 
commitment to the occupation framework, the notion of settling the West Bank entered the 
public discourse.63 
55 See AVI SHLAIM, THE IRON WALL: ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD 250–264 (2001) (For an account of the events 
that immediately followed the 1967 War). 
56 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Report Under General Assembly Resolution 2254 (ES-V) Relating to 
Jerusalem, U.N. Doc. S/8146, annex II (Sept. 12, 1967) (For an account of the various claims and efforts made by 
Israeli officials). See Transcript No. 126 of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, 5727–1967, Sixth Knesset, 
Second Session (Akevot trans., 1967) (Isr.), available at http://akevot.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/MAG-
Briefing-Eng.pdf. (For an account of recently released archival material that demonstrates Israel’s intention to 
adhere to the occupation framework in the weeks following the war.).  
57 ALLAN GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (1978). 
58 Id. See also Law and Administrative Ordinance (Amendment No. 11), 5727–1967, 21 LSI 75 (1966–67) (Isr.).  
59 Ian S. Lustick, Has Israel Annexed East Jerusalem?, 5 MIDDLE EAST POL. 35, 36-37 (1997).  
60 Gerson, supra note 57, at 111.  
61 Id.  
62 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director Memo 765, Israel State Archives File A-7371/4 (Akevot trans., Mar. 20, 
1968) (Isr.), available at http://akevot.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Comay-Meron Cable-Eng.pdf. (Recently 
released diplomatic cables, from within Israel’s Foreign Ministry, dispute the sincerity of these queries. The 
exchanges indicate that officials within the Ministry understood that the occupation framework was legally 
applicable and that certain actions – taken and intended – within the territories would violate the framework.). 
63 ZERTAL & ELDAR, supra note 4, at 333–34. See also SHAFIR, supra note 2, at 96.  
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Despite Israel’s evolving position, the international community remained steadfast. The Security 
Council called upon the involved governments to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions.64 
Israel was condemned during successive emergency sessions of the General Assembly. These 
denunciations ranged in tenor and called upon Israel to remove its military from the territories it 
now held.65 In response to the growing international consensus, Israel refuted the premise that its 
presence within the West Bank constituted an occupation. Israeli officials adopted an amended 
version of the “missing reversioner thesis” developed by Yehuda Blum.66 This drew upon the 
notion of terra nullius. Though it avoided such framing by name, Blum’s thesis emphasized the 
perceived sovereign void that existed within the West Bank.67 An altered, and partially 
moderated, version of the approach initially articulated by Blum gained further credence when 
presented as official policy by Meir Shamgar, then the Attorney General and later the President 
of the Israeli Supreme Court. Writing within his official capacity in the inaugural volume of the 
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights following a symposium at Tel Aviv University, Shamgar 
concluded that:  
the Israeli Government tried therefore to distinguish between theoretical juridical and 
political problems on the one hand, and the observance of the humanitarian 
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the other hand. Accordingly, the 
Government of Israel distinguished between the legal problem of the applicability to 
the territories, and decided to act de facto, in accordance with the humanitarian 
provisions of the Convention.68 
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank moved swiftly from acknowledgement to indeterminacy. 
Shlomo Gazit, who upon conclusion of the war was appointed as Coordinator of Activities in the 
Territories, was tasked with overseeing Israel’s administration of the West Bank.69 Gazit 
explained that the occupation’s architects ensured that “the establishment of military government 
64 S.C. Res. 237, ¶ 2 (June 14, 1967). 
65 See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 1526th plen. mtg. at ¶ 82, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1526 (June 19, 1967) (The strongest 
accusations levied against Israel came from the Arab and Soviet delegations). See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 
1554th plen. mtg. at ¶ 91, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1554 (July 14, 1967) (For a more tempered approach.).    
66 See DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 33–34 (2002) [hereinafter KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE] (A variety of state representatives 
presented direct and amended versions of the missing reversioner thesis before various UN bodies as debates within 
the legal sphere increasingly raised questions concerning the status of Israel’s assumed governance of the West 
Bank.). 
67 See Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samara, 3 ISR. L. REV. 
279, 283–84 (1968) (Yehuda Blum, a legal scholar and expert in international law at the Hebrew University who 
would later become Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations, published an influential article that provided the 
foundation for Israel’s legal approach to the question of the West Bank’s status. Blum’s thesis, known as the missing 
reversioner theory, was premised on the assertion that Jordan’s presence throughout the West Bank prior to 1967 
was the result of illegal aggression. Following the termination of the British Mandate in 1948, the relevant territory 
lacked a legitimate sovereign. While the question of Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank had been 
emphatically denounced by the international community, Blum contended, “the legal standing of Israel in the 
territories in question is thus that of a state which is lawfully in control of territory in respect of which no other state 
can show a better title.”). 
68 Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262, 
266 (1971) [hereinafter Shamgar, Observance of International Law].   
69 SHLOMO GAZIT, THE CARROT AND THE STICK: ISRAEL’S POLICY IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA, 1967–68 7 (1995). 
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in occupied territory be seen as a temporary phenomenon.”70 Privately, however, Israeli officials 
acknowledged that their presence within the territories would likely endure. Moshe Dayan, 
Israel’s Defense Minister, instructed Gazit to prepare for an “extended stay.”71 
A factual conception of occupation facilitated Israel’s prolonged presence. Meir Shamgar, then a 
Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, offered a traditional reading of the occupation framework. 
This forwarded a singular notion of temporality. It accentuated the absence of a durational 
limitation and remained silent on the form of control that an unconstrained occupation would 
assume. Shamgar wrote that “according to International Law the exercise of the right of military 
administration over the territory and its inhabitants had no time-limit, because it reflected a 
factual situation and pending an alternative political or military solution this system of 
government could, from the legal point of view, continue indefinitely.”72 This common 
interpretative approach became the foundation of Israel’s subsequent legal engagements with the 
occupation framework.73  
Writing in 1990, Adam Roberts correctly predicted Israel’s continued occupation of the 
Palestinian territories.74 The entrenchment of Israel’s presence throughout the West Bank 
accentuated questions concerning the occupation framework’s appropriateness. As Israel 
continued to govern the West Bank and establish its presence through the construction of 
settlements and their associated infrastructure, it would increasingly appeal to the occupation 
framework and management approach. As with the scholarly and juridical deliberations that 
acknowledged the occupation framework’s inadequacies, Israel purported that many of its legal 
engagements were in response to the challenges presented by this particular form of occupation. 
Imposed policies were justified in response to the occupation’s duration. Grounded within a non-
normative conception of occupation, these responses managed the results, and neglected the 
causes, of prolonged occupation. Collectively, they contributed to the quasi-permanent form of 
control that the occupation would assume.  
A. The Challenge of Economic Development  
On May 30, 1967, King Hussein of Jordan and Egyptian President Abdel Nasser signed a joint 
defense agreement.75 Regional tensions escalated. Nasser declared that “our basic objective will 
be the destruction of Israel.”76 A little more than a week later, Israel would gain control of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Combat forces gave way to military government units who 
expeditiously established an administrative structure.77 Duties were divided between the Israel 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at x.  
72 Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government — The Initial Stage, in 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967–1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 14, 43 
(Meir Shamgar ed., 1982) [hereinafter Shamgar, Legal Concepts].  
73 GROSS, WRITING ON THE WALL, supra note 7, at 3.  
74 Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 103.  
75 Laura M. James, Egypt: Dangerous Illusions, in THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR: ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 56–
70 (William Roger Lewis & Avi Shlaim eds., 2012).  
76 MARTHA GELLHORN, THE FACE OF WAR 283 (1988). 
77 Nimrod Raphaeli, Military Government in the Occupied Territories: An Israeli View, 23 MIDDLE E. J. 177, 178–
79 (1969).  
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Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel’s Government. Security and near-term economic needs came 
under the purview of military command. Political considerations and long-term economic 
matters would be addressed by ministerial committees.78 The Military Government declared that 
its primary objective was to oversee the resumption of normality. Corresponding efforts were 
largely guided by economic objectives.79  
Under the direction of Moshe Dayan, Israel implemented policies intended to foster economic 
integration with the assumed territories. The resulting governance structure claimed to provide 
for the “legitimate needs of local inhabitants and the security requirements of Israel itself.”80 
Ostensibly, this was consistent with the obligations imposed by the occupation framework. 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires an occupying power to restore and ensure public 
order and civil life throughout the occupied territory.81 The precise meaning of the provision and 
the extent of the obligations that it imposes are, however, unclear.82 Yet despite interpretative 
discord, it is widely assumed that Article 43 compels the occupying power to, inter alia, “restore 
order and normal economic life in the occupied territory.”83 
Israel’s earliest interventions appear consistent with the provision. The Military Government 
worked to liberalize trade, manage produce surpluses, protect the agricultural sector, and provide 
development loans.84 The passage of time would, however, witness the evolving needs of the 
occupied population. It would bring shifting priorities amongst the occupying power. The 
conventional application of the occupation framework appeared insufficient to pacify the 
involved interests. The uncertainty conveyed by the occupation framework, observations of its 
selective application, and its conservationist orientation prompted Adam Roberts to ask whether 
the framework unnecessarily confined economic development.85 During prolonged occupation, 
the desire for economic stewardship—in response to market changes, anticipated societal needs, 
technological advancements, and demographic shifts—creates tension with the occupation 
framework’s conservationist stance.86 To resolve this discordancy, to begin responding to the 
78 Gerson, supra note 57, at 110–111.  
79 Raphaeli, supra note 77, at 179.  
80 Id. at 180.  
81 See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 43 (The Article states, “The authority of the legitimate power 
having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and 
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in 
the country.”). 
82 See Marco Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers, 16 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 661, 663 (2005) [hereinafter Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance]. 
83 Id. at 663. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1483 (May 22, 2003) (Following the US-led invasion of Iraq, the Security Council 
required the occupying power to, “promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the 
territory.”) See also Bothe, supra note 40, at 1467.  
84 Raphaeli, supra note 77, at 179–80. See also NEVE GORDON, ISRAEL’S OCCUPATION 64-65 (2008).  
85 Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 52.  
86 See Trial of Alfreid Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen Und Halbach and Eleven Others (The Krupp Trial) (U.S. 
Military Trib. at Nuremberg 1948), in U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, 10 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 135 
(1949) (The Military Tribunal at Nuremberg expressing the conservationist principle. In the Krupp Trial, the 
Tribunal held, inter alia, that “the economic substance of the belligerently occupied territory must not be taken over 
by the occupant or put to the service of his war effort”). 
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challenge of economic development within prolonged occupation, Israel referenced the 
occupation’s duration to justify “more effective” means of management.87  
Since 1967, the West Bank has been governed as an economic union with Israel.88 The guiding 
policy of economic integration was presented as a benevolent necessity. Israel proclaimed that 
“[t]he Six Day War abolished to all intent and purposes the ‘Green Line’ that in the past 
demarcated the Israeli sector from the administered territories. Naturally and unavoidably, these 
areas are becoming dependent upon Israel for all their economic and service needs.”89 A 
fundamental economic transformation followed. Various sectors, including agriculture, trade, 
taxation, and natural resources, came under Israeli control. Initially, the imposed single market 
generated economic gains within the occupied territories.90 Though the successful development 
of the West Bank was understood as a mutual benefit, integration aligned with Israel’s 
(exclusive) economic interests.91 
Many of Israel’s economic interventions were challenged. Their legality was repeatedly 
questioned.92 In reply, Israel referenced the need to respond to the particular quandaries evoked 
by the occupation’s duration. Corresponding appeals to the management approach were 
grounded in a non-normative reading of the occupation framework. In 1972, a labor dispute 
occurred between hospital employees and a charitable association in Bethlehem. In response, the 
Military Government initiated settlement proceedings, amended preexisting legislation, and 
imposed mandatory arbitration. The petitioner claimed these actions were beyond the 
competence of an occupying power. It claimed that the imposed measures contravened the 
occupation framework’s conservationist ethos.93 
In the Christian Society case, Israel’s High Court of Justice considered the aforementioned 
claims. In response, it offered a broad interpretation of Article 43.94 Following five years of 
occupation, the Court drew upon Israel’s elongated presence within the territories. It identified 
and responded to the resulting challenges. The occupying power was deemed responsible for 
ensuring the, “whole social, commercial and economic life of the community.”95 The Court 
concluded that Israel must acknowledge changing conditions. It must attend to the resulting 
87 See generally KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66.  
88 See Raja Khalidi & Sahar Taghdisi-Rad, The Economic Dimensions of Prolonged Occupation: Continuity and 
Change in Israeli Policy Towards the Palestinian Economy, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/2009/2 (Aug. 2009). 
89 See Ministry of Defence, Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories, The 
Administered Territories 1967/1971 — Data on Civilian Activities in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip and 
Northern Sinai (Isr.), cited in BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 224. 
90 Id. at 241–42. See also Hisham Awartani, Israel’s Economic Policies in the Occupied Territories: A Case for 
International Supervision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO
DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP 399, 401–02 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992). 
91 Id. See also GORDON, supra note 84 at 70.  
92 See generally Osama A. Hamed & Radwan A. Shaban, One-Sided Customs and Monetary Union: The Case of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip under Israeli Occupation, in THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE 117 (Stanley 
Fischer, Dani Rodrik & Elias Tuma eds., 1993).  
93 KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 58–59.  
94 See HCJ 337/71 Christian Society for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defense 26(1) PD 574 (1971) (Isr.) (An 
English summary of the decision is available at, Court Decisions, Christian Society for the Holy Places v. Minister 
of Defense, 2 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 354 (1972)) [hereinafter Christian Society]. 
95 Id. 
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challenges. The Court obliged Israel to adopt measures needed to ensure “civil life.”96 This broad 
reading of Article 43 was justified by reference to the prolonged nature of the occupation. As an 
occupation’s duration increases, the Court held, “[l]ife does not stand still, and no administration, 
whether an occupation administration or another, can fulfil its duties with respect to the 
population if it refrains from legislating and from adapting the legal situation to the exigencies of 
modern times.”97 
Soon after, a Palestinian utilities provider challenged a Military Government decision appointing 
an Israeli company to provide electricity to the Hebron area.98 Prior to the order, a municipal 
generator supplied the city. Demand, however, increased following the development of Kiryat 
Arba, the early Israeli settlement located in the hills outside of Hebron. The former Palestinian 
provider argued that the military order was incompatible with a conservationist reading of 
Article 43.99 The petition was dismissed. The High Court of Justice reaffirmed its expansive 
understanding of the occupation framework. It held that the military order was intended to ensure 
basic needs. The Court invoked the local population’s economic welfare and ruled that the 
military commander did not violate the conservationist approach by ensuring the provision of 
electricity.100 
Israel continued to cultivate an expansive interpretation of Article 43. This was based on a dual 
affirmation. The occupation framework would remain applicable regardless of the occupation’s 
duration, but due to the occupation’s duration, particular management was required. The Court 
affirmed that economic initiatives that altered the status quo ante were permissible when 
benevolent.101 These early decisions legitimized foundational aspects of the occupation that 
purported to better manage the economic and social needs of the local population.102  
The economic union that guided many of Israel’s early policies vis-à-vis the West Bank was 
justified in accordance with Article 43.103 Such economic management was deemed necessary to 
96 Id. See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 58.  
97 Christian Society, supra note 94, at 582. See also, BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 246. 
98 BENVENISTI, supra note 8 at 221–22. See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 64–65. 
99 See HCJ 256/72 Electric Company for the District of Jerusalem v. Minister of Defence 27(1) PD 124 (1972) (Isr.) 
[hereinafter Electric Company]. See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 65 (The Palestinian 
Electric Company for the Jerusalem District had been authorized by the Jordanian authorities to supply utilities 
throughout much of the West Bank prior to 1967). 
100 Id. See also Electric Company, supra note 99.  
101 See generally KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66 at 57–74.  
102 See HCJ 351/80 Electricity Company for the District of Jerusalem v. Minister of Energy 35(2) PD 673 (1980) 
(Isr.) (For the High Court of Justice’s expansive view on what constituted the local population’s welfare.). See also 
KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 65–68. 
103 See generally HCJ 69/81 Abu Aita et al. v. Commander of Judea and Samaria et al. 37(2) PD 197, 105 (1983) 
(Isr.), translated in HCJ 69/81 Abu Aita et al. v. Regional Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area et al. 
Judgement, HAMOKED, http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=290 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) [hereinafter 
Abu Aita] (In Abu Aita, the High Court of Justice upheld the imposition of a value-added tax (VAT) within the West 
Bank. Israel asserted that the imposed VAT was necessary to, “protect the local residents from a situation in which 
VAT was imposed only in Israel.” In such a case, they reasoned, “Israel would have had to resurrect the economic 
borders and impose restrictions on the free flow of goods and services.” This, Israel argued, would be detrimental to 
the local population and inconsistent with the requirements of Article 43.). See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 
241. 
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“ensure a return to orderly life and prevent the effective observance of the duty regarding the 
assurance of la vie publique.”104 These decisions entrenched an expansive understanding of 
Article 43.105 They provided the occupying power with broad discretion to impose economic 
policies. Ostensibly, these policies were intended to better manage prolonged occupation. They 
were premised upon an interpretation of the occupation framework that accepts occupation as 
fact and the framework’s uninterrupted relevancy.  
In Yesh Din v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria et al., the High Court directly 
referenced the prolonged nature of the occupation. The case addressed Israel’s operation of 
several quarries within the West Bank.106 The Court considered and applied Article 55 of the 
Hague Regulations and, correspondingly, the rules of usufruct.107 It promoted a “broad and 
dynamic” reading of the obligations bestowed upon an occupying power within a prolonged 
occupation.108 Article 55 implies that an occupying power may derive benefit from the territory’s 
natural resources. It is widely understood, however, that an occupying power is prohibited from 
imposing changes to production levels and that any changes must not be to the detriment of the 
local population.109 
Although the Court held that Israel’s operation of the quarries was consistent with the rules of 
usufruct, it nevertheless pivoted to Article 43.110 It noted that Israel’s operation of the quarries 
served the welfare of the local population.111 The Court’s decision was premised on the 
prominent interpretation of the framework. It endorsed the framework while coupling its 
application with the view that management initiatives were required to benefit the local 
104 See Abu Aita, supra note 103, at 104 (In which the Court referenced the original French text of Article 43.). See 
also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 224. 
105 See HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria, ILDC 1820 (Isr.), translated in 
HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank et al., Judgement, HAMOKED, 
http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=Documents2185 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Yesh Din]. 
See also David Kretzmer, The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel, 94 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 207, 218 (2012) [hereinafter Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation].  
106 See generally Valentina Azarova, Exploiting a Dynamic Interpretation: The High Court of Justice and Israel’s 
Quarries in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, EJIL TALK! (Feb. 12 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/exploiting-a-
dynamic-interpretation-the-israeli-high-court-of-justice-accepts-the-legality-of-israels-quarrying-activities-in-the-
occupied-palestinian-territory [hereinafter Azarova, Dynamic Interpretation] (On Israel’s operation of quarries 
throughout the West Bank from the 1970s onward.). 
107 See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 55 (Article 55 states that, “the occupying State shall be regarded 
only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to 
the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and 
administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.”). See also Aeyal Gross, Israel is Exploiting the Resources 
of the Occupied West Bank, HAARTEZ (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-is-exploiting-the-resources-
of-the-occupied-west-bank-1.403988 [hereinafter Gross, Israel Exploiting Resources]. 
108 Gross, Israel Exploiting Resources, supra note 107.  
109 Azarova, Dynamic Interpretation, supra note 106. See also ARAI-TAKAHASHI, LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 
22, at 196–97.  
110 Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation, supra note 105, at 221–22.  
111 Id. at 222 (Kretzmer describing that the High Court of Justice noted that the quarries produced stone that could be 
used by local Palestinians, paid royalties to the civil administration that could be reinvested in local projects, 
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population. The High Court acknowledged that this management approach became necessary due 
to the occupation’s duration: 
the traditional occupation laws require adjustment to the prolonged duration of the 
occupation, to the continuity of normal life in the Area and to the sustainability of 
economic relations between the two authorities—the occupier and the occupied. . . . 
This kind of conception supports the adoption of a wide and dynamic view of the 
duties of the military commander in the Area, which impose upon him, inter alia, the 
responsibility to ensure the development and growth of the Area in numerous and 
various fields, including the fields of economic infrastructure and its development.112 
This hints at the notion of a benevolent occupier. The risks of Israel’s economic management 
would, however, become apparent. Following an initial period of growth, the Palestinian 
economy began a sustained decline.113 Israel derived benefit from its economic control of the 
West Bank. It gained access to a large, affordable, labor pool.114 This increased economic 
prosperity within Israel.115 At the same time, however, Shlomo Gazit explains that “the Israeli 
authorities and the military government did little to develop the local economic 
infrastructure.”116  
Israel’s economic approach to the West Bank continued to shift.117 The policy of pacification 
through increased prosperity was replaced by initiatives that fortified Israel’s control of the 
territory.118 Customs arrangements heavily favored Israeli goods, which benefited from 
unfettered access to the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian imports were restricted.119 Imposed 
policies increasingly prioritized Israel’s economic objectives. By the mid-2000s, the Palestinian 
economy teetered. Its GDP had plummeted. Following the Second Intifada, unemployment 
soared. The World Bank estimated that nearly 70 percent of the Palestinian population now lived 
in poverty.120  
112 Yesh Din, supra note 105, ¶ 10. See also Azarova, Dynamic Interpretation, supra note 106.   
113 Arie Arnon, Israeli Policy Towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Economic Dimension, 1967–2007, 
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Israel’s economic management was condemned.121 In the late 1980s, the General Assembly 
urged the international community to provide economic assistance to the Palestinians.122 Despite 
acknowledging that economic aid was not a substitute for a “genuine and just solution to the 
question of Palestine,” the General Assembly recognized the continued relevance of the 
occupation framework.123 It too opted in favor of better management. The international 
community pressed Israel to better ensure Palestine’s economic needs.124 The United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development favored working within the international community to 
“encourage Israel to allow wide-ranging economic policy reform and liberalization in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including the right to economic policy formulation and 
management by the Palestinian people.”125  
The economic challenges that resulted from the prolonged nature of the occupation have spurred 
continuous debate. While evoking diverse perspectives and encouraging an array of policy 
proposals, these debates rarely question the occupation framework’s continued relevance. 
Instead, they assume a non-normative conception of occupation. They seek to provide a more 
effective means of managing the resulting situation. Despite Israel’s increasingly entrenched 
presence throughout the West Bank, notwithstanding the precariousness of the Palestinians’ 
economic conditions, variants of the management approach remain the favored means of 
addressing the exigencies of prolonged occupation. Within scholarly debates, proposals often 
contest what Christine Chinkin identified as the “inherent dilemma” of determining the extent to 
which an occupying power should receive additional latitude. The prominent debates recognize 
that the occupation framework’s conservationist design impedes economic adaptability. All 
agree that this requires specific management.126 Despite the benevolent intentions that 
accompany these deliberations, they largely neglect the possibility that perpetual management 
often contributes to perpetual occupation.  
B. The Challenge of Legislative Competence and Long-term Planning  
The consequences of Israel’s territorial acquisition consumed its political and legal 
establishments in debate. Government officials contemplated their newly imposed duties and 
rights. Meir Shamgar, then the IDF’s Military Advocate General, told a Knesset Committee: 
121 See G.A. Res. 43/178, ¶ 13 (Dec. 20, 1988) (Condemning Israel for its “brutal economic and social policies and 
practices against the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory.”). 
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126 See, e.g., ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 89 
(Johnson Reprint Corp., 1971). See also Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 53 (acknowledging a 
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make “drastic and permanent changes in the economy or the system of government”). See Marco Sassòli, Article 43 
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Our aim is to minimize legislation on pure security and administrative matters, based 
on Article 64 of the Geneva Conventions, help restore life to its previous course 
through our actions and enable a smooth operation of civil courts as soon as possible. 
All of this while maintaining the principle of ensuring the interests of military control 
over the areas.127   
Immediately following the 1967 War, Israel announced its first military orders. Existing law, in 
force prior to June 1967, would be retained unless it contravened a subsequent military 
directive.128 This pronouncement accorded with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. The order 
empowered the Military Commander to issue legislative decrees deemed necessary to administer 
the assumed territory. During the following months and then years, military officials issued a 
vast network of orders.129 Though these orders formally maintained much of the preexisting 
legislative structure, they developed the occupation’s legal foundation.130 
The preferred use of administrative actions—the lessening of legislative initiatives—embraces a 
conservationist interpretation of the occupation framework. The occupying power’s legislative 
competence to introduce, annul, or amend laws within the controlled territory is delineated in 
both the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention.131 Traditionally, the occupying 
power’s ability to legislate is read restrictively.132 As with the economic development debate, 
however, this raises various questions. These query the efficacy of the occupation framework. 
When applied to prolonged occupation, they ask whether the framework frustrates the 
implementation of necessary legislative initiatives. They consider whether it impairs the 
imposition of policies intended to affect long-term change.133  
Eyal Benvenisti explains that historically, “the occupant was not expected, during the anticipated 
short period of occupation, to have pressing interests in changing the law to regulate the 
activities of the population except for what was necessary for the safety of its forces.”134 By the 
First World War, however, this restrictive reading of Article 43 was deemed untenable. 
Occupying powers became increasingly proactive. They desired flexibility.135 Article 64 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention provided broader exceptions to the framework’s legislative 
127 See Transcript No. 126 of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, supra note 56. 
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134 See BENVENISTI, supra note 8 at 91 (This, according to Benvenisti, was driven by the prevailing laissez-faire 
approach which influenced minimalist interpretations of the Regulation’s provisions.).   
135 Id.  
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limitations.136 While this increased the occupier’s ability to impose legislation or policy designed 
to create long-term change, the occupation framework maintained its conservationist purpose.137  
The nature of occupation evolved throughout the latter-half of the twentieth century. Initiatives 
imposed by occupiers were increasingly framed as responses to the exigencies of prolonged (or 
transformative) occupations.138 The occupation framework’s traditional laissez-faire approach to 
governance was presented as implausible.139 Morris Greenspan argued that human existence 
requires organic growth. It is impossible for a state to mark time indefinitely. Pragmatically, 
Greenspan noted the need for adaptive management, arguing that, “political decisions must be 
taken, policies have to be formulated and carried out.”140   
Increasingly, legislative initiatives were understood as a necessary means of responding to social, 
economic, and political changes.141 These changes are unavoidable, the inevitable by-products of 
the passage of time. They produce challenges and legal systems adapt accordingly. Initiatives 
and policies are introduced to meet evolving needs. Within a prolonged occupation, however, 
these unavoidable developments risk neglect. Proponents favored ensuring that the occupying 
power was not constrained by a conservationist reading of the framework. The longer an 
occupation lasts, Dinstein explains, “the more compelling the need to weigh the merits of a 
whole gamut of novel legislative measures designed to ensure the societal needs in the occupied 
territory do not remain too long in a legal limbo.”142 
The Likud Party’s electoral ascendency in 1977 heralded the expansion of the settlement 
project.143 Israel began imposing legislation and enacting policy designed to have permanent or 
long-term influence on the affected territory.144 A large transportation network was developed to 
modernize roadways within the West Bank. This would link various settlements to Jerusalem.145 
136 See Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Law-Making and the Judicial Guarantees in Occupied Territories, in THE 1949 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 1421, 1422–23 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 
2015) [hereinafter Arai-Takahashi, Law-Making and Judicial Guarantees]. See also Fourth Geneva Convention, 
supra note 5, art. 64 (Allowances for the “repeal or suspension” of existing legislation, deemed either a security 
threat or an imposition to the Convention’s application, and the positive formulation of the Article’s second 
paragraph (enabling the occupying power to fulfil its obligations under the Convention, maintain orderly 
government, and ensure security) were now read permissively). See DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra 
note 22, at 110 (describing Article 64 as an “amplification and clarification” of Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations). See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 90, 96.  
137 Id. at 120, 126. See also Bothe, supra note 40, at 1483.  
138 See Steven R. Ratner, Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of 
Convergence, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 695, 706 (2005).  
139 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 3, at 103.  
140 See GREENSPAN, supra note 133. 
141 See generally Arai-TAKAHASHI, LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 22 at 91–136. 
142 DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22 at 116–17.  
143 See generally GORENBERG, ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE, supra note 17.  
144 See generally KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 76. 
145Id. at 94–95 (noting that planners and the relevant authorities explicitly acknowledged the strategic significance of 
the proposed transportation networks. The creation of highways linking the settlements to Israel was determined to 
facilitate varied political objectives).  
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The initiative was challenged in Ja’amait Ascan v Commander of the IDF in Judea and Samaria.146 
The petitioners, whose land would be expropriated to enable construction, argued that the 
planning initiative primarily served Israeli interests and that the project’s permanence was 
inconsistent with a temporary notion of occupation.147 
Israel refuted these claims. It asserted that the project benefited local residents and cited the 
existing infrastructure’s inability to serve the growing population.148 Israel referenced Article 43. 
It argued that due to the occupation’s duration, it could not be required to preserve a distant 
status quo. A military government was obliged to further the local population’s interests.149 
Long-term planning initiatives were framed as requirements. To ensure effective management, 
the occupier was to anticipate local needs and respond accordingly.150 
In Ja’amait Ascan, the High Court of Justice endorsed Israel’s appeal to the management 
approach. In response to the requirements of prolonged occupation, the Court favored an 
interventionist response. Citing Morris Greenspan’s call for increased legislative competence, it 
held that:  
the power of the military government extends to taking all necessary measures to 
ensure growth, change and development. The conclusion that follows is that a 
military government may develop industry, trade, agriculture, education, health and 
welfare and other such matters which are related to good governance and are 
required in order to ensure the changing needs of the population in an area under 
belligerent occupation.151 
The Court explored the policy’s motives.152 Ultimately, it accepted the Government’s claim that 
the proposed changes were made necessary by the passage of time. It accepted that they would 
serve local interests and were thus compliant with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.153  
Israeli initiatives, ostensibly intended to respond to the challenges of prolonged occupation, were 
deemed legitimate if they benefited the local population. They were required to refrain from 
altering the basic institutions of the occupied territory.154 Article 43 was reinterpreted by the 
Court to better respond to prolonged occupation. Despite the conservationist principle’s 
146 See generally HCJ 393/82 Ja’amait Ascan v. Commander of the IDF in Judea and Samaria, 37(4) PD 785 (1983) 
(Isr.), translated in HCJ 393/82 Jam’iat Iscan Al-Ma’almoun v. IDF Commander in the Judea and Samaria Area — 
Judgment, HAMOKED, http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=160 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) [hereinafter 
Ja’amait Ascan]. See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 97–98. 
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 97.  
149 Id.  
150 See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 246. 
151 Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶ 26.  
152 Id. See KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 98 (noting that the Court understood, in 
accordance with the Hague Regulations, that the dominant motive must be to serve the interest of the local 
population. It asked whether the planning initiative had been taken to meet Israel’s exclusive interests or if the good 
of the local population had been a guiding factor in the decision). 
153 Id. 
154 Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation, supra note 105, at 220. See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 246.  
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historical origins, the Court held that contemporary manifestations of occupation should now 
guide the framework’s application. Article 43 must distinguish between short and long-term 
occupations. Its application would consider the passage of time. It would respond to altering 
conditions when establishing the requirements of civil life and public order. The High Court held 
that the military government, “may require long-term investments that will effect changes that 
will remain after the occupation ends.”155  
This need to impose change and address the inevitable results of prolonged occupation guided 
the Court’s subsequent oversight. It justified the Military Government’s desire to move beyond a 
conservationist conception of the occupation framework.156 Unconfined and with extensive 
discretion, it directed Israeli efforts purporting to better manage prolonged occupation. This 
facilitated the imposition of legislation and policy that would impose long-term changes. Despite 
the benevolent façade of the Court’s expansive interpretation of Article 43, David Kretzmer 
notes, “that there is no lack of evidence to show that [the resulting initiatives were] carried out as 
part of a general plan for the West Bank that was based on the planner’s perception of Israeli 
interests.”157 
Settlement growth was accompanied by massive infrastructure investments. The transportation 
network, established in accordance with the Ja’amait Ascan decision, expanded. Approximately 
1660 kilometers of roadways now link settlements to urban centers in Israel.158 As of 2005, the 
formal boundaries of Israel’s settlements constituted a mere 3 percent of the West Bank. The 
associated infrastructure, however, extended Israel’s physical presence to over 40 percent of the 
territory.159  
This creates significant impediments for the Palestinian population. Beyond linking the 
settlements to Israel, the road network that stretches throughout the West Bank impedes 
Palestinian movement. Due to a closure regime that employs checkpoints, road blocks, and 
access permits, Palestinian entry to the roads is limited. The physical presence of the roads often 
separate Palestinian communities into enclaves.160  This strengthens Israel’s control of the 
territory and impacts the quotidian experience of much of the West Bank’s Palestinian 
population.161  
Israel’s engagements with Article 43 are grounded within a traditional interpretation of the 
occupation framework. They build upon the prevalent supposition that prolonged occupation 
justifies legislative management. The challenges posed by prolonged occupation require long-
155 KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 69. See also Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶¶ 21–22.  
156 Emma Playfair, Playing on Principle? Israel’s Justification for its Administrative Acts in the Occupied West 
Bank, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 205, 210 (Emma Playfair ed., 
1992). 
157 KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 82.  
158 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli 
Settlements and other Infrastructure in the West Bank, 58 (June 2007).  
159 Id. at 8, 19.  
160 Id. at 58, 65–66.  
161 Id. at 58. See also World Bank, Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and 
Inefficiency in the Palestinian Economy (May 9, 2007). 
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term solutions, attuned to the evolving needs of the local population. Israel contends that if the 
imposed initiatives provide for the local population, they are consistent with the legal 
framework.162 This interpretative approach acknowledges, but does not question, the nature of 
the occupation. Formally, it professes to preserve sovereignty and ensure local needs.  
The High Court of Justice, however, has interpreted “local population” to include Israeli citizens 
who live within the West Bank’s many settlements.163 This builds upon the Court’s early 
judgment in the Christian Society case. Here, the Court understood Article 43 as compelling 
intervention into a range of sectors. Expansive legislative management was justified in response 
to the exigencies of prolonged occupation.164 In Electric Company for the District of Jerusalem 
v. Minister of Defense, however, the Court included the residents of Kiryat Arba within its
considerations. The occupying power was compelled to consider and ensure the needs of Kiryat
Arba’s residents alongside the requirements of the Palestinian population.165 Eyal Benvenisti
recalled how the Court’s decision provided the occupying power with the necessary legislative
competence to develop the settlement enterprise.166 This facilitated the movement of the
occupant’s population from Israel to the territories. It permanently tilted the calculus that
evaluated imposed measures to favor the West Bank’s Israeli population.167
Proposals to alter the legislative competence of the occupying power vary. Commonly though, 
contestations adhere to a non-normative reading of the occupation framework. They accept, in 
some cases as axiomatic, that the challenges created by the occupation’s duration must be 
managed.168 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) have reached similar conclusions.  
In Demopoulos v. Turkey, the ECtHR addressed the admissibility of a property claim brought by 
a group of Greek-Cypriots. In response to a 1974 coup, led by the Cypriot National Guard and 
pro-unification supporters of Greece’s military junta, Turkey assumed control of the northern-
third of Cyprus. Upon establishment in 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 
was widely recognized as an occupying power, a proxy for Turkish control of the territory it had 
162 Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶ 13. See also HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of 
Israel, et al. 48(5) PD ¶ 34 (2004) (Isr.), translated in HCJ 2056/04 — Beit Sourik Village Council et al. v. The 
Government of Israel, et al., Judgement, HAMOKED, http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=6520 (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Beit Sourik]; Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation, supra note 105, at 221–
22. 
163 Electric Company, supra note 99. See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 65. 
164 Christian Society, supra note 94, at 582.  
165 Electric Company, supra note 99, at 138. See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 65. 
166 See HCJ 5808/93 Economic Corporation for Jerusalem Ltd. v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria 49(1) PD 
89 (1993) (Isr.) (Settlement development was further facilitated by the High Court of Justice’s position that 
engagements with Article 43 must acknowledge and address “changing conditions” within occupied territory. The 
Court ruled that settlements constituted such change). See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, 
at 215. 
167 BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 221–22. 
168 See DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 120. See also Harris, supra note 3, at 103; Sassòli, 
Legislation and Maintenance, supra note 82, at 679. 
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assumed.169 The TRNC introduced a pilot-judgment procedure to address property claims by 
individuals displaced from Northern Cyprus.170 This raised questions regarding the TRNC’s 
legislative competence.171 The ECtHR was asked to decide on the admissibility of the applicant’s 
petition.172  
The Court’s judgment was grounded in international human rights law and the ECtHR’s 
admissibility requirements. IHL scarcely featured within the decision.173 Yet the ECtHR 
acknowledged the influence of the occupation’s duration. When rendering its decision, the Court 
prioritized the need to ensure the uninterrupted provision of individual rights by effectively 
managing the status quo.174 Acknowledging the complexities posed by duration, the Court held, 
“This reality, as well as the passage of time and the continuing evolution of the broader political 
dispute must inform the Court’s interpretation and application of the Convention which cannot, if 
it is to be coherent and meaningful, be either static or blind to concrete factual circumstances.”175 
The ECtHR drew upon the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia.176 South Africa assumed control of Namibia 
during the First World War. This continued under the Mandate system until the League of 
Nations was superseded by the United Nations.177 South Africa resisted the imposition of a 
trusteeship agreement and began a period of de facto administration.178 The ICJ’s Namibia 
Opinion facilitated the establishment of the international community’s preferred management 
169 Only Turkey has since recognized the TRNC. See Elihu Lauterpacht, The Right of Self-Determination of the 
Turkish Cypriots, REP. TURK., MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 9, 1990), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/chapter1.en.mfa. See 
also Elihu Lauterpacht, The Status of the Two Communities in Cyprus, REPUBLIC TURK., MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. 
(July 10, 1990), http://www.mfa.gov.tr /chapter2.en.mfa. See also G.A. Res. 3212 (XXIX), (Nov. 1, 1974). See also 
G.A. Res. 3395 (XXX), (Nov. 20, 1975); See S.C. Res. 541, (Nov. 18, 1983) (examples of the General Assembly 
and the Security Council denouncing the Turkish presence in Cyprus, rejecting resulting unilateral actions taken by 
Turkey, labeling its presence as an occupation, and branding the TRNC’s declaration of independence as legally 
invalid). See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 192. 
170 Demopoulos v. Turkey, App. No. 46113/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 50 (2010) [hereinafter Demopoulos]. For further 
context, see Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey,App. No. 46347/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 37 (2006).   
171 See Demopoulos, supra note 170, ¶¶ 55, 63. 
172 Id. (This case required the Court to determine whether the TRNC’s judgment procedure constituted a domestic 
remedy. The ECtHR held, for the purposes of admissibility, that the procedure created a local remedy and thus 
required exhaustion.).  
173 Much of the discourse regarding both Northern Cyprus and Western Sahara is grounded within human rights law. 
See Bothe, supra note 40, at 1459.   
174 See Demopoulos, supra note 170, ¶ 96.   
175 Id. ¶ 85.  
176 See Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 101–102 (2001) (separate opinion by Palm, J.). See also 
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Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J Rep. 16, ¶ 125 (June 21) 
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177 See generally JOHN DUGARD, THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE: DOCUMENTS AND SCHOLARLY 
WRITINGS ON THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1973).   
178 See G.A. Res. 2145 (XXI), (Oct. 26, 1966) (The General Assembly terminating the South African mandate and 
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approach. Famously, it obliged the mandatory power to ensure the daily administration of the 
controlled territory through the creation or maintenance of basic services. The ICJ held:  
In general, the non-recognition of South Africa's administration of the Territory 
should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived from 
international co-operation. In particular, while official acts performed by the 
Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the 
termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended 
to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, 
the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the 
Territory.179 
The Court’s reasoning is inherently pragmatic. It seeks to preserve Namibian self-determination. 
Yet by instilling the notion that the illegitimacy of foreign administration must not compromise 
the provision of local services, it has contributed to the entrenchment of the management 
approach.180  
Neither the ECtHR or the ICJ engaged deeply with the legal framework. Their decisions, 
however, provide credence to the notion that the occupation framework must only interpret 
occupation as a fact. Yet both Courts read this framework to address the challenges spurred by 
an occupation’s duration. They provide weight to the belief that despite the acknowledged 
illegitimacy of the occupation regimes, the fact of occupation must be managed. In response, the 
conservationist principle is amended to meet the challenges of prolonged occupation.   
C. The Challenge of Security and Ensuring Public Order and Safety  
Following two decades of occupation, a banal event triggered the First Intifada. An Israeli truck 
collided with a Palestinian passenger van near the Jabalia Camp at the northern point of the Gaza 
Strip. Four Palestinians were killed. Many Gazans believed the incident was in retaliation, a 
response to the stabbing of an Israeli citizen days earlier.181 Mass demonstrations—in Jabalia, 
throughout Gaza, and then across the West Bank—harnessed decades of Palestinian discontent 
and frustrated nationalist ambition. Israel’s engagements with the occupation framework shifted 
in response. Policies, professedly benevolent and ostensibly intended to manage the occupation, 
were no longer justified by appealing to local interests. Increasingly, Israel recalled the 
occupation framework’s security provisions to validate its actions and policies within the West 
Bank.182  
179 Namibia Opinion, supra 176, ¶ 125. 
180 KATHARINE FORTIN, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED GROUPS UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 260–61 (2017). 
181 JEAN-PIERRE FILIU, GAZA: A HISTORY 199 (2014). See also Michael Omer-Man, The Accident that Sparked an 
Intifada, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.jpost.com/Features/In-Thespotlight/The-accident-that-
sparked-an-Intifada. 
182 See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 238 (noting that by the late 1980s and the start of the First Intifada, Israel was 
unable to credibly cite the improvement of local interests as a motivating factor for the occupation’s policies). 
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This justificatory transition reflects IHL’s dual purposes.183 The occupation framework’s myriad 
humanitarian assurances are coupled with numerous security-based exceptions.184 Several 
military manuals cite security as the most relevant justification for the annulment or introduction 
of legislation within an occupied territory.185 An occupying power receives broad discretion.186 
Under Article 27(4) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupier is entrusted with, “such 
measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of 
the war.”187 Efforts to balance the demands of military necessity with the requirements of 
humanitarianism initially focused on conduct during general belligerency.188 Yet prolonged 
occupation creates distance between the present and the triggering conflict.189  
This distance poses questions regarding the function of the occupation framework. These query 
whether an occupation’s duration influences how the framework balances both military and 
humanitarian considerations. They ask if duration tempers recourse to exceptions.190 A 
prolonged occupation—as seen in the West Bank, Northern Cyprus, and Western Sahara—has 
moved from a military contest and become an administrative relationship. Although this shift 
183 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 16–
17 (1st ed. 2014). 
184 See, Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, arts. 18, 35, 46, & 53 (For example, Article 53 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of public or private property, “except where such destruction is 
rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.” Article 48 allows non-nationals of the occupied territory to 
depart from the territory unless, as per Article 35, their departure, “is contrary to the national interests of the state.” 
In accordance with Article 18, parties to the conflict are required to indicate the presence of civilian hospitals, “in so 
far as military considerations permit.” Under Article 46, individual or mass transfer is prohibited, however, the 
occupying power may “undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or 
imperative military reasons so demand”). See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 52 (Article 52 of the Hague 
Regulations permits requisitions in kind and service when required by the needs of the army of occupation). See also 
Koutroulis, supra note 53, at 191. 
185 See, e.g., U.K. Military Manual, supra note 12, at 286–88; U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27–10: THE 
LAW OF LAND WARFARE 143 (1956) (revised 1976), http://nile.ed.umuc.edu/-nstanton/FM27-10.htm. See also Arai-
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186 See JEAN S. PICTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR: COMMENTARY 1, 339 (1958) (stating that, “Article 64 
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does not discount the possibility of security threats or periodic incidents of violence, recourse to 
military necessity and the security needs of the occupier become less immediate. 
Many articulations of the management approach begin from the premise that the occupation’s 
duration presents challenges that the legal framework is ill-suited to address. Efforts to manage 
these challenges and meet the needs of the local population are heavily-weighted. Inversely, 
security or military necessity-based exceptions surrender much of their normative pull. Attempts 
to rebalance the military-humanitarian calculus represent yet another response to the challenges 
of prolonged occupation. Whether corresponding appeals propose strengthening humanitarian 
protection or (less commonly) assert broader security exceptions, they seek a better means of 
managing prolonged occupation.  
During proceedings for the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Swiss Confederation 
considered the influence of duration on the relationship between military necessity and 
humanitarianism.191 Switzerland submitted that: 
In the context of an occupation, international humanitarian law ensures consistency 
between humanitarian aims and the occupier’s security needs and reduces the risk of 
a deterioration in relations between the occupying Power and the occupied. Any 
examination of necessity and proportionality in circumstances of prolonged 
occupation when hostilities have ceased must be more rigorous, since stricter 
conditions govern the imposition of restrictions in such circumstances on the 
fundamental rights of protected persons.192  
Israel has not directly pursued justifications that rely upon the unconventional view that an 
occupation’s duration expands the occupier’s recourse to military necessity. Instead, the High 
Court of Justice noted that “military and security needs predominate in a short-term military 
occupation. Conversely, the needs of the local population gain weight in a long-term military 
occupation.”193 Despite the Court’s conventional approach, Israel’s presence within the West 
Bank brought mounting security challenges. Israel reverted to Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations. It embraced a factual conception of occupation and appealed to the exigencies of 
duration in response to these challenges.194 
The promotion of safety, as per the English translation of Article 43, is commonly invoked to 
justify amendments to local legislation.195 In Ja’amait Ascan, the High Court of Justice claimed 
that the establishment and scope of the military government’s powers to manage “public order 
and safety” are influenced by the occupation’s duration.196 The Court recalled the early work of 
Doris Appel Graber. Reciting the consensus opinion that the occupation framework is ill-suited 
to regulate prolonged occupation, the Court claimed that, “this distinction between a short-term 
191 Id. at 189. 
192 Swiss Statement, supra note 190, at 6, ¶ 26. See also Koutroulis, supra note 53, at 193. 
193 See Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶ 22. See also Koutroulis, supra note 53, at 191–92. 
194 See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 238. 
195 Boon, supra note 12, at 124.  
196 Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, at ¶ 22.  
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military government and a long-term military government has significant influence over the 
content which is to be infused into securing “public order and safety.”197 
The Court reached a similar determination in Abu Aita et al. v. Commander of Judea and Samaria. It 
confirmed that duration influences the implied balance between military requirements and 
humanitarian considerations. Interpreting Article 43, the Court held:  
It is true that this article contains no rules as to adjustment or reclassification bound 
up with, or conditional upon the time element, but the effect of the time dimension is 
implicit in the wording, according to which there is a duty to ensure, as far as 
possible, order and public life, which patently means order and life at all times, and 
not only on a single occasion. The element of time is also decisively involved in the 
question of whether it is absolutely impossible to continue acting in accordance with 
existing law, or whether it is essential to adapt that law to new realities. In the legal 
interpretation of Article 43, the relationship between the time element, and the form 
taken by the provisions of Article 43 is stressed more than once. It follows that the 
time element is a factor affecting the scope of the powers, whether we regard military 
needs, or whether we regard the needs of the territory, or maintain equilibrium 
between them.198 
These decisions adhere to the prominent interpretation of the occupation framework. They are 
premised upon and cite directly from scholars who forward the prevalent view that, within 
prolonged occupation, the legal framework is unable to regulate the needs of the occupier and the 
occupied. Without questioning the nature or normative structure of the occupation, they offer a 
means of better managing the challenges that result from prolonged occupation.  
The implications of Israel’s expansive conception of the “public order and safety” provision 
would, however, become apparent. Despite the Article’s intended focus on the needs of the 
occupied population, Article 43 was again interpreted to include the influx of Israeli settlers that 
now resided in the West Bank.199 Initiatives, justified in accordance with the Hague Regulations, 
were implemented to ensure the settler population’s security needs. Often, this elevated the 
interests of the occupying power above efforts to ensure the welfare of protected persons.200 As 
tensions rose and the occupation endured, Israel employed initiatives and policies that purported 
to manage the deteriorating security situation. A fence was erected around the Beit Hadassah 
building in Hebron. It was justified as a security measure, necessary for the protection of the 
Israeli families that had settled in the building’s upper stories. Its construction, however, 
restricted access to the Palestinian-owned shops at ground-level. The Military Commander 
declared the fence an essential security requirement.201 The High Court ruled that the 
197 Id.  
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Commander’s authority to impose security-based policies extended to arrangements that 
safeguarded the settler population.202 
This reasoning has created an artificial distinction. It has diluted the restraining influence of 
Article 43. The legal regulation of Israeli settlements and the needs of their population were 
placed under the auspices of the occupation framework.203 Israeli authorities consistently cited 
the challenges of prolonged occupation. They forwarded realist contentions regarding the nature 
and demands of the occupation and in justification of policies imposed throughout the West 
Bank.204 These appeals were grounded within an interpretation of the legal framework that treats 
occupation, regardless of duration or cause, as a fact that required regulation. Many Israeli 
initiatives were condemned. The foundational interpretative approach assumed by both Israel and 
its detractors was, however, consistent. Divergences, while significant and often framed as legal 
violations, primarily concerned the most effective means of managing prolonged occupation.  
III. THE NORMATIVE INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH: ASSESSING THE LEGALITY OF 
OCCUPATION 
Despite its civilian presence, notwithstanding its increasing control of the territory, Israel has 
refrained from claiming sovereignty of the West Bank. It has instead appealed to IHL in 
justification of its settlement initiatives. Maiden development projects were linked to Israel’s 
security apparatus.205 Later, following judicial intervention, settlement policy increasingly 
focused on the allocation of “public” land.206 Both approaches went beyond the mere denial of 
the occupation framework’s relevancy. Instead, Israel justified its settlement policy—the source 
of much international opprobrium—as consistent with various provisions of IHL. 
Israel presented expansionist interpretations of the occupation framework’s military necessity 
and property provisions. It read, restrictively, the framework’s humanitarian clauses and its 
prohibition on the transfer of civilian populations.207 These engagements are emblematic of what 
202 See HCJ 72/86 Zalum v. Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area 41(1) PD 528 (1987) (Isr.), 
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Aeyal Gross terms the “pick and choose” approach. Israel selectively applies the occupation 
framework, accepting the application of the Hague Regulations and denying the formal 
applicability of the Geneva Conventions.208 This has allowed Israel to treat the West Bank as 
either occupied territory under military control or as its own territory where civilian laws are 
applicable to Israeli settlements.209 
These selective appeals were often justified in tandem with references to the occupation’s 
duration. They could not, however, mollify the principal purpose of the occupation framework—
ensuring the inalienability of sovereignty. They failed to assuage criticisms that Israel’s presence 
in the West Bank purposefully impeded Palestinian self-determination. Contemporary 
manifestations of occupation, traditionally perceived as compatible with self-determination, had 
altered. Since the era of decolonization, occupation was increasingly framed as a symptom of 
foreign domination.210  
The High Court of Justice addressed the void between Israel’s appeals to specific Hague 
provisions and the framework’s guardianship of self-determination and sovereignty. In Saliman 
Tawfiq Ayub et al., v. Minister of Defense et al. (the Beth El Case), the Court pondered, “how 
can a permanent settlement be erected on land which was seized for temporary use only?”211 It 
accepted the state’s position that “civil settlement may continue to exist in that location only so 
long as the IDF holds the area by virtue of the confiscation order.”212  
The High Court of Justice has confirmed that an occupying power does not assume sovereign 
prerogative.213 The Court recognized the corresponding requirement that an occupation must 
remain temporary. It, however, coupled these pronouncements with the declaration that “this 
temporariness may be long-term.”214 Israeli officials and the High Court referenced the legal 
framework’s neutral conception of occupation and temporal neglect. They drew upon the 
prominent interpretative approach. The Court contended, correctly, that “international law does 
not set a time limit thereto and [the occupation framework] continues as long as the military 
government effectively controls the areas.”215 
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Though this is an accurate reading of the occupation framework, it is ultimately incomplete.216 
The prominent interpretative approach privileges considerations of the jus in bello. By 
embracing an interpretation that accentuates the framework’s durational neglect and 
uninterrupted relevancy, the requirement of temporality is diminished. Legal considerations, 
expressing jus ad bellum principles and conveyed by a holistic conception of temporality, are 
relegated alongside the normative pronouncements that they contain.217  
Israel increasingly claimed that controversial – and seemingly permanent – aspects of the 
occupation were, in fact, provisional. This coupled appeals to specific allowances, often under 
the Hague Regulations, with a limited conception of temporality. Senior IDF officials testified 
that the construction of the West Bank barrier was a “temporary fence erected for security 
needs.”218 Settlements were described as non-permanent. Following Israel’s 2005 disengagement 
from the Gaza Strip, a group of settlers challenged a legislative act that required the 
dismantlement and evacuation of several settlements in Gaza. Again, the High Court stressed the 
temporary nature of the occupation and the rules imposed by international law. The Court held,  
most Israelis do not have ownership in the land on which they built their homes and 
businesses in the evacuated area. They acquired their rights from the military commander 
or from those acting on his behalf. These are not the owners of the property, and they 
cannot transfer more rights than they have.219 
These contentions have created a judicially endorsed concept of temporality that privileges a 
literal notion of non-permanence above transitory characteristics.220 It is premised upon the 
prominent interpretation of the occupation framework. This continues to view occupation, 
regardless of its assumed form, as a factual phenomenon. While practice and commentary largely 
adhere to this interpretive approach, some have attempted to move the resulting discourse 
beyond its traditional boundaries. They have forwarded normative interpretations of the 
occupation framework. These accentuate aspects of the framework that Israel’s faciliatory legal 
engagements sought to indefinitely defer or failed to credibly address.   
Aeyal Gross favors a normative conception of occupation. This, Gross contends, is necessary to 
hold an occupying power accountable.221 As occupation is both a fact and a norm, it may not 
continue indefinitely. Recognition of occupation’s normative character—based upon the 
requirement of temporariness and the principle of sovereign preservation—is necessary to 
maintain an occupation’s legitimacy. It is essential to ensure that imposed foreign control may 
not become indefinite.222 Gross correctly and convincingly recognizes how the occupation 
framework, traditionally interpreted, may prolong subjugation. The pivot towards normative 
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content becomes crucial when engagements with the occupation framework preference a factual 
conception that perpetuates or neglects the occupation regime’s sovereign encroachments.  
Within the Palestinian territories, the resulting state of affairs prompted Hani Sayed to propose a 
more radical departure from the occupation framework. Sayed argues that the:  
post Oslo regime of Israeli control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is 
objectionable on normative grounds because it is perpetuating Palestinian 
subordination and forcing on the Palestinians a particular unviable final settlement of 
the conflict that is unrepresentative of the political dynamics inside the Palestinian 
polity in the [West Bank and Gaza Strip], inside the green line and in exile. The 
challenge is ultimately to imagine a legal framework for understanding the situation 
in the [West Bank and Gaza Strip] that does not link the Palestinian right to self-
determination to the law of occupation.223   
Although Sayed does not fully articulate what form this framework would assume, he 
acknowledges the necessity of a normative focus and a shift from the traditional legal approach 
to occupation. Such a shift has now occurred. Departures from a strict factual conception of 
occupation increasingly identify the framework’s normative structure to assess the legality of 
particular forms of occupation.  
A. The Illegality Approach  
Recently, Michael Lynk, the UN’s Special Rapporteur to the Palestinian territories, has urged the 
international community to amend its legal treatment of prolonged occupation. Lynk asserted 
that Israel’s occupation has, “become a legal and humanitarian oxymoron: an occupation without 
end.”224 Lynk cited the prevalence of a factual conception of occupation. His report noted that 
“the prevailing approach of the international community has been to treat Israel as the lawful 
occupant of the Palestinian territory. . . .”225 This, the Rapporteur suggested, had long become an 
inaccurate legal characterization.226 The report proposes a means of assessing when an 
occupation is rendered illegal.227  
This draws upon a history of past practice. The international community has, on several 
occasions, reached determinations of illegality.228 The General Assembly described the 
Palestinian territories as controlled through an illegal occupation.229 Since the 1980s, however, 
these classifications of Palestine’s occupation have decreased. Elsewhere though, South Africa’s 
presence in Namibia, Portuguese control of Guinea-Bissau, the Vietnamese invasion of 
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Kampuchea, Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait, and the regular presence of Ugandan forces in 
Congolese territory have been pronounced illegal.230  
Such pronouncements prompted Yaël Ronen to identify the existence of a juridical category of 
illegal occupation.231 Ronen explains that an occupation becomes illegal upon violation of a 
preemptory norm of erga omnes character.232 This acknowledgement, however, is not ubiquitous. 
Yoram Dinstein and Rosalyn Higgins both suggest that there is a strong doctrinal basis for the 
dismissal of the illegality claim.233 Dinstein argues that a myth surrounds the legal regime of 
belligerent occupation. This implies that a particular occupation is, or in time becomes, illegal.234 
Alluding to the prominent interpretative approach, Dinstein asserts that “far from viewing 
belligerent occupation as innately unlawful, there is a whole body of international law regulating 
this state of affairs.”235   
The dismissal of the illegality approach is facilitated by a factual conception of occupation. This 
moderates the significance of the occupation framework’s normative requirements. By 
preferencing international law’s regulation of occupation, by privileging the view that the 
existence of an occupation is a neutral legal phenomenon, the accompanying discourse remains 
fixated on the means of management. This diminishes the significance of the occupation 
framework’s fundamental purpose. Yet many of the international community’s references to the 
illegality of a particular occupation fail to articulate their legal reasoning.  
The recent report by the Special Rapporteur did, however, present a normative framework to 
assess the legality of occupation. The report prescribed that an occupant may not: (1) annex 
territory; (2) that an occupation shall remain temporary and not become permanent or indefinite; 
(3) that the best interests of the occupied population guides the occupying power’s interventions;
and (4) that the territory must be administered in good faith and in accordance with international
law.236 An occupying power whose administration breaches these identified principles verges
into illegality.237
These criteria draw heavily upon the work of Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal Gross, and Keren 
Michaeli.238 The authors propose identifying “a norm that governs the [occupation] phenomenon, 
230 Ronen, supra note 178, at 213–16, 222–26 (for a detailed summary). 
231 Id. at 203.  
232Id. at 206–08 (noting that this is often the prohibition on the use of force or the violation of the obligation to 
respect the right of peoples to self-determination).   
233 See Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1970).   
234 DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 34.   
235 See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Arab-Israeli Conflict in International Law, 43 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 301, 313–14 
(1994). See also ARAI-TAKAHASHI, LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 46. 
236 See Lynk, supra note 224, ¶¶ 27–37, 42 (explaining that these principles are derived from the ICJ’s Namibia 
opinion).  
237 Id. ¶ 64.  
238 Id. ¶ 27 (noting the additional influence of Aeyal Gross’ recent work and Eyal Benvenisti’s contention that an 
occupant who stalls efforts to terminate an occupation would be tainted with illegality. These are described as 
providing the “intellectual foundation” for the proposed criteria).  
51
differentiating between a legal and illegal occupation.”239 They identify three evaluative 
principles: (1) the notion that sovereignty or title does not vest in the occupying power; (2) the 
maintenance of public or civil life by the occupying power in accordance with the principle of 
self-determination; and (3) that occupation must be temporary and may not become either 
permanent or indefinite.240  Should the occupying power violate any of these principles, the 
occupation becomes illegal.241   
The desire to brand a particular occupation illegal, especially one which is prolonged, reflects a 
perceived failure of law and an accompanying sense of injustice. It is, however, worth 
recognizing a practical impediment. Applied to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories, a 
normative assessment of the occupation’s legality would likely be resisted by influential states. 
Mainstream political and legal engagements with the conflict are inherently pragmatic. Security 
Council Resolution 242, for example, begins by emphasizing the “inadmissibility of the 
acquisition of territory by war.”242 Its enduring legacy, however, is seen through its entrenchment 
of the land for peace formula.243 This provides a highly-incentivized calculation designed to both 
encourage and guide negotiations. 
The international community’s exchanges with the Israelis and Palestinians are steeped in the 
custom, diplomacy, and law that seek to manage this enduring conflict. A normative assessment 
of legality would likely struggle to influence this dominant approach. As the international 
community continues to prioritize engagement, declared illegality would presumably be viewed 
by, amongst others, the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom as 
facilitating isolation. Some may see benefit in such a result. This would, however, be resisted by 
dominant elements within the international community and, accordingly, raise questions 
regarding the approach’s effectiveness. 
Considerations of effectiveness raise subsidiary questions. It is unclear how a determination of 
illegality would alter subsequent legal engagements with the occupation regime. It is uncertain 
whether it would influence the application of the occupation framework. As Yaël Ronen notes, 
“for the category of illegal occupation to be meaningful, it must have consequences that advance 
the removal of the illegality.”244 The Special Rapporteur report suggests several such 
ramifications. These include encouraging member states and judicial bodies to prevent the 
cooperation of various entities that indirectly sustain the occupation.245 The report contends that 
a declaration of illegality would “invite the international community to review its various forms 
239 Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 551, 553 (2005). 
240 Id. at 553–55 (locating the “occupation within a normative framework that differentiates between legality and 
illegality and may both resolve the specific question of the legality of the Israeli occupation and redefine the 
contours of the legal discourse on occupation”).  
241 Id. at 555, 559, 586 (the authors determine that the “Israeli occupation . . . violates the three basic tenets of the 
normative regime of occupation and is, therefore, intrinsically illegal”).  
242 S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 1 (Nov. 22, 1967).  
243 See, e.g., WILLIAM B. QUANDT, PEACE PROCESS: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 
SINCE 1967 392 (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of Cal. Press, 2001).   
244 Ronen, supra note 178, at 227.  
245 Lynk, supra note 224, at 65.  
52
of cooperation with the occupying power as long as it continues to administer the occupation 
unlawfully.”246 
Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli suggest that normative results follow a declaration of 
illegality.247 Citing the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, they recall that conduct 
constituting an internationally wrongful act must cease.248 They concede that law does not 
replace statesmanship and cannot compel an occupation’s termination. The recognition of 
illegality may, however, affect subsequent legal considerations including the occupying power’s 
recourse to security measures and efforts to frame the illegal occupation as an act of 
aggression.249 
Declarations of illegality have been accompanied by the requirement to make reparations. This, 
too, is consistent with the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.250 In the Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo case, the ICJ found Uganda liable for its illegal presence in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and required the Ugandan Government to make 
reparations.251 This rebuked an illegal occupation. Confirmed illegality, however, is not a 
harbinger of legal consequence or sanction.  
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, the ICJ did 
not declare the Israeli occupation to be illegal.252 Nevertheless, it acknowledged numerous 
violations of the occupation framework.253 This compelled legal redress. Israel was obliged to 
comply with and cease violations of its international obligations.254 It was required to provide 
reparations, ensure restoration, and offer compensation to those impacted by the Wall’s 
construction.255 Referencing Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co. Ltd., the Court found 
Israel to have violated international obligations of an erga omnes character.256 The occupation 
did not require a declaration of illegality in order for the Court to recognize violations that 
compel state concern and protection.257 Where the Special Rapporteur report called upon the 
international community to review its forms of cooperation with the occupying power, so too did 
the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion. The Court held that states were forbidden from recognizing the 
situation resulting from the construction of a wall. It stated that they may not render aid or 
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assistance in maintaining the existing status quo. Members of the international community held a 
positive duty to end impediments, which stemmed from the wall’s construction, to Palestinian 
self-determination.258  
It is unclear whether the categorization of illegal occupation offers legal import not otherwise 
present within international law. Violations of the occupation framework inevitably taint 
prolonged occupation. Prolonged occupation is defined by subsidiary failures to adhere to 
various aspects of IHL. Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions requires High Contracting 
Parties to “respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”259 The 
general rules relating to compliance with IHL fully apply to situations of occupation.260 These 
are not contingent upon the occupation’s legal status.  
Significantly, the development of settlements is perhaps the most controversial feature of the 
occupation. They are almost universally viewed as a blatant violation of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.261 They constitute a grave breach of the Convention and are punishable under the 
Rome Statute.262 Again, the severity of these sanctions is not influenced by the occupation’s 
legal status. Recourse to such sanctions, however, is contingent on political and diplomatic will. 
Appeals to state responsibility, to the non-recognition of wrongful acts, or to reparations do not 
appear more attainable if grounded in the illegality approach.  
Declarations of illegality do, however, carry rhetorical weight. Adam Roberts acutely observed 
that the categorization of an illegal occupation is “invariably used to refer to an occupation 
which is perceived as being the outcome of aggressive and unlawful military expansion.”263 
Often, though with exception, evocations of “illegality” are devoid of legal specificity. 
Perception, however, is important. The legitimacy attributed to an occupation regime greatly 
influences the international community’s reaction to the occupant. It affects its treatment of the 
occupation. A prolonged occupation will inevitably suffer a deficit of legitimacy. Yet the source 
of illegitimacy that shrouds Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories is largely derived 
from the myriad features of the occupation that themselves constitutes violations of the legal 
framework. The continued expansion of settlements, restrictions on the Palestinian right to self-
determination, and the chronic violation of human rights are both sources of illegitimacy and 
violations of the occupation framework. It is doubtful that labeling the occupation illegal, in its 
totality, would alter or lessen the legitimacy calculus of a reality that is already widely 
denounced.  
Determining when an occupation becomes illegal will remain contested. Whether the 
implications of such a determination introduce otherwise unavailable legal consequences appears 
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uncertain. It is improbable that the label of illegality will further delegitimize an occupation 
already perceived as apocryphal.  This should not discount the value of the determination. Ben-
Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli note that reaching an assessment of illegality – through a normative 
account of an occupation regime – allows the observer to move beyond obfuscation and blurred 
boundaries.264 Israel’s myriad engagements with the occupation framework appeal to the 
indeterminacy that follows from a factual conception of occupation. Infusing normative content 
into considerations of an occupation regime is essential to gain legal clarity regarding the 
consequences of the occupying power’s efforts to manage prolonged occupation.  
Yet, as the ICJ claimed in its Namibia Opinion, “the qualification of a situation as illegal does 
not by itself put an end to it. It can only be the first, necessary step in an endeavor to bring the 
illegal situation to an end.”265 In accordance, efforts to meet the challenges of prolonged 
occupation should neither seek complete disassociation from the existing legal framework nor 
attempt to effectively manage the ongoing situation within the existing framework. Rather, they 
should embrace the occupation framework’s normative content. These efforts must move to 
identify a legal basis to encourage the termination of prolonged occupation.  
IV. FROM MANAGEMENT TO TERMINATION: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO PROLONGED 
OCCUPATION 
In the ICJ’s 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, 
Judge Elaraby offered a common-sense observation. Tasked with determining the legality of 
Israeli actions and policies, Judge Elaraby simply concluded, “the only viable prescription to end 
the grave violations of international humanitarian law is to end the occupation.”266 As the 
occupier becomes increasingly distant from the interests that led to the occupation’s initiation, as 
the occupied population faces growing subjugation and the continued suspension of their civil 
and political rights, the reality of prolonged occupation unavoidably fosters continued violations 
of international law. 
The benevolent occupier may successfully provide basic social or economic rights. The 
occupation framework, however, is structurally precluded from addressing many of prolonged 
occupation’s inescapable challenges. Consequentially, myriad responses to these challenges 
attempt to circumvent the framework. Political, diplomatic, and grassroots initiatives often favor 
ending the occupation. International law, however, remains fixated on an unattainable status quo.  
Guided by the prominent interpretative approach, these legal appeals endeavor to better regulate 
the present so as to preserve the past.  
Attempts to manage prolonged occupation may be benevolent. They may come in response to 
undeniable challenges that demand redress. They also, however, promote an interpretation of the 
occupation framework that perpetuates occupation. This prominent interpretative approach 
allows an occupying power to strengthen its control of the territory and of the population. 
Commonly and regardless of intention or motive, responses to prolonged occupation contort the 
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legal framework. They expand its provisions. In response to prolonged occupation, they claim 
latitude, while pledging fidelity to a factual, alegal conception of occupation that may continue 
indefinitely.  
Instead, responses to prolonged occupation must embrace a normative reading of the legal 
framework. They must situate their engagements, their management efforts, in an interpretative 
approach that identifies and accentuates a holistic conception of temporariness. This is intended 
to move from responses that produce perpetual management. The interpretative approach 
proposed here remains cognizant of both the occupation’s duration and the form that it assumes. 
The proposed interpretative approach harnesses a good faith obligation to terminate prolonged 
occupation. This must be preferred to interpretations whose silence on the question of duration 
facilitates the selective employment of international law, the perpetual management of identified 
challenges, and, by design or by default, the eventual entrenchment of foreign control.  
This proposed shift, taken under the framework’s auspices and cognizant of its confines, cannot 
unilaterally terminate occupation. Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli are correct. International law 
does not replace diplomacy.267 Yet it may facilitate or hinder its efforts. The interpretative 
approach offered here recognizes that engagements with the occupation framework are premised 
on a choice. This is between a factual, alegal conception of occupation and one that rests on 
normative acknowledgements regarding the nature and purpose of occupation. Further, it is 
amongst legal appeals that rely exclusively upon the jus in bello and those that additionally 
acknowledge the relevancy of the jus ad bellum.  Engagements based on the latter interpretation 
are more likely to constrain the occupation regime. They are better equipped to safeguard the 
preservation of sovereignty, maintain competing relations, ensure the occupying power’s military 
needs, and protect the occupied population. Legal appeals, grounded in this interpretative 
approach, are more consistent with the spirit of IHL and the principles espoused by the jus ad 
bellum.  
The proposed good faith approach to enable termination provides an alternative path. This is 
based on a normative recognition. It places the principle of temporality at the center of the legal 
regulation of occupation. Adherence to this approach will facilitate three objectives. These 
collectively strengthen international law’s relationship with prolonged occupation. First, it will 
recognize the significance of the interpretative choices that structure subsequent legal 
engagements with prolonged occupation. These reflect either an unconstrained or temporal 
conception of occupation. Such interpretative choices are further grounded within either 
exclusive appeals to the jus in bello or those engagements that draw upon a wider array of 
principles that exist in both IHL and the law governing the use of force. Next, it will appeal to 
the notion of good faith to accentuate the principle of temporariness and the objective of 
termination. This provides a more efficacious means of structuring and evaluating the legal 
regulation of prolonged occupation. Finally, it will contribute to a necessary shift in legal 
discourse. This shift follows the direction of diplomatic appeals by preferencing calls to 
terminate prolonged occupation above attempts to manage its unconstrained duration.  
267 Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 239, at 612–13. 
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The interpretative approach proposed here links engagements with the legal framework to the 
framework’s fundamental purpose—ensuring temporality. Appeals to identified tenets of 
international law facilitate a reemphasized interpretation of the occupation framework’s 
normative structure. This can moderate the framework’s lax temporal dimensions by elevating 
the innate requirement to enable the occupation’s termination. Such a reading of the occupation 
framework will provide a clear legal basis requiring an occupying power to delimit actions that 
perpetuate occupation. And it will preference interim initiatives, taken to address the challenges 
of prolonged occupation, that may stretch the framework’s conservationist origins but do not 
frustrate the requirement to enable termination. This alternative reading of the occupation 
framework is firmly grounded in international law.  
A. Recognition of an Interpretative Choice  
Many of Israel’s engagements with the occupation framework are conventional. Ostensibly, they 
draw upon a widely endorsed interpretative approach.268 This prominent approach and the 
responses to prolonged occupation stemming from it are, however, the result of a deliberate 
choice. This exists between readings that emphasize the framework’s lax temporal limitation and 
those that accentuate a holistic conception of temporality.269 Adherence to the prominent 
interpretative approach is influenced by the traditional distinction between the jus ad bellum and 
the jus in bello. Devoid of context, these choices constitute accurate readings. The occupation 
framework privileges temporariness and fails to ensure precision.270 In practice, however, these 
interpretative approaches become antinomies. They allow Meir Shamgar to claim that an 
occupation may continue indefinitely and they support Lassa Oppenheim’s contention that “there 
is not an atom of sovereignty in the authority of an occupying power.”271 
Shamgar’s interpretative choice enabled the legal architecture of Israel’s occupation.272 
Distinguishing between “political problems” and the “observance of the humanitarian provisions 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention,” the then Attorney General delineated considerations of the 
jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.273 This distinction is firmly grounded within international 
law.274 The collective legal treatment of war separates the regulation of the use of force from the 
means by which force is used. Israel has elsewhere cited the importance of this distinction.275 
268 See GREENSPAN, supra note 133, at 225–26. See also FEILCHENFELD, supra note 126, at 12 (both for early 
examples of such endorsements).  
269 See ICRC Expert Meeting, supra note 39, at 74 (for an example of the former). See also FRANCIS LIEBER, 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD 3–4 (1863) (for an example 
of the latter) [hereinafter Army General Order 100].  
270 See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 6. See also DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 3.  
271 See Shamgar, Legal Concepts, supra note 72, at 43. See also Lassa Oppenheim, The Legal Relations Between an 
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Traditionally, the exclusive legal treatment of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello ensures that 
the latter applies regardless of the former’s assessment. This was conveyed, in relation to 
occupation, by an American Military Tribunal at Nuremburg. In the Hostages Trial, the Tribunal 
submitted that: 
international law makes no distinction between a lawful and an unlawful occupant in 
dealing with the respective duties of occupant and population in territory. There is no 
reciprocal connection between the manner of the military occupation of territory and 
the rights and duties of the occupant and population to each other after the 
relationship has in fact been established. Whether the invasion was lawful or criminal 
is not an important factor in the consideration of this subject.276  
The separate and non-contingent application of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello was read 
into Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions. This requires High Contracting Parties to 
“respect and ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”277 The distinction 
received explicit recognition in the preamble to the First Additional Protocol. Accordingly, the 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions and of the Protocol “must be fully applied in all 
circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse 
distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict. . . .”278 
As Yoram Dinstein explains, “the law of belligerent occupation is a branch of the jus in bello.” 
The rights and obligations attributed to the occupying power are not altered by “the chain of 
events in which the belligerent occupation was brought about.”279 This is reflective of strong 
policy considerations.280 It is grounded within the realist contention that despite war’s 
prohibition, armed conflict continues to occur. War’s inevitability compels legal regulation and 
humanitarian moderation.281 In practice, however, the distinction between the jus ad bellum and 
the jus in bello becomes absolute. It is interpreted to require “a total normative separation.” The 
norms of one regime may not affect the “validity, application, compliance, or interpretation of 
the other.”282 
276 See Hostages Trial, supra note 21, at 637. See also Re Christiansen, 15 I.L.R. 412, 413 (Holland, Special Court 
of Arnhem, 1948) (The following year a Dutch Special Court ruled, “The rules of international law, in so far as they 
regulate the methods of warfare and the occupation of enemy territory, make no distinction between wars which 
have been started legally and those which have been started illegally.”). See also DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 3.  
277 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 1–2 [emphasis added] (a similar distinction was derived from 
the wording of Common Article 2 which held that the “present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war 
or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties…”). See also 
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The duality of international law’s relationship with armed conflict is deeply rooted in the legal 
orthodoxy that regulates occupation. Rotem Giladi has termed this the “total separation 
paradigm.”283 This distinction “prohibits answering IHL questions by recourse to jus ad bellum 
issues. It assumes that the jus in bello is neutral or autonomous.”284 Political or diplomatic 
considerations regarding the nature or status of the occupation are discounted by engagements 
grounded in IHL. The legal regulation of occupation is distinguished from politicized 
considerations that contest the cause, effect, and legitimacy of occupation.285 The influence of 
this rigid distinction is evidenced by the general reluctance of humanitarian and legal 
organizations—those otherwise consumed with tempering and critiquing occupation—to refrain 
from assessing the occupation’s legality. Accordingly, legal approaches deemphasize 
temporality’s significance. The pursuit and fulfillment of termination becomes the concern of the 
political sphere.  
Strict adherence to the total separation paradigm is, however, an interpretative choice. It 
facilitates the prominent approach to prolonged occupation. Grounded in the jus in bello, this 
preferred reading portrays occupation as fact. Subsequent considerations fixate on duration but 
neglect the fundamental principles that are compromised when the character of an occupation 
alters to become a form of quasi-permanent control. Accompanying legal engagements neglect 
the occupation’s origins. They do not engage with causes of occupation or those influences that 
contribute to its continuation. These factors—queries concerning the occupation’s duration—
remain within the political sphere. They are beyond the reach and relevancy of IHL. As the 
ICRC expert panel noted, since IHL did not impose formal limits on the occupation’s duration, it 
is incapable of preventing prolonged occupation.286 An unconstrained notion of occupation 
supersedes temporariness. It becomes the function of international law to manage, not resolve, 
occupation.  
The implications of this interpretative choice neglect the primacy of temporality. They negate its 
prominence within the occupation framework and they abandon its relevance to foundational 
considerations of the jus ad bellum. These are unnecessary concessions. While aspects of 
prolonged occupation will demand management, it need not come at the expense of broader 
considerations. Though the occupation framework is correctly assumed to form part of the jus in 
bello, this does not discount the continued significance of the jus ad bellum.  
Commentators have long-acknowledged the simultaneous relevancy of the jus ad bellum and the 
jus in bello.287 Christopher Greenwood notes, “while the former will always operate before the 
283 Giladi, supra note 21, at 263.  
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285 Id. at 264.  
286 ICRC Expert Meeting, supra note 39, at 74.  
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latter comes into play, once hostilities have commenced it is necessary to consider both. The 
relationship between them thus becomes of considerable importance.”288  
Rotem Giladi extends this reasoning to the case of occupation. 289 While the applicability of the 
occupation framework continues without distinction, “jus ad bellum considerations . . . play an 
important role in bringing about and shaping specific cases of occupation.”290 Giladi 
convincingly illustrates how the phenomenon of occupation requires reference to the jus ad 
bellum. The occupation framework is bound in duality. It is concerned, “like other IHL norms, 
with the humane treatment of individuals. It also uniquely addresses questions of governance and 
sovereignty.”291 Accordingly, the norms of occupation are reliant upon the norms of the jus ad 
bellum.292  This reliance is reflected in the occupation framework’s prohibition of annexation.293 
As Giladi explains, “the prohibition on annexation is still implicit in the transient, alegal nature 
of the occupation, but at the same time also serve to ensure the preservation of world order by 
removing one legal incentive for war.”294  
An interpretative choice that preferences a factual conception of occupation neglects the 
centrality of jus ad bellum norms. Responses to prolonged occupation that favor management 
while remaining silent on temporality surrender a principal function of the occupation 
framework. This implied deference is unnecessarily dismissive of the position that temporariness 
holds within the occupation framework and of the centrality that jus ad bellum norms claim both 
within general international law and for the legal regulation of occupation. Instead, a revised 
interpretative approach to the legal treatment of prolonged occupation should opt to accentuate 
the principle of temporariness and the subsequent requirement to enable occupation’s 
termination.  
B. Accentuating Temporariness and a Good-Faith Standard to Terminate Prolonged Occupation  
On the eve of the occupation’s fifth decade, a Military Appeals Court in the West Bank ruled that 
it possessed the authority to review the compatibility of military orders with the law of 
occupation. The Court pronounced that the occupation framework was “the grundnorm of the 
occupation regime, and judicial review was the only check against [the] unrestrained exercise of 
power by the military commander.”295 Elsewhere, Martti Koskenniemi described the High Court 
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of Justice’s reliance upon the principle of proportionality as constituting “the Grundnorm against 
which the activities of the occupation authority must be measured.”296 
Identifying a basic norm reflects the interpreter’s conception of what the occupation framework 
should achieve. It constitutes how the framework should be understood. To be effective—to 
accurately capture the spirit of IHL and the purposes of the jus ad bellum—this determination 
must not be influenced by a factual, indefinite conception of occupation. Instead, the proposed 
good faith approach to enable termination offers an alternative foundation. It is structured around 
two interconnected elements: the understanding that occupation constitutes a provisional state 
and the principle of good faith. These two factors collectively support the proposed interpretative 
shift. They identify and accentuate the principle of temporariness and invoke fundamental norms 
of international relations.  
Temporality’s identification is not innovative. The notion that occupation constitutes a 
provisional state remains undisputed.297 Article 55 of the Hague Regulations holds that an 
occupying power assumes the status of a temporary administrator.298 With reference to the 
objectives of the conservationist principle and the purposes of Article 43, the ICRC 
Commentaries define an occupying power as “merely being a de facto administrator.”299 The 
2015 Clapham Commentaries simply note that “occupation is a temporary situation, not 
equivalent to annexation.”300 Eyal Benvenisti surmises that “because occupation does not amount 
to sovereignty, the occupation is also limited in time and the occupant has only temporary 
managerial powers, for the period of time until a peaceful solution is reached.”301 
The prominent normative approaches proposed elsewhere recognize temporariness’s centrality. 
This is reflective of temporality’s ubiquity. Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli acknowledge that 
“the temporary, as distinct from the indefinite, nature of occupation is thus the most necessary 
element of the normative regime of occupation.”302 The consequences of the approach proposed 
here, however, diverge from the foundational normative and non-normative approaches 
identified elsewhere.  
The abovementioned approaches associate the failure to ensure temporality with declared 
illegality. The proposed approach, however, imposes a positive obligation—the enablement of 
termination. It articulates a means of shifting the international legal discourse from the 
prominent, management-focused approach to an understanding that better responds to the altered 
form of control that prolonged occupation represents. Referencing the Draft Articles on State 
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Responsibility, the illegality approach notes the obligation to cease wrongful acts.303 While this 
is a compelling legal argument, to extend its relevancy beyond a particular, recurring violation of 
the occupation framework, requires a holistic understanding of temporality.  
The proposed good faith obligation to enable termination provides this. It acknowledges that 
temporality is defined both by duration and the character of the occupation. The illegality 
approach offers a more limited notion of temporality that is linked to the occupation’s duration. 
Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli call upon the international community to establish a clear 
durational limitation. An occupation exceeding one year, they suggest, be transferred to an 
international authority.304 Further, the qualification of an occupation as “illegal” does not affect 
the continued application of the occupation framework.305 This maintains the risk of perpetual 
management. The proposed approach provides a means of coupling the employment of the 
occupation framework with a holistic conception of temporality that is conscience of and 
responsive to the form that the occupation has assumed.  
Temporality’s prominence reflects both political and humanitarian purposes. These are crucial 
features of international law’s relationship with occupation. They are expressive of the norms 
governing relations amongst states and between nations and individuals. Accordingly, 
employment of the occupation framework must embrace this holistic conception of 
temporariness. It must harness these grander meanings and preference a reading that facilitates 
the objective of termination. Engagements with the occupation framework, in response to 
prolonged occupation, must accentuate both this principle and reflect its origins and purposes.  
1. The Political and Humanitarian Purposes of the Occupation Framework Are Premised on a 
Holistic Notion of Temporality  
The legal construct of occupation developed as a rejection of conquest.306 International society 
discounted the validity of sovereign title that historically followed debellatio. Occupatio bellica 
became an intermediate status. It recognized a military authority’s territorial control and began 
establishing a temporary regulatory framework. This framework provided that an occupying 
force would administer the territory “on a provisional basis, but has no legal entitlement to 
exercise the rights of the absent sovereign.”307 
The emergent principle—that “belligerent occupation is in essence a temporary condition in 
which the powers of the belligerent occupant are not without limit”—was initially codified in 
Francis Lieber’s General Order No. 100.308 Further articulation and codification followed. A 
host of military manuals acknowledged a temporary conception of occupation. This temporal 
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conception informed, and was formalized by, the international law-making initiatives of the mid-
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.309 These efforts continued to premise occupation’s regulation 
upon the notion of a durational limitation. They infused both political and humanitarian 
objectives into international law’s relationship with the occupation of foreign territory.310 
Temporality undergirds initiatives to both preserve sovereignty and to protect a vulnerable 
population subject to foreign control. 
Sovereignty’s divergence from the historical right to conquest necessitated the construction of a 
provisional phase. This existed during the period between when a foreign state established 
control of a hostile’s territory and when the belligerents completed a peace treaty determining the 
territory’s status. This temporary state was to ensure that “de facto power did not immediately 
translate into de jure sovereignty, conquest, and subjugation.”311 Though the occupation 
framework’s origins reflected the desire to preserve European order, the notion that occupation 
constituted a provisional, de facto phenomenon privileged sovereign preservation.   
The prioritization of European order waned. Global initiatives structured the community of 
nations around the principles of sovereign equality and the prohibition of the acquisition of 
territory by force.312 Temporality assumed a constitutive function. It facilitated many of the 
foundational principles of international order. These principles received expression within the 
occupation framework. Prominently, temporality is reflected in the framework’s prohibition of 
annexation.313 This remains part of customary international law and receives articulation within 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and in the Declaration of Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Amongst States.314  
Temporality is reflected in the rules regulating an occupier’s authority. These rules establish the 
occupier as an administrator whose power is derived from its factual presence—not its sovereign 
entitlement.315 The requirement to preserve existing legislation—articulated within Article 43 of 
the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention—both constitutes and is 
reliant upon the principle of temporality.316  
Engagements with prolonged occupation that accentuate temporality better represent the political 
objectives conveyed within the occupation framework. They are reflective of fundamental 
international norms. Temporality’s relationship with and support of these norms go beyond 
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political considerations and structural components of the jus ad bellum. It is expressive of the 
occupation framework’s humanitarian purposes. Temporality constitutes a requisite condition of 
the framework’s jus in bello function.  
The occupation framework’s humanitarian purpose has become paramount. Article 4 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention establishes the status of protected persons.317 The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia described the Convention’s “object and purpose” 
as safeguarding those individuals “who do not enjoy the diplomatic protection, and . . . are not 
subject to the allegiances and control, of the State in whose hands they may find themselves.”318 
Humanitarian requirements are imbued throughout the Convention.319 Benvenisti remarked that 
“the very decision to dedicate the Fourth Geneva Convention to persons and not governments 
signified a growing awareness in international law of the idea that peoples are not merely the 
resources of states, but rather that they are worthy of being subjects of international norms.”320 
These developments, however, proceeded sequentially. The Hague Regulations made minimal 
reference to explicit humanitarian requirements.321 Nevertheless, the early willingness to deny an 
occupying power sovereignty forbade foreign control from becoming a means to subjugate a 
local population. The limitation of the right to conquest, through the temporal conception of 
occupation, accompanied the increasing humanization of conflict. Gregory Fox describes this 
lineage. The law governing occupation, “emerged in the late eighteenth century as a humanizing 
trend in the law of war, modifying a state’s previously unencumbered right to subjugate 
conquered foreign territories.”322 Though the use of force maintained legitimacy, these 
modifications tempered a foreign power’s rule. By establishing occupation as a temporary 
phenomenon, contingent upon a negotiated agreement, regulatory attempts endeavored to modify 
the “harsh but common consequences of foreign control over territory.”323 
The humanitarian purpose of the occupation framework evolved in tandem with the legal 
regulation of war. Now, an occupying power assumes responsibility for an array of humanitarian 
considerations. These directly influence the lived experiences of the occupied population. 
Corresponding humanitarian considerations are privileged by contemporary readings of the 
occupation framework.324 The management approach, ostensibly, endeavors to ensure 
humanitarian requirements. It seeks to fill a void. This exists when the needs created by an 
occupation’s duration exceeds the allowances that an occupying power may take to fulfill its 
humanitarian obligations. The ability of the occupied population to fully address their 
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humanitarian needs—to fulfill their political, economic, and cultural wants through the 
realization of self-determination—becomes contingent upon the principle of temporality.325 
The occupation framework embodies international norms. It sets particular objectives. These are 
widely acknowledged. They contend that occupation is not equivalent to annexation. The legal 
framework imposes duties of good governance and humanitarian concern upon the occupying 
power. And it provides the occupying power with specified allowances to ensure its military’s 
wellbeing and to provide effective administration of occupied territory.326 Again, each of these 
principles are contingent upon temporality.  
The purpose here is not to reiterate these principles. Their existence is not in doubt. The purpose 
here, instead, is to preference an interpretation of the occupation framework that accentuates a 
holistic, not merely durational, notion of temporality. It is to disentangle prolonged occupation’s 
treatment from the prominent interpretative approach. Attempts to manage prolonged occupation 
continue to cite, or are premised upon, an interpretation that emphasizes the absence of a firm 
durational limitation. Engagements that appeal to the management approach do not question 
whether initiatives taken under the framework’s auspices are conducive with enabling the 
occupation’s termination. They deemphasize a central and constitutive purpose of the occupation 
framework—ensuring an occupation’s temporality. For if an occupation is to constitute a 
temporary state, if sovereignty will revert, if the occupying power is to serve as a trustee and not 
a sovereign, then the occupation must end. While the framework may be silent on the chronology 
of such termination—and an exclusive focus on the question of duration may support the 
position assumed by Yoram Dinstein, the ICRC expert meeting, and others—to permit that such 
silence equates to or facilitates the implied permanence of prolonged occupation would render 
the entire framework an absurdity.  
2. Termination Is the Necessary Corollary of Temporality
When the Namibian Mandate terminated, South Africa was deprived of the international 
recognition that legitimized its control as a Mandatory Power. The Mandate’s termination, 
however, did not compel South Africa to vacate the foreign territory.327 The proposal presented 
within these pages does not purport to exact occupation’s termination. It is mindful of 
international law’s limitations.328 The proposal recognizes that the occupation framework cannot 
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coerce an occupying power to end its prolonged control of foreign territory when a 
predetermined threshold is reached.  
As noted, such determination is not suited to a fixed chronological scale.329 Yet, when the 
situation on the ground becomes one where neither The Hague Regulations nor the Fourth 
Geneva Convention can competently protect sovereignty or effectively balance the relationship 
between the occupier and the occupied, resulting legal engagements must recognize that the 
occupation has or risks becoming indefinite. The proposed approach wishes to reject the creeping 
prevalence of an indeterminate conception of occupation. By moving from a factual, 
unconstrained notion of occupation, this favored interpretation links the principle of temporality 
to its inevitable corollary, termination.  
The requirement to cease unlawful activity is firmly grounded in international law. The Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility compel an offending party to end unlawful activity and provide 
assurances of non-repetition.330 This suggests that a state, occupying foreign territory without 
legal justification, is required to immediately terminate the occupation.331 Calls for cessation are 
often contingent upon the perception that an occupation is itself illegal.332 Yaël Ronen illustrates, 
however, that such declarations are themselves predicated upon acknowledgement of violations 
that affect the constitutive nature of the occupation regime. Accordingly, “the cessation of a 
violation necessarily means termination of the occupation.”333  
In its Namibia opinion, the ICJ required South Africa to withdraw from and end its occupation of 
the administered territory. Again, this decision was reliant upon the Court’s determination of 
illegality.334 Similarly, the international community often predicates calls to terminate occupation 
on the assumption of illegality.335 A declaration that an occupying power is obliged to end its 
territorial control follows, as Benvenisti suggested, the burden to resolve the underlying political 
stalemate.336 This determination is influenced by the perceived legitimacy of the occupation.  
Such perception, however, does not reactively prompt a declaration of illegality. The 
international community has not reverted to the determinative language that the General 
Assembly employed in the late 1970s when describing the Israeli occupation.337 This has 
prompted the Special Rapporteur’s recent initiative to establish a framework assessing 
occupation’s legality. As noted, the Rapporteur’s report accurately observed that “the prevailing 
329 There should, of course, be no doubt as to whether Israel’s presence within the West Bank satisfies this 
classification.  
330 See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 248, art. 30.  
331 Olivier Corten, The Obligation of Cessation, in OXFORD COMMENTARIES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 545, 545 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).  
332 Ariel Zemach, Can Occupation Resulting from a War of Self-Defense Become Illegal?, 24 MINN. J. INT’L L. 313, 
316–17 (2015).  
333 Ronen, supra note 178, at 228.  
334 Namibia Opinion, supra note 176, ¶ 133. See also S.C. Res. 301, ¶ 6 (Oct. 20, 1971); Ronen, supra note 178, at 
228.  
335 Ronen, supra note 178, at 228. See also G.A. Res. 3061 (XXVIII), ¶ 3 (Nov. 2, 1973); S.C. Res. 661, at 19, 20 
(Aug. 6, 1990). 
336 BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 244.  
337 See G.A. Res. 32/20, supra note 229, preamble. See also G.A. Res. 33/29, supra note 229, preamble.  
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approach of the international community has been to treat Israel as the lawful occupant of the 
Palestinian territory.”338 
The interpretative approach presented here separates the objective of termination from 
assessments of legality. This distinction is motivated by the abovementioned apprehensions 
concerning the illegality approach.339 The proposed approach does not deny that an occupation 
may be, or may become, illegal. It instead recognizes that a determination of illegality, within a 
context as fraught as Israeli-Palestinian relations, is inseparable from politics. To move beyond 
the political resistance that would accompany such a declaration, to bypass the pragmatic 
challenges of selecting which individuals or what mechanisms possess the authority to render 
such a determination, the proposed approach embraces the more modest standard of enabling the 
occupation’s termination. This requirement is associated not with the occupation’s legal status, 
but with its duration and form.  
Despite the prevalence of the management approach, the requirement to enable an occupation’s 
termination is indicative of international will. Notwithstanding the common association between 
termination and illegality, calls to conclude occupation are not dependent on the occupation’s 
legal status. Following the U.S. and British occupation of Iraq, the Security Council held that the 
Iraqi right to self-determination was contingent upon the occupation’s expeditious termination.340 
Termination thus becomes the necessary fulfillment of the occupation framework’s fundamental 
purposes. It is the prerequisite of the principle pacta sunt servanda.341  
Linking the enablement of termination to temporality provides an objective. If an occupant is 
determined to violate international law, it provides a subsequent step—a means of redress—that 
is not immediately conveyed by the illegality approach. Devoid of a legal determination, it 
acknowledges that termination is not merely a means to rectify a legal wrong. It is a positive 
requirement compelled by the occupation framework’s normative purpose. This durational 
limitation is effectively absent from the prominent interpretative approach, which maintains that 
nothing under IHL prevents an occupant from embarking on a long-term occupation.342  
Temporality’s dependency on termination reiterates an inescapable truth. This holds that the 
principles conveyed by the occupation framework—preserving sovereignty, safeguarding local 
needs, ensuring self-determination—prevent an occupation from becoming prolonged. These 
principles are contingent on the basic norm of temporality and the fulfillment of this primary 
requirement compels termination. To avoid perpetual management, to better capture the spirit of 
IHL, an amended interpretative approach that accentuates temporality and preferences 
termination may derive faciliatory support from the principle of good faith.   
338 Lynk, supra note 224, ¶ 18.  
339 See supra Part III.A. 
340 See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 40, preamble. See also Lynk, supra note 224, ¶ 32. 
341 Corten, supra note 331, at 545–46.  
342 ICRC Expert Meeting, supra note 39, at 74. r 
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3. The Relevance and Potential of the Principle of Good Faith
In 1973, largely in response to Israel’s continuing occupation of the Palestinian territories, the 
General Assembly passed Resolution 3171. The resolution supported the rights of peoples living 
under foreign occupation to “regain control of their natural resources.”343 Eyal Benvenisti 
remarked that Resolution 3171 conveyed that an occupying power may not purposefully delay a 
conflict’s peaceful settlement. It may not perpetuate occupation.344 The occupant, Benvenisti 
noted, “has a duty under international law to conduct negotiations in good faith for a peaceful 
solution.”345 
The second element of the proposed interpretation appeals to the principle of good faith. This 
reinforces an amended normative approach that views temporality as a basic norm and 
termination as an objective imbued throughout the occupation framework. Within the Israeli-
Palestinian context, the notion of good faith often appears as a rhetorical device. It assumes the 
form of a loaded allegation that both parties enthusiastically accuse the other of lacking.346 
Alongside this popular usage, the principle of good faith has become an evaluative criterion. It 
provides a standard of compliance against which an occupation’s legality is assessed. Proponents 
of the illegality approach link determinations of malfeasance to particular violations of the 
occupation framework.347 Commonly, these violations amount to de facto annexation. They 
manifest through the refusal to “engage in good faith negotiations toward ending the 
occupation.”348 Benvenisti has long contended that an occupant, acting in bad faith to stall an 
occupation’s termination, becomes an aggressor and is tainted with illegality.349 
The present invocation of good faith, however, assumes a more fundamental purpose. It protects 
against the misuse of international law. It ensures that legal interpretations and engagements with 
the occupation framework maintain consistency with the framework’s ostensible purposes.350 
Good faith is firmly rooted in international law and underpins many preeminent legal rules.351 It 
343 G.A. Res. 3171, (Dec. 17, 1973).  
344 BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 245.  
345 Id. 
346 See, e.g., JAMES L. GELVIN, THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF WAR 240–41 (2007) 
(for a broader use of the notion of good faith in the formal peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians). 
347 See Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 239, at 553–55. See also Ronen, supra note 178, at 206–08; Lynk, supra note 
224, ¶¶ 27–37.  
348 Zemach, supra note 332, at 316. 
349 See Benvenisti 1st ed., supra note 320, at 215. See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 245–46.  
350 This foundational legal requirement is expressed through the rule, pacta sunt servanda, and is codified in Article 
26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This is described as a cornerstone of international relations. 
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, T.S. No. 58, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]. See also MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW 
OF TREATIES 363 (2009). 
351 The duty to act in good faith is found in Article 2(2) of the U.N. Charter, Articles 26 and 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, and in the preamble to the Declaration on Friendly Relations. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 2; Vienna 
Convention, supra note 350, arts. 26 & 31; Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 312, preamble. See Certain 
Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. Rep. 9, 48 (Jul. 6) (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J.) (Judge 
Lauterpacht held that, “Unquestionably, the obligation to act in accordance with good faith, being a general principle 
of law, is also part of international law.”). See Lynk, supra note 224, ¶ 35 (The Special Rapporteur report noted that 
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is expressive of the international community’s desire to preserve order and avoid arbitrariness 
and chaos.352 In its Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ explained that, “One of the basic principles 
governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the 
principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in 
particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential.”353 
 
The good faith principle governs the conduct of international negotiations. It requires, 
“negotiating in a way that is likely to yield an agreement.”354 The ICJ further elucidates. The 
Court has explained that good faith negotiations must demonstrate willingness to contemplate 
alternative proposals, avoid preconditions, and accept assistance from third-parties.355 This is 
supportive of the view, expressed by Benvenisti and others, that bad faith conduct compels 
illegality. However, the good faith obligation to enable termination does not purport to oblige 
negotiations. It does not assess the legality of an occupation regime. Instead, this proposal 
recognizes that responses to the challenges posed by prolonged occupation are the result of 
interpretative discordance between a temporal understanding of occupation and one that 
accentuates the framework’s failure to assert a firm durational limit. It is between a factual and a 
normative conception of occupation. And it contests an alegal and an illegal vision of the 
occupation regime.  
 
Each interpretative account is premised upon a particularized reading of the occupation 
framework. Despite temporality’s incontestability, despite its embodiment and expression of the 
occupation framework’s constitutive norms, it continues to be relegated through an interpretative 
approach that views occupation as an unconstrained fact. A reading of the occupation framework 
that appeals to the requirements of good faith is better situated to emphasize temporality’s 
preeminence. It better facilitates an interpretative approach that, recalling Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention, accentuates the “object and purpose” of the occupation framework.356 The 
proposed approach creates a link between a treaty’s interpretation and its performance.357 It 
clearly articulates the claim, established within the occupation framework, that temporality is 
contingent upon termination. Such an interpretation offers  a more purposeful reading of the 
occupation framework and a more efficacious means of engaging with the myriad challenges 
posed by prolonged occupation.  
 
4. Ensuring an Effective Safeguard Against Misuse 
 
The desire to move from a factual, unconstrained notion of occupation and the corresponding 
management approach does not discount the challenges posed by prolonged occupation. These 
challenges are real and often urgent. As noted, occupations traditionally conclude when the 
the principle of good faith is a cornerstone principle of the international legal system and of all legal relationships in 
modern international law).  
352 See Steven Reinhold, Good Faith in International Law, 2 BONN RES. PAPER PUB. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2013). 
353 Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgement, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 49 (Dec. 20).   
354 Barry O’Neill, What Does it Mean for Nations to “Negotiate in Good Faith”?, CTR. INT’L SECURITY & 
COOPERATION, STAN. U. 2 (2001), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/boneill/goodfaith5.pdf.   
355 Id. See also The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 142 (Sept. 
25). 
356 Vienna Convention, supra note 350, art. 31.  
357 Villiger, supra note 350, at 425.  
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fortunes of war are altered or upon a negotiated agreement.358 The good faith obligation to enable 
termination seeks to facilitate the latter. In the West Bank, the first traditional means—the 
changing fortunes of war—is improbable due to Israel’s disproportionate military strength. 
Equally, it is undesirable in a region plagued by instability and violence. Yet it is these regional 
realities that heighten the risk of an already prolonged occupation continuing indefinitely. An 
occupying power, disinclined to withdraw from territory and harboring security-based 
apprehensions, is unlikely to make concessions that stray from its immediate interests. An 
occupied population, politically divided and hamstrung by ineffective leadership, will struggle to 
represent its constituent’s objectives.  
 
The approach proposed here presupposes that temporality compels termination. The posited 
interpretation is immediately concerned with ensuring that the legal framework is not interpreted 
to facilitate occupation or resigned to its perpetual management. It recognizes that an adjustment 
to the occupation framework will not usurp geopolitical and regional dynamics and simply 
compel an occupation’s termination. Thus, certain management is inescapable. It is a required 
means of ensuring the interests of a population bereft of political and economic autonomy. It is 
obliged by the occupation framework.359 In accordance, the enablement of termination becomes 
an accompaniment to and an objective of management initiatives. The proposed interpretative 
shift intends to alter understandings of the legal framework so that termination moves from the 
background to the forefront of relevant legal engagements. Thus, the objective of termination 
becomes a bulwark against initiatives—masquerading as management efforts and compelled by 
the occupation’s duration—that frustrate, rather than facilitate, the principle of temporality.  
 
The proposed imposition of a check is not novel. Often, however, the prescribed restraint 
accompanies engagements with prolonged occupation that adhere to the prominent interpretative 
approach. This permeates much of the academic literature. The aforementioned “inherent 
dilemma”—concerning the latitude required to effectively treat prolonged occupation—often 
fails to link purported management initiatives with the principle of temporality or the obligation 
to terminate occupation.  
 
In as early as 1942, E.H. Feilchenfeld argued that an occupying power may disregard the 
conservationist principle by providing “appropriate justification.360 This would provide the 
occupying power with what Feilchenfeld believed was the necessary latitude to address the 
economic challenges of prolonged occupation. Yoram Dinstein proposed a litmus test. It is 
axiomatic, Dinstein held, that an occupying power requires increased legislative latitude to 
effectively manage prolonged occupation.361 Misuse, however, could not be discounted. If the 
occupying power truly requires further legislation to meet the needs of the occupied population, 
if it endeavors to successfully manage the prolonged occupation, it must, Dinstein concluded, 
358 Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 47. See also DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 
22, at 271–72.   
359 See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 6. See also Roberts, Military Occupation, supra note 31, at 295 (Both 
Benvenisti and Roberts capture this purpose of the occupation framework by defining the occupying power as 
serving as a trustee for the limited duration of the occupation.).  
360 See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 133, at 89.  
361 See DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 120.  
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exhibit a similar (legislatively enacted) concern for its own population.362 In Abu Aita, the High 
Court of Justice adopted Dinstein’s litmus test.363 The Court held that imposed initiatives, 
ostensibly intended to benefit the local population, were valid if “the military government is 
filled with the same concern in regard to its own people and applies the same measures taken in 
the area of military government in its own area.”364  
 
Subsequent efforts to both increase and regulate the legislative latitude received by an occupant 
maintained fidelity to the prominent interpretative approach. These initiatives rarely linked the 
proposed means of preventing abuse with the principle of temporality. Adam Roberts, for 
example, acknowledged the need to amend the occupation framework. Such alterations would, 
however, be susceptible to misuse. To safeguard against potential abuse, Roberts favored 
limiting particular allowances while extending only those deemed necessary to effectively 
manage prolonged occupation.365  
 
Similar proposals followed. The scholarly treatment of prolonged occupation offered an array of 
regulatory methods. These intended to both better manage occupation and safeguard against 
legislative overreach by the occupying power. Marco Sassòli proposed appealing to the Security 
Council.366 Eyal Benvenisti suggested a consultative process that solicits local participation and 
input.367 While Benvenisti’s response lends a degree of democratic legitimacy to the 
management process, others seek a broader international mandate. Richard Falk has proposed the 
development of an international convention. If an occupation continues for ten years, the 
convention would direct the management of the prolonged occupation and safeguard local 
interests.368 Similarly, Brian Walsh and Ilan Peleg call for the creation of an “occupation 
document.” To effectively manage prolonged occupation, the proposed mechanism would 
identify imposed foreign control as a “special legal condition which requires specific legal 
doctrine designed to meet the needs of an occupation.”369 Effective management is derived from 
362 Id. at 121. See also Yoram Dinstein, The Legislative Power in Administered Territories, 2 TEL AVIV L. REV. 505, 
511 (in Hebrew) (1972); BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 92 (In accordance, the existence of a law in the occupant’s 
own territory will provide evidence of the lawfulness of a similar law’s introduction within the occupied territory. 
Both Dinstein and Benvenisti note, however, this may only serve as a prima facie test that requires specific 
examination within a particular case.). 
363 See Abu Aita, supra note 103, at 5, 135–36.  
364 Id. (Justice Shamgar, delivering the judgment, concluded, as had Dinstein, that this criterion was not exhaustive. 
This reflected the belief that circumstances may arise where “conditions in a territory and special circumstances 
demand legislative steps not required at the time, or at all, in the home country.).   
365 Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 22, at 51, 53.  
366 To prevent abuse, the UN body would evaluate and authorize necessary departures from the occupation 
framework to ensure the required management initiatives. See Sassòli, Article 43, supra note 126, at 15–16. See also 
David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 842, 843 (2003) (offers a similar appeal in relation to 
the U.S. and British-led occupation of Iraq and “transformative” occupations more broadly). 
367 BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 146–247. See Christopher Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied Territory in 
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 241, 264 (Emma 
Playfair ed., 1992) (offering a similar suggestion in relation to local governance). 
368 See Falk, supra note 49, at 45–47 (suggesting the creation of an internationally supervised plebiscite or a 
mechanism to evaluate whether the law governing belligerent occupation remains relevant). 
369 Brian Walsh & Ilan Peleg, Human Rights Under Military Occupation: The Need for Expansion, 2 INT’L J. OF 
HUM. RTS. 62, 62–63 (1998). 
71
human rights law. This, according to Walsh and Peleg, balances protections that safeguard the 
local population and the occupier’s right to pursue genuine security interests.370  
 
Other proposals indirectly allude to temporality’s importance. Most often, though, these fail to 
reference the requisite criterion of termination. Proponents of a self-determination-based 
standard, such as Alain Pellet, acknowledge the discordance between the legal framework and 
the challenges posed by prolonged occupation. This discordance compels initiatives to better 
facilitate effective management. Pellet asserts that “humanitarian” responses, necessary to 
address these challenges, are lawful to the extent that they do not threaten the occupied 
population’s right to self-determination.371  
 
Considerations of an occupying power’s legislative discretion consistently fail to build upon an 
interpretation of the legal framework that accentuates temporality. This process begins before an 
occupation becomes prolonged. Scholarly deliberations concerning how and when an occupant 
may introduce legislation remain within the direct wording of Articles 43 and 64.372 Legislation 
may be introduced to maintain order, to ensure the safety of the occupant’s military forces, or to 
realize the legitimate purposes of the occupation.373 Subsequent efforts to reconcile the 
framework’s conservationism with prolonged occupation followed this approach. They permit 
expansive authority to better manage the exigencies of prolonged occupation but fail to couple 
these allowances with the principle of temporality or the requirement to enable termination of 
prolonged occupation.  
 
The proposed good faith approach offers an alternative. It insists that initiatives, undertaken for 
the ostensible benefit of the local population, must remain consistent with the occupation 
framework’s purposes. These must not compromise a notion of temporality that is cognizant of 
the foundational norms that this principle encapsulates. Instead, they must enable its termination. 
This is justified by a simple assumption. This holds that responses to the challenges posed by 
prolonged occupation are most effective when premised upon temporality. That the interests of 
the occupied population, the requirements of the occupying power, and the demands of 
international order are best satisfied when occupation terminates. Too often, the international law 
governing the phenomenon of occupation preferences a factual, unconstrained notion of 
occupation. Where diplomatic appeals and the principle of self-determination have constantly 
called for the occupation to end, international law is largely silent. The good faith approach to 
enable termination seeks to more accurately represent the spirit of IHL. It wishes to realign legal 
appeals with the principle of self-determination and diplomatic calls for the conclusion of 
prolonged occupation.  
 
370 Id. Noam Lubell, Human Rights Obligations in Military Occupation, 885 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 317, 329 (2012) 
(for an example of similar proposal to Walsh and Peleg).  
371 Alain Pellet, The Destruction of Troy Will Not Take Place, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 169, 192, 201–02 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992). 
372 Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 42. See also Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 64.  
373 See generally LORD ARNOLD D. MCNAIR & ARTHUR D. WATTS, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR (4th ed. 1966). See 
also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 91–92; GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A 
COMMENTARY ON LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 97 (1957); Sassòli, Legislation and 
Maintenance, supra note 82  
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C. Aligning the Occupation Framework with Diplomatic Appeals to Terminate Prolonged 
Occupation and the Principle of Self-Determination 
Shortly following the 1967 War, the Security Council gathered in New York. On November 22,  
it adopted Resolution 242. The Security Council cited the illegality and inadmissibility of the 
acquisition of territory by force.374 It directly referenced the recent war. Continuing, the 
resolution famously affirmed that the establishment of a “just and lasting peace” required Israeli 
withdrawal from the recently occupied territories.375 The termination of belligerency was 
premised upon respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all 
states in the region.376 The resulting “land for peace” formula compelled the nascent 
occupation’s termination and the normalization of relations.377 This formula became the 
foundation of the diplomatic approach to the enduring conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians.  
A decade later, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat journeyed to Jerusalem and addressed the 
Knesset. A new era of optimism was heralded. Sadat declared that “peace cannot be worth its 
name unless it is based on justice, and not on the occupation of the land of others.”378 The 
Egyptian leader evoked the international consensus that had developed around Resolution 242. 
Sadat pronounced that the call for a “permanent and just peace, based on respect for the United 
Nations resolutions, has now become the call of the whole world. It has become a clear 
expression of the will of the international community. . . .”379 The following year, Egypt and 
Israel signed the Camp David Accords. A framework for Middle East peacemaking was 
reestablished. Palestinian autonomy would be implemented over five years. Transitional 
arrangements would be negotiated. Upon Palestinian self-governance, Israel was required to 
withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.380  
Similar optimism accompanied Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat on the White House lawn in 
1993. The symbolism of an Israeli Prime Minister embracing the hand of a Palestinian Chairman 
was momentous. The era of Oslo and the Declaration of Principles again premised a negotiated 
peace upon Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian self-governance.381 Yet optimism would flounder 
following an intifada, a series of deadly wars in Gaza, and the continued entrenchment of Israel’s 
374 S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 1 (Nov. 22, 1967). 
375 Id.  
376 Id.  
377 See Bruce D. Jones, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Wars: Responsibility Without Power, in THE 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 298, 308 
(Vaughn Lowe et al. eds., 2008).  
378 Anwar Sadat, Egypt President, Address at the Israeli Knesset (Nov. 20, 1977), reprinted in THE ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 1967–1990 136, 139, 142 (Yehuda Lukacs ed., 1992). 
379 Id. 
380 A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, Isr.-Egypt, Sept. 17, 1978, 1136 U.N.T.S. 196, in THE ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 1967–1990 155, preamble, sec. 1 (Yehuda Lukacs ed., 1992).  
381 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Isr.-P.L.O., art. 1, 7(2), Sept. 13, 1993, 32 
I.L.M. 1525.  
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civilian presence throughout the West Bank. Still, however, the international community remains 
steadfast. It continues to insist that Israel end its occupation of the Palestinian territories.   
Since at least 1980, the international community has referenced the prolonged character of the 
occupation. It has directly appealed to Israel to end its control of the West Bank and Gaza. 
Security Council Resolution 476 cites the “overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation 
of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967.”382 Similar calls have become ubiquitous.383 
From widely endorsed UN resolutions to the activist’s placard, appeals to terminate the 
occupation are ever-present. Yet international legal engagements, premised on the prominent 
interpretive approach, assume that the occupation’s duration is neither limited nor affected by the 
occupation framework. Alternative interpretations that draw upon occupation’s normative 
character find that an occupation regime violates fundamental principles of the legal framework. 
Often, the occupation is declared illegal. It is unclear, however, whether this declaration triggers 
legal consequences not otherwise elicited by the underlying violation(s). It is not immediately 
apparent what subsequent steps follow declared illegality.  
Both interpretative approaches diverge from the international community’s affirmed diplomatic 
course. The proposed good faith approach to enable termination offers an alternative. It better 
represents the spirit of IHL. It aligns the occupation framework with the prominent diplomatic 
treatment of the occupation. International law is understood to inform diplomatic engagement. 
Though it may not always be a decisive factor, “the rules of international law frequently 
[provide] the framework in which diplomatic negotiations, arguments, and positions [are] 
formulated.”384 International law shapes the content of and the positions offered in “multilateral 
forums and in bilateral diplomatic representations.”385 As observed throughout the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict “the long-term framework for [normalizing] relations between hostile actors” 
has been articulated in a legal vernacular and imposed through numerous diplomatic 
initiatives.386 
To influence and support diplomatic initiatives, international law must be effective. The 
international law of occupation, as prominently interpreted, threatens to frustrate the principles 
espoused by the international community. These principles directly align with the occupation 
framework’s normative character. Yet, they are continuously neglected by an interpretative 
approach that is either resigned to benevolent attempts to humanize a purportedly unalterable 
situation or vulnerable to manipulation. International law, the former Secretary General Javier 
Pérez de Cuéllar declared, must become more effective in governing international relations. It 
must not “stagnate but keep pace with change in the conditions of international life. . . . It must 
382 S.C. Res. 476, ¶ 1 (June 30, 1980).   
383 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 71/23, (Nov. 30, 2016). See also Lynk, supra note 224, ¶ 15.  
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385 Francois O. Wilcox et al., International Law in Diplomacy, 77 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANN. MEETING OF THE AM.
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evoke a shared understanding and it must be seen to derive from the morality of international 
behavior.”387 
General Assembly Resolution 44/23 announced the “decade of international law.”388 The 
General Assembly spoke of the need to strengthen the “rule of law in international relations.”389 
It reaffirmed the role of international law in promoting the “means and methods for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes between states.”390 The proposed good faith approach facilitates the 
alignment of legal and diplomatic discourses. In accordance with the demands of the 
international community and the constitutive principles upon which they draw, engagements 
with the occupation framework that accentuate temporality are better suited to present 
termination as the required means of preserving sovereignty, protecting local interests, and 
ensuring self-determination. An occupying power may not legitimize initiatives that appeal to the 
occupation’s duration but do not enable its termination. An interpretative approach that 
acknowledges occupation as fact and merely seeks to manage its effects compromises 
international law’s efficacy and thus its relevancy.   
Diplomatic appeals to terminate occupation are often grounded in the principle of self-
determination. Building upon Palestinian nationalism and the spirit of Camp David, formal 
appeals to self-determination accompanied American and Egyptian calls to terminate the 
occupation.391 The principle of self-determination vests in Article 1 of the UN Charter.392 It is 
confirmed in both the international human rights covenants.393 Its normative development, 
however, corresponds with the era of decolonization. Self-determination would associate with 
state-building initiatives.394 These advancements, however, proved difficult to reconcile with the 
occupation framework’s conservationist design. The law of occupation is described as 
antithetical to state-building initiatives.395 Several have questioned its compatibility with the 
principle of self-determination.396  
This poses an important distinction. Consideration of self-determination’s compatibility with the 
occupation framework followed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. This debate largely focuses on the 
387 See Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, U.N. Secretary-General, Address at the University of Bordeaux (Apr. 24, 1991), in 
Press Release, Secretary-General’s Statement at University of Bordeaux, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/4560 (1991).  
388 G.A. Res. 44/23, preamble, ¶ 2(b), (Nov. 17, 1989). 
389 Id.  
390 Id. 
391 See NATHAN THRALL, THE ONLY LANGUAGE THEY UNDERSTAND: FORCING COMPROMISE IN ISRAEL AND
PALESTINE 22 (2017).  
392 See U.N. Charter, art. 1, ¶ 2 (states that the purpose(s) of the United Nations are to, “develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples…”).  
393 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1., Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. See also, 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3.  
394 Manuela Melandri, Self-Determination and State-Building in International Law: The Need for a New Research 
Approach, 20 J. CONFLICT. & SEC. L. 74, 83 (2015).  
395 Nigel D. White, Settling Disputes: A Matter of Politics and Law, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS:
READING MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 61, 70 (Wouter Werner, Marieke De Hoon & Alexis Galán eds., 2017). See also 
Melandri, supra note 394, at 82–85.  
396 Melandri, supra note 394, at 83. See also Steven Wheatley, The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and 
Regime Change, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 531 (2006).  
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phenomenon of transformative occupation.397 The notion of state-building evoked by this context 
differs from that discussed within this article. The proposed normative reading of the occupation 
framework is applicable to transformative occupations. This, however, raises various issues that 
are beyond the current scope but will be considered elsewhere. The form of control exhibited by 
prolonged occupation differs from that of transformative occupation. It is employed for 
alternative purposes and serves distinguishable ends.  
Since Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem, calls for Palestinian statehood increasingly appeal to self-
determination.398 This provides a legal basis that favors the termination of occupation. Marco 
Sassòli notes that the fact of occupation may be construed as incompatible with the right to self-
determination.399 Palestinian statehood, the two-state solution, and the realization of self-
determination compels, and is contingent upon, termination. The occupation framework, 
traditionally conceived, does not facilitate this process. Sassòli explains that the right to self-
determination cannot be implemented by an occupying power. To ensure self-determination, 
Sassòli continues, an occupying power need not legislate. Instead, it must withdraw.400  
The consequences of the right to self-determination and the objective of the proposed 
interpretative approach are identical. Each identify termination as a constitutive requirement. 
Yet, adherence to the non-normative interpretative approach poses a conflict. Though Sassòli 
acknowledges that the fulfilment of self-determination compels cessation, this is described as an 
issue of the jus ad bellum. The self-determination argument “cannot be used to deny an 
occupying power the right to legislate under the jus in bello.”401 The proposed approach does not 
suggest the revocation of an occupant’s legislative competence. It, however, aligns the purposes 
of the occupation framework with the right to self-determination. By acknowledging the 
relevancy of jus ad bellum norms by insisting that termination is the corollary of temporality, the 
proposed approach wishes to insulate the occupation framework. It intends to ensure that the law 
of occupation does not become an anachronism; that it is not dismissed in favor of more 
efficacious legal approaches that better align with prevailing normative standards or diplomatic 
objectives. This does not require radical restructuring. But it compels a recommitment to the 
object and purpose of the occupation framework.  
The proposed interpretative approach operates within the confines of international law. 
Accordingly, it remains susceptible to many of its weaknesses.402 Little here will move the 
hardened skeptic to reconsider the viability of international law and its place within the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Yet it is important to recognize—even upon such dismissive terms—that 
simply rejecting the role assumed by international law as inept underestimates how the 
prominently interpreted occupation framework perpetuates occupation.  
397 See generally Fox, supra note 10. See also Cohen, supra note 28. 
398 THRALL, supra note 391, at 22. 
399 Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance, supra note 82, at 677.  
400 Id. 
401 Id. 
402 See Boon, supra note 12, at 110–12. 
76
Still, one is entitled to wonder whether the proposed interpretative approach fares better than the 
specific provisions contained within the occupation framework. This, however, misunderstands 
the purpose of the approach. The proposed interpretive approach is not intended to replace 
treaty-based provisions. Instead, it wishes to complement them. Employment of the good faith 
obligation does not compel a choice between specific provisions and fundamental norms. The 
conformity of settlement development, for example, may be evaluated in accordance with both 
Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention but also with broader legal considerations. As 
presently interpreted, the occupation framework engages with the symptoms of prolonged 
occupation. A non-normative interpretation of the legal framework, confined to management, 
does not acknowledge or address the altered form of control that a prolonged occupation 
imposes. The proposed approach facilitates engagement with the causes of this control.  
Settlement construction perpetuates, and thus prolongs, occupation. Beyond Article 49(6), 
settlement construction may be construed as an act of aggression.403 The perpetuation of 
occupation, the altered form of quasi-permanent control that prolonged occupation has become 
may be understood to contravene Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The occupation framework will 
contribute to a discourse grounded in uncontested principles—regarding the use of force, the 
annexation of territory, and the realization of self-determination—that resonate with and within 
international society.404  
When the Cypriot government remonstrated with the international community, it called for the 
termination of Turkey’s occupation of the northern-third of its territory. It did not, however, 
emphasize the occupation framework.405 It spoke clearly of occupation and invoked international 
law. The Cypriot government coupled calls to terminate the occupation with the principles of the 
jus ad bellum.406 It appealed to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. It 
employed human rights law.407 Such foundational principles of international order vest within 
the occupation framework. They are inherent to the principle of temporality and their assurance 
logically compels termination. Should an occupying power choose to pursue permanent control, 
the proposed normative approach will strip away the façade provided by a factual conception of 
occupation. It will pivot the accompanying discourse from perpetual management to termination. 
And it will facilitate appeals to fundamental norms, neglected by the prominent interpretative 
approach, but which constitute cornerstones of the international order.  
CONCLUSION 
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank has now reached fifty years in duration. It demonstrates 
little prospect of subsiding. Within this occupied landscape, strong legacies have been forged. 
403 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art 3(a), annex (Dec. 14, 1974).  
404 JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL 
ACCOUNT 271–349 (2010). 
405 See, e.g., Latest Developments, CYPRUS MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF., 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/mfa09_en/mfa09_en?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).  
406 See, e.g., Permanent Rep. of Cyprus to the U.N., Letter Dated May 29, 2001 from the Permanent Rep. of Cyprus 
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/55/970-S/2001/541 (May 31, 2001).  
407 JACOVIDES, supra note 384, at 234. 
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These extend from clearly identifiable spaces that constitute settlements and their associated 
infrastructure to the increasingly fraught relations between the Israelis and Palestinians who live 
amongst these spaces—settler and indigenous; occupying power and protected person; other and 
other. IHL and the occupation framework are intended to manage these relations and confront 
their potential legacies so as they do not become eternal features of the conflict. With the passage 
of time, however, and the construction of a status quo, the traditional occupation framework has 
proven incapable of regulating the inevitabilities and challenges of prolonged occupation.     
The proposals within this article, of a good faith obligation to enable termination, of a holistic 
notion of temporality, offer an amended normative approach. This approach is grounded in 
general principles of international law. It exclusively focuses, however, on the obligations of the 
occupying power. This is not intended to discount or undervalue the role the Palestinians and 
their leadership in Ramallah must assume to facilitate the occupation’s termination and the 
normalization of relations with Israel. Instead, this singular focus acknowledges the position of 
strength that an occupying power assumes. Over the course of prolonged occupation, Israel’s 
presence has become entrenched. As such, it faces a significant burden and responsibility in 
realizing the occupation’s termination. The good faith obligation attempts to ensure that the 
occupying power is unable to apply the existing framework so as to indefinitely defer the 
consequences of this burden.   
Naturally, this only represents a point of departure within the confines of international law. Many 
questions remain and untold obstacles will present. The good faith obligation to enable 
termination does not represent the extent to which the occupation framework requires 
reevaluation. Nor has this article considered all of the shortcomings or challenges of international 
law’s relationship with prolonged occupation. Instead, the approach proposed here recognizes 
how a factual or alegal conception of occupation threatens the fundamental principles conveyed 
by the framework itself. In response, the good faith obligation is intended to challenge the legally 
manufactured status quo that has facilitated the occupation’s duration. It must, however, remain 
conscious of its own limitations and recognize that international law—an amended legal 
framework or normative structure—does not provide all of the answers to the challenges or 
unintended consequences presented by prolonged occupation and entrenched conflict. Yet it may 
better contribute to their redress. 
In relation to the West Bank, this is particularly pertinent. Many in Israel have long recognized 
that the occupation presents a self-imposed existential dilemma. This stems from the 
demographic realities of the West Bank’s Palestinian population, which with the Palestinian 
citizens of Israel, will eventually become a majority. The consequences of this were succinctly 
conveyed by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak: “As long as in this territory west of the 
Jordan River there is only one political entity called Israel it is going to be either non-Jewish, or 
non-democratic.”408  
408 Rory McCarthy, Barak: Make Peace with Palestinians or Face Apartheid, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2010), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/03/barak-apartheid-palestine-peace.  
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The traditional occupation framework allows this dilemma to remain unaddressed. It facilitates a 
status quo that is viewed as indeterminate and legally neutral but in which specific violations, 
like settlement construction, create a far more powerful reality that frustrates the entire enterprise 
and purpose of the framework. The imposition of the good faith obligation may not directly 
result in the freeze of settlement development or the termination of the occupation. It can, 
however, move an occupying power to confront and no longer benefit from a manufactured 
status quo that has developed under the guise of the occupation framework. It can limit appeals 
to a facilitatory interpretation that discounts normative content.   
Israeli society has long been split—left and right—in its response to the demographic dilemma 
posed by the occupation. This is often viewed as a point of ideological departure. It has defined 
elections and distinguishes political parties. The left favors recognition of the occupation, 
acceptance of its governing framework, and its eventual termination in accordance with a two-
state solution and Palestinian self-determination. The right continues to deny its status, 
preferencing security justifications, and an accompanying notion of a Greater Israel. Yet when 
viewed in collaboration with the means by which international law has been engaged by 
proponents of settlement development, and those wishing to perpetuate the occupation, this 
fundamental political distinction presents an unexpected paradox.    
While the occupation framework is most likely to be received by those who favor the 
occupation’s termination and to be rejected by those who oppose territorial compromise, Joseph 
Weiler describes how the traditional framework favors rejectionists: 
It is exactly here that the construct of belligerent occupation can be manipulated. For 
it presents those who would wish to retain the Territory with the preferred position: 
You exercise control over the territory (as a belligerent occupant) but you are able to 
deny the local citizens any political rights since they do not become citizens of the 
occupying state – and all of this with the penumbra of legality accorded to this status 
in international law. Legally you get the land without the people.409 
The good faith obligation reemphasizes the normative structure of the traditional framework. It 
recognizes that with prolonged occupation, the traditional framework can serve as an unwilling 
accomplice, but an accomplice nonetheless, to the occupation’s protraction and thus the 
conflict’s perpetuation. Adopting a good faith obligation to enable termination, triggered by 
prolonged occupation, will begin to strip the occupying power of an indeterminate, legally-
confirmed status that permits it to indefinitely maintain an advantageous status quo. Instilling a 
requirement to act in accordance with prolonged occupation’s termination, the occupying power 
will be reduced in its ability to use the occupation framework as a legal guise to avoid the 
consequences of its prolonged occupation. Facing such consequences may prove a more 
409 Joseph H.H. Weiler, Israel, the Territories and International Law: When Doves are Hawks, in ISRAEL AMONG
THE NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON ISRAEL’S 50TH ANNIVERSARY 381, 390 
(Alfred E. Kellermann, Kurt Siehr & Talia Einhorn eds., 1998).   
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powerful motivator to move towards the occupation’s termination than any codified legal 
provision has or could.   
80
INVESTIGATION AS LEGITIMISATION: 
THE DEVELOPMENT, USE AND MISUSE OF INFORMAL 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
Investigation as Legitimisation 
DAVID HUGHES* 
This article introduces the idea of informal complementarity. Where the principle of 
complementarity allows the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) to assess the admissibility of a 
particular case, informal complementarity is employed by states. It exists independently (or pre-
emptively) of an International Criminal Court investigation. Appeals to informal 
complementarity speak fluidly of individual criminal proceedings and state-level investigations 
or inquiries. When a state appeals to informal complementarity, it is not immediately concerned 
with individual criminal liability or the admissibility of a particular case. Instead, informal 
complementarity serves to deny the state’s non-criminal responsibility. Appeals to informal 
complementarity constitute an emergent vocabulary. It increasingly features within the lexicon of 
states that engage in the use of force. It provides a novel means of asserting legitimacy. Within 
armed conflict, states are supplementing traditional appeals to international law and assertions 
of legal fidelity with claims of post-hoc legal accountability. Grounded within a study of Israel’s 
engagements with international law during and after the 2008–09 and 2014 Gaza wars, this 
article demonstrates that the post-war discourse has moved from exclusive assertions of legal 
compliance to include pronouncements of investigative willingness. Framed around the 
metaphor of the proleptic show trial, four phases of legal engagement are introduced that 
collectively constitute both an appeal to informal complementarity and an emergent means of 
asserting legitimacy. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
On 16 January 2015, Fatou Bensouda, the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court (‘ICC’), began a preliminary examination into the ‘situation in 
Palestine’.1 This followed years of diplomatic and legal manoeuvring by the 
Palestinian Authority (‘PA’). In the preceding weeks, Palestine had acceded to 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘Rome Statute’)2 and 
under art 12(3) of the founding treaty accepted ICC jurisdiction over alleged 
crimes committed throughout the Palestinian territories since 13 June 2014.3 
Israel had long resisted Palestinian efforts to gain formal international 
recognition by means other than bilateral peace negotiations and was staunchly 
opposed to the Court’s pending jurisdiction.4 Predictably, the Israeli response to 
the Prosecutor’s announcement was harsh, constituting a near ontological attack 
on the Court.5 Then Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman announced plans to 
lobby Israel’s allies to defund the Court and declared that ‘Israel will act in the 
international sphere to bring about the dismantling of this court which represents 
hypocrisy and gives impetus to terror’.6 
 1 See Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘The Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the 
Situation in Palestine’ (Press Release, ICC-OTP-20150116-PR1083, 16 January 2015) 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1083> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/7LC5-F9MW>.  
 2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 
UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) (‘Rome Statute’). 
 3  Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘The Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in 
Palestine’, above n 1. See also Mahmoud Abbas, Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court (31 December 2014) <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/press/Palestine_A_12-3.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/8U8Q-
FA3C>.  
 4 See, eg, Daniel Benoliel and Ronen Perry, ‘Israel, Palestine, and the ICC’ (2010) 32 
Michigan Journal of International Law 73, 73–6. See also Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘Ad Hoc 
Declarations of Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The Palestinian Situation Under Scrutiny’ in 
Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford 
University Press, 2015) 179.  
 5 Jodi Rudoren, ‘Joining International Criminal Court Wouldn’t Guarantee Palestinians a War 
Crimes Case’, The New York Times (online), 1 January 2015 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/02/world/middleeast/court-membership-wouldnt-
guarantee-palestinians-a-war-crimes-case.html>. See also ‘Israel Slams International 
Criminal Court for Letting Palestinians Join: “There is No Palestinian State”’, The National 
Post (online), 1 April 2015 <http://nationalpost.com/news/world/israel-middle-east/israel-
slams-international-criminal-court-for-letting-palestinians-join-there-is-not-palestinian-
state>; Khaled Abu Toameh, Tovah Lazaroff and Lahav Harkov, ‘Israel Freezes Palestinian 
Tax Revenues in Response to ICC Membership’, The Jerusalem Post (online), 3 January 
2015 <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Israel-freezes-
Palestinian-tax-revenues-in-response-to-ICC-membership-386556> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/Z2EF-6P8B>.  
 6 Justin Jalil, ‘FM Calls to Dismantle ICC After Launch of “War Crimes” Probe’, The Times 
of Israel (online), 16 January 2015 <https://www.timesofisrael.com/fm-calls-to-dismantle-
icc-after-launch-of-war-crimes-probe/> archived at <https://perma.cc/W6ZL-M6K5>. 
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Within months, however, Israel began to shift its position. Initially, it refused 
to cooperate with the Court’s investigation but later, to the wonderment of many 
observers, amended its stance. It opened a formal dialogue with ICC officials.7 In 
September 2016, Israel acquiesced to the Prosecutor’s request to visit the region 
in coordination with the Court’s preliminary inquiry.8 Israeli officials suddenly 
appeared to welcome the ICC’s pending intervention: ‘We have nothing to hide 
and we would be happy to show the court at The Hague how serious, 
professional and independent the Israeli legal system is’.9 
Facing a potential criminal investigation and amidst the fury of condemnation 
that followed the 2014 Gaza war — Operation Protective Edge — these 
newfound Israeli assurances allude to both the principle of complementarity and 
the obligation of states to investigate non-criminal violations of international 
humanitarian law (‘IHL’). These notions are formally and legally distinct. 
Criminal and civil respectively, each convey an obligation, incentive and 
prerogative upon the state to address alleged violations of international law that 
may amount to, inter alia, war crimes.10 Complementarity, as articulated within 
the Rome Statute, structures the relationship between national and international 
jurisdictions and intends for each system to simultaneously complement the 
other.11 It incentivises domestic redress of international crimes by premising 
international intervention upon the absence of national proceedings.12 
The obligation to investigate non-criminal violations of IHL compels states to 
monitor and assess compliance with their legal commitments.13 Each intends to 
strengthen compliance with international law. Each provides a form of redress 
should these obligations not be met. In practice, however, states often conflate 
these principles and reference one, the other, or both to assert the primacy and 
7 Initially, Israel officials made clear that their dialogue with the Court did not constitute 
cooperation with the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) investigation but this stance 
would also alter. See generally Barak Ravid, ‘Exclusive: Israel Decides to Open Dialogue 
with ICC over Gaza Preliminary Examination’, Haartez (online), 9 July 2015 
<http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.665172> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/8CNM-PC67>.  
8 Barak Ravid, ‘Netanyahu Weighs International Criminal Court Prosecutors’ Request for 
Israel, West Bank Visit’, Haartez (online), 2 September 2016 
<http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.739905> archived at <https://perma.cc/MGY9-
2RGW>. See also Barak Ravid, ‘ICC Delegation Arrives in Israel for Five-Day 
“Educational Visit”, Won’t Conduct Evidence Collection’, Haartez (online), 5 October 2016 
<http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.745849> archived at <https://perma.cc/EG3R-
778D>.  
9 Ravid, ‘Netanyahu Weighs International Criminal Court’, above n 8.  
10 Article 5 of the Rome Statute explains that only the most serious international crimes that 
concern the international community as a whole come within the ICC’s auspices. The scope 
of the civil obligation of a state to investigate violations of international humanitarian law is 
not as clearly defined. See Michael N Schmitt, ‘Investigating Violations of International 
Law in Armed Conflict’ (2011) 2 Harvard National Security Journal 31, 37–9. See also 
Françoise J Hampson, ‘An Investigation of Alleged Violations of the Law of Armed 
Conflict’ (2016) 46 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 1, 12–16.  
11 See Mohamed M El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal 
Law: Origin, Development and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 4.  
12 See generally William W Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International 
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice’ (2008) 49 
Harvard International Law Journal 53. See also William W Burke-White, ‘Implementing a 
Policy of Positive Complementarity in the Rome System of Justice’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law 
Forum 59.  
13 See Hampson, above n 10, 8–9. 
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appropriateness of employing domestic measures to address incidents that allege 
individual criminal liability or the violation of the state’s non-criminal 
responsibilities.14 
Since the PA embarked upon its strategy of ‘internationalising’ the conflict 
with Israel — an attempt to shift the conflict from its traditional political 
paradigm to accentuate the legal questions that accompany the PA’s grievances 
and policies — recourse to the ICC has served as the endgame.15 
Correspondingly, Israel has viewed ICC membership as the most serious and 
threatening of the various international bodies and treaty regimes in which the 
Palestinians have pursued membership.16 As the PA began to formalise their 
relationships with a host of international bodies and signalled their intention to 
prosecute the conflict before judicial and quasi-judicial institutions, various 
commentators wrote about the potential consequences and legal questions 
resulting from the PA’s successive jaunts to The Hague.17 These queries, 
however, commonly fixate on formal legal questions. Often, they seek to reach 
 14 Orna Ben-Naftali describes this confluence in relation to the Israeli High Court of Justice’s 
treatment of targeted killing decisions. See Orna Ben-Naftali, ‘A Judgment in the Shadow of 
International Criminal Law’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 322, 329. 
See also Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National 
Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) vol 34, 15; 
Jennifer Trahan, ‘Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International Criminal 
Court’s Crime of Aggression? Considering the Problem of “Overzealous” National Court 
Prosecutions’ (2012) 45 Cornell International Law Journal 569, 571. For an account of the 
well-established position that states are required to investigate alleged violations of 
international law occurring within their jurisdiction, see Amichai Cohen and Yuval Shany, 
‘Beyond the Grave Breaches Regime: The Duty to Investigate Alleged Violations of 
International Law Governing Armed Conflicts’ (2011) 14 Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 37, 41. See also Alon Margalit, ‘The Duty to Investigate Civilian 
Casualties During Armed Conflict and its Implementation in Practice’ (2012) 15 Yearbook 
of International Humanitarian Law 155, 160–1; Paul Seils, Handbook on Complementarity: 
An Introduction to the Role of National Courts and the ICC in Prosecuting International 
Crimes (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2016) 5–7. 
 15 President Mahmoud Abbas announced the Palestinian Authority’s intention to 
‘internationalise’ the conflict in a 2011 New York Times op-ed: Mahmoud Abbas, ‘The 
Long Overdue Palestinian State’, The New York Times (online), 16 May 2011 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/opinion/17abbas.html>. See also Barak Ravid, 
‘Israel’s Troubles are Just Beginning: Enter the Palestinian “Nuclear Option”’, Haaretz 
(online), 1 January 2015 <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.634807> 
archived at <https://perma.cc/UL5P-BA8M>.  
 16 See Orde F Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford University Press, 2016) 208.  
 17 See, eg, Maryne Rondot, ‘The ICC and the Israel–Palestine Conflict: Current Developments, 
Implications and Future Scenarios’ (Report, American Non-Governmental Organizations 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 7 August 2013); Benoliel and Perry, above n 
4; El Zeidy, ‘Ad Hoc Declarations of Acceptance of Jurisdiction’, above n 4; David Luban, 
‘Palestine and the ICC — Some Legal Questions’ on Just Security (2 January 2015) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/18817/palestine-icc-legal-questions/> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/Y2QX-H9XK>; Luis Moreno Ocampo, ‘Palestine’s Two Cards: A 
Commitment to Legality and an Invitation to Stop Crimes’ on Just Security (12 January 
2015) <https://www.justsecurity.org/19046/palestines-cards-commitment-legality-
invitation-stop-crimes/> archived at <https://perma.cc/3G48-NJUY>; Alan M Dershowitz, 
‘Response to My Friend Luis Moreno Ocampo on the International Criminal Court and the 
Palestinian Situation’ on Just Security (20 January 2015) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/19248/response-friend-luis-moreno-ocampo-international-
criminal-court-palestinian-situation/>; Bar Levy and Shir Rozenzweig, ‘Israel and the 
International Criminal Court: A Legal Battlefield’ (2016) 19(2) Strategic Assessment 129; 
Eugene Kontorovich, ‘Israel/Palestine — The ICC’s Uncharted Territory’ (2013) 11 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 979.  
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determinations of legality. They question the appropriate jurisdiction of the 
Court. And they seek corresponding conclusions regarding the Court’s 
competence, the associated requirements of Palestinian statehood and standing or 
the formal admissibility of a particular petition.18 
These debates often allude to (or conflate) the principle of complementarity 
and the obligation to investigate non-criminal violations of IHL.19 When Israel 
reversed its approach to the ICC and spoke of its efforts and capacity to address 
alleged legal violations, the concurrent discourse assessed the sincerity of these 
assurances. Israel was accused of ‘shielding’.20 Valentina Azarova, for example, 
argued that ‘Israel, well aware of the complementarity principle, is clearly taking 
steps to shield itself from ICC investigation’.21 Azarova cites what she perceives 
as the tokenistic convictions of Israel Defense Forces (‘IDF’) soldiers — the 
Israeli State Comptroller’s appeal to international law within an examination of 
political and military decision-making structures, and the joint reports of the 
Israeli Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs into IDF conduct and the legal 
questions posed by the 2014 Gaza war — as evidence of the intent to shield.22 
These initiatives, however, also enable an alternative conclusion. David 
Luban has explained that  
[c]omplementarity would offer Israel a large measure of protection from most war 
crimes charges. If Israel carries out its own investigations in good faith, it would 
be insulated from most liability — potentially, even if it never indicts anyone.23  
Luis Moreno Ocampo, the ICC’s inaugural Prosecutor, argued that Israel 
has the ability to avoid the opening of an ICC investigation. As a court of last 
resort the ICC can intervene only when there are no genuine national 
investigations of the crimes under its jurisdiction.24  
By appealing to the principle of complementarity, Ocampo claimed Israel ‘can 
conduct national investigations of the alleged crimes committed after June 13, 
2014 and make the situation inadmissible’.25 
Divergent interpretations of complementarity’s potential application and the 
sincerity of Israel’s domestic accountability measures emerged. One understood 
complementarity as offering Israel a direct opportunity to avoid ICC scrutiny. It 
held Israel’s practice of self-investigation and willingness to resort to domestic 
criminal proceedings as satisfying its legal requirements and rendering a 
 18 These debates have taken various approaches but have largely focused on jurisdictional 
quandaries and associated questions of statehood and eligibility. See Kontorovich, above n 
17, 982–3. See also Dershowitz, above n 17. Alternatively, John Quigley has argued in 
favour of recognised Palestinian statehood for the purposes of satisfying art 12(3) of the 
Rome Statute. See John Quigley, ‘The Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal 
Court: The Statehood Issue’ (2009) 35 Rutgers Law Record 1, 2, 9.  
 19 See Hampson, above n 10, 16.  
 20 Valentina Azarova, ‘Palestine’s Day in Court? The Unexpected Effects of ICC Action’ on 
Al-Shabaka (1 April 2015) <https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/palestines-day-in-court-the-
unexpected-effects-of-icc-action/> archived at <https://perma.cc/C2EJ-6M5A>. The notion 
of shielding is addressed in art 17 of the Rome Statute and will be discussed in Part II below.  
 21 Azarova, above n 20.  
 22 Ibid. 
 23 Luban, above n 17 (emphasis added).  
 24 Moreno Ocampo, above n 17.  
 25 Ibid. 
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potential petition to the ICC inadmissible.26 The other interpreted these same 
actions as a nefarious strategy designed to insulate the state from the Court’s 
oversight.27 Should the Palestinian petition to the ICC move beyond the 
preliminary examination stage, the Prosecutor and Court will have the 
opportunity to examine the domestic measures undertaken by Israel and 
determine whether the necessary admissibility requirements have been 
satisfied.28 Within this process, the principle of complementarity asks whether 
domestic proceedings have occurred and, if so determined, may then present 
contestable legal questions — regarding accusations of shielding and exploring 
whether Israel’s domestic initiatives constitute ‘genuine’ efforts to investigate or 
prosecute the alleged international crime(s) — that will likely influence the 
Court’s determination of admissibility.29 
This article does not, however, attempt to provide answers to these questions. 
It does not seek to assess whether Israel’s efforts following the Gaza wars 
constituted genuine attempts to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes 
committed during the conduct of hostilities. Equally, it does not seek to reach a 
legal determination regarding the admissibility of a Palestinian petition. It 
assumes an agnostic approach to such formal legal questions. 
Instead, this article will observe and explore the significance of informal state 
engagements with the principle of complementarity. It considers how these 
observed engagements are employed to generate legitimacy and establish an 
advantageous legal narrative in defence of controversial military actions. Within 
armed conflicts, states are increasingly supplementing their traditional appeals to 
international law and assertions of compliance with evidence of investigative 
willingness. In response to international scrutiny, states are moving from a 
discourse of legal fidelity to one of post-hoc legal accountability. The traditional 
refrain of we respect and adhere to the law is increasingly coupled with a novel 
chorus of we investigate the law. 
Complementarity provides a legal vernacular through which this emerging 
form of legitimacy may be asserted. This does not suggest that states will feign 
investigation simply to discharge their legal duty. Frédéric Mégret has 
questioned the extent to which a state is likely to undertake such explicit forms 
of shielding. Mégret argues that understandings of shielding, as conveyed within 
 26 See Dershowitz, above n 17.  
 27 See B’Tselem — The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories, ‘ICC Jurisdiction Cannot Be Denied Based on Israel’s Façade of Investigation’ 
(Press Release, 16 July 2015) 
<https://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20150715_israel_claims_regarding_icc_authority_
unfounded> archived at <https://perma.cc/XW7X-37HS>.  
 28 Formally, determinations of admissibility apply to specific cases and not general or 
preliminary investigations. Often, the Office of the Prosecutor will examine an entire 
‘situation’ before individual cases are identified through the formal accountability processes 
provided by the Rome Statute. See Stigen, above n 14, 91. See also Office of the Prosecutor, 
International Criminal Court, ‘The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou 
Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine’, above n 1. 
 29 See Rome Statute art 53(1).  
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art 17 of the Rome Statute, often do not fit with reality.30 If anything, Mégret 
claims, typical ICC cases 
are those in which there will be no investigation whatsoever (regardless of the 
adequacy of legislation) and where a state evidences no intention of complying 
with either their Rome Statute or general international law obligations to try 
certain crimes … In fact, it was always unlikely politically that states would 
conduct ‘mock’ proceedings for the purposes of holding off ICC jurisdiction. If a 
state is unwilling, it will generally be unwilling all the way.31 
Israel does not demonstrate the overt unwillingness that Mégret references. It 
has long professed at least a rhetorical devotion to the precepts of international 
law.32 Much of the literature addressing questions of admissibility, the 
application of the complementarity principle and potential instances of shielding 
exhibits a formalist orientation. This is reflective of the approach promoted by 
the ICC’s jurisprudence and the drafting history of the Rome Statute.33 
While Frédéric Mégret is likely correct — that states will not routinely engage 
in sham proceedings — this article traces Israel’s employment of informal 
complementarity when facing alleged violations of international law during or 
after armed conflicts. These legal appeals occur well before, or in the absence of, 
formal ICC proceedings. They are not immediately concerned with individual 
criminal liability or the admissibility of a particular case (which may never 
occur). Instead, they serve principally, though not wholly, to deny the state’s 
non-criminal responsibility and substantiate assertions of legitimacy. The state 
may offer examples of investigations, criminal proceedings and efforts to ensure 
against impunity. Redress may be provided should an alleged violation be 
substantiated. These actions are displayed as evidence of legal compliance. They 
imply legitimacy of process. Collectively, they are required and necessary but 
may also be duplicitous. Informal appeals to complementarity enable efforts to 
frame the conflict and present a gainful narrative of legal compliance through 
fulfilment of the prescribed inspective processes. Within these processes, the 
state may both interpret international law and adjudge compliance through its 
advantageously conveyed dictates. Coupled with appeals to the legitimacy of 
process, this facilitates efforts to exhibit legitimacy of substance. 
 30 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Too Much of a Good Thing? Implementation and the Uses of 
Complementarity’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International 
Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011) 361, 376.  
 31 Ibid.  
 32 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008 – 18 
January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects’ (Report, 29 July 2009) 2 [6], 35 [89] (‘Operation 
in Gaza Report’).  
 33 See, eg, William A Schabas, ‘“Complementarity in Practice”: Some Uncomplimentary 
Thoughts’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 5; William W Burke-White, ‘Complementarity 
in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-Level Global 
Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 557; Kevin Jon Heller, ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The 
Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law 
Forum 255; Federica Gioia, ‘State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and “Modern” International 
Law: The Principle of Complementarity in the International Criminal Court’ (2006) 19 
Leiden Journal of International Law 1095. For a broad overview of related judicial 
consideration, see El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal 
Law, above n 11, 163–75.  
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As these observed forms of engagement draw upon the formal language and 
purpose of complementarity but are likely to occur as a response to broad 
situations and not the individual cases that are the focus of international criminal 
law, they are described here as informal legal engagements. Informal 
complementarity, as it is understood within these pages, occurs independently (or 
pre-emptively) of an ICC case and beyond the strictures of statutory 
requirements. Where the Rome Statute and international criminal law address the 
actions of individuals — the unruly solder, the negligent commander or the 
unrelenting génocidaire — informal complementarity conflates the language of 
criminal and non-criminal liability under international law. It speaks fluidly of 
individual criminal proceedings and state-level investigations or inquiries.34 
Despite the orientation of such assertions and the formal distinction between 
individual liability and state responsibility, collective appeals to informal 
complementarity provide a vocabulary to diffuse international condemnation of 
state actions, establish a narrative of legal fidelity, and substantiate the 
legitimacy of state behaviour and policy within instances of armed conflict. 
As a means of achieving particular preordained and didactic purposes, these 
legal engagements, and the processes through which they are conveyed, may be 
understood as a form of show trial. This framing is not intended to be 
unavoidably pejorative. It differs significantly from the famous show trials of the 
20th century — in Moscow, of Klaus Barbie, Slobodan Milošević, Saddam 
Hussein and others.35 Significantly, where general understandings of such trials 
foretell guilt and conviction, the processes described here ‘show’ compliance and 
legitimacy. They are not an individual trial in which there is an accused and an 
accuser. Instead, the state’s efforts to exhibit investigative willingness may be 
understood as a proleptic show trial. It serves rhetorical purposes in anticipation 
of legal objections and criticisms so as to answer them pre-emptively. The state 
places itself on trial, not formally, but through a series of self-investigations and 
multifaceted legal engagements that are facilitated by, and appeal to, informal 
complementarity. 
To begin to understand the development, use and misuse of informal 
complementarity, this paper explores recent events in Israel, Palestine and The 
Hague. These considerations, however, are removed from the formal legal 
questions posed by the Palestinians’ recent overtures. Instead, this paper wishes 
to understand how the post-war performance of a proleptic show trial — how 
appeals to and engagements with informal complementarity — allow Israel to 
 34 Françoise Hampson alludes to this conflation when she notes that the ‘duty to investigate’ is 
used, confusingly, to describe both monitoring obligations under international humanitarian 
law (‘IHL’) and criminal investigations. See Hampson, above n 10, 10. In practice, there is 
of course much necessary overlap. See generally Beatrice I Bonafè, The Relationship 
between State and Individual Responsibility for International Crimes (Martinus Nijhoff, 
2009).  
 35 See, eg, Max Radin, ‘The Moscow Trials: A Legal View’ (1937) 16(1) Foreign Affairs 64; 
Awol K Allo, ‘The Show in the Show Trial: Contextualising the Politicization of the 
Courtroom’ (2010) 15 Barry Law Review 41, 56; Jeremy Peterson, ‘Unpacking Show Trials: 
Situating the Trial of Saddam Hussein’ (2007) 48 Harvard International Law Journal 257; 
Gerry Simpson, ‘Politics, Sovereignty, Remembrance’ in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe 
and Eric Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy 
Issues (Hart Publishing, 2004) 47; Michael P Scharf, ‘The International Trial of Slobodan 
Milosevic: Real Injustice or Realpolitik?’ (2002) 8 ILSA Journal of International & 
Comparative Law 289.  
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move from viewing a Palestinian petition to the ICC as what Avichai Mandelblit, 
then the Military Advocate General (‘MAG’), labelled as an act of war to now 
welcoming the Court’s intervention.36 
Part II of this article briefly describes the principle of complementarity and 
the obligation of states to investigate alleged violations of IHL. This is intended 
to provide context. It distinguishes between the widely understood purpose of 
complementarity — as applied to determine admissibility under the Rome Statute 
— and the notion of informal complementarity introduced within these pages. 
Part III situates informal complementarity within the broader discussion of 
international law’s relationship with legitimacy. It acknowledges that when states 
use force they attempt to exhibit the rightfulness of their actions and recall 
international law to provide the requisite justification. This Part traces Israel’s 
early appeals to international law. It argues that over a succession of conflicts 
and ensuing diplomatic contestations of legitimacy, the post-conflict discourse 
has moved from exclusive assertions of legal compliance. Now it includes 
pronouncements of investigative willingness. Part IV observes Israel’s increasing 
appeals to informal complementarity following the 2008–09 and 2014 Gaza 
wars. Framed around the metaphor of a proleptic show trial, this section 
introduces four broad phases of legal engagement. These are expressive of state 
recourse to informal complementarity. Part V concludes. It considers the efficacy 
of appeals to informal complementarity. A tension exists between the desire for 
states to investigate their conduct upon the use of force and the potential for 
engagements with complementarity to facilitate something other than what the 
principle intends. 
This may be significant. Appeals to informal complementarity and the 
preordained and didactic purposes of the proleptic show trial can facilitate state 
efforts to forestall formalist measures and endeavour to nationalise international 
scrutiny of state actions during instances of armed conflict or upon the use of 
force. A significant tension exists between the desire for states to seriously 
engage with their formal legal commitments, to protect against impunity, and to 
investigate and redress potential violations of IHL and the capacity of appeals to 
domestic measures to formalistically assert post-hoc legitimacy. The strategic 
legal focus exhibited by appeals to the latter, and in neglect of the former, 
threatens to promote a conception of international humanitarian law that 
understands breaches as occurrences requiring redress not prevention. 
II THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE OBLIGATION TO 
INVESTIGATE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
States often conflate the principle of complementarity with the obligation to 
investigate violations of IHL.37 This blurs the formal distinction between 
 36 See Colum Lynch, ‘Should Israel Fear ICC War Crimes Prosecutions if Palestine Becomes a 
State?’, Foreign Policy (online), 12 September 2011 
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/12/should-israel-fear-icc-war-crimes-prosecutions-if-
palestine-becomes-a-state/> archived at <https://perma.cc/U85T-U6LB>. See also Kittrie, 
above n 16, 208.  
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individual responsibility under international criminal law (‘ICL’) and the non-
criminal, civil liability of states for violations of IHL.38 Despite the formalism of 
this distinction, these separate means of legal accountability often merge in 
practice and objective. This is observed in the political speech of states. 
Increasingly, they apply the language of self-investigation, appeal to the pre-
eminence of local measures or promote their capacity to conduct independent 
and impartial domestic proceedings. The state purports that these efforts protect 
against ICC scrutiny and/or international censure. Merger, however, is also 
present when either criminal or non-criminal accountability mechanisms are 
applied in good faith. Much practical overlap exists between these respective 
legal measures and obligations.39 
This confluence is exhibited through the political rationale presented by an 
Israeli official who asserted that,  
against the background of both the events of Operation Protective Edge and in the 
wake of the 2009 United Nations Goldstone Report concerning Operation Cast 
Lead in Gaza [the 2008–09 Gaza war], that a thorough internal investigation will 
reduce international pressure and thwart legal measures against IDF officers 
abroad.40  
This appeals to both criminal and non-criminal measures. It offers a means of 
satisfying an amalgamated notion of international justice. While the convergence 
of these notions is common — in rhetoric and in practice — it is necessary to 
understand the formal purpose of both complementarity and the obligation to 
investigate non-criminal violations of IHL before considering the informal legal 
engagements identified throughout. 
A The Principle of Complementarity 
The principle of complementarity serves important and necessary purposes. It 
works to promote compliance. It encourages the domestication of international 
law and assuages the sovereignty-based concerns of member states. It ensures an 
 37 See Turkel Commission, ‘The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 
May 2010 — Second Report: Israel’s Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating 
Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to 
International Law’ (Report, February 2013) 85–7 [33] (‘Second Turkel Commission 
Report’).  
 38 The Nuremberg Trials viewed individual prosecutions as an essential means of international 
legal enforcement. See Judicial Decisions, ‘International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg): 
Judgment and Sentences’ (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172. See also 
Cohen and Shany, above n 14, 44. See Dianne Orentlicher, Report of the Independent 
Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity — Addendum: Updated Set of 
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat 
Impunity, UN ESCOR, 61st sess, Agenda Item 17, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (8 
February 2005). 
 39 See André Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State 
Responsibility in International Law’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 615, 615. See generally Bonafè, above n 34; Thomas Franck, ‘Individual 
Criminal Liability and Collective Civil Responsibility: Do They Reinforce or Contradict 
One Another?’ (2007) 6 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 567; Willian A 
Schabas, ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’ (2008) 98 Journal of Criminal 
Law & Criminology 953.  
 40 Amos Harel, ‘Preempting The Hague: How the IDF Seeks to Avoid International Legal 
Action’, Haaretz (online), 3 January 2015 <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.635021> 
archived at <https://perma.cc/3PDH-P2FZ> (emphasis added).  
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efficient and co-dependent relationship between national and international 
jurisdictions.41 Collectively, it facilitates the primary objective of the ICC. In so 
doing, it pursues the promise of universal justice by encouraging states to 
employ domestic measures to prevent impunity for the most serious international 
crimes.42 
Complementarity builds upon a succession of developments that occurred 
throughout the 20th century.43 Most commonly, though, while various notions of 
complementarity have long existed, it is prominently associated with the ICC and 
the Court’s jurisdictional governance.44 Though the Rome Statute does not 
explicitly reference complementarity, the principle is articulated throughout art 
17.45 To establish admissibility and balance the co-dependent relationship 
between national legal systems and the ICC, the article provides a two-step test. 
First, art 17 determines whether a case has been investigated or prosecuted. If it 
has not, then the case will be admissible. Second, if a case has been prosecuted at 
the national level, the ICC may assess the proceedings and assert jurisdiction 
only if the state is deemed to have been unwilling or unable to genuinely conduct 
proceedings.46 
 41 Tatiana E Sainati, ‘Divided We Fall: How the International Criminal Court Can Promote 
Compliance with International Law by Working with Regional Courts’ (2016) 49 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 191, 200.  
 42 Then United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan explained the purpose of the ICC as 
providing ‘the promise of universal justice’: United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, 
Overview: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998–99) 
<http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm> archived at <https://perma.cc/95XA-
FELM>, quoting United Nations, ‘International Criminal Court Promises Universal Justice, 
Secretary-General Tells International Bar Association’ (Press Release, SG/SM/6257, 12 
June 1997). See also David Wippman, ‘The International Criminal Court’ in Christian Reus-
Smit (ed), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 151, 176; 
Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman, ‘The Law and Economics of Humanitarian 
Violations’ (2004) 36 Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 211, 229–30.  
 43 El Zeidy presents four major models of complementarity that have developed throughout the 
twentieth century. See El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International 
Criminal Law, above n 11, 6–8.  
 44 Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement 
International Criminal Law’ (2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 869, 870.  
 45 The closest direct reference is found in art 1 of the Rome Statute. This holds that:  
An International Criminal Court (‘the Court’) is hereby established. It shall be a 
permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over 
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this 
Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The 
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this 
Statute.  
  Rome Statute art 1 (emphasis added). For a general account of the drafting history of art 17, 
see John T Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’ in Roy S Lee (ed), The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute — Issues, Negotiations, 
Results (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 41.  
 46 Rome Statute art 17 holds, inter alia, that:  
(1) … the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:  
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution;  
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it 
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless 
the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute;  
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The Rome Statute balances the sovereign concerns of member states with the 
need to ensure an efficient relationship between the ICC and national 
jurisdictions. Article 17’s inclusion of the unwilling and unable exceptions, 
however, acknowledged that this procedural requirement — as conveyed by the 
test’s first step — may become susceptible to abuse or manipulation.47 The 
‘unwilling’ and ‘unable’ exceptions provide safeguards against such abuse. 
‘Unable’ refers to the criterion of inability. It objectively evaluates a state’s 
capacity to undertake a genuine investigation.48 This assesses conditions or 
factors that may bar a state from conducting the necessary proceedings within 
circumstances where it would otherwise be inclined to meet the requisite 
standard.49 Primarily, the ‘unable’ requirement addresses instances in which a 
state cannot pursue genuine prosecution due to such factors as civil disorder, 
war, natural disaster or the collapse of a national judicial system.50 
The criterion of ‘unwillingness’ is of more immediate relevance.51 In relation 
to the focus of this paper, and as Azarova asked following the Palestinians’ 
initiation of proceedings at The Hague, ‘[t]he question is not whether Israel is 
“able” to conduct any investigations, but whether it is “willing” to do so’.52 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the 
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under 
article 20, paragraph 3;  
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court. 
  See also El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above 
n 11, 161; El Zeidy, ‘A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law’, above n 
44, 898. See also Darryl Robinson, ‘The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity’ 
(2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 67, 90.  
 47 See Rome Statute art 17(1)(a). The inclusion of the unwilling or unable standard recognises 
that although states have the first responsibility and right to prosecute international crimes 
and that the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction where national legal systems fail to act, 
exceptions allow the Court to assert jurisdiction when the state ‘purport[s] to act but in 
reality [is] unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out proceedings’. See Office of the 
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘The Principle of Complementarity in Practice’ 
(Informal Expert Paper, 2003) 3 (‘Complementarity in Practice’). See also Cohen and 
Shany, above n 14, 57; Margalit, above n 14, 157–8.  
 48 El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above n 11, 
222. See Margalit, above n 14, 157.  
 49 The determination of inability is discussed broadly in Rome Statute art 17(3). This holds 
that:  
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, 
due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, 
the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or 
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.  
 50 See El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above n 11, 
222. Further, the ICC held that Libya was unable to conduct an adequate investigation and 
prosecution of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi. See Carla Ferstman et al, ‘The International Criminal 
Court and Libya: Complementarity in Conflict’ (Meeting Summary, Chatham House, 22 
September 2014) 3 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140922Li
bya.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/BT4U-V4KY>. See also Prosecutor v Gaddafi 
(Decision on the Admissibility of the Case) (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/11–01/11–344–Red, 31 May 2013).  
 51 Valentina Azarov and Sharon Weill, ‘Israel’s Unwillingness? The Follow-Up Investigations 
to the UN Gaza Conflict Report and International Criminal Justice’ (2012) 12 International 
Criminal Law Review 905, 910.  
 52 Azarova, above n 20. 
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Ostensibly, this may be answered in the affirmative. Since the commencement of 
Operation Cast Lead in 2008, Israel has conducted numerous investigations and 
formed several commissions to evaluate, post-hoc, its conduct and compliance 
with international law.53 Yet, Israel’s investigative initiatives remain susceptible 
to the various interpretations that accompanied the Office of the Prosecutor’s 
announcement of a preliminary examination. The ICC has made clear, however, 
that the simple occurrence of an investigation does not reactively render a case 
inadmissible.54 The Rome Statute provides further specification. Article 17(2) 
explains that the Court’s Prosecutor may invoke jurisdiction, despite the 
occurrence of national proceedings, on the basis of the accused state’s 
unwillingness if: the purported national proceeding was made for the purpose of 
shielding the accused from criminal responsibility; there has been an unjustified 
delay deemed ‘inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice’; or if the domestic measures were or are not being conducted 
independently or impartially.55 
Mohammed El Zeidy notes that the unwillingness requirement in art 17 is a 
‘test of the good faith of national authorities’.56 The article’s second paragraph 
provides preconditions to assure the test’s effectiveness.57 Shielding, conveyed 
in sub-para (a) and as alluded to by Azarova, is of greatest relevance to the 
divergent assessments of Israel’s post-war accountability measures and 
investigative efforts. El Zeidy explains that circumstances constituting shielding 
vary greatly. He cites examples of explicit bad faith, the formal adoption of 
amnesty laws or (despite Mégret’s dismissal)58 the orchestration of sham 
proceedings.59 Still, it is difficult to qualify the totality of circumstances that may 
 53 For example, the Turkel Commission examined both the naval incident and Israel’s existing 
mechanisms for investigating alleged violations of international law during armed conflicts. 
See Turkel Commission, ‘The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 
May 2010 — Part One’ (Report, 23 January 2011) (‘First Turkel Report’). See also Second 
Turkel Commission Report, above n 37. Further, a government commissioned report on the 
legal status of settlement construction considered both the domestic and international legal 
status of West Bank settlements. See Levy Commission, ‘The Levy Commission Report on 
the Legal Status of Building in Judea and Samaria’ (Report, 21 June 2012) 
<http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/sourcefiles/The-Levy-Commission-Report-on-the-
Legal-Status-of-Building-in-Judea-and-Samaria.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/9SLF-
WWY5>. Section C of the 2010 Israeli report into the factual and legal aspects of the 2008–
09 Gaza war and chapter seven of the Israeli report published in 2015 following Operation 
Protective Edge provide detailed accounts of Israel’s investigative procedures following 
alleged violations of IHL and the status of undertaken investigations for alleged incidents 
having occurred during the respective conflicts. See Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 
76–151 [209]–[430]; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual 
and Legal Aspects’ (Report, State of Israel, 14 June 2015) 218–41 [409]– [457] (‘2014 Gaza 
Conflict Report’).  
 54 See Prosecutor v Lubanga (Warrant of Arrest) (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04–01/06–2–tEN, 10 February 2006). For discussion of the 
Lubanga decision and a detailed account of the drafting history and development of the 
unable and unwilling criteria, see El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in 
International Criminal Law, above n 11, 161–70.  
 55 Rome Statute arts 17(2)(a)–(c).  
 56 El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above n 11, 
168. 
 57 Ibid.  
 58 Mégret, above n 30, 376. 
 59 El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above n 11, at 
175.  
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constitute shielding.60 These varied understandings support competing 
assessments of Israel’s domestic accountability measures. They also raise 
questions about the necessary means of legal compliance and the potential for 
manipulation. This has caused Kevin Jon Heller to ask ‘what kinds of national 
investigative steps are required to establish that a state is indeed genuinely 
investigating the suspect targeted by the ICC’?61 
The inclusion of complementarity and the art 17 criteria pacified traditional 
proponents of state sovereignty. This drew upon the foundational contention that 
a state possesses the right ‘to exercise its jurisdiction over crimes committed in 
its territory’.62 Historically, states were exceedingly reluctant to dilute sovereign 
rights and resisted initiatives to delegate their bestowed prerogatives beyond 
local structures.63 Efforts, initiated during the inter-war years and under the 
auspices of the League of Nations, to establish a permanent international 
criminal court were required to negotiate with a devout Westphalian state 
system.64 When such negotiations became formalised in the lead up to the 
creation of the ICC, the principle of complementarity, as articulated through art 
17 of the Rome Statute, was the resulting compromise.65 El Zeidy explains: 
In order to create an international criminal court to punish grave crimes of an 
international character, this historical obstacle had to be overcome. The 
compromise reached is the principle of complementarity. This principle requires 
the existence of both national and international criminal justice functioning in a 
subsidiary manner for the repression of crimes of international law. When the 
former fails to do so, the latter intervenes and ensures that perpetrators do not go 
unpunished.66 
The principle of complementarity also serves a pragmatic function. The ICC 
has limited resources and cannot possibly provide redress for the totality of 
 60 See ibid.  
 61 See Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Radical Complementarity’ (2016) 14 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 637, 640 (emphasis in original). See also Prosecutor v Muthaura 
(Judgement on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II of 30 May 2011) (International Criminal Court, Appeals Chamber, Case No 
ICC-01/09–02/11–274, 30 August 2011) [40]–[43].  
 62 See El Zeidy, ‘A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law’, above n 44, 
870. The territoriality principle is a general principle of public international law and holds 
that a state has the right to prosecute criminal offences that occur within its borders. See SS 
Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10. See also Ian Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2003) 301.  
 63 See Antonio Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment 
of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International 
Law 2, 11–12. See also Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the 
Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New Millennium (Transnational 
Publishers, 2002) 8, 25.  
 64 Cassese, above n 63; Sadat, above n 63. See also Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The International 
Criminal Court and National Courts: A Contentious Relationship (Ashgate, 2011) 3, 5.  
 65 Member states to the ICC have reached opposing interpretations of whether the Rome 
Statute obliges or reaffirms the entitlement of states to invoke jurisdiction following the 
suspected commission of international crimes. See Jann K Kleffner, Complementarity in the 
Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (Oxford University Press, 2008) 235–7. 
See also Rome Statute Preamble, para 6.  
 66 El Zeidy, ‘A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law’, above n 44, 870.  
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international crimes that may come within its mandate.67 Complementarity 
recognises that in many instances domestic legal systems are best suited to 
ensure appropriate remedies.68 In practice, the Court would rather defer to a 
functional domestic system to provide protection and ensure against impunity.69 
This is consistent with complementarity’s primary efforts to encourage states to 
investigate alleged violations domestically, to ensure that states possess the 
necessary legal mechanisms to pursue such prosecutions and to address impunity 
at the national level.70 
When states, subject to international scrutiny, point towards the various 
domestic measures that they purport satisfy accountability requirements (and 
thus preclude admissibility under art 17), they often identify both individual and 
general investigative procedures. Mireille Delmas-Marty describes the necessity 
of a formalist distinction between criminal and non-criminal accountability:  
An important point to be verified in appreciating a state’s willingness to 
investigate is not only the opening of an investigation into a general situation, but 
whether or not the investigation is in fact directed toward the persons truly 
responsible.71  
While this formal distinction is widely acknowledged, there are practical 
reasons why evaluations of domestic proceedings may wish, at least initially, to 
avoid too rigid a distinction.72 Nevertheless, when states claim legitimacy by 
employing the language of complementarity, when they reference national-level 
inquiries into the legality of a general situation, they often conflate the principle 
of complementarity with the obligation of states to investigate non-criminal 
violations of IHL. 
 67 See Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘Paper on Some Policy Issues 
before the Office of the Prosecutor’ (Policy Paper, September 2003) 3 <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25--
60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/VP5E-
G52K>. See also Olympia Bekou, ‘Building National Capacity for the ICC: Prospects and 
Challenges’ in Triestino Mariniello (ed), The International Criminal Court in Search of its 
Purpose and Identity (Routledge, 2015) 133, 138–9.  
 68 Sainati, above n 41, 204–5.  
 69 Complementarity in Practice, above n 47, 3.  
 70 William Burke-White has termed this approach ‘proactive complementarity’: Burke-White, 
‘Proactive Complementarity’, above n 12, 54. Moreno Ocampo noted in 2004 that the 
Office of the Prosecutor would apply a positive approach to complementarity and that 
‘rather than competing with national systems for jurisdiction, we will encourage national 
proceedings wherever possible’. See Luis Moreno Ocampo, ‘Statement of the Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno Ocampo to Diplomatic Corps’ (Speech delivered at The Hague, 12 February 
2004) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/0F999F00-A609-4516-A91A-
80467BC432D3/143670/LOM_20040212_En.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/7U6L-
STZG>.  
 71 See Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‘Interactions between National and International Criminal Law 
in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 2, 5.  
 72 See El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above n 11, 
166–7. See also Second Turkel Commission Report, above n 37, 147 [109].  
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B The Obligation to Investigate Non-Criminal Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law 
International criminal law is premised on the belief that ‘only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced’.73 IHL provides states with the obligation to investigate non-criminal 
violations. Prominently, violations of IHL involve individual conduct.74 The 
Geneva Conventions, however, address both individual criminal liability and the 
civil responsibility of states for the commission of international crimes and 
wrongful acts.75 Marco Sassòli notes that this recalls IHL’s origins of governing 
relations between belligerent states: ‘violations are attributed to States and 
measures to stop, repress and redress them must therefore be directed against the 
State responsible for the violations’.76 
The relationship between state and individual responsibility was succinctly 
distinguished by the International Law Commission (‘ILC’). During the arduous 
codification process of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the ILC 
declared: 
the criminal responsibility of individuals does not eliminate the international 
responsibility of States for the consequences of acts committed by persons acting 
as organs or agents of the State. But such responsibility is of a different nature 
and falls within the traditional concept of State responsibility. The criminal 
responsibility of the State cannot be governed by the same régime as the criminal 
responsibility of individuals …77 
This dual focus is reflective of international practice. Countless historical 
examples demonstrate that, most often, international crimes and individual 
violations of IHL feature substantial state involvement.78 
It is widely understood that states hold a legal duty to investigate their 
conduct for non-criminal or civil breaches of IHL. Positivist readings of IHL do 
not, however, provide substantive guidance regarding the content or cause of the 
 73 Judicial Decisions, above n 38, 221. As part of the fulfillment of these obligations, a state 
may be required to conduct a criminal investigation. Although this may contribute to the 
conflation of the two legal frameworks (criminal and civil), they remain both formally and 
substantively separate. See Hampson, above n 10, 4–5.  
 74 See Marco Sassòli, ‘State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ 
(2002) 84 International Review of the Red Cross 401, 401–2.  
 75 Ibid. Reference to state obligation is found in art 51 of the first Geneva Convention and is 
repeated in arts 52, 131 and 158 of the second, third and fourth Geneva Conventions 
respectively. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 
(entered into force 21 October 1950) art 51 (‘Geneva Convention I’); Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 
21 October 1950) art 52 (‘Geneva Convention II’); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 
(entered into force 21 October 1950) art 131 (‘Geneva Convention III’); Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) art 148 (‘Geneva 
Convention IV’). 
 76 Sassòli, above n 74, 402.  
 77 ‘Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 
Thirty-Sixth Session’ [1984] II(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 11. See 
also Bonafè, above n 34, 33.  
 78 Bonafè, above n 34, 71.  
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required investigations.79 Instead, the substance and source of the obligation to 
investigate is derived from international human rights law.80 In Velásquez 
Rodríguez v Honduras, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights interpreted 
the requirement that states ‘ensure’ the rights within the American Convention on 
Human Rights81 as presenting an affirmative duty to ‘prevent, investigate and 
punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention’.82 Several 
international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’)83 and the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CAT’),84 contain 
language obliging states to undertake investigations of alleged legal violations.85 
In its art 2 jurisprudence, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the 
right to life imposes positive obligations. These include a duty to investigate 
deaths that may have occurred in breach of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.86 Further, in Resolution 60/147 the General Assembly affirmed the 
 79 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: Rules’ (Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol 1, 530–3. Article 4(1) of 
the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts holds that: 
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any 
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and 
whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of 
the State. 
  Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res 56/83, UN GAOR, 56th 
sess, 85th plen mtg, Agenda Item 162, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (28 January 2002, adopted 12 
December 2001) annex (‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’) art 
4(1). See also Hampson, above n 10, 12. See generally Sassòli, above n 74. 
 80 See generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave 
Human Rights Violations in International Law’ (1990) 78 California Law Review 451. See 
also Michael Scharf, ‘The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal 
Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes’ (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 
41.  
 81 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1144 
UNTS 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978). 
 82 See Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgement) (1988) Inter-Am Court HR (ser C) No 4, 
[166] (emphasis added). See also Roht-Arriaza, above n 80, 469–74.  
 83 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (‘ICCPR’). 
 84 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 
June 1987) (‘CAT’). 
 85 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, 80th sess, 2187th mtg, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004) [8]. See also CAT art 12. For an overview of 
these developments, see Marzuki Darusman, Steven R Ratner and Yasmin Sooka, ‘Report of 
the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka’ (Report, United 
Nations Secretary-General, 31 March 2011) 73–5 [262]–[269] (‘Panel of Experts on 
Accountability Report’).  
 86 The Court held that: 
a general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the State would be 
ineffective, in practice, if there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of 
the use of lethal force by State authorities. The obligation to protect the right to life 
under this provision (art 2), read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under 
Article 1 (art 2+1) of the Convention to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention’, requires by implication that 
there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have 
been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State. 
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requirement that states investigate cases of gross violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law.87 Both the International Committee of the Red Cross and the 
United Nations Secretary-General’s Expert Panel on Accountability in Sri Lanka 
have found that the obligation to investigate serious violations of human rights 
and IHL ‘are now buttressed by a generation of state practice’ and form part of 
customary international law.88 
Françoise Hampson explains that a state’s obligation to investigate and 
monitor civil or non-criminal violations of IHL is influenced by the requirements 
that states ‘respect’ and ‘ensure respect’ for the Geneva Conventions.89 This 
supposes a state obligation to both prevent violations and to act should a 
violation occur.90 While the regulation of grave breaches instils individual 
criminal responsibility,91 each of the Conventions have common language 
requiring that a ‘High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the 
suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other 
than the grave breaches’.92 The requirement to suppress transcends war crimes 
and the liability of individuals. As Hampson notes: 
In order to suppress something, States need to know whether it is occurring. This 
would appear to require some form of monitoring. If, as a result of monitoring, a 
State determines that a violation of the Conventions is occurring, it is required to 
suppress it. This may be by means of criminal proceedings but, unlike the case 
with ‘grave breaches’, it does not have to be by such means. The only obligation 
is to put an end to the behaviour in question.93 
To ensure respect, under Common Article 1, and to satisfy treaty provisions 
requiring the ‘prevention’, ‘suppression’ and ‘repression’ of violations, states are 
  McCann and Others v The United Kingdom [1995] 21 Eur Court HR 1, 41 [161], citing 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). See 
generally Alastair Mowbray, ‘Duties of Investigation under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 437.  
 87 See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, GA Res 60/147, UN GAOR, 60th sess, Agenda Item 71(a), 
UN Doc A/RES/60/147 (21 March 2006).  
 88 Panel of Experts on Accountability Report, above n 85, 75 [269]. See Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck, above n 79, 607.  
 89 Common Article 1 holds that: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to 
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’. See Geneva Convention I art 
1. See Hampson, above n 10, 12.  
 90 Hampson notes that this view is affirmed by the obligation to disseminate the treaty 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions as conveyed by arts 47, 48, 127 and 144 of the four 
Conventions respectively: Hampson, above n 10, 12. See Geneva Convention I art 47; 
Geneva Convention II art 48. The wording of the obligation is extended by both the third 
and fourth Conventions. See Geneva Convention III art 127; Geneva Convention IV art 144. 
See also Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, ‘The Obligation to 
Disseminate International Humanitarian Law’ (Fact Sheet, International Committee of the 
Red Cross, 28 February 2003) <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/obligation-disseminate-
international-humanitarian-law-factsheet> archived at <https://perma.cc/9G4S-P2W8>.  
 91 Hampson, above n 10, 13. 
 92 Geneva Convention I art 49; Geneva Convention II art 50; Geneva Convention III art 129; 
Geneva Convention IV art 146. See also Hampson, above n 10, 13.  
 93 Hampson, above n 10, 14.  
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required to monitor the function of their military systems and investigate alleged 
violations that may occur within an armed conflict.94 
As with the principle of complementarity, the obligation to investigate non-
criminal violations serve important and necessary purposes. These should be 
encouraged and enabled. Both individuals and states, however, may be reluctant 
to assume such responsibility. Frequently, when facing accusations of serious 
legal violations, states reactively deny such accusations.95 They argue and 
interpret the relevant provisions of international law and present corroborating 
facts to support their claim and assert legitimacy.96 These traditionally structured 
forms of legal argumentation remain ever-present features of armed conflicts. 
They manifest throughout the discourse that follows the use of force. States, 
however, are increasingly supplementing their international legal engagements 
with pre-emptive and informal appeals to the principle of complementarity and 
the obligation to investigate non-criminal violations of IHL. Investigations are 
conducted for various reasons and often in good faith.97 However, the informal 
appeals to complementarity identified here are intended, principally, to generate 
legitimacy upon the use of force and through the legal discourse that follows the 
cessation of hostilities. 
III INTERNATIONAL LAW, LEGITIMACY AND THE USE OF FORCE 
‘You cannot win a war today without simultaneously keeping legitimacy 
inside the country and around the world’, declared Mandelblit following the 
Second Lebanon War in 2006.98 States have long acknowledged an 
interconnectedness between legitimacy and the use of force.99 M Cherif 
Bassiouni dates this relationship to antiquity.100 From this time, states have 
coupled initiations of force with appeals to the legitimacy of their actions.101 
International relations scholars ponder the source, purpose and effects of these 
 94 Ibid 15. See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 
8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) arts 57, 87, 91 
(‘Additional Protocol I’); Ian Park, ‘Joint Series on International Law and Armed Conflict: 
The Obligation to Investigate Violations of IHL’ on EJIL Talk! (30 September 2016) 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/joint-series-on-international-law-and-armed-conflict-the-obligat 
ion-to-investigate-violations-of-ihl/>.  
 95 Cohen and Shany explain that states are reluctant to prosecute persons who acted in their 
name or pursuant to direct orders. See Cohen and Shany, above n 14, 77–8.  
 96 See David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton University Press, 2006) 7–8.  
 97 Ibid 34.  
 98 See Alan Craig, International Legitimacy and the Politics of Security: The Strategic 
Deployment of Lawyers in the Israeli Military (Lexington Books, 2013) 7, quoting Military 
Advocate General (‘MAG’) Avichai Mandelblit’s testimony before the Winograd 
Commission.  
 99 See David Armstrong and Theo Farrell, ‘Force and Legitimacy in World Politics: 
Introduction’ (2005) 31 Review of International Studies 3, 3. See generally Jeremy Black, 
‘War and International Relations: A Military-Historical Perspective on Force and 
Legitimacy’ (2005) 31 Review of International Studies 127, 127.  
 100 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Terrorism: The Persistent Dilemma of Legitimacy’ (2004) 36 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 299, 299.  
 101 See ibid. See also Armstrong and Farrell, above n 99, 8–9; Dino Kritsiotis, ‘The Power of 
International Law as Language’ (1998) 34 California Western Law Review 397, 402; 
Richard Falk, ‘Legality and Legitimacy: The Quest for Principled Flexibility and Restraint’ 
(2005) 31 Review of International Studies 33, 36–44.  
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assertions.102 Though these considerations are beyond the present scope, a broad 
recognition has emerged, that from at least the latter half of the 20th century, 
international law influences appeals to legitimacy. It now provides states a 
vocabulary to justify (or contest) the use of force.103 
It is, of course, possible to distinguish between legitimacy and legality.104 
However, since the post-World War II shift towards international institutions, the 
Charter of the United Nations’ (‘UN Charter’) prohibition of the use of force105 
and the dissemination of IHL, the embrace of legal argument has become ‘one of 
the staple features of state practice on the use of force, so that when states use 
force against other states, they also use international law to define and defend, 
argue and counter-argue, explain and rationalise their actions’.106 This goes 
beyond positivist appeals to the specific provisions that express the limited 
grounds upon which states may resort to force and which govern, often in great 
detail, the means by which such force may be applied.107 Christian Reus-Smit 
notes that when states began codifying the principles that govern the conduct of 
hostilities, they were not only enshrining rules. They also established a 
framework of what constituted rightful state actions within the international 
sphere.108 Accordingly,  
[i]nternational law has become a site for the social construction of models of 
legitimate agency and action, and the models it enshrines have become key 
justificatory touchstones in the constitutive political struggles of global society.109 
Law is also framed as an excuse. Critical legal scholars have traced the 
evolution of law’s humanising endeavours.110 Premised on the assumption that 
legal war is a more humane exercise than illegal war, legalised contestations 
have long provided states a means of explaining the need for war and excusing 
 102 See generally Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford University Press, 
2005). See also Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International 
Relations and Customary International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1999); David 
Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd ed, 2013); Allen Buchanan, 
Human Rights, Legitimacy, and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 2010); Andrew 
Hurrell, Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle Be Squared? (2005) 31 Review of 
International Studies 15.  
 103 See Michael Byers, War Law: Understanding International Law and Armed Conflict (Grove 
Press, 2005) 3, 43.  
 104 See generally Nicholas Rengger, ‘The Judgment of War: On the Idea of Legitimate Force in 
World Politics’ (2005) Review of International Studies 143. See also Martti Koskenniemi, 
‘Faith, Identity, and the Killing of the Innocent: International Lawyers and Nuclear 
Weapons’ (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 137.  
 105 Charter of the United Nations art 2(4) (‘UN Charter’). 
 106 Dino Kritsiotis, ‘When States Use Armed Force’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The Politics of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 45, 47 (emphasis in original). See 
also Jennifer Welsh, The Return of History: Conflict, Migration, and Geopolitics in the 
Twenty-First Century (Anansi Press, 2016) 64.  
 107 David Kennedy, for example, explains that for the past century law and international law 
have been in revolt against formalism. Law and legal argument, Kennedy claims, have 
successfully become a ‘practical vocabulary for politics’. See Kennedy, above n 96, 45.  
 108 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Politics of International Law’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The 
Politics of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 14, 20. 
 109 Ibid.  
 110 See generally Chris af Jochnick and Roger Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence: A 
Critical History of the Laws of War’ (1994) 35 Harvard International Law Journal 49.  
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particular actions taken during combat.111 Inside the domestic polity and 
throughout the international sphere, the legal regulation of war provides states 
with, as David Kennedy identified, a means of privileging the use of force.112 
Adherents to various strands of international relations question the association 
between international law and politics. Realist, rationalist and constructivist 
approaches offer differing accounts of international law both generally and in 
times of armed conflict.113 Though a diversity of motivational perspectives exist, 
understandings of international law and the use of force mostly accept that states 
do appeal to the former upon engagement of the latter.114 Despite international 
law’s acknowledged weaknesses — its deficient enforcement mechanisms and 
the absence of formal requirements compelling legal justifications — states 
willingly invoke law.115 Numerous observed instances of state recourse to legal 
argument substantiate the self-reliant nature of international law’s relationship 
with the politics and legitimacy of armed conflict. This does not endorse the 
validity of, or suggest parity between, particular legal claims. Such appeals to 
international law are commonly contested, may be offered in bad faith or strain 
plausible interpretations beyond reasonable recognition.116 
Notwithstanding tenuous appeals and alongside particular rules, customs and 
treaty provisions, international law provides ‘a framework and vocabulary for 
states to imagine, negotiate and realise social relations’.117 Yet war’s inevitable 
tragedy induces heightened controversy. Cicero declared inter arma enim silent 
leges (in war law is silent) but Grotius contended that war is ‘so horrible, that 
nothing but the highest necessity or the deepest charity can make it be right’.118 
Silence has long given way to contestations of legitimacy. Claims that war or the 
use of force are ‘right’ now assume a familiar argumentative structure. Andrew 
Hurrell notes that the state’s reliance on law is not a result of the law’s 
(perceived) capacity to unambiguously determine the legality of a military 
action.119 Instead, reliance reflects law’s internal structure, which contains  
well-established patterns of argumentation about the use of force, about the rules 
that have governed and might govern the use of force, about the ways political 
interests can be expressed in a common language of claim and counter-claim.120 
Similarly, Kennedy has described war as both a fact and an argument.121 
Within the argument that accompanies the use of force, international law has 
 111 Ibid 50. See also David Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and Warfare’ in James Crawford and Martti 
Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) 158.  
 112 Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and Warfare’, above n 111, 160.  
 113 For an overview of these perspectives, see Christian Reus-Smit, above n 108, 15–24.  
 114 Kritsiotis, ‘When States Use Armed Force’, above n 106, 46.  
 115 Kritsiotis, ‘The Power of International Law as Language’, above n 101, 402.  
 116 See One Humanity: Shared Responsibility — Report of the Secretary-General for the World 
Humanitarian Summit, UN GAOR, 70th sess, Agenda Item 73(a), UN Doc A/70/709 (2 
February 2016) 13 [48]. See also Kritsiotis, ‘The Power of International Law as Language’, 
above n 101, 402; Welsh, above n 106, 89–90; Byers, War Law, above n 103, 3.  
 117 Armstrong and Farrell, above n 99, 10.  
 118 M Tulli Ciceronis, ‘Pro T Annio Milone: Oratio ad Iudices’ in F H Colson (ed), Cicero pro 
Milone (MacMillan, 1893) 1, 5; Hugonis Grotii, De Jure Belli et Pacis (Cambridge 
University Press, 1853) vol 2, 442.  
 119 Hurrell, above n 102, 24. 
 120 Ibid 24–5.  
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become ‘the rhetoric through which we debate and assert the boundaries of 
warfare’.122 These appeals to international law, however, serve divergent 
purposes. Kennedy contends that if law can 
increase friction by persuading relevant audiences of a campaign’s illegitimacy, it 
can also grease the wheels of combat. Law is a strategic partner for military 
commanders when it increases the perception of outsiders that what the military is 
doing is legitimate. And of course, it is a strategic partner for the war’s opponents 
when it increases the perception that what the military is doing is not 
legitimate.123 
Proponents and opponents of war may possess symmetrical access to the legal 
vernacular that structures contestations of legitimacy. However, as Max Weber 
famously opined, only states successfully claim a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force.124 Corresponding attempts to demonstrate the legitimacy of the use 
of force by state actors traditionally appeal, often separately, to both jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. Israel has promoted the formality of this distinction.125 In 
accordance, Israel claims that evaluations of military conduct must observe this 
division to ensure that an alleged violation does not unduly influence overall 
assessments of a military operation’s legitimacy.126 
Collectively, states appeal to both the cause of war and the means through 
which it is conducted. This intends to demonstrate the legitimacy of their actions 
and the consistency of their methods with the requirements of international law. 
The common refrain of we obey the law underscores specific arguments. The 
public and diplomatic discourses accompanying the use of force emphasise the 
general legitimacy (or legality) of the overall operation. In accordance with the 
prohibition on the use of force, states have traditionally appealed, under jus ad 
bellum, to the self-defence exception contained within the UN Charter. On 
countless occasions, from the Caroline incident to the US-led wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, states have followed a familiar argumentative structure. This recalls 
international law and self-defence, it demonstrates legal compliance and asserts 
legitimacy.127 This traditional structure of legal argument, in justification of the 
use of force, remains a prominent feature of contemporary conflicts. States, 
however, are increasingly coupling accounts of legal adherence, to jus ad bellum, 
with appeals to the legitimacy of their actions, through jus in bello. 
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A Israel’s Early Appeals to International Law and Legitimacy 
Israel has long viewed the relationship between diplomacy — including its 
legal aspects — and security policy as a strategic calculation. David Ben-Gurion 
described this relationship. He explained that ‘[t]he Minister of Defense is 
authorized to make defense policy; the role of the Foreign Minister is to explain 
that policy’.128 Israel’s earliest appeals to the legitimacy of its military actions 
primarily invoked self-defence. Upon the use of force, Israel employed the 
language of art 51 of the UN Charter to purport legal compliance.129 As many 
states claim, the use of force was presented as a final resort, a demand of 
necessity. Although war has been a palpable feature of the Israeli–Arab conflict 
since the Mandate era and despite cyclical episodes of violence, Israeli and 
Palestinian actors remained cognisant of the evolving legal framework that 
rapidly formalised in the latter half of the 20th century.130 
In 1948 Israel achieved statehood and a war began.131 In response to the 
Security Council, Israeli officials sought to illustrate the conformity of their 
actions with the UN Charter.132 Asked whether its military forces were operating 
beyond its borders, the Provisional Government of Israel replied that  
[n]o area outside of Palestine is under Jewish occupation but sallies beyond the 
frontiers of the State of Israel have occasionally been carried out by Jewish forces 
for imperative military reasons, and as part of an essentially defensive plan.133  
Undertaken military actions were presented in accordance with international 
law. They appealed to the self-defence exception contained in art 51 of the UN 
Charter and purported to respect the prohibition on the use of force within art 
2(4).134 Collectively, Israel claimed that its military actions were taken ‘in order 
to repel aggression, as part of our essentially defensive plan, to prevent these 
areas being used as bases for attacks against the State of Israel’.135 They were 
intended to 
protect Jewish population, traffic and economic life, including the protection of 
those Jewish settlements outside the area of the State where, owing to the absence 
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of any duly constituted authority and the failure to implement the guarantees and 
safeguards provided for under the General Assembly Plan, life and property are in 
imminent danger.136 
Israel’s justifications directly appealed to international law and asserted 
compliance with its newly codified dictates. Significant segments of the 
international community were generally (though not completely) supportive of 
Israel’s defensive claims and the Security Council neither formally endorsed nor 
directly rebuked them.137 
Nearly two decades later, in reaction to the events of June 1967, Israel 
displayed a similar reliance upon the language of self-defence and international 
law. Many in Israel believed that the nation verged on the brink of annihilation 
prior to its swift victory in the 1967 war.138 Despite Israel’s newfound control of 
the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula 
and the Golan Heights, the Security Council moderated its initial engagements 
with the political and legal questions that accompanied the regional 
transformation.139 Throughout the international community, however, Israel 
faced growing condemnation. This too harnessed an international legal 
vocabulary. It appealed to the UN Charter, claiming that Israeli actions violated 
the UN Charter’s prohibition on the aggressive use of force.140 The Israeli 
response was immediate and decisive. Abba Eban, addressing the Security 
Council, purported that Israel’s actions were consistent with international law. 
They were presented as legitimate and as a necessary response to an 
overwhelming threat: 
as time went on, there was no doubt that our margin of general security was 
becoming smaller and smaller. Thus, on the morning of 5 June, when Egyptian 
forces engaged us by air and land, bombarding the villages of Kissufim, Nahal-Oz 
and Ein Hashelosha we knew that our limit of safety had been reached, and 
perhaps passed. In accordance with its inherent right of self-defence as formulated 
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Israel responded defensively in full 
strength. Never in the history of nations has armed force been used in a more 
righteous or compelling cause.141 
Israel’s response was multifaceted. However, to the extent that it employed 
international law to demonstrate legitimacy, it purported compliance with the 
immanency and necessity requirements of self-defence.142 
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The legal questions, diplomatic exchanges and contestations of legitimacy 
that followed the 1967 war were principally fixated on the jus ad bellum before 
shifting towards the protracted conflict accompanying Israel’s subsequent 
occupation of the Palestinian territories. Though such considerations were rarely 
absent over the tumultuous decades that followed, during the escalating conflict 
with the Palestinians, and within the increasingly entrenched occupation of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Second Lebanon War featured expansive appeals 
to international law. These increasingly emphasised the legitimacy of state 
actions under jus in bello. Now, assertions of legal compliance, based on appeals 
to defensive necessity, were expanded. Commonly, the state would profess that 
its specific military actions — its selection of targets, choice of weaponry or 
calculation of proportionality — adhered to the requirements of international 
law. 
B Lebanon and an Increased Reliance on International Law 
On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah operatives crossed into Israel. They sought to 
ambush and abduct an IDF patrol unit. The operation had been planned for 
months. It served Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s strategy of 
antagonising Israel, of bolstering his domestic standing and of gaining leverage 
to free Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners held within Israel.143 Early that 
morning, two IDF military vehicles were fired upon with heavy weaponry. The 
unit was separated. Three soldiers were killed while others hid nearby. Udi 
Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were captured by militants, transferred to jeeps and 
driven north into Lebanon.144 Although the abductions of Goldwasser and Regev 
triggered the Second Lebanon War, tensions had been mounting between Israel 
and Hezbollah in the years that followed Israel’s withdrawal from southern 
Lebanon in 2000.145 Israel framed the abductions, not as a terrorist or militant 
action undertaken by Hezbollah, but instead as a state act that required and 
warranted a decisive military response. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert 
announced: ‘The events of this morning cannot be considered a terrorist strike; 
they are the acts of a sovereign state that has attacked Israel without cause’.146 
Almost immediately, the IDF launched attacks against Hezbollah targets in 
southern Lebanon. In response, communities in Israel’s north — in and near 
Nahariya and Safed — came under rocket attack. Over the next month Israeli 
forces bombed targets within Lebanon. Hezbollah militants launched rockets into 
Israel.147 International efforts to produce a ceasefire were initially blocked by the 
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Americans and British, who viewed the Israeli offensive as a necessary facet of 
the broader struggle against regional terrorist organisations.148 When the UN-
brokered ceasefire came into effect on 13 August, approximately 1200 Lebanese 
and over 40 Israeli civilians had been killed.149 
Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs framed the continuous rocket attacks by 
Hezbollah as violations of the principle of distinction and thus IHL. It claimed 
Hezbollah employed human shields, also in violation of IHL, and intentionally 
targeted Israeli civilians through their choice of weaponry and means of 
combat.150 Again, Israel presented its response as a legitimate and necessary 
appeal to self-defence. Israel claimed that diplomatic means were exhausted, its 
actions necessary, and the use of force proportionate.151 
Initially, Israel’s decision to launch a military operation received qualified 
international support.152 This, however, would falter. As the campaign 
continued, civilian casualties rose. Shiite villages and neighbourhoods in Beirut 
were bombarded and the IDF began targeting Lebanese infrastructure.153 In 
response, Israel faced mounting condemnation.154 On 30 July, the Israeli Air 
Force (‘IAF’) attacked the village of Qana. The strike killed an estimated 28 
civilians and evoked a strong international reaction.155 Kofi Annan condemned 
the attack.156 The Security Council expressed ‘shock and distress’.157 Following 
the conflict, the UN Soares Report held: 
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while Hezbollah’s illegal action under international law of 12 July 2006 provoked 
an immediate violent reaction by Israel, it is clear that, albeit the legal justification 
for the use of armed force (self-defence), Israel’s military actions very quickly 
escalated from a riposte to a border incident into a general attack against the entire 
Lebanese territory.158 
The report continued to note that Israel, jus in bello, exhibited a ‘lack of 
respect for the cardinal principles regulating the conduct of armed conflict, most 
notably distinction, proportionality and precaution.’159 It held that ‘[t]he 
particularly tragic impact on civilians and civilian property is certainly due to 
this deficit.’160 In reply to mounting accusations of legal disregard, Israel 
professed fidelity to international law: 
In responding to the threat posed by Hezbollah’s terrorist attacks, and 
notwithstanding the fact that Hezbollah made no effort to comply with the 
principles of humanitarian law, the IDF regarded itself as bound to comply with 
the established principles of the law of armed conflict.161  
Israel claimed that it carefully determined what constituted a legitimate military 
target, adhered to the principle of proportionality when assessing targets, and 
emphasised the distinction between military objectives and civilian objects.162 
Strikes against Lebanese infrastructure — including the Beirut airport and the 
Al-Manar television station — that had provoked significant condemnation were 
presented as being in accordance with international law.163 Israel claimed these 
facilities served dual-use purposes.164 The airport was said to constitute a 
legitimate military target as it was likely to be used to supply weaponry and 
military materials to Hezbollah and transport the abducted Israelis from 
Lebanon.165 Al-Manar purportedly relayed messages to terrorists and incited acts 
of violence.166 Israel claimed that pursuant to the Committee established to 
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review NATO bombings in Yugoslavia, such actions rendered the station a 
legitimate military target.167 
The Israeli assault on Qana was immediately described as a war crime.168 The 
UN Soares Report would later hold that it found no evidence suggesting the 
buildings Israel had attacked were used by Hezbollah to launch rockets. 
Accordingly, they did not constitute military targets.169 The IDF were adjudged 
to have used disproportionate force. They were censured for the deaths of 
civilians.170 Again, in response, Israel claimed that its actions did not constitute a 
violation of international law.171 Qana was presented as a hub of terrorist 
activity. Israel claimed that the IAF targeted launching sites, undertook 
precautions to minimise civilian casualties and only took action against terrorist 
infrastructure. Israel steadfastly rejected that it purposefully targeted civilians.172 
In Jerusalem and at The Kirya in Tel Aviv, politicians and military officials 
discussed the likely international reactions to Israel’s proposed response.173 
Assessments of legitimacy and perception weighed heavily throughout 
deliberations. Attorney-General Menachem Mazuz was asked to adjudge the 
legality of strikes against homes that intelligence indicated were used to store 
rockets but would also result in civilian casualties.174 Military lawyers were 
deployed in theatre to evaluate proposed targets. They received broad discretion 
to veto targets that contravened IHL.175 The IDF’s International Law Department 
(‘ILD’) contributed to the formation of general military policy and, despite 
institutional resistance to the newfound prominence accorded to international 
law, military lawyers substantively contributed to operational decisions.176 
Following the war, as Israel faced persistent condemnation ‘legal discourse 
became central to Israel’s defence of its campaign and the lawyers now played 
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an unprecedented international role in defending the legality of the war and 
mitigating legitimacy costs to the state.’177 Advocacy professed compliance. 
Daniel Reisner, the former head of the ILD, provided the Israeli Government’s 
response to a Human Rights Watch report.178 The report claimed the high 
numbers of civilian casualties resulted from Israel’s failure to distinguish 
between military objectives and civilian objects.179 Reisner argued that military 
targets were vetted by lawyers, resulting civilian damage was proportionate and 
that Israel’s actions were consistent with the requirements of jus in bello.180 
The Second Lebanon War featured increased reliance upon international law. 
The legal engagements that accompanied the use of force shifted from exclusive 
assertions of defensive legitimacy to broader exhibitions of legal compliance. As 
with the major conflicts that preceded it, Israel justified its decision to use force 
in a legal vernacular that appealed to self-defence and the UN Charter. When 
Israel faced international condemnation that challenged the legitimacy of its 
actions, Israel increased its reliance upon the legitimising potential of law. It 
expressed adherence to relevant legal norms, professed total compliance and 
exhibited its efforts to ensure that specific targets were vetted to determine the 
legality of military actions. These engagements recall Kennedy’s description of 
law’s strategic potential.181 They are expressive of the common state refrain of 
we obey the law and serve to illustrate the military campaign’s legitimacy. 
Domestically, however, the Second Lebanon War was perceived as a 
failure.182 Israel did not significantly weaken Hezbollah or exhibit a strong 
deterrent capability. It suffered reputational damage within the international 
community and faced questions about the IDF’s capacity and readiness.183 The 
Winograd Commission was formed to evaluate political and military decision-
making within the much-maligned campaign.184 Testimonies from Attorney-
General Mazuz and Mandelblit described the function of IDF lawyers and their 
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reliance upon international law during the conduct of hostilities.185 The 
Commission criticised what it perceived as an unnecessary deference to 
international law. It accused Mazuz of ‘taking international law too seriously’.186 
In response, the Attorney-General directly referenced complementarity and 
argued that the role of international law within armed conflict had increased. 
Such legal engagements, claimed Mazuz, would provide opportunity to ensure 
that Israel’s military conduct was not adjudicated in international forums.187 In 
order to both avoid criticism and to ensure against individual responsibility, the 
Attorney-General stressed international law’s strategic importance and 
legitimising potential.188 
Although Israel would later employ the Attorney-General’s advice, its direct 
response to the criticism it faced during and upon conclusion of the Second 
Lebanon War followed a familiar pattern. Israel countered claims of legal 
violations with assertions of legal fidelity. It sought to demonstrate that its 
military actions, jus ad bellum and jus in bello, complied with international law. 
Israel appealed to legal reasoning and offered broad interpretations of 
international law that facilitated its claims of legality, and thus legitimacy. These 
arguments were relatively silent on questions of process. Following the assault 
on Qana, Israel had argued that its targets constituted military objectives, 
presented evidence of rocket sites and accused the Lebanese militants of using 
human shields. However, when the Association for Civil Rights in Israel called 
for a state inquiry into the incident, neither the Government nor military were 
willing to comply.189 Although little direct attention was paid to the legitimising 
potential of formal investigations, this soon would change as Israel’s security and 
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legal apparatuses shifted their attention from Hezbollah and the northern border 
to Hamas and the Gaza Strip. 
IV INVESTIGATION AS LEGITIMISATION: INFORMAL COMPLEMENTARITY AND 
GAZA 
The Winograd Commission’s efforts to constrain the IDF’s recourse to 
international law were unsuccessful. Israel furthered its appeals to legal 
argument and justification. Over subsequent military campaigns, Israel became 
progressively cognisant of the strategic benefit conveyed by complementarity. 
Pnina Sharvit Baruch, the former head of the IDF’s International Law Division, 
noted that 
[t]he main way to confront the anticipated allegations in the international arena, 
and especially in potential criminal proceedings, is to carry out independent 
investigations that are thorough, effective, fast, and transparent, and are conducted 
in such a way that the investigative mechanism will also receive international 
legitimacy. In specific cases — if for example, it becomes clear that IDF forces 
acted contrary to military orders and the laws of warfare — a hard line should be 
taken against those responsible, including prosecution in suitable cases. This is 
necessary in order to preserve and protect the rule of law and the values of the 
IDF. But in addition, this will enable reliance on the principle of 
complementarity, whereby international proceedings and foreign judicial 
intervention are not appropriate when the state concerned carries out a genuine 
and effective investigation on its own.190 
Israel appealed to the principle of complementarity after a Spanish court 
claimed universal jurisdiction to hear a case regarding the targeted killing of 
Salah Shehadeh.191 In 2002, an Israeli operation to kill Shehadeh, then the 
military commander of Hamas’ Izz ad-Din al Qassam Brigade, resulted in the 
deaths of 14 civilians.192 The operation was condemned throughout the 
international community but Israel initially refused to conduct criminal 
 190 Pnina Sharvit Baruch, ‘Operation Protective Edge: The Legal Angle’ in Anat Kurz and 
Shlomo Brom (eds), The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge (Institute for National 
Security Studies, 2014) 65, 70.  
 191 See generally Sharon Weill, ‘The Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh’ (2009) 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 617, 618, 624.  
 192 See Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘12 Dead in Attack on Hamas’, The Guardian (online), 23 July 
2002 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/23/israel1> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/X9LU-CJ7J>. See also Weill, above n 191, 617–19.  
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proceedings.193 Israel exhibited a common posture — dismissive of the threat of 
international prosecution and supportive of both the individual actions taken 
during the operation and the general policy that propagated the controversial 
event.194 After a non-governmental organisation advocated for criminal 
proceedings against the involved members of the IDF, General Dan Halutz, the 
Commander of the IAF, reassured the pilots that conducted the operation: 
You aren’t the ones who choose the targets, and you were not the ones who chose 
the target in this particular case [the Shehadeh assassination]. You are not 
responsible for the contents of the target. Your execution was perfect. Superb … 
You did exactly what you were instructed to do. You did not deviate from that by 
as much as a millimeter to the right or to the left.195 
Following the Second Lebanon War, however, Israel had become increasingly 
mindful of international law’s strategic potential.196 In 2008, upon the initiative 
of Chief Justice Aharon Barak, Israel established a commission of inquiry to 
assess the Shehadeh operation. This would ‘examine the circumstances 
surrounding the harm inflicted on uninvolved civilians’.197 When a Spanish court 
began proceedings against a number of high-level Israeli officials a year later, 
 193 A petition was filed to the Israeli High Court of Justice that sought an order requiring the 
MAG and the Attorney-General to begin a criminal investigation into the actions of the Air 
Force Commander, the Chief of General Staff, the Minister of Defense and the Prime 
Minister. This was denied by the Court. See Hass v Judge Advocate General, Supreme 
Court of Israel, 8794/03, 23 December 2008. Israel faced both domestic and international 
condemnation. See Amnesty International UK, ‘Israel/OT: Killing Palestinian Civilians Will 
Not Bring Security or Peace’ (Press Release, 23 July 2002) 
<https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/israelot-killing-palestinian-civilians-will-not-
bring-security-or-peace> archived at <https://perma.cc/65HB-4H9D>. See also David Stout, 
‘White House Rebukes Israel for Attack, Calls it “Heavy-Handed”’, The New York Times 
(online), 23 July 2002 <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/23/international/white-house-
rebukes-israel-for-attack-calls-it-heavyhanded.html>; Mark Oliver, ‘Bush Joins in 
Condemnation of Israeli Attack’, The Guardian (online), 24 July 2002 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/23/israel2> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/KT2F-9VKN>; Margalit, above n 14, 158–9; Weill, above n 191, 618.  
 194 For example, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared the mission to be one of Israel’s 
greatest successes but did note, in response to the collateral damage and international fallout 
following the targeted killing, that had he known the outcome, the assassination would have 
been postponed. See June Thomas, ‘Israel Hits and Misses’, Slate (online), 26 July 2002 
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/international_papers/2002/07/israel_hits_
and_misses.html> archived at <https://perma.cc/7R98-DNCC>.  
 195 Uri Ben-Eliezer, Old Conflict, New War: Israel’s Politics Toward the Palestinians (Palgrave 
MacMillian, 2012) 137. See Moshe Reinfeld, ‘Gush Shalom: Investigate IAF Chief Over 
Shehadeh Bombing’, Haartez (online), 21 August 2002 
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 196 Eyal Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to 
Gaza (Verso, 2011) 90.  
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Commission’ (Report, 27 February 2011) 
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Israel referenced complementarity.198 Israel replied to the Spanish authorities 
that the Shehadeh incident was subject to a domestic inquiry. This would 
establish whether criminal proceedings were necessary.199 The Israeli 
communication claimed that Spanish jurisdiction would infringe upon Israeli 
sovereignty, violate the principle of subsidiarity and contradict the principle of 
complementarity.200 Meanwhile, it continued to detail the various methods of 
domestic review available for suspected legal violations by Israeli personnel and 
the efforts taken under these procedures following the Shehadeh incident.201 
Israel’s various accountability measures addressed (and dismissed) issues of 
state responsibility and not individual criminal liability. Regardless, upon 
review, the National Court of Spain declined to pursue prosecution on the basis 
of Israel’s demonstrated domestic initiatives.202 Despite Israel’s initial reluctance 
to employ criminal proceedings or display investigative aptitude, the post-
Lebanon embrace of legal recourse signalled a shift in tactic. When international 
attention refocused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict following the 2008–09 and 
2014 Gaza wars, Israel coupled traditional assertions of legal compliance with 
appeals to informal complementarity. These novel efforts to generate legitimacy 
following the use of force — by appealing to the state’s willingness to 
investigate alleged violations of international law — were presented as evidence 
of legal compliance and through what may be conceptualised as a proleptic show 
trial. 
 198 The Spanish Court asserted universal jurisdiction following complaints by six Palestinians 
who alleged that the use of a one tonne bomb in a densely populated residential 
neighbourhood constituted an indiscriminate attack and thus an alleged war crime. See 
Weill, above n 191, 617, 618, 624.  
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inquiries are subject to further review by the Attorney-General and the Israeli Supreme 
Court. Further, the Israeli letter described the various reviews and inquiries, including at the 
Supreme Court, into the Shehadeh incident and a general defence of the legality of its 
targeted killing policy. In relation to Shehadeh this included a review by the MAG and the 
Attorney-General which held criminal investigation was not merited as the attack was 
against a lawful military target; the Supreme Court decision which rejected a petition by an 
NGO seeking to nullify the administrative decisions of the MAG and the Attorney-General; 
and the results of a subsequent public inquiry into the matter. See Letter from Israel to the 
Spanish Court, 29 January 2009. 
 202 Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 114 [306]; ‘Spain Court Drops Gaza Probe into 
Israeli Air Raid’, Ynet News (online), 30 June 2009 
<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3739264,00.html> archived at 
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A The 2008–09 and 2014 Gaza Wars 
It was not happenstance that upon acceding to the Rome Statute, the 
Palestinians chose the date of 13 June 2014 to accept the Court’s jurisdiction.203 
A day earlier, on 12 June, Marwan Qawasmeh and Amar Abu Aysha stole a car 
near Hebron. The two were members of Hamas but believed to be acting on their 
own initiative.204 They drove towards Gush Etzion, a bloc of Israeli settlements 
in the Judean Mountains south of Jerusalem. Here they came upon three students 
from a nearby yeshiva. Eyal Yifrach, Gilad Shaar and Naftali Fraenkel were 
hitchhiking home. They were forced into the car. Upon being taken, Gilad Shaar 
attempted to contact the police on his phone and report the abduction. Kawasmeh 
and Abu-Isa, discovering this attempt, shot and killed the three young 
students.205 
Weeks later, when the bodies were found, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu directly implicated Hamas: ‘Hamas is responsible, and Hamas will 
pay … [the students] were kidnapped and murdered in cold blood by wild 
beasts’.206 Israeli society galvanised around the abduction and killing of the three 
students.207 Tensions throughout Israel and the Palestinian territories continued 
to rise. A day after the burials of Yifrach, Shaar and Fraenkel, Mohammad Abu-
Khdeir, a 16-year old Palestinian from East Jerusalem, was forced into a car by a 
group of Israelis believed to be members of an extremist cell. Abu-Khdeir was 
driven from near his home in Shua’fat to the Jerusalem Forest, beaten, doused in 
gasoline and ignited in an act of vengeance that would claim his life.208 
The escalating events interrupted a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Gazan 
militants that preceded the murders in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Protests 
spread across the region. Militant groups in Gaza, believed to be unaffiliated 
 203 See Kittrie, above n 16, 218. See also Amira Hass, ‘Abbas Asks ICC to Probe “Israeli War 
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with Hamas, began launching rockets towards Israel in declared acts of defiance 
and solidarity. When the attacks increased, Israel ordered an airstrike that killed 
seven Hamas militants in Khan Yunis. In response, Hamas assumed 
responsibility for the rocket attacks and increasingly began to target sites in 
southern Israel. The following day, on 8 July 2014, Israel announced the 
commencement of Operation Protective Edge.209 
The resulting conflict, as with the international community’s response, 
followed a similar pattern to the 2008–09 Israeli offensive against Hamas in 
Gaza — Operation Cast Lead. In both instances, the international community 
appealed for restraint before condemning the military actions taken by Israel and 
Hamas.210 As formal hostilities ceased, the parties presented competing legal 
narratives. Each vied for legitimacy.211 Sharvit Baruch, who served as the head 
of the ILD between 2003–09, acknowledges that Israel was fully aware that its 
military campaigns are likely to receive condemnation.212 In reply, and 
consistent with previous practice, Israel appealed to self-defence and the legality 
of its actions under jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It sought to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of its military operations and the necessity of its decision to use force. 
Sharvit Baruch notes that while considerations of legitimacy are only a factor of 
operational decision-making, appeals to legitimacy serve important post-conflict 
purposes: 
it is important on a diplomatic level — to be able to give good answers to allies 
like the United States and the United Kingdom. Now it is also important, with the 
potential of [international] criminal investigations, to demonstrate the legitimacy 
of actions and also be able to give good answers. Beyond criminal proceedings, 
however, it is necessary to respond to international organizations, NGOs and 
others who are critical of the military action.213 
These post-hoc engagements may be placed within a process of normative 
judgment. As described by Alan Craig, standards are set and states engage in the 
strategic promotion of their policies. Craig notes that ‘[i]n the area of security 
policy, states can be expected to deploy their lawyers at home and abroad to 
influence understandings of international legitimacy that best fit the execution of 
 209 See generally Thrall, above n 208, 11.  
 210 See United Nations General Assembly, ‘General Assembly Demands Full Respect for 
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<https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/ga10809.doc.htm> archived at <https://perma.cc/F7S3-
3PPT>. See also SC Res 1860, UN SCOR 1860, 6063rd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1860 (8 
January 2009). The response to the 2014 war followed a similar pattern. See United Nations 
Security Council, ‘Security Council Weighs Effectiveness during “Eventual and at Times 
Tragic Month”’ (Press Release, SC/11502, 30 July 2014) 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11502.doc.htm> archived at <https://perma.cc/PV9W-
8E4Y>. For an account of the international community’s shift from acceptance of Israeli 
claims regarding jus ad bellum to condemnation pursuant to jus in bello, see Joel Peters, 
‘Gaza’ in Joel Peters and David Newman (eds), The Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict (Routledge, 2013) 196, 203. See also Colin Shindler, A History of 
Modern Israel (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 379–80.  
 211 Barak Ravid, ‘Delegitimization of Israel Must Be Delegitimized’, Haaretz (online), 16 
October 2009 <https://www.haaretz.com/1.5250761> archived at <https://perma.cc/F74C-
QH9L>.  
 212 Interview with Colonel (Retired) Adv Pnina Sharvit Baruch, (Tel Aviv, 20 March 2017). 
 213 Ibid. 
115
their policies’.214 In accordance with traditional appeals to international law, 
where compliance is asserted through a legal vernacular, Israeli officials drew 
upon supportive segments of the international community to articulate self-
defence-based justifications for the use of force and profess legal fidelity upon its 
application.215 
Such legal appeals were not exclusive to Israel. The PA claimed that Israel, as 
an occupying power, had abdicated its responsibilities towards the Palestinian 
population. It called upon the international community to ensure Israeli 
compliance with its associated obligations.216 Hamas, who do not hold a formal 
voice within the international community and do not often engage a legal 
vernacular when addressing grievances with Israel, also made allusions to 
international law. These held Hamas to be acting in self-defence, as possessing a 
right to resist foreign domination, and claimed that their armed groups undertook 
necessary efforts to avoid targeting civilians.217 
Israel’s initial efforts to employ a legal vernacular and articulate a narrative of 
compliance did not, however, halt the inevitable chorus of condemnation. 
Following the 2008–09 and 2014 wars, the resulting legal discourse developed 
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around a series of UN fact-finding reports.218 These presented detailed 
accusation of legal violations by Israeli and Palestinian actors.219 The most 
serious accusations were contained within the 2009 Goldstone Report and would 
become the source of considerable controversy.220 The report held that Israel had 
deliberately targeted Gaza’s civilian population as part of its military 
operation.221 Both the Goldstone Report and the 2014 Independent Commission 
Report would also accuse the PA and Hamas of various legal violations that 
ranged in severity.222 Hamas was held to have, inter alia, engaged in 
indiscriminate attacks against a civilian population, actions which could amount 
to war crimes.223 
The UN-mandated reports became the fulcrum for much of the post-conflict 
legal discourse. Israeli officials interpreted this process as an effort to 
delegitimise their military operation.224 Prime Minister Netanyahu announced 
 218 See, eg, Richard Goldstone et al, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab 
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that such efforts must, in turn, be delegitimised.225 The Israeli response exhibited 
many features commonly employed by states that faced allegations of legal 
violations. Declarations of compliance and interpretations of legal provisions 
were presented. Now, however, Israel also supplemented its claims of legal 
compliance and legitimacy with informal appeals to complementarity and 
expressions of investigative willingness. 
Israel’s collective response was robust. Initially, following the 2008–09 war, 
Israel refuted the perceived efforts of the UN’s Goldstone Report to delegitimise 
the undertaken military operation. Israel mounted its own claims to legitimacy. 
Initially, these followed a familiar pattern. Protestations were forged in legal 
vernacular and designed to establish the legitimacy of Israeli conduct under jus 
ad bellum.226 While elements of Israel’s immediate reaction to the Goldstone 
Report devolved into ad hominem attacks, Israel attempted to pivot the post-war 
debate towards reiterations of the self-defence-based justifications that had 
gained notable traction with significant elements of the international community 
in the war’s earliest days and which Israel accused the UN report of failing to 
sufficiently acknowledge.227 
Israel’s retorts moved from broad pronouncements to specific analysis. This 
recognised that despite the appeal of self-defence-focused arguments, much of 
the ensuing criticism addressed Israeli actions pursuant to jus in bello. Sharvit 
Baruch noted that ‘the more significant claims concern the manner in which the 
IDF used force in the operation and the application of the laws of warfare (that 
is, the area of jus in bello)’.228 Israel addressed these accusations through a series 
of reports following both the 2008–09 and 2014 Gaza wars.229 The reports, 
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defence constituted one of the most significant threats facing the state. See Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, ‘PM Netanyahu Addresses the Saban Forum’ (Press Release, 15 November 
2009) 
<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/PM_Netanyahu_addresses_Saban_Forum_
15-Nov-2009.aspx>. See also Robbie Sabel, ‘Manipulating International Law as Part of 
Anti-Israel “Lawfare”’ in Alan Baker (ed), Palestinian Manipulation of the International 
Community (Jerusalem Center of Public Affairs, 2014) 13, 19; Weizman, above n 196, 102.  
 228 Sharvit Baruch, above n 190, 66. 
 229 See Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32; 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53. 
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prepared jointly by the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, provide 
examples of (and themselves constituted) informal appeals to complementarity. 
It is, of course, unsurprising that Israel responded to the accusations it faced 
and contested international attempts to adjudicate the conflict. Equally, it is 
predictable that these responses served to deny accusations, to posit 
advantageous interpretations of international law and to frame the ensuing debate 
within supportable narratives that drew upon legitimising legal frameworks and 
the repetitious call of we obey the law.230 While these responses contained a 
range of legal justifications that commonly feature when a state asserts that its 
military actions are legitimate, they would move beyond the expected legal and 
factual claims that the state conformed to the requirements of international law. 
Through the employment of various accountability measures and the initiation of 
formal investigative processes, Israel appealed to informal complementarity and 
the obligation to investigate. 
The series of Israeli reports, disseminated following the Gaza wars, chronicle 
what is characterised here as a proleptic show trial. Informal appeals to 
complementarity were woven throughout Israel’s various diplomatic interactions, 
domestic investigations and commissions, and documented within the series of 
reports that followed the succession of wars in Gaza. Commonly, the proleptic 
show trial features four phases of engagement that purport legal compliance, 
advocate for broad and permissive interpretations of various provisions of IHL, 
and document investigative initiatives. Within the first stage of the proleptic 
show trial, the state establishes its legal capacity and esteem. Next, it asserts 
standing. Thirdly, the state conducts and conveys general investigations into the 
legality of its conduct. And, finally, it performs and then disseminates the results 
of individual criminal proceedings. These described forms of legal engagement 
overlap. They are not linear and often conflate the formal distinction between 
individual criminal responsibility and the non-criminal liability of states for 
violations of IHL. Collectively, though, these diverse, multifaceted and informal 
forms of engagement seek to achieve didactic purposes, establish a narrative of 
legal compliance and substantiate associated claims of legitimacy. 
B Establishing Legal Capability and Esteem  
The proleptic show trial begins abstractly. During the first phase of 
engagement, the state demonstrates the capacity, independence and esteem of its 
domestic legal system. These efforts recall the Israeli official who, following the 
 230 For Israel, these efforts were initially premised around the notion of self-defence and framed 
in accordance with international efforts to combat terrorism. See Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, ‘Responding to Hamas Attacks from Gaza — Issues of Proportionality’ 
(Background Paper, 29 December 2008) 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/law/pages/responding%20to%20hamas%20att
acks%20from%20gaza%20-%20issues%20of%20proportionality%20-
%20march%202008.aspx>; Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 14 [38], 26–7 [69]–[70]. 
In contrast, the PA’s position was framed around the notion of belligerent occupation and 
sought to accentuate the obligations and requisite legal framework placed upon Israel, the 
occupying power, under The Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV. See 
Negotiations Affairs Department, Palestine Liberation Organization, ‘Gaza: Occupation by 
Siege’, above n 216; Negotiations Affairs Department, Palestinian Liberation Organization, 
‘Dr Erekat Condemns “the Savage Israeli Assault on the Gaza Strip”’, above n 216. See also 
Geneva Convention IV arts 47–78. 
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Palestinian petition to the ICC, did not refer to a specific investigation or 
prosecution but instead expressed a willingness to ‘show the court at the Hague 
how serious, professional and independent the Israeli legal system is’.231 This 
does not allude to complementarity’s formal focus. It does not claim that the 
state has initiated criminal proceedings against an individual accused of violating 
ICL. Instead, it provides a declaration of capacity. This initial phase of 
engagement is broad. It speaks generally, to the international community, of the 
state’s willingness to ensure accountability. Additionally, it attempts to influence 
the ICC’s preliminary investigation. This may consider general questions of 
domestic judicial competence.232 When the Prosecutor initiates proceedings, she 
will often begin by examining an ‘entire situation’ before identifying specific 
cases for direct scrutiny and potential prosecution.233 
In addition to the admissibility requirements contained within art 17 of the 
Rome Statute, the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence encourage states to 
demonstrate that their national courts meet internationally recognised standards 
for independence and impartiality.234 Commenting on the strength of Israel’s 
legal system, Alan Baker, a former Israeli diplomat, veteran negotiator and 
member of Israel’s delegation to the Rome Conference, asserts: 
this is a fact. If a delegation or the Prosecutor of the ICC comes to Israel to talk 
and to present the ICC, then clearly it is in Israel’s interest to impress upon the 
delegation the fact that Israel has a very advanced legal system … Israel has an 
interest in telling the world — whether it is the ICC, or the UN, or Goldstone — 
that Israel has an advanced legal system in its army and therefore investigates 
anytime there is a need to investigate.235 
 231 Ravid, ‘Netanyahu Weighs International Criminal Court’, above n 8.  
 232 Asked whether investigations conducted within the Israeli army itself will be considered as 
fulfilling the complimentary requirement, Fatou Bensouda replied:  
During the course of this preliminary examination, any information given by the 
Israel and Palestinian governments related to complementarity efforts will be 
evaluated in order to determine whether national investigations and prosecutions are 
genuine, and bearing in mind the Office’s policy of focusing investigative efforts on 
those most responsible for the most serious crimes. The Office will also consider 
information gathered from other reliable sources, as well as open sources, in 
assessing complementarity. 
  Quoted in Aeyal Gross, ‘ICC Prosecutor: Low-Ranking Israeli Soldiers, as well as 
Palestinians, Could Be Prosecuted for War Crimes’, Haaretz (online), 1 May 2015 
<https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-icc-prosecutor-low-ranking-idf-soldiers-palestinians-
could-be-prosecuted-1.5357334> archived at <https://perma.cc/NN6Q-GJBR>. See also 
Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations’ (Policy Paper, November 2013) 12 <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-
policy_paper_preliminary_examinations_2013-eng.pdf> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/LGW4-7TA5>; Stigen, above n 14, 88.  
 233 See Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘The Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the 
Situation in Palestine’, above n 1. The distinction between situations and cases is intended to 
provide the Court with independence so as it can identify cases that merit prosecution 
following the referral of a general situation by the Security Council. See Stigen, above n 14, 
91–2.  
 234 See International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Doc No ICC-ASP/1/3 
(adopted 9 September 2002) r 51 (‘ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence’). Jo Stigen notes 
that ‘[t]he question as to which weight should be placed upon such general information 
remains, however, highly discretional’. See Stigen, above n 14, 131.  
 235 Interview with Ambassador Alan Baker (Jerusalem and Toronto, 19 March 2017).  
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Israel began responding to claims that it had violated international law during 
the Gaza wars by describing its national legal capacity and the esteem of its 
domestic legal system. The series of reports disseminated following the 2008–09 
war exhibited this first phase of engagement with informal complementarity. 
Between the conclusion of Operation Cast Lead and the publication of Israel’s 
principal report into the ‘factual and legal aspects’ of the war, the National Court 
of Spain had declined to prosecute the Israeli officials accused of war crimes 
during the targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh.236 Israel referenced the Court’s 
decision to substantiate the claim that it is capable and ‘committed to fully 
investigating alleged violations of Israel’s legal obligations’.237 The report 
accentuated that the Criminal Chamber of the (Spanish) National Court had 
emphasised Israel’s ability to fully and fairly investigate the charges itself. It held 
that Israeli procedures and decisions with regard to the legality of preventive 
strikes under international law, and the military, civilian and judicial review in 
Israel of the Shehadeh incident, comport with the principle of complementarity, as 
the State of Israel is a democratic country where the rule of law applies.238 
The series of reports disseminated following the Gaza wars further exhibit this 
first phase of engagement. Each report dedicates substantial space to detail the 
function of Israel’s various accountability measures — both military and civilian 
— and favourably compares these procedures with those of other states.239 Israel 
acknowledged that ‘all allegations regarding violations of international law in 
Gaza by any party, for which there is reliable information, must be thoroughly 
investigated, and where appropriate, prosecuted’.240 The reports provide 
accounts of the investigative processes. These include IDF field investigations, 
review by the MAG and the Attorney-General and appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Independence is accentuated.241 These claims intend to demonstrate legitimacy 
of process. They claim that domestic legal and investigatory systems are capable 
of providing redress and preventing impunity, that they meet or exceed 
international standards and that ‘Israel does not shy away from investigating its 
operations, or from filing criminal complaints where they are warranted’.242 
Legitimacy is derived from the assertion that the state is both able and willing 
to investigate allegations of international legal violations. It trades upon the 
democratic credentials of the state, its commitment to the rule of law and the 
professional esteem of its judiciary. Though investigative willingness is initially 
presented abstractly, it facilitates pre-emptive appeals to the principle of 
complementarity. Following Operation Protective Edge in 2014, Israel’s 
references to domestic capacity drew upon the Second Turkel Commission 
 236 See Weill, above n 191, 631.  
 237 Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 107 [283].  
 238 Ibid [306].  
 239 For example, Israel’s primary report following the 2008–09 war provided a detailed 
comparison between the Israeli system and its US and British counterparts. See ibid [307]–
[311].  
 240 Ibid [312].  
 241 Ibid [312]–[445]. See Follow-Up to the Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission 
on the Gaza Conflict — Report of the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 64th sess, Agenda 
Item 64, UN Doc A/64/651 (4 February 2010) annex I (‘Gaza Operation Investigations: An 
Update’) 7, 10, 31–7.  
 242 Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 107 [283], 157 [451].  
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Report.243 The Commission was formed following the 2010 naval raid of the 
Mavi Marmara which, alongside five other ships, attempted to breach Israel’s 
blockade of Gaza.244 Mandated to investigate the legality of the flotilla raid and 
the maritime blockade, the Commission was further tasked with assessing 
Israel’s mechanisms for evaluating complaints and alleged violations of IHL.245 
When Israel sought to reaffirm its investigative capacity, it offered the 
endorsement of the Turkel Commission. This was presented as evidence of the 
comprehensiveness of Israel’s domestic investigative and accountability 
mechanisms and the favourable standing of these procedures in comparison to 
several western, democratic nations.246 This further facilitated efforts to establish 
the legitimacy of process. Mandelblit, the MAG, described the report’s strategic 
importance as a means of substantiating Israel’s assertions of operational 
legitimacy and as providing evidence of and support to claims that under the 
complementarity regime Israel is capable of satisfying its legal obligations: 
The report thus has tremendous significance for strengthening Israel’s image 
around the world. It has an important role to play in Israel’s battle for legitimacy, 
which has been unjustly impugned over the past decade. It is also a significant 
step in eliminating the international community’s doubts about the credibility of 
the Israeli judicial system and its ability to investigate complaints and allegations 
of violations of the laws of war.247 
Israel asserted that it possesses a respected and internationally endorsed legal 
system that exhibits the requisite values of ‘independence, impartiality, 
 243 See, eg, 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 218–19 [410]–[411]. See also Second 
Turkel Commission Report, above n 37. 
 244 See generally Robert Booth, ‘Israeli Attack on Gaza Flotilla Sparks International Outrage’, 
The Guardian (online), 1 June 2010 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/31/israeli-attacks-gaza-flotilla-activists> 
archived at <https://perma.cc/9GFJ-3AC6>. See also Human Rights Council, Report of the 
International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, 
Including International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, Resulting from the 
Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance, 15th sess, Agenda 
Item 1, UN Doc A/HRC/15/21 (27 September 2010).  
 245 See First Turkel Report, above n 53, 17 [4]. Alongside its initial mandate, the Commission 
was also asked to examine  
the question whether the examination and investigation process for complaints and 
allegations raised with regard to violations of the law of combat, as generally 
practiced in Israel and as implemented with regard to the incident under 
consideration, is consistent with the obligations of the State of Israel pursuant to the 
rules of international law.  
  At 17 [4], quoting Resolution 1796 of the 32nd Government: ‘Appointment of an Independent 
Public Commission, Chaired by the Supreme Court Judge (ret), Jacob Turkel, to Examine 
the Maritime Incident of May 31, 2010’ (Israel) 14 June 2010, art 5. See also Second Turkel 
Commission Report, above n 37, [1]–[2].  
 246 Israel’s primary report following the 2014 Gaza war made explicit reference to the findings 
of the Turkel Commission. See 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 218 [410].  
 247 Avihai Mandelblit and Keren Aviram, ‘The Second Turkel Commission Report’ (Insight 
Report No 403, Institute for National Security Studies, 13 February 2013) 3 
<http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2608> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/J72N-7MD7>. 
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effectiveness, thoroughness, and promptness’.248 It claimed it is capable of 
fulfilling the requirements of the state’s investigatory obligations.249 This 
encouraged Prime Minister Netanyahu to respond to the ICC preliminary inquiry 
by appealing to complementarity and citing Israel’s investigative capacity and 
the esteem of its legal system. The Prime Minister stated:  
It’s absurd for the ICC to go after Israel, which upholds the highest standards of 
international law … Our actions are subject to the constant and careful review of 
Israel’s world-renowned and utterly independent legal system.250  
The Prime Minister’s remarks capture both the traditional state approach of 
asserting legal fidelity and novel appeals to the legitimising potential of 
investigation. 
C Asserting Appropriateness and Standing 
Upon establishing an abstract capacity to ensure legal accountability, the 
second phase of the proleptic show trial makes a specific claim of 
appropriateness and standing. Various legal and diplomatic engagements frame 
complementarity and the obligation to investigate non-criminal violations of IHL 
as a state right or prerogative. These efforts are, of course, consistent with 
traditional understandings of international law, sovereignty and the drafting 
history of the Rome Statute. Equally, these do not deny that complementarity or 
investigative requirements are understood as obligations. Instead, they serve to 
accentuate the appropriateness and primacy of the state’s jurisdiction.251 
Following Operations Cast Lead and Protective Edge, Israel expressed 
willingness to investigate incidents in which the IDF were accused of violating 
international law.252 The series of Israeli reports, however, premised this 
willingness on the proposition that ‘[u]nder international law, the responsibility 
to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of the Law of Armed Conflict by 
a state’s military forces falls first and foremost to that state’.253 
Israeli appeals to the appropriateness of domestic jurisdiction allude to the 
principle of complementarity. The first Israeli update report — which provides 
accounts of individual investigations and criminal proceedings conducted 
 248 Independence, impartiality, thoroughness, promptness and effectiveness are ‘universal 
principles’: Human Rights Council, Report of the Committee of Independent Experts in 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Laws to Monitor and Assess Any Domestic, 
Legal or Other Proceedings Undertaken by Both the Government of Israel and the 
Palestinian Side, in the Light of General Assembly Resolution 64/254, Including the 
Independence, Effectiveness, Genuineness of These Investigations and Their Conformity 
with International Standards, UN GAOR, 15th sess, Agenda Item 7, UN Doc A/HRC/15/50 
(23 September 2010) [21] (‘Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on IHL and 
HRL’). 
 249 See Mandelblit and Aviram, above n 247. 
 250 Isabel Kershner, ‘Israeli Government Watchdog Investigates Military’s Conduct in Gaza 
War’, The New York Times (online), 20 January 2015 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/21/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-gaza-strip-war-
investigation.html?_r=0>. 
 251 Alongside appeals to the principle of territoriality, this recalls Israel’s reference to the 
principle of subsidiarity in its communication to the Spanish Court’s pending prosecution 
following the Shehadeh case. See Letter from Israel to the Spanish Court, 29 January 2009.  
 252 See Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 117 [312]. See also 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, 
above n 53, 218 [409].  
 253 See Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I paras 71–2.  
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following Operation Cast Lead — cites an ICC expert paper. This defines and 
explains complementarity as establishing that ‘[s]tates have the first 
responsibility and right to prosecute international crimes’.254 These appeals to 
informal complementarity are again presented in the abstract. They serve to 
assert the legitimacy of domestic jurisdiction, presented as capable within the 
first phase of engagement, and now offered as the appropriate means of 
assessment. This subtly shifts complementarity’s emphasis from structuring a co-
dependent relationship between the ICC and national courts to confirming the 
primacy of domestic jurisdiction. 
Appeals to informal complementarity attempt to establish the legitimacy of 
state actions. Pleas to the appropriateness of domestic jurisdiction ensure that 
legitimising assessments of state behaviour occur at the (preferential) national 
level. Following Operation Cast Lead, the rhetoric that accompanied Israel’s 
investigative efforts equated complementarity with the prominence of national 
proceedings: 
The international community and national fora must respect and support national 
investigations currently in progress in Israel. To the extent that external 
organisations have gathered information related to the Gaza Operation, in the 
interest of justice, they should provide the information and any evidence on which 
it is based to Israel to facilitate those investigations. This is the essence of the 
principle of complementarity.255 
The Second Turkel Commission Report accentuates the appropriateness of 
domestic jurisdiction.256 The view that complementarity elevates the standing of 
domestic legal systems draws upon the principle’s association with sovereignty. 
The ICC was established amidst the widespread reluctance of states to relinquish 
their prerogative over criminal jurisdiction.257 Complementarity, in part, 
appeased state concerns. It was presented to ensure that states would retain 
‘investigative and prosecutorial priority’.258 Thus, when a state pre-emptively 
appeals to complementarity and frames complementarity as conveying an 
investigative prerogative, it draws upon this formative conception. Made within 
the proleptic show trial, however, recourse to informal complementarity claims 
standing and facilitates subsequent efforts to establish the legitimacy of process 
and of substance. 
Assertions of complementarity — which prioritise domestic jurisdiction — 
often blur measures intended to address individual criminal liability with those 
that pursue collective state responsibility. By framing complementarity and 
investigative obligations as a prerogative, the state may broaden 
complementarity’s formal focus on domestic criminal proceedings to include 
general national investigations, commissions of inquiry or fact-finding missions. 
These serve, principally, to assess the overall legality of the military action or 
 254 Ibid [71], quoting Complementarity in Practice, above n 47, 3.  
 255 Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 117 n 256.  
 256 See Second Turkel Commission Report, above n 37, 85 [32]. 
 257 Cassese, above n 63, 11. See also Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Political and Legal Responses to 
the ICC’ in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly (eds), The Permanent 
International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Hart Publishing, 2004) 389, 441; 
Holmes, above n 45, 43.  
 258 Stigen, above n 14, 35.  
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use of force. The facilitating language of complementarity is employed to 
establish a forum in which broadly conceived investigations may be conducted, 
where legality is assessed and through which legitimacy may be purported. 
D Development of a Legal Narrative through General Investigations of State 
Conduct 
Establishment of the state’s capacity and prerogative to investigate facilitates 
the third phase of the proleptic show trial. In this phase, the state addresses the 
merits of its military operation. In anticipation of condemnation, it assesses the 
legality of its actions and policies. It conducts and publicises the results of 
general investigations or commissions of inquiry. These are offered in 
satisfaction of the complementarity principle. This, purportedly, renders 
international scrutiny unnecessary. Appeals to informal complementarity 
recognise that, most often, states face broad accusations of legal violations. 
Within the public sphere, these accusations rarely differentiate between 
individual and state responsibilities. In response, the state builds upon the esteem 
of its domestic legal system to address accusations that its actions or policies are 
themselves illegal or illegitimate. 
The investigative process exhibits characteristics of a show trial.259 General 
investigations enable efforts to frame the conflict. They attempt to achieve pre-
ordained and didactic purposes by showing a greater ‘truth’ and developing a 
legal narrative that purports investigative willingness, compliance and 
legitimacy. Following the Gaza wars, Israel’s response to the mounting 
accusations of legal wrongdoing built upon the experiences of Lebanon. Israeli 
officials recognised that by conducting investigations they may appeal to 
complementarity and substantiate claims of legal compliance. Motivated by 
international law’s perceived prominence and its ability to convey legitimacy, 
unprecedented resources ensured a thorough level of legal engagement both 
during and after Operation Cast Lead.260 Six years later, following the ICC 
Prosecutor’s commencement of a preliminary examination, Israel’s State 
Comptroller, Joseph Haim Shapira, announced a broad inquiry into Israel’s 
conduct during the 2014 war. He coupled this announcement with the claim that:  
According to principles of international law when a State exercises its authority to 
objectively investigate accusations regarding violations of the laws of armed 
conflict, this will preclude examination of said accusations by external 
international tribunals (such as the International Criminal Court in The Hague).261 
 259 Jeremy Peterson argues that a show trial is defined by the presence of two related elements. 
First, there is an increased probability that the defendant will be convicted due to the 
planning and control of the trial. Second, the trial focuses, principally, on an ‘audience 
outside of the courtroom rather than on the accused’. See Jeremy Peterson, ‘Unpacking 
Show Trials: Situating the Trial of Saddam Hussein’ (2007) 48 Harvard International Law 
Journal 257, 260.  
 260 Weizman, above n 196, 90. See generally Amichai Cohen, above n 177, 367.  
 261 State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel, ‘The State Comptroller Investigation of 
Operation Tzuk Eitan — Protective’ (Press Release, 20 January 2015) 
<http://www.mevaker.gov.il/(X(1)S(loetsz0npwuzelkraw3ut1ok))/he/publication/Articles/Pa
ges/2015.1.20-Tzuk-EItan.aspx?AspxAutoDet ectCookieSupport=1> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/4DKD-DZMK>. See also Kershner, above n 250.  
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The State Comptroller responded directly to the ICC announcement. The 
proposed investigation sought to insulate the State from formal international 
scrutiny. Israel, however, had begun investigating its conduct and establishing a 
narrative of legal compliance and legitimacy while still in theatre. Writing after 
Operation Protective Edge, Sharvit Baruch discussed the difficulty of 
substantiating claims that a particular use of force was in fact legal. To address 
this challenge, Sharvit Baruch described the importance of expeditious 
investigation — of documenting events, attaining relevant testimonies and 
compiling photographic evidence that illustrates adherence to requisite legal 
principles.262 Through the series of reports disseminated following the Gaza 
wars, Israel presented its investigative initiatives as inferring legitimacy of 
process. Many of the investigations detailed within these reports prioritise 
assessments of state responsibility above questions of individual criminal 
liability. While this stage of engagement demonstrates investigative willingness, 
these investigations primarily evaluate state conduct. They provide a platform to 
advocate in favour of permissive interpretations of foundational legal principles. 
They detail Israel’s investigative efforts and processes. And, collectively, they 
present a narrative, crafted in an international legal vernacular, of the state’s 
military operation that substantiates claims to legitimacy of substance. 
Israel’s investigative willingness — as well as its assessments of the cause 
and conduct of each war — was framed within a compelling defensive context. 
As with the jus ad bellum-based arguments that accompanied Israel’s decisions 
to use force in 1948 and 1967, each report is framed around the threat posed by 
the rocket and mortar attacks emanating from Gaza. Following Operation Cast 
Lead, Israel asserted: 
For eight years, Hamas, a terrorist organisation avowedly dedicated to the 
destruction of Israel, has launched deliberate attacks on Israeli civilians, from 
suicide bombings to incessant mortar and rocket attacks. Since October 2000, 
Hamas and other terrorist organisations unleashed more than 12,000 rockets and 
mortar rounds from the Gaza Strip at towns in Southern Israel. Even though Israel 
withdrew from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, the attacks continued. Even though 
Israel made repeated diplomatic efforts, including appeals to the UN Security 
Council, to end the violence, the attacks continued. The death, injuries and — as 
Hamas intended — terror among the civilian population, including children, were 
intolerable, particularly as Hamas increased the range and destructiveness of its 
attacks.263 
In response to constant peril, Israel justified its decision to use force through 
the language of the UN Charter. Post-conflict legal engagements were premised 
on the position that military action was necessary, that it constituted self-
defense.264 Investigations of military actions remained mindful of this context. 
They were evaluated alongside a narrative of defence against a persistent, 
 262 Sharvit Baruch, above n 190, 66. 
 263 Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 5 [15]. The primary Israeli report following 
Operation Protective Edge contained detailed accounts and documentations of Hamas’ 
operations, chronicling the impact of rocket attacks in southern Israel. See 2014 Gaza 
Conflict Report, above n 53, 58–136 [107]–[230].  
 264 See, eg, Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 1 [3], 5 [16], 26 [68].  
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asymmetrical, campaign of terror.265 Legal evaluations were to acknowledge, as 
Israel claimed, that  
Hamas’ cynical choice of tactics — including the unlawful strategy of 
deliberately shielding their operatives and munitions in civilian buildings and 
protected sites — made difficult, complex and hazardous battlefield decisions by 
IDF even more difficult, more complex, and more hazardous.266  
Despite the appeal of defensive necessity, Israel recognised that the 
implications of these decisions evoked international condemnation and presented 
challenges to the legitimacy of its military operations.267 In acknowledgment, 
Israel’s investigative efforts moved beyond well-received articulations of self-
defence. They assessed the state’s conduct upon the use of force.268 
The Israeli reports, and the results of the various investigations, were in part a 
response to the demands of the international community.269 Following both the 
2008–09 and 2014 Gaza wars, Israel expressed willingness to investigate any 
credible allegation of legal wrongdoing.270 When Operation Cast Lead 
concluded, the IDF initiated field investigations into allegations that it had 
violated IHL. The MAG and the Attorney-General were tasked with evaluating 
the findings of these inquiries.271 After its initial response, the IDF conducted an 
overarching examination of its conduct during Operation Cast Lead. This was 
 265 Ibid 118 [315]. 
 266 Ibid 8–9 [26] (emphasis in original).  
 267 Sharvit Baruch, above n 190, 66.  
 268 Amongst heightened sensitivities regarding the threat and challenges posed by terrorism, 
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said to emanate from, and satisfy, the IDF’s ‘professional, moral and legal’ 
obligations to thoroughly investigate its conduct during the 2008–09 war.272 
In accompaniment of Operation Protective Edge, Israel launched three 
inquiries to investigate the campaign’s conformity with international law. The 
first began during the conflict. Upon the initiative of the IDF Chief of General 
Staff, a fact-finding assessment mechanism was established to investigate 
‘Exceptional Incidents’.273 This prompt expression of investigative willingness 
was promoted as evidence of the IDF’s commitment to the rule of law and to the 
requirements of international law.274 In the months following the cessation of 
hostilities, along with the State Comptroller investigation, the Knesset’s Foreign 
Affairs and Defense Committee launched an inquiry into Protective Edge.275 
By conducting and publicising investigations, the state gains an opportunity to 
advocate for (and apply) broad and permissive interpretations of IHL. During 
this phase of engagement, as the state moves from abstract pronouncements to 
specific analysis, it attempts to influence evaluative legal standards. This recalls 
Joseph Nye’s description of soft power. Within, states attempt to shape 
international rules in accordance with their own interests, so that their actions 
appear more legitimate to external observers.276 Incident-specific investigations 
appealing to the principle of complementarity, employ permissively interpreted 
standards of legal compliance to reach an advantageous determination and 
exhibit legitimacy of both process and substance. 
Addressing the source of much of the condemnation it faced following 
Operation Cast Lead, Israel referenced the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) and argued, ‘[t]he fact of civilian casualties in 
an armed conflict, even in significant numbers, does not in and of itself establish 
any violation of international law’.277 Constitutive principles like distinction and 
proportionality were understood within Israel’s diplomatic communications as 
broad and permissive. They were interpreted to provide the state significant 
 272 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘IDF: Conclusion of Investigations into Claims in 
Operation Cast Lead — Part 1’ (Press Release, 22 April 2009) 
<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/IDF_Conclusion_of_investigations
_Operation_Cast_Lead_Part1_22-Apr-2009.htm.aspx>.  
 273 See Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission, UN Doc 
A/HRC/29/CRP.4, 164 [611]. 
 274 Ibid.  
 275 Ibid [617].  
 276 Joseph S Nye Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Public Affairs, 2004) 
10–11. See also Craig, International Legitimacy and the Politics of Security, above n 98, 17, 
233.  
 277 Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 35 [90]. Israel further noted that civilian casualties 
could occur for a variety of justifiable reasons including that 
[civilians] may be harmed due to their proximity to a military target, or by 
operational mistakes. At times civilians may suffer harm because they are 
conscripted by the adversary to serve as ‘human shields’ against an attack upon a 
military target.  
  At 35 [91]. In support, Israel cited the position taken by the Office of the Prosecutor at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which ‘rejected any suggestion, 
in its evaluation of the NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, that the mere fact of 
civilian harm was indicative of wrongdoing’: at 35 [91]. See International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, above n 167, 1271 [51]. 
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operational latitude.278 These readings of international law became the evaluative 
standards that Israel applied to assess its actions in theatre. 
Didactic and procedural investigative objectives merged within the conveyed 
assessments of IDF conduct. During the third phase of engagement, the state 
investigates the factual and legal aspects of controversial incidents. The resulting 
assessments, however, focus on the legality of state policy. Accordingly, in the 
maiden hours of Operation Cast Lead, Israel launched several strikes against 
police facilities throughout Gaza.279 These resulted in numerous casualties, a 
torrent of international condemnation and competing discourses regarding the 
legitimacy of the IDF’s targeting determinations.280 Following the strikes, an 
IDF spokesperson noted that targeting decisions are made on the presumption 
that anyone involved with terrorism and in Hamas constitutes a valid target.281 In 
reply, Human Rights Watch asserted that, in accordance with IHL, police and 
police infrastructure are presumptively civilian. They maintain this status 
throughout hostilities unless members of the police forces become direct 
 278 The 2009 report, following Operation Cast Lead, addressed both the principles of distinction 
and proportionality. In relation to distinction, the report recognised the definition provided 
within Additional Protocol I. See Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 36–42 [94]–[115], 
citing Additional Protocol I art 48. The report continues to explain that distinction, in 
accordance with widespread state practice, addresses ‘only deliberate targeting of civilians, 
not incidental harm to civilians in the course of striking at legitimate military objectives’: 
Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 37 [97]. Having provided and supported broad 
understandings of the terms ‘military advantage’ and ‘indiscriminate attack’, Israel 
concluded its assessment of the principle of distinction by noting that ‘military operations 
that cause unintended and unwanted damage to civilians do not constitute violations of the 
Law of Armed Conflict, much less a war crime’: at 36–42 [94]–[115] (emphasis in original). 
The Israeli report continues to acknowledge that proportionality, as recognised in Additional 
Protocol I, prohibits attacks or military actions ‘which may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated’: at 44 [120], citing Additional Protocol I art 51(5)(b). In recognising the 
difficulty of balancing military and civilian objectives, Israel advocates for an evaluative 
standard that assesses proportionality from the perspective of the ‘reasonable military 
commander’. See Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 45 [123], 46 [125], 46 [127]; 2014 
Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 126 [332].  
 279 The highest profile incident involved the targeting of a police ceremony that killed between 
15 and 100 individuals (the precise nature of the event is disputed). See Taghreed El-
Khodary and Ethan Bronner, ‘Israelis Say Strikes Against Hamas Will Continue’, The New 
York Times (online), 27 December 2008 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/world/middleeast/28mideast.html>; Tim Butcher, 




 280 Human Rights Watch was critical of the targeting decision and noted that it may be 
unlawful. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Israel/Gaza: Civilians Must Not Be Targets’ (Press 
Release, 30 December 2008) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/30/israel/gaza-civilians-
must-not-be-targets> archived at <https://perma.cc/TQS7-FCTA>. See also Shay Fogelman, 
‘Shock and Awe’, Haaretz (online), 31 December 2010 <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/shock-and-awe-1.334520> archived at <https://perma.cc/GN44-FXRY>. 
 281 Captain Benjamin Rutland, the IDF spokesperson, communicated that ‘[o]ur definition is 
that anyone who is involved with terrorism within Hamas is a valid target. This ranges from 
the strictly military institutions and includes the political institutions that provide the 
logistical funding and human resources for the terrorist arm’. Heather Sharp, ‘Gaza Conflict: 
Who is a Civilian’, BBC News (online), 5 January 2009 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7811386.stm> archived at <https://perma.cc/WW2V-TAWG>.  
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participants in the armed conflict.282 The Goldstone Report determined that the 
Gazan police maintained their status as a civilian law enforcement agency. It 
found that many of those killed in the Israeli attacks were not participating in 
hostilities and thus did not forfeit their civilian status.283 Israel’s actions, at the 
commencement of Cast Lead, were labelled a violation of IHL. 
The legitimacy and legality of Israel’s operation had been challenged. In 
response, Israel conveyed the results of its investigation into these (and other) 
incidents. The ensuing discourse attempted to influence the factual and the legal. 
Despite the potential for individual criminal liability, these investigations 
assessed Israel’s targeting determination policy. First, Israel framed its military 
action within the established narrative of avowedly defensive objectives. The 
operation was presented as a necessary means of reducing Hamas’ terrorist 
capability.284 Numerous factual assertions were offered in substantiation of 
Israel’s claim that the Gazan police forces served a military function.285 Next, 
Israel communicated the process of its investigative efforts. The requisite — 
albeit broadly interpreted — legal framework was applied to adjudge legality and 
assess legitimacy. Legal norms like distinction and proportionality, interpreted 
abstractly, now provided evaluative standards of self-assessment. The 
investigation found that while members of a solely civilian police force are 
immune from attack, this principle does not apply where the police are part of an 
armed party.286 Within these circumstances, police forces constitute a legitimate 
military target.287 
Israel further evaluated its targeting decisions in accordance with the principle 
of distinction. Israel had called for a permissive reading of distinction. This held 
the foundational humanitarian principle to address only the deliberate targeting 
of civilians and not incidental harm incurred in the course of striking a legitimate 
military target.288 This reading provided Israel with an advantageously 
interpreted legal framework, under which incident-specific evaluations were 
 282 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Israel/Gaza: Civilians Must Not Be Targets’, above n 280. See 
also B’Tselem — The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories, Explanation of Statistics on Fatalities (2018) 
<https://www.btselem.org/statistics/casualties_clarifications> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/43NR-EG8D>.  
 283 See Goldstone Report, UN Doc A/HRC/12/48, 17 [33]–[34].  
 284 The airstrikes against police stations in al-Sajaiyeh and Deir al-Balah were placed within the 
context of Israel’s overarching military objective of reducing Hamas’ terrorist capabilities. 
See Second Follow-Up to the Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Gaza Conflict — Report of the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 64th sess, Agenda Item 64, 
UN Doc A/64/890 (11 August 2010) annex I (‘Gaza Operation Investigations: Second 
Update’) 64 [82].  
 285 Israel contended that Hamas’ military capabilities included both its armed forces (the Izz al-
Din al-Qassam Brigades) and its internal security forces: Operation in Gaza Report, above n 
32, 29–30 [77]–[79], 89–92 [237]–[244].  
 286 Ibid 89 [238].  
 287 Ibid. Israel cited The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict. This states, inter 
alia, that, ‘[a]long with the combatant status attained through the incorporation into the 
armed forces, these (police) forces also become a military target (as defined by Art 52, para 
2 API) and are therefore subject to armed attacks by the opposing party to the conflict just 
like any other unit in the armed forces’: at 89 n 210, citing Knut Ipsen, ‘Combatants and 
Non-Combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed 
Conflicts (Oxford University Press, 1995) 65, 75.  
 288 See Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 36–42 [94]–[115].  
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rendered. These substantiated traditional claims of legal fidelity. However, they 
also allowed Israel to demonstrate that it investigated allegations of legal 
violations, that it adhered to the required processes that the international 
community demanded. Investigative willingness entered the well-established 
patterns of argumentation that have long accompanied the use of force. 
Demonstration of such willingness allowed the state to claim compliance, to 
further its legal argument and ultimately to assert legitimacy. 
Israel disseminated the results of its investigations. Amalgamated factual and 
legal arguments purportedly conveyed legitimacy of process and substance. 
Upon review, the MAG found that the strike against police stations in al-
Sajaiyeh and Deir al-Balah adhered to the principle of distinction.289 The stations 
constituted legitimate military targets. The policy that identified these targets 
was deemed consistent with international law. The station in Deir al-Balah was 
designated as part of Hamas’ ‘internal security’ apparatus and said to be 
occupied by armed operatives. The attack was found to have served a legitimate 
objective by ‘substantially weakening the military force available to Hamas’.290 
Despite the professed legality of the attack, a number of civilians had been killed 
while shopping at a nearby market.291 The MAG investigation concluded, 
however, that the IAF was not aware of the market’s existence. It could not have 
planned the attack to avoid the resulting casualties. Therefore, it did not violate 
the principle of distinction by intentionally targeting those civilians in the 
vicinity of the attack.292 
The investigation demonstrated the purported legitimacy of Israel’s targeting 
policy. It contributed to a general narrative of legal conformity and engagement. 
Israel was credited for having employed measures to minimise collateral 
damage.293 It had performed investigations into the incident and found that the 
IDF’s actions were in conformity with the requirements of IHL. The perceived 
benefit of these general, state-centric, investigative initiatives is multifaceted. 
They provide a platform upon which the state may present, uninterrupted, its 
narrative or theory of the case. The state gains an opportunity to advocate for, 
and then apply, permissive interpretations of legal provisions like distinction or 
proportionality. By engaging in this process, appealing to these investigative 
requirements, the state may illustrate legal compliance of both process and 
substance. Although these legal engagements did not fully moderate the 
condemnation Israel faced following both Gaza wars, they facilitated efforts to 
generate legitimacy. 
Following the investigations into the incidents in al-Sajaiyeh and Deir al-
Balah, the MAG declined to recommend assessment for individual criminal 
liability. During Operation Protective Edge and under the direction of Major 
General Danny Efroni, who served as MAG from 2011–15, Israel employed 
near-immediate investigations following contentious incidents. These, claimed 
 289 Gaza Operation Investigations: Second Update, UN Doc A/64/890, annex I 23–4 [79]–[82].  
 290 Ibid 24 [83].  
 291 This was directly addressed in the Goldstone Report: Goldstone Report, UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/48, 102 [406].  
 292 Gaza Operation Investigations: Second Update, UN Doc A/64/890, annex I 24 [84].  
 293 These included the use of a warhead of reduced size and strength and equipped with a delay 
fuse. The IAF were said to be unable to provide advanced warning because the attack 
‘required the element of surprise’: ibid 24 [85].  
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Efroni, would ensure the rule of law while also reducing international pressure 
and thwarting legal measures against the IDF abroad.294 The third phase of legal 
engagement is primarily focused on state behaviour and assesses military 
decisions and policies central to the controversy that accompanies the use of 
force. Often, these find that a particular incident, in which these policies are 
exercised, does not require further criminal assessment.295 Efroni’s statement, 
however, is illustrative of a dual focus. Despite recognising complementarity’s 
potential to legitimise Israel’s conduct during the Gaza wars, appeals to this 
principle are not completely separate from complementarity’s formal purpose. 
When criminal proceedings are deemed necessary, the final phase of the 
proleptic show trial exhibits the state’s willingness to employ these proceedings 
in direct appeal to the principle of complementarity. 
E The Employment of Individual Criminal Proceedings 
The incident-specific assessments featured within the third phase of the 
proleptic show trial serve a subsidiary purpose. Despite pleas to 
complementarity’s implied ability to legitimise general state conduct, appeals to 
this principle are not made in isolation of its formal purpose. As illustrated by the 
al-Sajaiyeh and Deir al-Balah cases, these investigations prioritise assessments of 
state policy. Upon completion, however, general investigations will also assess 
whether additional criminal proceedings are necessary. Often, the incident-
specific investigations displayed during the third phase substantiate claims that 
individual criminal proceedings are unwarranted. The fourth and final phase of 
the proleptic show trial, nevertheless, exhibits the state’s willingness to 
investigate individual criminal liability, and when deemed appropriate, prosecute 
individuals accused of violating international law. 
The state (or military) may pursue these investigations in good-faith and for 
various reasons.296 Within the proleptic show trial, however, these investigations 
are presented collectively. They illustrate the willingness of the state to 
investigate allegations of individual misconduct. These efforts are presented in 
satisfaction of complementarity. Incident-specific investigations and, if 
necessary, criminal proceedings convey a willingness to consider whether an 
individual violation occurred. They purport evidence of accountability. And they 
claim to display adherence to the purposes of the complementarity regime. These 
investigations differentiate illegitimate individual actions from state policy and 
from the — professedly legitimate — domestic framework that governs the 
conduct of hostilities. They are likely to occur well before the formal attention of 
the ICC. Offered collectively, within the proleptic show trial, these appeals to 
 294 Harel, ‘Preempting The Hague’, above n 40. See also Gili Cohen, ‘Israeli Reservists 
Demand End to Army’s Criminal Probe of Gaza War’, Haartez (online), 5 January 2015 
<http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.635439> archived at <https://perma.cc/PVN9-
G852>. See also ‘Ramat Gan — Israeli Military Lawyer Says ICC Probe Not a Concern’, 
Vos Iz Neias? (online), 19 February 2015 
<http://www.vosizneias.com/195316/2015/02/19/ramat-gan-israeli-military-lawyer-says-
icc-probe-not-a-concern/?comments_sort=asc> archived at <https://perma.cc/4PLM-
JQRH>. 
 295 Nye Jr, above n 276, 10. 
 296 Hampson, above n 10, 3.  
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and examples of the state’s willingness to investigate and prosecute cases again 
present as legitimacy of process and of substance. 
Israel, as with many states, has rejected abstract calls for members of its 
military to be prosecuted before international tribunals. Prime Minister 
Netanyahu, following the PA’s accession to the Rome Statute, vowed to his 
Cabinet that ‘[w]e will not allow Israeli soldiers and officers to be dragged to 
[the International Criminal Court in] The Hague’.297 Ehud Olmert, who served as 
Prime Minister during Operation Cast Lead, stated that  
[t]he soldiers and commanders who were sent on missions in Gaza must know 
that they are safe from various tribunals and that the State of Israel will assist 
them on this issue and defend them just as they [boldly] defended us during 
Operation Cast Lead.298 
Israeli officials have of course, recognised the importance of individual 
prosecutions as a means of ensuring domestic accountability, discipline and 
structure within the IDF.299 Additionally, however, officials acknowledge that 
such prosecutions generate legitimacy and enable appeals to the principle of 
complementarity. This recalls Sharvit Baruch’s claim that to rely upon 
complementarity and confront both allegations in the international arena and 
potential criminal proceedings, Israel should employ independent investigations 
that will receive international legitimacy.300 The Turkel Commission sought to 
facilitate these efforts.301 It recognised the importance of legislative readiness in 
ensuring that a state possesses the required legal framework to ‘investigate and 
prosecute individuals for the offenses set out in the Rome Statute’.302 
Israel presented its post-conflict investigative efforts as in accordance with 
international obligations.303 Following Operation Cast Lead, Israel asserted that 
its ‘legal and judicial apparatus is fully equipped and motivated to address 
alleged violations of national or international law by its commanders and 
soldiers.’304 Investigations were conducted by the Military Police Criminal 
 297 Daniella Peled, ‘How Israel Stands to Lose at the ICC, without a Single Trial Taking Place’, 
Haaretz (online), 6 January 2015 <http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.635650> 
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<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2009/pages/Cabinet_communique_25-jan-
2009.aspx>. See also Human Rights Watch, Turning a Blind Eye: Impunity for Laws-of-War 
Violations during the Gaza War (Report, April 2010) 22 (‘Turning a Blind Eye’).  
 299 Harel, ‘Preempting The Hague’, above n 40. Decisions to investigate and efforts to 
prosecute have, however, caused considerable controversy within the IDF, especially in 
relation to the events related to conduct of Operation Protective Edge. See, eg, Yonah 
Jeremy Bob, ‘IDF War Crimes Probes Threaten to Tear Military Apart from Within’, The 
Jerusalem Post (online), 1 January 2015 <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Analysis-IDF-
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Investigation Division (‘MPCID’), the MAG and the Military Courts.305 The 
scope of these investigations was considerable. They included legal assessments 
of numerous incidents that had evoked concern amongst international 
observers.306 Israel’s post-conflict accountability efforts supplemented the 
incident-specific investigations of state policy with assessments of individual 
criminal liability. When the war concluded and attention shifted to the diplomatic 
sphere, Israel conveyed the results of these inquiries. Many of the incident 
specific investigations, featured during the third phase of engagement, did not 
find a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. These cases were closed.307 
A number of investigations into high-profile incidents that occurred during 
Operation Cast Lead were dismissed as intelligence failures that did not entail 
individual (or state) responsibility.308 
The permissive interpretations of legal standards like proportionality and 
distinction — for which Israel had advocated — were initially applied to assess 
state conduct. Now they would determine individual criminal liability.309 A 
series of 90 command-level investigations evaluated incidents that resulted in 
civilian injuries, fatalities and the destruction of property. These investigations 
were premised on the view that ‘injuries to civilians and damage to civilian 
property during hostilities do not, in themselves, provide grounds for opening a 
criminal investigation into potential violations of the Law of Armed Conflict’.310 
In cases where investigations found that international law had been breached, 
such breaches also constituted violations of the IDF’s rules of engagement.311 In 
one incident ‘a Brigadier General and a Colonel had authorized the firing of 
 305 Ibid 108 [286].  
 306 Following Operation Cast Lead, five broad categories of alleged violations, encompassing 
thirty individual incidents, were initially investigated under the direction of Lieutenant 
General Gabi Ashkenazi, the IDF’s Chief of General Staff. These addressed:  
Claims regarding incidents where UN and international facilities were fired upon and 
damaged during the Gaza Operation; Incidents involving shooting at medical 
facilities, buildings, vehicles and crews; Claims regarding incidents in which 
civilians not directly participating in the hostilities were harmed; The use of 
weaponry containing phosphorous; and Destruction of private property and 
infrastructure by ground forces.  
  Ibid 119 [318].  
 307 See, eg, 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 236 [455]. 
 308 For example, an investigation into an operation targeting a weapons storage facility that 
resulted in civilian deaths found that the IDF had mistakenly targeted the home of the Al-
Daya family rather than the neighbouring building. In another incident under consideration, 
the update report described an incident where the lead car of a UNRWA convoy was fired 
upon. The report noted, however, that the investigation revealed that this was due to a 
communications error and found no legal responsibility under IHL/ICL. Gaza Operation 
Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 42 [99].  
 309 See Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 35–42 [90]–[91], 36–42 [94]–[115]; 2014 Gaza 
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 311 See, eg, Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 42 [100]. 
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explosive shells which landed in a populated area’.312 This was held to be a 
violation of IDF orders limiting the use of artillery fire in such areas.313 
Similar patterns emerged following Operation Protective Edge. Upon the 
recommendation of the Turkel Commission, the fact-finding assessment 
mechanism provided the MAG with information that would be used to determine 
whether reasonable grounds existed to begin a criminal investigation.314 The 
principal Israeli report noted the significant number of complaints that Israel had 
received and was reviewing following the war.315 126 incidents were under 
consideration by March 2015.316 General investigations of state conduct gave 
way to specific investigations that would determine whether a particular incident 
entailed criminal liability. Assessments were rendered as to whether accused 
individuals adhered to a standard of reasonableness. The Israeli position held 
that: 
Rooted in the idea of the ‘reasonable commander’, the legal analysis is focused on 
circumstances at the time of the incident, in light of information that was known 
to the commander (or should have been known). Thus, for example, targeting 
decisions that result in civilian casualties do not, ipso facto, indicate a [criminal] 
violation of the Law of Armed Conflict, whereas the deliberate targeting of 
civilians would indicate such a violation.317 
Often, such investigations into high-profile events — those that elicited 
significant international controversy — served to demonstrate legal compliance, 
defuse state responsibility and generate legitimacy through their individual focus. 
In one incident, a MAG investigation into an IDF strike that killed two 
caregivers at a centre for people with mental and physical disabilities in Beit 
Lahiya found that the intelligence assessment did not produce evidence of a care 
centre.318 Under the auspices of an investigative mechanism that was intended to 
assess criminal liability, the Israeli investigation served a dual purpose. 
Conveyed and disseminated through a post-conflict report, Israel could 
 312 Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 42 [100]. 
 313 The report explains that in this case ‘[t]he Commander of the Southern Command 
disciplined the two officers for exceeding their authority in a manner that jeopardized the 
lives of others’: ibid.  
 314 Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission, UN Doc 
A/HRC/29/CRP.4, 164 [612]. See also Second Turkel Commission Report, above n 37, 425–
6 [8]–[9].  
 315 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 233 [448]. As noted in all Israeli reports, 
investigations could (and commonly were) initiated followed any credible complaint from a 
wide variety of sources that include Palestinian civilians, local or international non-
governmental organisations, UN bodies or agencies, in response to media reports, or on the 
IDF’s own initiative. See, eg, Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 108 [288]; Gaza 
Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 38–9 [91].  
 316 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 233 [449].  
 317 Ibid 234 [452].  
 318 Ibid 236 [456]. The strike was intended to target a weapons depot located inside the home of 
a senior Hamas commander. The report explained:  
According to the factual findings and material collected by the FFA Mechanism 
[Fact Finding Assessment] and presented to the MAG, the strike was directed at a 
weapons depot located inside the residential home of a senior Hamas commander, in 
a building comprising four apartments. While the operating forces were aware of the 
existence of a kindergarten in the same building, close to the weapons depot, there 
was no information indicating the existence of a care centre.  
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demonstrate that the incident had been investigated and that there was no 
evidence of individual criminal liability. Israel could avail of an additional 
platform to reiterate that its conduct and policy accorded with relevant legal 
requirements: 
the MAG found that the targeting process followed in this case accorded with 
Israeli domestic law and international law requirements. The attack was directed 
against a military objective, while adhering to the requirements of the principle of 
proportionality, and the decision to attack was made by the authorities authorised 
to do so. Further, the MAG found that the attack was carried out after a number of 
precautions were undertaken intended to minimise the potential for civilian harm, 
and that the professional assessment at the time of the attack — that civilians 
would not be harmed as a result of the attack — was not unreasonable under the 
circumstances. Although seemingly civilians were harmed as a result of the attack 
— indeed a regrettable result — it does not affect its legality post facto.319 
When investigators found that international law had been breached, that an 
individual criminal offense had occurred, they did not question state policy or 
action. Such cases were well-removed from the responsibilities of the state. They 
were also few in number. After Operation Cast Lead, of the 36 criminal 
investigations referenced in the first Israeli update report, only one led to 
indictment, seven were dismissed due to a lack of evidence or inability to obtain 
testimony and the remainder were in progress.320 In totality, following the 2008–
09 Gaza war, Israel initiated approximately 400 investigations. From these, the 
MAG commenced 52 criminal investigations. Two produced convictions — in 
the first a soldier was sentenced to seven and a half months’ imprisonment for 
the theft of a credit card, while in the other two soldiers were convicted of using 
a child as a human shield and each received suspended sentences of three 
months.321 
The post-conflict response to Operation Protective Edge drew upon a fact-
finding assessment mechanism. Resulting investigations into ‘exceptional 
incidents’ allowed Israel to demonstrate adherence to a process that had been 
endorsed by the Turkel Commission. Under the mechanism, Israel would first 
investigate and document a particular event. This allowed for an assessment of 
state conduct. On the basis of this investigation, however, Israel determined 
 319 Ibid.  
 320 See Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 43–6 [104]–
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See also Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 49–50 
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whether additional criminal investigation was necessary.322 Regardless of the 
assessment, this facilitated the claim that alleged breaches of international law 
were investigated for criminal liability. The final MAG update report explained 
that 190 incidents had been referred for investigation.323 Some remained pending 
and many had been closed.324 In one incident, the MAG opened a criminal 
investigation when two soldiers were accused of stealing NIS2420 from a home 
in the Shuja’iyya neighbourhood of Gaza City. Three soldiers were indicted.325 
On 16 July 2014, four children were killed when playing on a beach near the 
Gaza port. Ahed, Ismail, Mohamad and Zakaria Bakr were cousins. Two shells 
from a naval vessel exploded as they ran along the shore of the Mediterranean.326 
The Israeli strike became one of the most controversial events of the war. The 
UN Commission of Inquiry found ‘strong indications that the IDF failed in its 
obligations to take all feasible measures to avoid or at least minimize incidental 
harm to civilians’.327 The Israeli response coupled the traditional refrain of we 
obey the law with the novel claim of we will investigate. Only hours after the 
incident, an IDF spokesperson claimed the attack was against a ‘legitimate’ 
military target.328 Soon after, however, the IDF announced that it was 
investigating the events.329 
The incident was referred to the fact-finding assessment mechanism (‘FFA’) 
for evaluation. The mechanism found reasonable grounds for suggesting that the 
attack ‘was not carried out in accordance with the rules and procedures 
applicable to IDF forces’.330 In accordance, the MAG began a formal 
investigation.331 When the investigation was complete, the MAG found that 
there was insufficient evidence that a criminal offence had occurred. The case 
was closed. The MAG held that the IDF targeted an area known to be used by 
 322 Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission, UN Doc 
A/HRC/29/CRP.4, 165 [615].  
 323 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Operation Protective Edge: Investigation of Exceptional 
Incidents — Update 4: Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General’ (Press Release, 11 
June 2015) <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/IsraelGaza2014/Pages/Operation-
Protective-Edge-Investigation-of-exceptional-incidents-Update-4.aspx>.  
 324 Cases were closed for a variety of reasons. These included incidents where it was 
determined that there were no reasonable grounds for suspicion of criminal behaviour. In 
other cases, the MAG found that the alleged incident was in conformity with international 
law and thus there was no need to assess individual liability. See ibid. 
 325 Ibid.  
 326 Jethro Mullen and Ben Wedeman, ‘“They went to the Beach to Play”: Deaths of 4 Children 
Add to Growing Toll in Gaza Conflict’, CNN (online), 17 July 2014 
<http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/17/world/meast/mideast-conflict-children/> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/ER6H-HRZ7>; Anshel Pfeffer, ‘An Eyewitness Account of the Attack 
that Killed Four Children on Gaza Beach’, Haartez (online), 16 July 2014 
<https://www.haaretz.com/an-eyewitness-account-of-the-attack-that-killed-four-children-
on-gaza-beach-1.5255759> archived at <https://perma.cc/S2GP-C2FR>.  
 327 Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission, UN Doc 
A/HRC/29/CRP.4, 170 [631].  
 328 Pfeffer, above n 326. 
 329 Ibid. See also Ben Wedeman, Michael Pearson and Ali Younes, ‘Israel, Hamas OK 
Temporary Cease-Fire: Five Hours on Thursday’, CNN World (online), 16 July 2014 
<https://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/16/world/meast/mideast-crisis/index.html> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/C2M6-DQTH>.  
 330  Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Operation Protective Edge: Investigation of Exceptional 
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Hamas naval forces and that was exclusively utilised by militants. A day earlier 
the IDF had targeted a nearby site used to store military supplies. Intelligence 
reports were said to show that Hamas planned to use this area to launch an attack 
against Israel. Aerial surveillance identified four individuals running through the 
site. It was unclear that they were children.332 The MAG found that the attack 
was in accordance with Israel’s legal obligations. The decision to attack ‘was 
aimed at figures who were understood to be militants from Hamas’ Naval 
Forces, who had gathered in order to prepare to carry out military activities 
against the IDF’.333 The attack was not ‘expected to result in any collateral 
damage to civilians or to civilian property’ and several precautionary measures 
were taken.334 
When Israel communicated the results of its investigation, it emphasised the 
process used to reach its legal determination: 
The investigation that was conducted was thorough and extensive. During the 
investigation process testimony was collected from a large number of IDF 
soldiers and officers who were involved in the planning and execution of the 
attack. Additionally, an extensive number of documents relating to the attack 
were reviewed, along with video footage documenting the attack in real time, as 
well as media images and video footage which documented parts of the incident. 
Moreover, MPCID investigators made efforts to collect the testimonies of Gaza 
Strip residents who were, allegedly, witnesses to the incident. In this context, the 
collection of testimony from three witnesses was coordinated. Regretfully, despite 
the prior coordination, the witnesses eventually declined to meet with the MPCID 
investigators, and instead provided affidavits in regard to the incident.335 
The Israeli response attempted to illustrate the legitimacy of its military action 
and investigative processes. Each was intended to demonstrate the State’s 
compliance with international law.336 Following the 2008–09 and 2014 Gaza 
wars, Israel partook in an international dialogue regarding the conflict and in 
assessment of the use of force.337 It is of course not unusual that Israel defended 
its military action, that it professed compliance with international law. Such 
declarations of legal fidelity commonly accompany the use of force. They form 
part of the conversation that follows conflict and attempts to justify state 
violence. Now, however, the state is incentivised to cite complementarity. The 
traditional post-conflict discourse increasingly includes assertions of legitimacy 
that draws upon the state’s willingness to investigate. 
V CONCLUSION: THE UNCERTAIN EFFICACY AND INHERENT TENSION OF 
INFORMAL COMPLEMENTARITY 
The proleptic show trial is a metaphor. The phases of legal engagement 
described throughout Part IV are not fixed. In practice, they do not follow a 
linear progression and they continue to emerge and evolve. Certain features of 
the proleptic show trial are formal. This includes professional investigations. 
 332 Ibid. 
 333 Ibid. 
 334 Ibid.  
 335 Ibid.  
 336 Ibid. 
 337 See, eg, ibid. 
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Undertaken by the state, these may adhere to international standards and are 
employed for various purposes. One such purpose, however, is to generate 
legitimacy. This is the principal objective of the proleptic show trial, which 
displays adherence to a process and contributes towards a narrative that 
traditionally draws upon the justificatory tone of international law.338 While the 
outcome of a particular investigation may not be predetermined, it is weighted in 
favour of the state. Investigations commonly substantiate claims of legal 
adherence or distinguish between an overt violation and the state policy 
governing the use of force. Within the proleptic show trial the state may 
determine the appropriate standards of legal compliance and evaluate incidents 
for conformity with these standards. The prosecutor becomes both the legislator 
and the judge. 
As such, many ardent critics remain unmoved by Israeli engagements with 
international law. They receive accompanying appeals to complementarity with 
scepticism.339 Israel’s displays of investigative willingness — to the extent that 
Israel sought to achieve didactic objectives and generate legitimacy — did, 
however, experience qualified success. Israel received diminishing scrutiny 
within limited but noteworthy circumstances. Significantly, Richard Goldstone 
— the former South African judge and primary author of the report often placed 
at the centre of the legal discourse and who arguably became the most high-
profile critic of Israeli actions following the 2008–09 Gaza war340 — recanted 
his most damaging accusation. Writing in The Washington Post, Goldstone 
claimed: ‘If I had known what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have 
been a different document’.341 He continued that at the time of writing, Israel had 
conducted 400 investigations of operational misconduct while Hamas had 
conducted none. Goldstone cited with approval comments from a UN expert 
panel formed to oversee the implementation of his report. This, in part, 
commended the Israeli investigations.342 
Ultimately, Richard Goldstone reconsidered and disavowed his report’s 
primary accusation, that Israel had intentionally targeted civilians. The former 
judge noted the influence of the numerous investigations undertaken by Israel: 
The allegations of intentionality by Israel were based on the deaths of and injuries 
to civilians in situations where our fact-finding mission had no evidence on which 
to draw any other reasonable conclusion. While the investigations published by 
the Israeli military and recognized in the UN committee’s report have established 
 338 See, eg, Byers, War Law, above n 103, 3.  
 339 See Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission, UN Doc 
A/HRC/29/CRP.4, 159–69 [618]–[629]. See also Report of the Committee of Independent 
Experts on IHL and HRL, UN Doc A/HRC/15/50, 22–3 [90]–[95]; B’Tselem — The Israeli 
Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, ‘ICC Jurisdiction Cannot 
Be Denied Based on Israel’s Façade of Investigation’, above n 27; Turning a Blind Eye, 
above n 298, 1; Schmitt, above n 10, 31–4.  
 340 See Goldstone Report, UN Doc A/HRC/12/48; Richard Goldstone, ‘Reconsidering the 
Goldstone Report on Israel and War Crimes’, The Washington Post (online), 1 April 2011 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-israel-
and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html> archived at <https://perma.cc/CG45-
TTMD>. 
 341 Goldstone, above n 340.  
 342 Ibid. See also McGowan Davis Report, UN Doc A/HRC/16/24. For an account of the 
various readings of Goldstone’s decision to renounce aspects of his report, see Craig, 
International Legitimacy and the Politics of Security, above n 98, 201–3.  
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the validity of some incidents that we investigated in cases involving individual 
soldiers, they also indicate that civilians were not intentionally targeted as a 
matter of policy.343 
The Israeli experience, following the succession of wars in Gaza, supports 
Mégret’s contention that states are unlikely to conduct ‘mock’ proceedings to 
avoid ICC scrutiny.344 The conclusion, however, that ‘[i]f a state is unwilling, it 
will generally be unwilling all the way’345 is contestable. When Luban, Azarova 
and others considered the role that complementarity may play should the ICC 
Prosecutor move beyond a preliminary examination and bring a case before the 
Court, their opposing assessments queried the genuineness of Israel’s 
investigative and accountability initiatives.346 These inquiries employ the 
language of art 17 of the Rome Statute. They attempt to assess whether a 
(hypothetical) case is admissible due to the unwilling exception or if Israel’s 
domestic efforts ensure that cases are ‘investigated and prosecuted by a State 
which has jurisdiction over it’.347 
The purpose of this paper is not to relitigate the Israel-Palestinian conflict or 
the Gaza wars. Instead, this paper suggests — through its description of informal 
complementarity — that a broader, more encompassing understanding and 
purpose of this principle exists. This goes beyond the formal usage conveyed 
through art 17 of the Rome Statute. It exceeds complementarity’s formulistic 
assessment of a particular case’s admissibility. Informal complementarity, as 
understood throughout, facilitates an emerging means of generating legitimacy 
following the use of force. It has entered the post-conflict discourse and 
diplomatic debates. The state now couples its traditional assertions of legal 
compliance with evidence of both its capacity and willingness to investigate. 
These legal engagements with informal complementarity occur pre-emptively, 
in advance of ICC involvement — which may never transpire. They conflate the 
formal distinction between individual criminal liability and the non-criminal 
obligation of states under IHL. States often appeal to informal complementarity 
with multiple motives. Primarily, they rely upon the language of 
complementarity to convey legitimacy of process and of substance. The requisite 
investigations provide a platform from which the state may build a narrative of 
legal compliance. They may demonstrate the legality of state policy, in both jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello, and defend particular decisions within specific 
operations. Overt violations of international law can be acknowledged and 
identified as exceptional. Informal complementarity allows proactive 
differentiation between an individual violation and the state’s policy or the 
military’s rules of engagement. Finally, appeals to informal complementarity 
 343 Goldstone, above n 340. While Richard Goldstone retracted part of the report’s conclusion, 
his co-authors affirmed the original accusations. See Hina Jilani, Christine Chinkin and 
Desmond Travers, ‘Goldstone Report: Statement Issued by Members of UN Mission on 
Gaza War’, The Guardian (online), 14 April 2011 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/14/goldstone-report-statement-un-
gaza> archived at <https://perma.cc/RXP8-LP45>.  
 344 Mégret, above n 30, 376.  
 345 Ibid. 
 346 See, eg, Luban, above n 17; Moreno Ocampo, above n 17; Dershowitz, above n 17; 
Azarova, above n 20.  
 347 Rome Statute art 17(1)(a).  
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provide a means of insulating both the state and its officials from international 
scrutiny. 
These forms of legal engagement do not suggest that the domestic 
investigations, fact-finding missions, commissions of inquiry and criminal 
proceedings that substantiate appeals to informal complementarity are not 
genuine. States are expected to investigate and encouraged to ensure domestic 
accountability so as to avoid international scrutiny. This is a central purpose of 
the complementarity regime. Certain domestic initiatives — that profess to 
satisfy investigative requirements and preclude ICC admissibility — may, of 
course, be in bad faith. Others may exhibit mixed motives. As Abram Chayes so 
ably demonstrated, it is difficult, often impossible, to know the extent to which 
international legal considerations influence domestic political decisions.348 
Within the increasingly fraught and polarised context of Israeli-Palestinian 
relations, appeals to complementarity may be processed as manipulations of 
international law. Equally, they may present as evidence of compliance to a 
proscribed process. They can, and have, been observed in condemnation and in 
vindication. The primary purpose of this paper, however, has not been to assess 
Israel’s investigative mechanisms. It has been to observe this larger use of 
complementarity and identify a shift toward investigative legitimacy. 
The political and legal debates that accompany the Israeli-Palestinian context, 
however, illustrate an inherent tension that rests at the core of informal 
complementarity. This exists between the desire to encourage investigation by 
states and the unavoidable implication that appeals to informal complementarity 
are somehow disingenuous efforts to manufacture legitimacy. Despite the 
sceptical tone often evoked by appeals to informal complementarity, it is vital 
that states are encouraged to investigate and redress alleged violations of 
international law. Such encouragement is central to the formal complementarity 
regime. This promotes the internalisation of international law and compels states 
to ensure against impunity. It is what Moreno Ocampo meant when he declared 
that, ‘as a consequence of complementarity … the absence of trials before this 
Court … would be a major success’.349 
Yet, it is necessary to understand the implications of informal 
complementarity and ask whether this principle has become or facilitates 
something other than what it initially intended. Asking such questions, however, 
risks producing what Darryl Robinson termed ‘inescapable dyads’.350 A state is 
faulted for either failing to engage or engaging with its investigative obligations. 
A state official or military leader may interpret these forms of criticism as 
products of a winless situation, the positioning of moral judgement above legal 
standard. 
This is understandable. But as David Kennedy and others have explained, 
professed legitimacy risks enabling conflict and emboldening states to use 
force.351 The extent to which investigation as legitimisation facilitates the use of 
 348 Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (Oxford University Press, 1974) 4. See also 
Kritsiotis, ‘The Power of International Law as Language’, above n 101, 401–2.  
 349 See Complementarity in Practice, above n 47, 2.  
 350 See Darryl Robinson, ‘Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot 
Win’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 323, 323–4  
 351 Kennedy, above n 96, 41.  
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force and excuses state violence requires further consideration. Do informal 
appeals to complementarity help break, or facilitate, the cycle of violence that 
continues to plague Palestine, Israel and beyond? Whether these informal legal 
engagements can facilitate state efforts to forestall formalist measures and 
endeavour to nationalise international scrutiny of state behaviour compels 
additional thought. The inherent tension that exists between the desire for states 
to investigate potential violations of IHL and the capacity of appeals to domestic 
measures to formalistically assert post-hoc legitimacy must be contemplated. 
And the implications of strategic legal engagements in appeal to the latter, and in 
neglect of the former, must also be recognised to ensure that states do not 
understand breaches of international law as something that requires redress not 
prevention. A violation must not become an occurrence that is to be explained 
but not avoided. 
VI ADDENDUM 
On 14 March 2018, Israel’s State Comptroller issued its long-awaited report 
evaluating the 2014 Gaza War.352 Adopting an international legal framework, the 
report assessed political and military decision-making during Operation 
Protective Edge. The State Comptroller — tasked with providing independent 
governmental oversight — had announced this investigative initiative mere days 
after the ICC Prosecutor launched the preliminary examination into the ‘situation 
in Palestine’.353 The report’s title — IDF Activity from the Perspective of 
International Law, Particularly with Regard to Mechanisms of Examination and 
Oversight of Civilian and Military Echelons — signalled its purpose and 
emphasis. The Comptroller would audit how the ‘political echelon carried out its 
responsibilities from the perspective of international law in the context of the 
Cabinet’s deliberations during Operation “Protective Edge”’.354 It would 
evaluate the ‘implementation and the recommendations of the Turkel II Report’ 
as it pertained to the methods of investigating alleged violations of international 
law.355 It would consider the effectiveness of the fact-finding assessment 
mechanism that had been deployed during the war and in its aftermath. And it 
would review various IDF policies that were implemented throughout the 
conflict.356 
The State Comptroller cited the strategic benefits of the proposed 
investigation when announcing its audit of the Gaza war.357 The 2018 report 
reiterated these motivating factors. On the first page the Comptroller assures that 
international criminal law provides that ‘the domestic judicial system has 
 352 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Operation “Protective Edge”: IDF Activity from the 
Perspective of International Law, Particularly with Regard to Mechanisms of Examination 
and Oversight of Civilian and Military Echelons’ (Report, 14 March 2018) (‘State 
Comptroller Report 2018’). 
 353 Kershner, above n 250.  
 354 State Comptroller Report 2018, above n 352, 6. 
 355 Ibid. 
 356 Ibid 6–7. 
 357 The Comptroller remarked that ‘when a state exercises its authority to objectively 
investigate accusations regarding violations of the laws of armed conflict, this will preclude 
examination of said accusations by external international tribunals’: Kershner, above n 250, 
quoting State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel, above n 261.  
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precedence over an extraterritorial judicial system in adjudicating international 
law violations’.358 Referencing the principles of complementarity and 
subsidiarity, the Comptroller noted that ‘investigative and judicial systems in the 
State of Israel which function properly will help prevent the intervention of 
external courts and tribunals in the sovereign affairs of the State of Israel’.359 
This is framed around contestations of legitimacy.360 
The State Comptroller report considers the extent to which international law 
informed high-level decision-making. It evaluated whether IDF command 
received adequate legal training, how legal considerations influenced operational 
initiatives and whether necessary measures were taken to reduce harm to 
uninvolved civilians and to protect against humanitarian crisis.361 Previous post-
war assessment reports — those published jointly by the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and Defense — addressed policy provisions in relation to specific 
accusations of legal violation.362 The Comptroller report, however, focuses 
abstractly on broader policy.363 It attempts to determine whether an overarching 
commitment to the requirement of international law informed Israel’s conduct 
during the 2014 war. The Comptroller reviewed the minutes of Cabinet meetings 
and interviewed numerous high-level political and military officials.364 The 
report concludes that  
it is evident that both the political echelon and the senior military echelon 
explicitly considered the limitations and rules set forth in international law 
regarding the conduct of the fighting in Gaza, and even the Prime Minister 
instructed against harming uninvolved civilians.365  
 358 State Comptroller Report 2018, above n 352, 3. The report notes that 
[t]his is based on two principles: the ‘principle of complementarity’, according to 
which the authority of an international jurisdiction will be exercised as a last resort 
when states are unwilling or unable to exercise their duty to investigate and 
prosecute; and the ‘principle of subsidiarity’, according to which a jurisdiction with 
territorial or national affiliation has precedence over an international jurisdiction, 
which has subsidiary responsibility. 
 359 Ibid.  
 360 Ibid 19.  
 361 Under the rubric of ‘Conduct of the Political Echelon during Operation “Protective Edge” 
from the Perspective of International Law’, the report evaluated the extent to which 
international legal considerations influenced efforts to reduce harm to uninvolved civilians: 
ibid 66–77.  
 362 See generally Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32. See also 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, 
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 363 For example, the evaluation of targeting decisions conveyed, following interviews with 
senior officials, that general measures were taken to ensure that civilians were protected. A 
senior legal official noted that ‘[t]he army is working together with the International Law 
Department at the MAG Corps with respect to the “incrimination” of targets’: State 
Comptroller Report 2018, above n 352, 70. During a Cabinet meeting, the Chief of General 
Staff noted: ‘I am very proud that, wherever possible, attacks where we believed uninvolved 
civilians might be harmed were stopped’. The Attorney-General was cited as noting during a 
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bombing. We saw how much effort was invested in respect of each and every house, how 
many phone calls were made to the house. We, at least, were very impressed’. 
 364 The audit was conducted within, inter alia, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of 
Justice, the IDF, the Operations Directorate, the MAG Corps and the Military Police 
Investigations Department. See ibid 27, 73. 
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The Comptroller found that, ‘in providing their instructions at the cabinet 
meetings, the political echelon and the military echelon were careful to take steps 
to prevent potential violations of the provisions of international law’.366 
The Comptroller report cites Moshe Ya’alon. The former Minister of Defense 
told the audit that ‘[a] military action should be planned both in terms of ethics 
and in terms of legal defense’.367 Constituting a significant portion of the report, 
consideration of the State’s capacity to investigate is presented by the 
Comptroller as part of that legal defence. The Comptroller recalls that following 
Operation Cast Lead and the formation of the Turkel Commission, the United 
Nations cited Israel’s investigative initiatives with approval. It noted ‘that Israel 
had dedicated significant resources to investigate allegations of operational 
misconducts in the course of [Operation Cast Lead], and has made progress in 
investigating the concrete cases mentioned in the Goldstone Report’.368 
The Comptroller describes Israel’s reliance upon various investigative 
mechanisms in response to ‘exceptional incidents’ during the 2014 Gaza War.369 
Again, assessed abstractly, these efforts were described as in accordance with the 
State’s international legal obligations.370 
The Comptroller references the now 464 investigations that were launched 
since the conclusion of Operation Protective Edge. The responsibilities of the 
MAG and the fact-finding assessment mechanism are described.371 Where past 
reports detailed the investigative processes and conveyed their findings, much of 
the Comptroller report evaluates whether the State sufficiently internalised the 
recommendations of the Turkel Commission.372 Effectively, the Comptroller 
report recognises the legitimising potential of investigative procedures. It 
accentuates the importance and influence of the Turkel Commission’s work. Its 
recommendations are said to convey the ‘principles guiding the state and the 
military’ in their investigative duties.373 Stressing the strategic importance of 
these duties, the report provides recommendations intended to strengthen the 
ability of officials to actualise the legitimising potential of investigations.374 
Ultimately, the Comptroller report endorses and exhibits informal 
complementarity. It provides further checks to ensure that the recommendations 
of the Second Turkel Commission Report are fully implemented. This purports 
 366 Ibid 167. 
 367 Ibid 72.  
 368 Ibid 78–9. Citing the United Nation’s Davis Commission, the Comptroller continued that 
the Commission had noted positively the work of Turkel and concluded that ‘a public 
commission of inquiry like the Turkel Commission is an example of a mechanism that Israel 
can use’: at 79, citing McGowan Davis Report, UN Doc A/HRC/16/24, 19 [80].  
 369 State Comptroller Report 2018, above n 352, 79–80.  
 370 Ibid 78.  
 371 See, eg, ibid 79, 144–65. 
 372 The report found that the fact-finding mechanism and the State’s investigative capacity 
exhibited flaws regarding their efficiency and expediency. Overall, however, the report 
determined that these investigative initiatives were conducted ‘in good faith and out of a 
sincere desire to conduct a thorough and complete fact-finding assessment and to arrive at 
the truth’: ibid 163.  
 373 Ibid 89. 
 374 For example, recommendations to amend reporting and documentation procedures are 
explained as, inter alia, having ‘great significance with regard to the legitimacy of IDF’s 
operations and its ability to manage the legal and media campaigns that accompany its 
military operations’: ibid 94.  
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to be additional evidence of Israel’s investigative willingness. Characteristic of 
informal complementarity, this accentuates the potential of general investigations 
— often focused on policies and state actions and irrespective of individual 
criminal liability — to discharge legal requirements and discount international 
scrutiny. The Comptroller, in accordance with the Turkel Commission, notes that 
in order to ensure that the fact-finding assessment fulfills its purpose and to 
justify, in the eyes of international bodies, the MAG’s decision not to open a 
criminal investigation, it is appropriate to apply to the [fact-finding assessment 
mechanism] the general principles set forth in international law as material 
requirements for the existence of an investigation that will be considered 
effective.375  
Proposals to reform the investigative processes and improve the various 
mechanisms are, again, presented as responses to the legal campaigns and 
accusations of violations that are assumed inevitable following war or upon the 
use of force.376 They become another means through which the state may contest 
and assert both the legitimacy of substance and the legitimacy of process.  
 375 Ibid 144.  
 376 Ibid 164–8. 
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law’s relationship with terrorism, war, and national security was 
altered.2 The proliferation and institutionalization of international law 
that had followed the Second World War was suddenly met with 
increased resistance.3 The term “lawfare,” upon entering the 
concurrent discourse, initially described what observers perceived as 
the novel use of international law within situations of traditional or 
asymmetrical conflict, before later developing into a blanket term of 
competing meanings. 
Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr. of the United States Air 
Force first popularized lawfare in a paper describing the challenges 
posed by international law when engaging in a modern military 
intervention. Lawfare, he posited, was an innovative form of warfare 
in which law was employed to achieve a traditional military 
objective.4 Years later Dunlap would evolve his understanding of the 
term, holding that lawfare constituted “the strategy of using – or 
misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to 
achieve a warfighting objective.”5 When Dunlap sought to define the 
term, he claimed ideological neutrality. Lawfare, like traditional 
weaponry, could be wielded for legitimate or illegitimate purposes.6 
Furthermore, lawfare conveyed limited descriptive potential. Dunlap 
would later explain that lawfare was intended to focus “principally on 
circumstances where law can create the same or similar effects as 
those ordinarily sought from conventional warmaking approaches.”7 
Yet when the term lawfare entered the public vernacular and policy 
 
 
2. For a discussion of how the events of September 11, 2001 have effected or been used 
to justify a ‘new paradigm’ in international law, see Stephen P. Marks, International Law and 
the ‘War on Terrorism’: Post 9/11 Responses by the United States and Asia Pacific Countries, 
1 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 43, 48 (2006). See also Anthea Roberts, Righting Wrongs or Wronging 
Rights? The United States and Human Rights Post-September 11, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 721 
(2004). See generally DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, FROM 9-11 TO THE ‘IRAQ WAR 2003’: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY (2004). 
3. For a detailed and critical overview of the Bush Administration’s approach  to 
international law, see JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015). 
4. As Dunlap recognized, the term is widely believed to have originated in a paper 
published as part of an edited volume in 1975. See Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1. The 
authors used the term lawfare to decry the adversarial nature of western legal systems. See 
John Carlson & Neville Yeomans, Whither Goeth the Law – Humanity or Barbarity, in THE 
WAY OUT: RADICAL ALTERNATIVES IN AUSTRALIA 155 (David Crossley & Margaret Smith 
eds., 1975). 
5. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Lawfare Today…and Tomorrow, 87 INT’L L. STUD. SER. US 
NAVAL WAR COL. 315, 315 (2011) [hereinafter Dunlap Today and Tomorrow]. 
6.  Id. at 315-16. 
7. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 121, 122 (2010) [hereinafter Dunlap Apologia]. 
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discourses that followed the September 11th attacks, its meaning 
became blurred and its uses varied. 
Today, there is no consensus as to lawfare’s meaning.8 It has, 
however, moved from Dunlap’s purportedly neutral connotations to 
assume a pejorative or polemic tone within popular and political 
speech.9 The propagation of the term lawfare that followed Dunlap’s 
early framing of the neologism, its influence on the concurrent 
discourse, has occurred on the margins of the US-led War on Terror, 
though it is not limited to these events. 
Within such a context, lawfare has evolved to describe and 
denounce various forms of international legal engagement.10 Often, 
though not exclusively, these usages are directed towards non-state 
actors: individuals, non-governmental organizations, international 
institutions, or sub-state militant groups. Descriptions or accusations 
of lawfare have occurred in relation to the general and the specific. 
Lawfare has been understood as the imposition or manipulation of 
international legal standards to confine traditional military means and 
operations and to limit both state responses to terrorism and the use of 
force.11 Those who employ the precepts of international law, often 
before international fora, to shame countries like the United States or 
Israel have been accused of engaging in lawfare.12  The use of  human 
 
 
8. See Michael P. Scharf & Elizabeth Andersen, Is Lawfare Worth Defining? - Report of 
the Cleveland Experts Meeting - September 11, 2010, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 11, 13-15 
(2010); see also Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries – Part Two, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 
(May 22, 2003), http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/lawfare-latest-asymmetries—-part- 
two/p6191; Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 18, 2003), 
http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/lawfare-latest-asymmetries/.p5772. 
9. David Luban, Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 457, 458 (2010). 
10. For a more detailed account of how the term “lawfare” has evolved since being 
reintroduced by Charles Dunlap, see Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Semiotic Definition of Lawfare, 43 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 29, 51-57 (2011). See also Wouter G. Werner, The Curious Career 
of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 61 (2010). 
11. For example, the position assumed by the Council on Foreign Relations described 
lawfare as “a strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means  to 
achieve military objectives.” This understanding of lawfare does not differ from Dunlap’s 
offering but the Council held, in accordance with this meaning, that “[e]ach  operation 
conducted by US military results in new and expanding efforts by groups and countries to use 
lawfare to respond to military force.” See Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, supra note 8. 
12. W. Chadwick Austin and Antony Barone Kolenc, for example, argue that the 
International Criminal Court is vulnerable to abuse by the United States’ adversaries who may 
seek to shame the United States by misusing the Court’s investigative processes, filing dubious 
complaints with the Court, or by engaging the media in relation to ICC proceedings to generate 
international pressure against the United States. See W. Chadwick Austin & Antony Barone 
Kolenc, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? The International Criminal Court as a Weapon of 
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shields by non-state actors engaged in asymmetrical warfare has been 
held to constitute lawfare.13 Further, the use of libel laws to attempt to 
silence groups who “oppose” the threat of “militant Islam” and  seek 
to expose the means of terrorist financing have been described as acts 
of lawfare.14 Lawfare has also been used to label and  deride the 
efforts of lawyers and organizations representing foreign nationals 
held at the Guantánamo Bay detainment camp in Cuba.15 Finally, and 
in close association to Dunlap’s intended use of the term, the label of 
lawfare has described the strategic use of international law by States 
for the purpose of achieving a particular, often military, objective.16
This paper is built around several prominent quotations which 
claim to either define lawfare or describe what the user deems as an 
act of lawfare. It will explore these varied uses of the term and 
attempt to understand what the significance of lawfare’s advent is for 
the practice and function of international law. It accepts that a 
consensus definition of the term will remain elusive and does not 
attempt to provide one. Instead, it borrows from Alison Young’s 
argument that to better understand a particular discourse, and our 
investment in it, we should “flow with the current meaning.”17 As 
such, it is not consumed by the definitional question of what lawfare 
is. Rather, it asks what the label of lawfare means for both the 
understanding and practice of international law. 
In exploring this question, it attempts to (re)frame the debate that 
surrounds lawfare. Currently, this exists amongst three broad camps: 
those who understand lawfare as the use and abuse of international 
law to threaten state interests; those who view it as a rhetorical device 
intended to discredit parties who attempt to engage with international 
law as a means to ensure accountability and compliance; and those 
who describe lawfare as a weapon, the legitimacy of which is defined 
by its user’s intentions. 
Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 291 (2006); see also David  Scheffer, 
Whose Lawfare Is It, Anyway?, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 215, 223 (2010); infra discussion 
in Sections 2, 3. 
13. See infra Sections 2, 7. 
14. See infra Section 6.
15. See infra Sections 4, 5. 
16. See infra Section 7.
17. ALISON YOUNG, FEMININITY IN DISSENT 43 (1990); see also Anne Orford, Muscular 
Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
679, 682 (1999). 
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A 2010 symposium hosted by Case Western Reserve’s School of 
Law, titled LAWFARE!, featured proponents of each view.18 Many 
from all sides of the lawfare debate presented positions that held the 
notion of lawfare as novel—an observed phenomenon that now 
assumed a prominent position within an increasingly internationalized 
environment.19 While this view was widely accepted,  manifestations 
of what is commonly termed lawfare often predate the term’s 
popularization. Alongside the proliferation of international law 
throughout the twentieth century it is, of course, possible to find 
myriad examples of legal engagements and arguments that may 
conform with what is now broadly termed lawfare. Furthermore, 
critical framings of lawfare that explicitly or implicitly view it as 
novel and contextual risk erroneously preserving it within a singular 
time and place. Most often this is the United States of George W. 
Bush and the War on Terror.20 What is popularly held to constitute 
lawfare is neither novel nor contextual, yet the implications of the 
term’s use may be significant. 
Lawfare, however, as most commonly understood and applied, 
has evolved within political and popular discourses to serve as a 
warning of the corrosive effects and potential hazards of international 
law.21 Opponents of this framing have argued that the labelling of 
international legal engagements as lawfare has become a 
neoconservative doctrine whose “real target is international law 
itself.”22   Thus,  lawfare  is  presented  not  as  a  legal  argument,  but 
18. For an overview of the symposium, see Michael P. Scharf & Shannon Pagano, 
Foreward: LAWFARE!, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010). The papers of the participants 
are contained throughout all of 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. (2010-2011). 
19. E.g., Craig H. Allen, Command of the Commons Boasts: An Invitation to Lawfare, 83 
INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 21 (2007); see also Michael J. Lebowitz, The 
Value of Claiming Torture: An Analysis of Al-Qaeda’s Tactical Lawfare Strategy and  Efforts 
to Fight Back, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 357 (2010); Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12. 
20. For example, see Michael Kearney’s explanation of lawfare having “emerged in
response to human rights litigation during the ‘war on terror’, and rapidly progressed from 
conservative newspaper opinions and blogs to legal and political academic journals.”  Michael 
Kearney, Lawfare, Legitimacy and Resistance: The Weak and the Law, 16 PAL. Y.B. INT’L L. 
79, 88 (2010). 
21. The editorial board of the Wall Street Journal has warned about the dangers of 
lawfare, holding that “however well our troops do on the battlefield, a reality of modern  times 
is that the U.S. can still lose the war on terror in the courtroom.” See The Lawfare Wars, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703467004575463 
721720570734; see also David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 
2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117220137149816987. 
22. Scott Horton, The Dangers of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 163, 167 
(2010-2011); see also Scheffer, supra note 12, at 217. 
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instead as a policy prescription. Leila Nadya Sadat and Jing Geng 
have argued that the use of the term, popularly conceived, constitutes 
“an effort to attack and dismantle legal norms – and even some legal 
or international institutions – in order to promote the efforts of 
America’s (or Israel’s) military.”23 
When one observes contemporary applications of lawfare, it is 
often intended to decry or delegitimize arguments that themselves 
draw upon international legal principles. Viewed singularly, this 
provides credence to the understanding of lawfare espoused by Sadat 
and Geng. But as several observers have noted, nearly all States 
engage with international law in a manner that can fit comfortably 
within common conceptions of lawfare.24 Thus, when observing the 
debate that surrounds the use of the term, it becomes evident that 
pejorative or polemic applications of lawfare are often decrying a 
particular use of international law by a particular type of actor. When 
framing the lawfare debate or articulating a response to accusations of 
lawfare that are intended to delegitimize such specific uses of 
international law, it is prudent to understand the application of the 
label not as a general means of attacking or dismantling legal norms, 
but as a particular strategy intended to limit access to international 
justice. 
 
2. “THE FIRST TYPE OF LAWFARE IS ASYMMETRICAL 
WARFARE. DURING THE RECENT CONFLICT WITH IRAQ, 
ALLIED FORCES WERE THE TARGET OF A PERSISTENT 
LAWFARE CAMPAIGN. EVEN BEFORE THE CONFLICT BEGAN, 
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISTS USED LEGAL MEANS TO TRY TO 
DECLARE MILITARY ACTION ILLEGITIMATE. IN 
COORDINATION WITH IRAQI AUTHORITIES, HUMAN SHIELDS 
WERE POSITIONED AT PROSPECTIVE TARGETS TO DISRUPT 
AMERICAN WAR PLANS.” 
— Council on Foreign Relations25 
Lawfare, as initially described by Dunlap, was a reaction to the 




23. Leila Nadya Sadat & Jing Geng, On Legal Subterfuge and the So-Called “Lawfare” 
Debate, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 153, 160 (2010-2011). 
24. Allen, supra note 19, at 36. See generally ORDE F. KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A 
WEAPON OF WAR (2016). 
25. Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, supra note 8. 
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strategic role within situations of international armed conflict.26 With 
increasing frequency, actors engaged in traditional conflict situations 
were believed to rely upon what Dunlap characterized as lawfare 
within “circumstances where law can create the same or  similar 
effects as those ordinarily sought from conventional war making 
approaches.”27 Upon popularizing the term, Dunlap evolved his 
understanding of lawfare to include what he perceived to be the 
cynical manipulation of particular uses of international law.28 
Accordingly, and with what was presented as increased frequency, the 
United States’ opponents were understood to nefariously engage the 
rule of law and the humanitarian values it represents to create a 
perception that the United States is waging war in violation of 
international law.29 
This notion of lawfare is emblematic of the view forwarded by 
the Council on Foreign Relations. This warned, in regards to the Iraq 
War, that international activists were turning to legal means to 
demonstrate the illegitimacy of the military operation.30 Several 
commentators have lent credence to this notion of lawfare, holding 
that it endeavors to “gain a moral advantage over your enemy in the 
court of world opinion.”31  In response, they have declared that  “[t]he 
U.S. must go on both the legal and public diplomacy offensive, 
utilizing such aggressive litigation tactics as seeking sanctions against 
lawyers who make frivolous arguments or violate security 
regulations.”32 Often, nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) are 
perceived as the primary perpetrators of this notion of lawfare and are 
increasingly held to function in opposition to a State’s security 
interests.33 
The currency that international law-based claims carry within the 
public sphere is viewed as an extension of the general influence that 




26. See Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 2-4. 
27. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 122; see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A 
Decisive Element of 21
st 
Century Conflicts?, 54 JOINT FORCES Q. 34  (2009) [hereinafter 
Dunlap Conflicts]. 
28. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7. 
29. Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 4. 
30. Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, supra note 8. 
31. Rivkin & Casey, supra note 21. 
32. Id. 
33. See generally Neve Gordon, Human Rights as a Security Threat: Lawfare and the 
Campaign against Human Rights NGOs, 48 L. & SOC’Y REV. 311, 311-12 (2014). 
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armed conflict.34 Some, observing the increasing application of 
international law from within military establishments, have been 
inclined to interpret such uses as an obstruction. General Wesley 
Clark, who served as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe during the 
NATO mission in Kosovo, described the challenges posed by 
increased legal oversight within a military campaign: 
The processes of approving the targets, striking the targets, 
reading the results, and restriking were confusing. The original 
plans had presumed that the [Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe] would have the authority to strike targets within overall 
categories specified by NATO political leaders, but Washington 
had introduced a target-by-target approval requirement. The other 
Allies began to be increasingly demanding, too. It was British 
law that targets struck by any aircraft based in the United 
Kingdom had to be approved by their lawyers, the French 
demanded greater insight into the targeting and strikes, and of 
course there had to be continuing consultation with NATO 
headquarters and with other countries, too.35 
The NATO intervention in Kosovo and the accompanying campaign 
against Serbia are held by many, from an operational perspective (jus 
in bello), to represent “a high-water mark of the influence of 
international law in military interventions.”36 Certain commentators, 
opposed to the heightened influence of international law on 
operational decision-making, described the perceived restrictive or 
prohibitive function of international law as lawfare. Often held to be 
encouraged by NGOs and as an impediment to the achievement of 
military or security objectives, opponents of the restrictive use of 
international law claimed: 
One of the most striking features of the Kosovo campaign, in 
fact, was the remarkably direct role lawyers played in managing 
combat operations – to a degree  unprecedented  in  previous 






34. Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 1. 
35. WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE FUTURE 
OF COMBAT 224 (2001). 
36. Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 1-2; see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL 
WAR: KOSOVO AND BEYOND 197-98, 200, 207 (2000); Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian 
War’ over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY 102, 102 (1999). 
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sobering – indeed alarming – for devotees of power politics who 
denigrate the impact of law on international conflict.37 
The term lawfare, in response, served as a descriptive denunciation of 
the perceived rise and prohibitive influence of international law 
within conflict situations. Though Dunlap and others would later 
insist that understandings of lawfare were intended to maintain a 
neutral connotation, these common applications of the term would 
retain a pejorative association.38 
As the asymmetrical warfare of the twenty-first century replaced 
the traditional wars of the twentieth century, an amended 
understanding of certain uses of international law – termed lawfare – 
employed as a means of achieving a military objective, increasingly 
became associated with the tactics of non-state militant groups.39 The 
label of lawfare, now applied to an ever-broadening scope of legal 
engagements within instances of armed conflict, was held to define 
occasions of asymmetrical warfare in which “a group or state that is 
facing a nation committed to comply with the laws of war will choose 
to openly violate the law not only for the tactical advantage gained 
but for the strategic benefit that arises.”40 
The 2003 US-led war in Iraq provided the archetypical example. 
Lawfare came to describe the tactics of US adversaries. These 
included: 
. . . attacking from protected places and using protected places or 
objects as weapons storage sites, fighting without wearing a 
proper uniform, using human shields to protect military targets, 
using protected symbols to gain military advantage, and 
murdering of prisoners or others who deserve protection.41 
In each of these observed instances, the term lawfare is employed to 
describe “an inferior force [using] the superior force’s commitment to 





37. Richard K. Betts, Compromised Command: Inside NATO’s First War, 80 FOREIGN 
AFF. 126, 129 (2001). 
38. Dunlap Today and Tomorrow, supra note 5, at 315. 
39. See Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12; see also Dale Stephens, The Age of Lawfare, 87 
INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 327, 330 (2011); Kittrie, supra note 24, at 340-41. 
40. Eric Talbot Jensen, The ICJ’s “Uganda Wall”: A Barrier to the Principle of 
Distinction and an Entry Point for Lawfare, 35 DENV. J. INT’L & POL’Y 241, 269 (2007). 
41.  Id. at 269-70. 
42.  Id. at 270. 
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Thus, three related notions of lawfare emerged from the term’s 
description of the use of international law within instances of armed 
conflict. The first, as initially identified by Dunlap, employed law and 
legal argumentation to imply that the United States was engaging in a 
war and actions that violated fundamental principles of international 
law. The second notion of lawfare held that through the increased 
influence of international law, law served as a prohibitive intrusion on 
US efforts to achieve operational and security-based objectives. The 
final notion suggests that the United States’ adversaries used a variety 
of asymmetrical tactics, deemed lawfare, to disrupt the operational 
capabilities of, and gain tactical advantage against, a State committed 
to upholding the precepts of international law. 
Such conceptions of lawfare, however, cannot be exclusively 
attributed to non-state actors. Dunlap, along with many others, has 
acknowledged that many states engage with international law through 
such means as to constitute lawfare.43 He provides examples that 
include the US purchase of selected satellite imagery prior to the 
commencement of military operations in Afghanistan, the imposition 
of sanctions against Iraq to prevent the purchase of aircrafts or 
materials necessary for the maintenance of their existing fleet, efforts 
to enhance the rule of law as a strategic objective of 
counterinsurgency operations, and the use of legal means  to 
confiscate financial assets from terrorist groups and their funders.44 
The use of international law, employed by state actors, however, 
goes well beyond these identified examples of strategic legal 
engagements. It manifests through instances in which international 
law is employed by States for similar purposes to those that prevalent 
uses of the lawfare label commonly accuse the United States’ 
“adversaries” of undertaking. Of relevance to the Council on Foreign 
Relation’s assertion that lawfare constitutes efforts to claim that US 
wars represent legal violations, David Kennedy notes: 
But if law can increase friction by persuading relevant audiences 
of a campaign’s illegitimacy, it can also grease the wheels of 
combat. Law is a strategic partner for military commanders when 
it increases the perception of outsiders that what the military is 




43. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7; see also Scheffer, supra note 12. 
44. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 123-24. 
45. DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 41 (2006). 
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Furthermore, claims that lawfare is demonstrative of the increasingly 
prohibitive application of international humanitarian law seeks to 
assign pejorative implications to what is purely a debate concerning 
the purpose or necessity of law and legal regulation within a particular 
context. Since the mid-twentieth century, when the Geneva 
Conventions opened for ratification, they have been subject to 
interpretative disagreement.46 Yoram Dinstein explains that 
international humanitarian law is predicated on an equilibrium 
between opposing impulses – military necessity and humanitarian 
considerations.47 This naturally facilitates interpretive discord: 
“[B]etween military commanders and humanitarian workers, there 
might be a different understanding of that which constitutes 
acceptable collateral damage, simply because their respective 
interpretations of the principle of proportionality are taken from 
different standpoints.”48
The suggestion that the source of such disagreement concerning 
the applicability or necessity of legal regulation constitutes a notion of 
lawfare seeks to delegitimize a particular interpretation of 
international humanitarian law. It preferences the interpretation of the 
military commander, while denouncing, or assigning pejorative 
implications to, a humanitarian-focused reading of the law that 
becomes the form of legal engagement employed by the weak, 
employed by the adversary. 
Furthermore, the described forms of legal engagement and 
denouncement that hold lawfare to have become a tactic employed by 
non-state actors against US interests and commitments to 
international law are scarcely limited to this context. Neither are they 
the sole manifestations of the asymmetrical wars fought in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Human shields, often presented as a lawfare method in 
which opponents of a State committed to international law manipulate 
this commitment to gain an operational or moral advantage, are 
consistently discussed as tactics employed by US adversaries in the 
War  on  Terror.49   The  use  of  human  shields  for  tactical purposes, 
46. Jamie A. Williamson, The Knight’s Code, Not His Lance, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 447, 447-48 (2010). 
47. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 16  (2004). 
48. Williamson, supra note 46, at 448. 
49. See, e.g., Robert Gates, Sec’y of Defense, & Michael Mullen, Joint Chief of Staff,
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen on U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Press Conference from the 
Pentagon (May 12, 2009), available at http://iipdigital. usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/20 
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however, has been observed in such early military encounters as the 
American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War.50 The British 
Manual of Military Law, issued at the start of the First World War, 
denounced the practice, as did the Commentaries to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.51 Nevertheless, human shields have been employed 
within many of the conflicts that have occurred throughout the 
twentieth century.52 
Similar discourses as those observed in relation to the use of 
human shields against US interests and by sub-state armed groups 
have featured prominently in numerous conflict situations. These 
include Israel’s official response to the international condemnation 
that followed its military operations within the Gaza Strip in 2014.53 
Russian forces commonly accused Chechen fighters of tactically 
employing human shields during the bombardment of Grozny in the 
late 1990s, and Pakistani Security Forces made similar claims during 
the siege of Lal Masjid in Islamabad.54 Commonly, these claims hold 
that the employment of such tactics by non-state actors demonstrate 
not simply a violation of international law, but instead the 
manipulation of international law. This infers, often directly, that state 
actors, otherwise committed to upholding the various provisions of 
international humanitarian law within situations of international or 
non-international armed conflict, are placed in a manufactured 
environment in which compliance with international law is 
compromised. It serves to delineate two forms of international law   – 
 
 
09/05/20090512113947eaifas0.118664.html#axzz4ErRG1lTZ (describing how the Taliban 
provokes and exploits civilian casualties); see also Lawfare,  the  Latest  in Asymmetries, 
supra note 8; Dunlap Today and Tomorrow, supra note 5, at 315; Jensen, supra note 40, at 
269-70; Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12, at 326. 
50. Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 292, 293 (2009). 
51.  Id. at 293-94. 
52.  Id. at 294-96. 
53. See, e.g., Behind the Headlines: Fighting Hamas terrorism within the law, ISR. 
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 7, 2014), http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/ 
Pages/Fighting-Hamas-terrorism-within-the-law.aspx; see also Hamas’ Use of Human Shields 
is a War Crime, ISR. DEF. FORCES (July 14, 2014), https://www.idfblog.com/blog/ 
2014/07/14/hamas-use-human-shields-war-crime/; Captured Hamas Manuel Explains Benefit 
of Human Shields, ISR. DEF. FORCES (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.idfblog.com/blog/ 
2014/08/04/captured-hamas-combat-manual-explains-benefits-human-shields/>. 
54. Chechens ‘using human shields’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 1999, 7:37 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/545672.stm; see also Pakistan’s Red Mosque Showdown: 





legitimate and illegitimate – that are employed by the state and non- 
state actor respectively. 
From such origins, the notion of lawfare presented by Dunlap, 
evolved from its particular application to instances of traditional and 
asymmetric armed conflict and was increasingly viewed as a threat to 
US interests in a post-September 11th internationalized landscape. 
With newfound prominence, lawfare came to describe a host of 
international legal engagements. Its popularized usages would 
maintain a pejorative slant and would present a deep skepticism 
concerning the role and utility of international law within this 
environment. Denunciations of international law, however, were not 
absolute and instead focused specifically on the use of international 
law by non-state actors. 
 
3. “OUR STRENGTH AS A NATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE 
CHALLENGED BY THOSE WHO EMPLOY A STRATEGY OF THE 
WEAK USING INTERNATIONAL FORA, JUDICIAL PROCESSES, 
AND TERRORISM.” 
— United States of America, 2005 National Defense Strategy55 
 
That the National Defense Strategy of the United States equated 
recourse to international law with acts of terrorism demonstrates the 
extent to which particular forms of legal engagement were viewed as 
a threat to US interests. Jack Goldsmith, an international lawyer and 
scholar, who served as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the 
Bush Administration, recalls the extent of this concern: “[Secretary of 
Defense] Rumsfeld had already been worrying about this problem 
under the rubric of ‘lawfare’, an idea that had been discussed in the 
Pentagon for years.”56 Within the White House, the Department of 
Justice, and the Pentagon, lawfare provided an all-encompassing term 
to describe the means by which the United States’ foes engaged with 
international law to shame and attempt to weaken US efforts within 
the War on Terror and the broad security apparatus that developed in 
the wake of the September 11th attacks. Goldsmith explained this 




55. DEP’T DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 5 (2005), http://archive.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf. 
56. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:  LAW  AND  JUDGMENT  INSIDE 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 58 (2007). 
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Enemies like Al Qaeda who cannot match the United States 
militarily instead criticize it for purported legal violations, 
especially violations of human rights or the laws of war. They 
hide in mosques so that they can decry U.S. destruction of 
religious objects when attacked. They describe civilian deaths as 
“war crimes” even when the deaths are legally permissible 
“collateral damage” or they complain falsely that they were 
tortured . . . . Lawfare works because it manipulates something 
Americans value: respect for law.57 
Yet the perceived threat of lawfare was not simply viewed as a tactic 
undertaken by non-state actors like al-Qaeda or the Taliban, with 
whom the United States was engaged in asymmetrical war. Secretary 
Rumsfeld and the Pentagon viewed lawfare as constituting an 
unwarranted, but potentially influential, check on US military power. 
The expressed commitment of the United States’ traditional allies in 
Europe and South America to human rights regimes caused Rumsfeld 
to believe “that opponents incapable of checking American military 
power would increasingly rely on lawfare weapons instead.”58 A 
Department of Defense memorandum, authored by Secretary 
Rumsfeld, directly articulated the implied extent of the threat posed 
by such a notion of lawfare: 
In the past quarter century, various nations, NGOs, academics, 
international organizations, and others in the “international 
community” have been busily weaving a web of 
international laws and judicial institutions that today threatens 
[US Government] interests . . . . Unless we tackle the problem 
head-on, it will continue to grow. The issue is especially urgent 
because of the unusual challenges we face in the war on 
terrorism.59 
Despite its broad usage, within a variety of contexts and by various 
actors, lawfare gained much of its political currency and popular 
practice amid the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 
emergent national security response to the terrorist attacks in New 
York and Washington, D.C.60 Increasingly, law-based criticisms (both 
 
 
57.  Id. at 58-59. 
58. Id. at 59. 
59. Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., on Judicialization of 
International Politics to Vice President et al. (Apr. 9, 2003), http://library.rumsfeld.com/ 
doclib/sp/221/2003-04-09%20to%20Vice%20President%20et%20al%20re 
%20Judicialization%20of%20International%20Politics.pdf. 
60. Horton, supra note 22, at 167. 
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international and municipal) of US actions and policies were met with 
accusations of lawfare. This popularized notion of lawfare had shifted 
considerably from Dunlap’s professed neutrality.61 It developed a 
broad reach that extended well beyond the term’s initial conception as 
a means of legal engagement focused on the achievement of a 
traditional military objective.62 This emergent reactive notion of 
lawfare was firmly embedded within neoconservative doctrine, an 
extension of an entrenched skepticism that viewed international  law 
as a cumbersome and ultimately ineffective means of addressing 
national and global security challenges.63 
Many within the Bush Administration viewed this scant 
understanding of international law as an avoidable constraint on 
efforts to expand the boundaries of executive power and as 
constituting an affront to US sovereignty.64 Yet despite their 
ideological disdain and the professed ineffectiveness of international 
law, neoconservatives, paradoxically, view particular forms of legal 
engagement as a direct (and potentially effective) threat to the United 
States’ domestic and foreign interests.65 Various conservative 
commentators and ideological allies echoed the Administration’s 
cautions concerning the threat posed by international law.66 They held 
that “the most significant common thread among all these actions is 
the clear desire to portray U.S. government actions as illegal and 
unprecedented” and that “international law constitutes a real and 
immediate threat to U.S. national interest.”67 
 
 
61. Dunlap himself, in a later paper, noted this ideological shift and asserted that “despite 
the lawfare’s [sic] frequent negative characterization as a tool of terrorists, it is vital to 
remember that it is not restricted to one side of a conflict.” See Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, 
at 123-24. 
62. In relation to this development, Dunlap held that “lawfare was never meant  to 
describe every possible relation between law and warfare. It focuses principally on 
circumstances where law can create the same or similar effects as those ordinarily sought from 
conventional warmaking approaches.” See id. at 122. 
63. Francis Fukuyama, After Neoconservatism, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 19, 2006), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/after-neoconservatism.html. 
64. Ohlin, supra note 3, at 8-9; see also Horton, supra note 22, at 167-68. 
65. See generally JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005). 
66. See, e.g., John Fonte, Democracy’s Trojan Horse, NAT’L INT. (2004), 
http://nationalinterest.org/article/democracys-trojan-horse-1155; Clare Lopez, SEALs Case 
Shows How Terrorists Use ‘Lawfare’ to Undermine U.S., HUM. EVENTS (Mar. 8, 2010), 
http://humanevents.com/2010/03/08/seals-case-shows-how-terrorists-use-lawfare-to- 
undermine-us/; David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Rocky Shoals of International Law, 
62 NAT’L INT. 35 (2000-2001) [hereinafter Rocky Shoals]; Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12. 
67. Rivkin & Casey, supra note 21; Rocky Shoals, supra note 66, at 35. 
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Though this strayed considerably from Dunlap’s more limited 
iteration of lawfare, it came to represent the term’s prevalent, 
politicized application.68 Opponents of lawfare’s  current 
manifestation and ideological grounding often (though not 
exclusively) hold that, however defined, “lawfare is a potentially 
powerful term that reflects the importance of law in the conflicts of 
the twenty-first century.”69 Still, its most ardent critics argue that the 
accusation or labelling of lawfare, popularly understood, facilitates 
the critique and silencing of human rights advocacy, verges towards 
propaganda, and ultimately discredits the intended function of 
international law.70 
Sadat and Geng, continuing their argument that lawfare’s 
common use serves to attack and dismantle legal norms, assert that 
the use of the term lawfare “poses a frontal challenge to our 
constitutional system, as well as the specific rules of war, 
international human rights law, and the international legal system, and 
even U.S. Constitutional rights, such as the right to habeas corpus.” 
Opponents who view lawfare within this context, as attempting to 
silence or delegitimize international law-based criticisms of state 
actors, place the use of lawfare within a culture of international legal 
neglect and unchecked impunity. This understanding and rejection of 
such uses of lawfare often accompanies the view that the Bush 
Administration and neoconservative ideology express general 
hostility towards international law, that it dismisses its dictates.71 
But framing lawfare, generally, as an attack on international law 
or as an attempt to dismantle legal norms perpetuates an overtly 
utopian view of international law.  It reduces  understandings     of 
 
 
68. The Cleveland Experts Meeting discussed whether the term lawfare had been 
hijacked by neoconservative interests and debated how best to respond to this. While there 
appeared broad consensus that the term had been manipulated along ideological lines, there 
was no broad agreement about how to best respond. Several participants expressed that “now 
that others have widely propagated an alternative definition of the term, the academy has lost 
the initiative and would be fighting a futile cause in trying to recapture the concept as a neutral 
term.” See Scharf & Anderson, supra note 8, at 12-13. 
69. This did not discount the view that “lawfare may not be a particularly useful term 
and may serve simply as an invented phenomenon useful only to anti-international 
humanitarian law hijackers as a tool of intimidation.” Id. at 13, 15. 
70. See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 20, at 88-89. 
71. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Crying War, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BRIDGING THEORY AND PRACTICE 93, 100 (Thomas J. 
Biersteker et al. eds., 2007). See generally JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH 




international law to binary conceptions of conformity/violation, and 
fails to recognize the myriad forms of legal engagement that occur 
under the broad rubric of international law.72 The  Bush 
Administration and its neoconservative allies, so often the recipients 
of allegations of international legal maleficence, nevertheless engaged 
consistently with international legal arguments.73 Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense memorandum, which warned of 
the international community’s efforts to use international law to 
threaten US interests, continued to provide a host of potential 
responses to what was perceived as the judicialization of international 
politics.74 These themselves drew heavily upon international law. 
They called for the formulation of legal arguments under the laws of 
armed conflict and belligerent occupation to justify a US presence and 
the use of force within and against Iraq. In attempting to delegitimize 
the International Criminal Court, Secretary Rumsfeld’s prescriptions 
sought to strengthen and expand bilateral frameworks through Article 
98 agreements to protect US officials from prosecution at the Court 
and proposed the enactment of legislation that would effectively 
sanction nations that pursue charges against US officials.75 
Such forms of legal engagement by the Bush Administration do 
not imply fidelity with international law or dismiss claims grounded 
within law that undertaken actions or policies by the Administration 
served to violate US legal commitments or international legal norms. 
Instead,  this  is  intended  to  illustrate  the  folly  of  viewing lawfare 
 
 
72. See generally EYAL WEIZMAN, THE LEAST OF ALL POSSIBLE EVILS: 
HUMANITARIAN VIOLENCE FROM ARENDT TO GAZA (2011); Kennedy, supra note 45. 
73. For an account of the Bush Administration’s legal argumentation in relation to many 
of its most controversial practices, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Bush Administration and 
International Law: Too Much Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (2010). 
74. Memorandum from the U.S. Sec’y of Defense, supra note 59. 
75. Article 98 agreements reference Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute which holds, inter 
alia, that the ICC may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under an existing international 
agreement. On this basis, the United States has signed over one hundred bilateral immunity 
agreements with individual countries to ensure they do not surrender any American to the 
Court’s jurisdiction. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 98(2), July 17, 
1998, 183 U.N.T.S. 9; see also David J.R. Frakt, Lawfare and Counterlawfare: The 
Demonization of the Gitmo Bar and Other Legal Strategies in the War on Terror, 43 CASE W. 




through such a generalized lens – as a broad assault on the discipline 
of international law. What is often described, critically, as lawfare is 
not a total or ontological challenge to international law, but is  instead 
a denouncement of particular groups of law’s users. It is therefore 
more prudent to understand lawfare not as a general dismissal of 
international law, but instead as a particular affront to international 
law. This affront seeks to limit the access of particular groups and 
individuals to international recourse and delegitimize the means and 
methods through which such recourse may be pursued. 
 
4. “LAST YEAR THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
(ACLU) AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE LAWYERS (NACDL) ESTABLISHED THE JOHN ADAMS 
PROJECT TO ‘SUPPORT MILITARY COUNSEL AT 
GUANTANAMO BAY.’ THE MISSION BEHIND THIS 
TREACHEROUS ENTERPRISE WAS TO IDENTIFY 
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS INVOLVED IN INTERROGATING 
GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES AND THEN PROVIDE THAT 
INFORMATION TO MILITARY DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 
REPRESENTING DETAINEES SO THAT THEY COULD ATTEMPT 
TO CALL INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL TO TESTIFY.” 
— Florida Congressman Jeff Miller (R)76 
Lawfare came to describe the efforts of lawyers and 
organizations attempting to challenge the bestowed legal status and 
detention of foreign nationals held in the US Naval base at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The foreign national detention program, 
initiated by the Bush Administration in 2002, became a notorious 
symbol of the US-led War on Terror. The location, and uncertain 
legal status of the detainees, constituted a deliberate strategy to place 
these individuals beyond the jurisdiction of US courts.77 This initially 
served to create a legal gray area, where detainees were  denied 




76. Jeff Miller, Guest Blogger: Congressman Jeff Miller (R-FL) On Investigating the 
John Adams Project, DAILY SIGNAL (May 21, 2010), http://dailysignal.com/2010/05/21/guest- 
blogger-congressman-jeff-miller-r-fl-on-investigating-the-john-adams-project/. 
77. Fiona de Londras, Guantanamo Bay: Towards Legality?, 71 MOD. L. REV. 36, 36-37 
(2008); Frakt, supra note 75, at 347 (recalling how alternative locations, like Andersen Air 
Force Base in Guam, were rejected due to the possibility that detainees held there may gain 
access to US Courts). 
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insulated from legal challenges that would contest the grounds of their 
detention.78 
The Administration’s strategy evoked a torrent of criticism that 
drew upon domestic constitutional law and a human rights-based 
framework.79 Foreign States, alongside regional and international 
organizations, joined the mounting chorus of condemnation.80 The 
European Parliament called on the United States to “close the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility and insist[] that every prisoner 
should be treated in accordance with international humanitarian law 
and tried without delay in a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent, impartial tribunal.”81 
Within the United States, the Bush-era detention program faced 
mounting domestic legal challenges.82 A series of petitions, 




78. John Yoo, a former lawyer in the Office of Legal Counsel and architect of much of 
the Administration’s legal framework concerning many of the most controversial aspects of 
the war on terror, confirmed this intention. See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN 
INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 142-46 (2006). 
79. The US section of Amnesty International have been amongst the most high-profile 
critics of the Guantánamo Bay detention program, holding that “[f]rom day one, the USA 
failed to recognize the applicability of human rights law to the Guantanamo detentions.” See 
Amnesty Int’l, Guantanamo, A Decade of Damage to Human Rights, AI Index No. AMR 
51/103/2011 (2011). Numerous other human rights-focused NGOs expressed similar, rights- 
based, condemnations of the detention program. See e.g., Locked Up Alone: Detention 
Conditions and Mental Health at Guantanamo, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 9, 2008), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/locked-alone/detention-conditions-and-mental-health- 
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British Prime Minister Tony Blair); see also UK told US won’t shut Guantanamo, BBC NEWS 
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81. Resolution on Guantanamo, EUR. PARL. DOC. B6-0299/2006 (May 23, 2006); see 
also Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n on H.R., Inter-American Commission Urges United 
States to Close Guantanamo Without Delay, Resolution No. 1/06 (July 28, 2006); Juan E. 
Mendez (Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of 
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82. See generally Meredith B. Osborn, Rasul v. Bush: Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction 
over Habeas Challenges and Other Claims Brought by Guantanamo Detainees, 40 HARV. 
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numerous writs of habeas corpus on behalf of various detainees. The 
representation provided by these lawyers, dubbed the Guantánamo 
Bay Bar, in bringing forth habeas petitions attracted instant 
controversy and would be viewed as an example of an expansive 
notion of lawfare.83 
Several commentators perceived the actions of these lawyers, 
and the intentions of their clients, as treacherous and equated the legal 
motions with national security threats: 
Lawyers can literally get us killed . . . . We may never know how 
many of the hundreds of repatriated detainees are back in action, 
fighting the U.S. or our allies thanks to the efforts of the 
Guantanamo Bay Bar . . . . Allowing lawyers to subvert the truth 
and transform the Constitution into a lethal weapon in the hands 
of our enemies – while casting themselves as patriots – makes 
mockery of the sacrifices made by true patriots       84 
Others assumed a critical but more measured response to the assigned 
intentions of the lawyers and the habeas petitions. While these did not 
reach the levels of hysteria displayed by some commentators, they 
served to provide an expansive understanding of how lawfare was 
understood: 
Most instances of lawfare, such as the more than 400 habeas 
corpus lawsuits filed by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, simply seek to harass and burden our legal mechanisms. 
Like a computer virus or a hacker’s denial-of-service attack on a 
network, meritless suits seek to grind the wheels of justice to a 
halt.85 
This emergent notion of lawfare moved well beyond Dunlap’s 
conception of law as a substitute for a traditional military means to 
achieve an operational objective.86 As David Frakt, a former Defense 
Counsel with the Office of Military Commissions, asks of this 
imposed  notion  of  lawfare:  “[W]hat  exactly  are  the  military ends 
 
 
83. For an overview of the associated controversy, see Frakt, supra note 75, at 336-40. 
See also Scott Horton, Silencing the Lawyers, HARPER’S MAG. (May 26, 2010, 10:23 AM), 
http://harpers.org/blog/2010/05/silencing-the-lawyers/ [hereinafter Horton Silencing the 
Lawyers]. 
84. Daniel Halper, Lawfare Warning, WKLY. STANDARD (Mar. 5, 2010), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/lawfare-warnings/article/422507, quoted in Frakt, supra note 
75, at 338. 
85. C. Peter Dungan, Fighting Lawfare: At the Special Operations Task Force Level, 21 
SPECIAL WARFARE 9, 10 (2008). 
86. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 122. 
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pursued by [this] lawfare? What is it that a military enemy is 
theoretically trying to accomplish through manipulative legal 
actions?”87 
Yet when the Supreme Court of the United States held District 
Courts had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions and, later, that the 
Guantánamo detainees were entitled to protection under the US 
Constitution, accusations of lawfare were accompanied by firm policy 
prescriptions that served to further obfuscate the detainees’ access to 
judicial remedies and the ability of their lawyers to bring forth such 
petitions.88 This emergent notion of lawfare, described in a 
Washington Post op-ed as the use of federal courts to undermine the 
military’s ability to keep dangerous enemy combatants off the 
battlefield, evoked a range of official responses.89 
From the time that the Bush Administration initiated the transfer 
of foreign detainees to Guantánamo Bay, efforts were taken to limit 
their access to both courts and lawyers.90 Initially, many of the 
detainees were held incommunicado and had their identities 
concealed.91 In direct response to the early Supreme Court  decisions 
in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,92 which extended habeas 
protections to the detainees, the US Congress passed the 2005 
Detainee Treatment Act, which, inter alia, held that: 
[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or 
consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or 
on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.93 
Following the Hamdi decision, in which the Court held the detainees 
are entitled to some level of due process, the Government established 
Combat Status Review Tribunals.94 These, however, were designed to 
deny detainees legal representation and prohibited the lawyers who 
 
 
87. Frakt, supra note 75, at 341. 
88.  See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507   (2004); 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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90. See generally David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. 
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91. Id. at 1989. 
92. See generally Rasul, 542 U.S. 466; Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507. 
93. Detainee Treatment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2005). 
94. See generally Robert A. Peal, Combat Status Review Tribunals and the Unique 
Nature of the War on Terror, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1629 (2005). 
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represented these clients in federal court from discussing the Review 
Tribunal procedure.95 
When defense counsel formally gained increased access 
following the Supreme Court decisions in 2004, they faced numerous 
practical obstacles in accessing their clients. Guantánamo’s location, 
limiting travel logistics, federal oversight of lawyer-client 
communications, and the classified status of such information all 
contributed to a climate in which “the mechanics of meeting with 
[their] clients comprise[d] one important set of policies that [made] 
these representations unusually difficult.”96 These factors were 
compounded by several other intentional efforts that sought to deny 
the detainees’ access to their lawyers and endeavored to compromise 
the lawyers’ abilities to conduct their defense effectively. Deliberate 
efforts were taken to ensure that the detainees were unable or 
unwilling to meet with their lawyers: 
They don’t tell the detainee that his lawyer is there to see him. 
Instead, they tell him that he “has a reservation,” which means an 
interrogation. The detainee says he doesn’t want to go, so then 
they tell the lawyer that his client doesn’t want to see him.97 
Numerous other methods were deliberately employed to strain the 
client-lawyer relationship. Detainees were told of their lawyer’s 
sexual orientation, cultural or religious heritage, or given examples of 
their past clients. The detainees were told that their lawyer was gay, 
Jewish, or once represented the State of Israel (whether or not these 
claims were factual), and were encouraged by Guantánamo 
interrogators not to trust their lawyers as a result.98 
Beyond the restrictive environment manufactured in 
Guantánamo, Jeff Miller, the Congressman from Florida who equated 
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ (“NACDL”) efforts to 
support habeas petitions for several of the  Guantánamo detainees 
with an act of treachery, compelled the Defense Department’s 





95. Luban Lawfare, supra note 90, at 1987; see also JOSEPH MARGULIES, 
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who represented clients at Guantánamo.99 Government officials 
publicly shamed the defense attorneys as a professional class and 
implicitly threatened the business interests of the firms where they 
were employed.100 David Frakt asserted that “[t]he Bush 
Administration took their counterlawfare efforts to the extreme by 
denying detainees all access to lawyers or to courts, and by asserting 
that no laws or treaties, including Article 3 [of the Geneva 
Conventions], protected detainees . . . .”101 
Again, though, this was not a blanket rejection of international 
law or an assertion that the exigency of the post-September 11th 
landscape compelled derogation from relevant legal frameworks. 
Instead, in establishing its response to this expansive notion of 
lawfare, the Administration presented intricate legal arguments that 
drew directly on interpreted notions of international law. The Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatments of Prisoners of War  (The 
Third Geneva Convention) was held, based on a formulistic  reading 
of the Convention’s provisions, to apply only to High Contracting 
Parties “which can only be states.”102 In following: “[N]one of the 
provisions of [the Third Geneva Convention] apply to our conflict 
with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world.”103 
Common Article 3 of the Conventions, which provides 
protection to combatants captured during battle in instances of non- 
international armed conflict, was declared inapplicable due to the 
international status of the US military campaigns in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.104 The Office of Legal Counsel and the State Department 
debated the application of this body of law to the detainees, each 
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putting forth international law-based arguments detailing how the 
President was required to act in response to the threat of terrorism.105 
These legal engagements, along with various legislative and policy 
initiatives taken by both the Administration and Congress, contrived 
to ensure that, until definitive Supreme Court intervention nearly 
seven years after Guantánamo Bay received its first detainees in the 
War on Terror, habeas petitions were severely limited.106 
Contested conceptions and interpretations of international law 
were at the core of the debate and controversy that surrounded the 
detention program at Guantánamo Bay. The policies and legislative 
framework that created the detention facility drew upon 
interpretations of international law.107 These arguments failed to 
convince many beyond the Administration and its staunchest allies. 
The Supreme Court denounced many of the Government’s policies 
and supporting legal arguments.108 Yet, the efforts taken by the 
detainees themselves, by individual lawyers who offered their 
representation, and by private organizations who coordinated or 
supported these efforts merited the charge of lawfare. In response to 
this expansive understanding of lawfare, the Administration and 
Congress increased its efforts to further deny the Guantánamo 
detainees, the vast majority of whom were never charged, access to 
courts and access to legal representations.109 Again, lawfare did not 
equate to a broad denouncement of international law, but instead to a 
particular and systematic effort to limit the use of international law 
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5. “AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRIAL, ONCE MORE THE 
BROTHERS MUST INSIST ON PROVING THAT TORTURE WAS 
INFLICTED ON THEM BY STATE SECURITY [INVESTIGATORS] 
BEFORE THE JUDGE.” 
— al-Qaeda Training Manual (The Manchester Manual)110 
 
The controversy that surrounded the detainees contributed 
towards another understanding of lawfare that carried beyond the 
boundaries of the US Naval base at Guantánamo Bay. This use of the 
term lawfare is of multifaceted purpose. It claims that accusations of 
torture or mistreatment by, or on behalf of, detainees constitute either 
a strategic effort to burden tactical operations within zones of combat 
or seek to shame the United States’ international reputation and 
generate public disapproval of its foreign policy. 
The first accused motive holds that, “[r]ecently, insurgent forces 
in Iraq and Afghanistan have been waging a legal battle against 
tactical-level forces to extend the lines of operation of their leaders’ 
lawfare efforts and to attempt to blunt America’s tip of the spear.”111 
This understanding of lawfare, which manifests simply through the 
accusation of torture, abuse, or other forms of mistreatment, 
constitutes a strategic attempt to compromise the operational 
objectives of the state against whom the accusation is made: 
[D]etainees may make claims of abuse at the point of capture by 
indigenous forces, claim abuse again when transferred to an 
American detachment or team, and then claim abuse once again 
when they reach the detention facility . . . . Knowing that U.S. 
forces are duty-bound to investigate all claims of detainee abuse, 
insurgents can effectively burden leaders at three different levels 
of tactical command with detailed investigations.112 
Additionally, this notion of lawfare argues that claims of torture 
constitute a significant public relations victory for the United States’ 
enemies: 
By latching onto the torture narrative through the confirmed 
instances of mistreatment, and further taking this narrative onto 
the record in various legal forums, the tactic served to irreparably 
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harm the image of the United States, removed the benefit of the 
doubt pertaining to government efforts to combat torture 
allegations, and consequentially the government’s ability to 
effectively prosecute both a war and its accused war criminals.113 
Commentators who perpetuate this notion of lawfare have suggested 
that detainees of the War on Terror intentionally provoke US officials 
so as to “force” mistreatment and substantiate a claim of abuse.114 
That these detainees (often, accused members of al-Qaeda or the 
Taliban) would manufacture an accusation of torture or abuse to  gain 
a tangible advantage over their captors is described as “akin to 
malicious prosecution.”115 This understanding of lawfare, however, 
extends beyond the individual detainee who claims torture or abuse. 
Both non-governmental organizations and media outlets who 
have either reported or investigated accusations of torture have been 
charged with practicing this form of lawfare. Such groups and their 
representatives are believed to be forwarding an ideological agenda 
intent on damaging the United States’ reputation and curtailing its 
hegemonic design.116 Amnesty International has been accused of 
disseminating its literature to detainees held by US forces and 
essentially directing detainees to claim torture.117 This  particular 
claim of lawfare moved beyond the accusation made by the detainee, 
often with little regard for the merits of the accusation, and fixated on 
the intermediary who sought to substantiate or disseminate the varied 
claims. 
NGOs and certain media outlets were declared as threats to US 
interests.118 Their actions were equated with terrorist organizations: 
“This new class of warrior consists of intergovernmental 
organizations, transnational guerrilla and terrorist groups, 
multinational organizations . . . and a rapidly growing number of 
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areas.”119 These charges, however, went beyond simple accusations 
and talking-points espoused by various commentators who – in 
accordance with Michael Kearney’s understanding of lawfare as a 
“critique of human rights activism and advocacy” – viewed the role 
assumed by NGOs and certain media outlets as detrimental to US 
interests within the War on Terror.120 
Donald Rumsfeld introduced this notion of lawfare into the 
official discourse that surrounded the detainees held in US custody. 
The Secretary of Defense claimed, “[t]hese detainees are trained to 
lie, they’re trained to say they were tortured, and the minute we 
release them or the minute they get a lawyer, very frequently they’ll 
go out and they will announce that they’ve been tortured . . . The 
media jumps on these claims.”121 Secretary Rumsfeld would 
substantiate such accusations with reference to an al-Qaeda training 
manual, discovered by the Manchester Metropolitan Police during a 
raid of a home in the North-East of England. Dubbed the Manchester 
Manual, Secretary Rumsfeld repeated the claim that terrorists have 
been trained to lie about abuse and torture while in US captivity 
because “their training manual says so.”122 
The Manchester Manual served as purportedly uncontroversial 
evidence that al-Qaeda practiced aggressive forms of lawfare, were 
familiar with and able to advantageously manipulate US and 
international law, and employed a standard operating procedure that 
manufactured false claims of abuse to both burden and denigrate US 
objectives and interests.123  David Frakt has claimed that the Bush 
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Administration used the existence of the Manual to convince the 
public of the legitimacy of its enhanced interrogation program. He 
cites a Department of Defense official who argued that  the 
Manchester Manual demonstrated al-Qaeda’s ability to remain 
impervious to traditional interrogation techniques: “There is a very 
lengthy chapter on counter-interrogation techniques. These are 
sophisticated terrorists who know how to avoid interrogation.”124 
The Manual, described as both an act and evidence of lawfare, 
was used by US officials to formally defend the United States against 
international law-based accusations of torture and prisoner 
mistreatment, despite the fact that the Manual had been discovered in 
2000 – before the United States formally began its leadership role in 
the War on Terror.125 In response to questions posed by the United 
Nation’s Committee Against Torture to the US Government regarding 
allegations of abuse and torture, Charles Stimson, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, replied to the UN 
monitoring body: 
While the United States is aware of allegations of torture and ill- 
treatment, and takes them very seriously, it disagrees strongly 
with the assertion that such are widespread or systematic . . . 
these allegations must be placed in context: they relate to a 
minute percentage of the overall number of persons who have 
been detained. Moreover, not everything that is alleged is in fact 
truth. For example, it is well-known that al Qaeda are trained to 
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when captured, to allege torture, even if they are not subject to 
abuse.126 
The Administration’s position in the debate over interrogation 
techniques and accusations of torture and other forms of mistreatment 
did not, however, disassociate from international legal reasoning. The 
enhanced interrogation program that gave rise to many allegations of 
torture leveled against the United States was based largely upon 
particular readings and interpretations of international law. The 
notorious definition of torture that would form the basis of the 
enhanced interrogation programs operated by the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the Department of Defense was effectively a legal 
argument about the necessary standard of conduct that must be 
achieved so as to remain in compliance with the United Nation’s 
Convention Against Torture.127 The Bush Administration and the 
Department of Justice drew directly upon international law when they 
sought to devise the means and methods of interrogation that would 
provide their desired security and intelligence outcomes. These legal 
arguments were, of course, abject failures that were routinely 
denounced and almost universally held to have strayed disastrously 
from any plausible account of state obligation pertaining to the 
treatment of detainees or the prohibition on torture.128 Yet the  merits 
of these arguments and legal engagements are not of direct concern, 
nor do they alter the fact that US officials attempted to draw directly 
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Individuals or organizations who claimed abuse or denounced 
these interrogation techniques and the treatment of detainees more 
broadly were accused of practicing lawfare. First, the accusation of 
lawfare would dismiss the substance of the claim, effectively (albeit 
informally) rendering the claim inadmissible due to the perceived and 
assigned motives of the individual or organization forwarding the 
claim. This allows the claim to be denied by accusing the claimant of 
lying as per the Manchester Manual. Second, it accuses third-party 
interests (often NGOs or international organizations) who make or 
publicize similar accusations of perpetuating a false claim. 
Collectively, this delegitimizes the use of international mechanisms 
and standards by such actors who seek to pursue or frame claims in 
accordance with international law. These particular forms of 
international legal engagement become an illegitimate and 
(informally) inadmissible means of achieving redress or demanding 
account. 
6. “SUCH LAWFARE – THE MANIPULATION OF WESTERN
LAWS AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ENDS – OFTEN MANIFESTS AS
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS DESIGNED TO SILENCE, PUNISH, AND 
DETER THOSE WHO PUBLICLY SPEAK AND REPORT ON 
MILITANT ISLAM, TERRORISM AND THEIR SOURCES OF 
FINANCING.” 
— Brooke Goldstein and Benjamin Ryberg (of the Lawfare 
Project)129
On the margins of the War on Terror, lawfare has come to 
describe the actions of individuals or organizations who employ libel 
or hate speech laws to “silence” criticism of “controversial Islamic 
organizations.”130 This marked a significant departure from Dunlap’s 
description of law as a substitute for traditional military means to 
achieve  an  operational  objective.131    Opponents  of  this  notion   of 
129. Brooke Goldstein & Benjamin Ryberg, Note, The Emerging Force of Lawfare: 
Legal Maneuvering Designed to Hinder Exposure of Terrorism and Terror Financing, 36 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 634, 637 (2003). 
130. Alan Dershowitz & Elizabeth Samson, The chilling effect of ‘lawfare’ litigation, 
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central/2010/feb/09/libel-reform-radical-islamic -groups. 
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lawfare hold that, “over the past ten years, there has been a steady 
increase in Islamist lawfare tactics directly targeting the human rights 
of North American and European civilians in order to constrain the 
free flow of public information about radical Islam.”132 
This notion of lawfare is believed to create a chilling effect on 
individuals disseminating information about such groups.133 Alan 
Dershowitz and Elizabeth Samson have argued that “[radical Islamic 
groups] have learned to sue their critics for defamation, not with the 
intent to win the case, but with the hope of imposing an unaffordably 
high cost on criticism of their actions.”134 According to opponents of 
this notion of lawfare, it is “effective because one lawsuit can silence 
thousands who have neither the time nor the financial resources to 
challenge well-funded terror financiers or the vast machine of the 
international judicial system.”135 
Despite the apparent departure from Dunlap’s intended meaning 
of the term, this notion of lawfare has strained its application to 
include national security considerations. Brooke Goldstein and 
Benjamin Ryberg of The Lawfare Project argue that the significance 
of such lawfare tactics has adversely impacted how the US 
Government approaches national security reporting.136 This threat, 
according to Goldstein and Ryberg, has resulted from formal 
engagements with international legal mechanisms: 
For more than ten years, an international movement to silence 
free speech about Islamist terrorism has emerged from the United 
Nations under the guise of “prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of religion or belief” – with a marked focus on Islam.137 
Accordingly, this, coupled with the use of domestic courts to bring 
libel  cases  against  groups  or  individuals  who  attempt  to   expose 
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“terrorism or terrorist financing,” carries detrimental effects on 
domestic policy and security initiatives.138 Domestically, this has 
manifested through a host of initiatives, largely undertaken by the 
Obama Administration, that Goldstein and Ryberg believe  to 
evidence “how the Islamist lawfare strategy to politicize speech 
deemed ‘Islamophobic’, and to silence speech deemed blasphemous 
of Islam, is directly impacting U.S. domestic policy.”139 
While free speech receives broad formal protection under the 
First Amendment to the US Constitution, opponents of this form of 
purported lawfare draw upon the threat of “libel tourism.”140 This 
supposes that a plaintiff will “forum shop” to find a sympathetic and 
legally advantageous jurisdiction to bring forth a libel claim against a 
foreign defendant. Most often, the United Kingdom, known for 
plaintiff-friendly libel laws and a burden of proof standard under 
which the accused must prove his or her own innocence, is the 
preferred venue.141 While such methods and legal tactics have 
increasingly been discussed in relation to an expansive notion of 
lawfare, the use of libel tourism, forum shopping, and the vexatious 
employment of domestic laws to silence criticism have long histories 
of strategic application.142 Yet it has not been until particular groups – 
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perceived to begin, engaging with libel laws that the term lawfare was 
applied and legislative and judicial measures were taken in response. 
Following the 2003 publication of Funding Evil: How Terrorism 
is Financed and How to Stop It, a book in which author Rachel 
Ehrenfeld accused Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz, a prominent Saudi 
banker, of providing financial support to al-Qaeda and other terrorist 
organizations, Bin Mahfouz filed a defamation claim in English 
court.143 After Ehrenfeld refused to acknowledge the English Court’s 
jurisdiction, Bin Mahfouz was awarded damages.144 Bin Mahfouz did 
not attempt to enforce the ruling in the United States;  however, 
Rachel Ehrenfeld filed for a declaratory judgment, arguing that 
“under federal and New York law, bin Mahfouz could not prevail on 
the libel claim against her and that the English default judgement was 
invalid.”145 
The New York Court of Appeals declined jurisdiction on the 
matter but held that there was a need to protect New York residents 
from the chilling effect of foreign libel judgments but that such 
actions needed to result from state legislation.146 In direct response, 
lawmakers in Albany passed the Libel Terrorism Protection Act, 
dubbed “Rachel’s Law,” which “was designed to address the issue of 
obtaining personal jurisdiction over a plaintiff in a foreign defamation 
action, as well as the substantive issue of whether a New York Court 
would enforce a foreign judgment.”147 
The legislation focused on narrow jurisdictional issues and the 
compatibility of foreign judgments with afforded First Amendment 
protections. The accompanying discourse surrounding  the drafting 
and passage of the legislation, however, fixated on issues of terrorism, 
terrorist financing, and the accompanying notion of lawfare.148 
Various  States  followed,  passing  similarly  formed  laws  and    the 
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following year federal legislation began moving through Congress.149 
While the resulting federal legislation sought to balance free speech 
protections with the principle of comity and did not directly mention 
issues of terrorism or lawfare, the legislation was largely driven by 
such influences.150 
Certainly, individuals or groups of litigants may attempt to 
advantageously or vexatiously apply libel laws, either within the 
United States or through foreign jurisdictions, but this is hardly an 
exclusive phenomenon attributable to a particular group. Yet, the 
identification of such legal actions, regardless of their respective 
merits, as lawfare, is reserved for what Alan Dershowitz  and 
Elizabeth Samson dubbed “controversial Islamic organizations.”151 
The singular focus of this notion of lawfare, and the at least partially 
implied intentions of accompanying reactive legislation, serves to 
brand any legal action brought by an Islamic group or individual as 
malicious and devoid of legal merit often before or without the 
substance of the legal claim receiving judicial treatment. This, in 
itself, creates a chilling effect. From the moment of commencement, 
legal actions brought by a particular class, under the supposed  guise 
of lawfare, are reactively doubted, limited, and repressed. 
 
7. “TRUTH BE TOLD, WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO EMBRACE 
LAWFARE, FOR IT IS VASTLY PREFERABLE TO THE BLOODY, 
EXPENSIVE, AND DESTRUCTIVE FORMS OF WARFARE THAT 
RAVAGED THE WORLD IN THE 20TH CENTURY…I WOULD FAR 
PREFER TO HAVE MOTIONS AND DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
FIRED AT ME THAN INCOMING MORTAR OR ROCKET- 
PROPELLED GRENADE FIRE.” 
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Much of what was originally termed lawfare is clearly preferable 
to the high costs and tragic certainties of war. Charles Dunlap has 
acknowledged that “there are many uses of what might be called 
‘lawfare’ that serve to reduce the destructiveness of conflicts, and 
therefore further one of the fundamental purposes of the law of 
war.”153 In such instances, it is not immediately evident why these 
uses of international law do not simply represent an intended or 
successful function of international law. Though if Dunlap is correct 
that acts such as purchasing satellite imagery, imposing sanctions 
against Iraq’s Air Force, strengthening the rule of law, or ceasing the 
finance of terrorist organizations enabled the evasion of sustained 
episodes of violence then such forms of legal engagement are plainly 
preferable.154 
States, however, have long partaken in such forms of legal 
engagement. An increasingly globalized and formalist international 
environment, mature legal mechanisms, and developed civil society 
organizations may provide greater opportunities for engagement but 
such forms of strategic legal employment are well-established.155 The 
actions of a State or international actor that invokes international law 
in furtherance of a strategic objective do not frequently merit such 
general attention or a designated nomenclature. 
Despite the ubiquity of much of what Dunlap’s evolved 
conception of lawfare describes, the term has gained prominence 
within media and amongst policymakers. It is tempting to place the 
rise of lawfare within the context of a post-September 11th, War on 
Terror, Bush Administration-dominated environment. It is here that 
lawfare has its origins, developed its diverse understandings and 
applications, and received prominent attention from the highest levels 
of political power. But lawfare should not be understood within this 
singular context. An analysis of the use of the term lawfare over a ten- 
year span found that while the term began appearing within the media 
in 2003, eighty-seven percent of total references to lawfare occurred 
between 2009 and 2013, when the study concluded.156 
 
 
153. Dunlap Today and Tomorrow, supra note 5, at 316. 
154. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 123-24. 
155. See generally PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
AMERICAN HISTORY (2010); MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914 (2004). 
156. The analysis performed by Neve Gordon was global in scope and found that the 
term lawfare appeared in 43 of the 207 “Major World Publications” within the LexisNexis 
database. See Gordon, supra note 33, at 318-21. 
181
Still, the question remains: Do we have every reason to embrace 
a state-led notion of lawfare, as many commentators have 
suggested?157 Orde Kittrie argues that “the U.S. government’s lack of 
systematic engagement with lawfare is a tremendous missed 
opportunity” and that “lawfare, deployed systematically and adeptly, 
could in various circumstances save U.S. and foreign lives  by 
enabling U.S. national security objectives to be advanced with less or 
no kinetic warfare.”158 
Again, it is evident that such uses of international law, while not 
necessarily novel, are to be welcomed. Kittrie, and many 
commentators engaged in the lawfare debate, however, understand 
law within this context to constitute a weapon of war. Dunlap, for 
instance, has argued that: 
[H]arking back to the original characterization of lawfare as 
simply another kind of weapon, one that is produced, 
metaphorically speaking, by beating law books into swords . . . a 
weapon can be used for good or bad purposes, depending upon 
the mindset of those who wield it. Much the same can be said 
about the law.159 
If one, however, envisions law as a weapon, as opposed to a strategic 
tool or some less incendiary analogy, it will facilitate efforts to 
brandish such a weapon in instances that its user perceives as a just 
cause. Congruently, however, this view of international law also 
facilitates an inverse understanding of law’s use by one’s opponent. 
Whether an enemy on the battlefield or an ideological challenger, law 
becomes a weaponized threat requiring a firm and decisive response. 
Considerations of whether we have every reason to embrace lawfare 
should be made within this context. Often, when a legal  engagement 
is branded as lawfare, the response to this particular form of legal 
engagement begins to demonstrate what lawfare means. This is not a 
definitional question but instead one focused on the implications of 
applying the term lawfare to such forms of legal engagement – as an 
action, a form of speech, and as a label. 
As Neve Gordon demonstrates, the vast majority of literature 
dedicated to lawfare focuses on its definition and normative 
underpinnings.160  Instead, he holds that “lawfare is not merely used to 
157. Carter, supra note 152. 
158. Kittrie, supra note 24, at 3. 
159. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 123-24. 
160. Gordon, supra note 33, at 312. 
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describe certain phenomena, but that it operates as a speech act that 
reconstitutes the human rights field as a national security threat.”161 
Gordon’s understanding of what lawfare does asks both the correct 
question and is well demonstrated through the Israeli case study that 
substantiates his work.162 It is now, however, prudent to ask what 
lawfare means – to both understandings and functions of international 
law – from a more holistic perspective. 
If we survey the literature and observe examples of how lawfare 
has been deployed and understood as both a description of a 
phenomenon and an act with normative implications varied examples 
emerge. The claim of torture, filing a habeas brief, and the use of a 
human shield are each held to constitute both an international legal 
engagement and an act of lawfare. Likewise, the imposition of 
sanctions against a foreign military or a defense lawyer, the signing of 
an Article 98 agreement to immunize a US official from ICC 
prosecution, or the confiscation of terrorist assets constitute both a 
legal engagement and a form of lawfare. 
The critical view of lawfare, that it popularly constitutes an 
attack on or dismantlement of legal norms, serves to endow 
international law with a singular, likely virtuous, purpose. It does not 
recognize that international law is commonly used for a diversity of 
reasons, any of which may evoke their own competing moral 
pronouncements or normative attributions. This recalls David 
Kennedy’s understanding of international law as “a set of arguments, 
rhetorical performances and counter-performances, deployed by 
people pursuing projects of various kinds.”163 Labeling certain legal 
engagements as lawfare serves to tip the balance of these pursuits. 
Its pejorative application – that is, its framing of international 
legal engagement as a weapon, as a threat – serves to delegitimize and 
ultimately disenfranchise particular forms of legal engagement. It is 
thus accurate to view, understand, and frame, this most common 
application of the term lawfare, not as a dismantlement of legal norms 
or as an attack on the human rights field (though it may do such 
things), but instead as a limitation on access to international justice. 
The concept of access to justice is well formed within many 




162. Id. at 318-39. 
163. DAVID KENNEDY, LAWFARE AND WARFARE IN THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 158, 173 (James Crawford & Martti Koskinniemi eds., 2012). 
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international law, while drawing upon established concepts, is recent 
in its use.164 As international law’s focus developed from its early 
state-centric conception to include considerations of the individual 
actor, the notion of access to international justice began to form.165
Individualized international justice secured its modern foundation 
through the drafting of the United Nations Charter and the 
establishment of the Nuremburg Tribunal.166 Article 2 of  the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights holds that “[e]veryone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind . . . .”167 Continuing, the Declaration 
holds that every individual possesses a right to an effective remedy 
for any acts that violate their fundamental rights and that all are 
“entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights 
and obligations . . . .”168
These foundational principles, which gave license to individuals 
within international mechanisms, began the transformation of 
established domestic legal principles into international legal 
obligations.169 These received further grounding through the host of 
global developments occurring throughout the latter-half of the 
twentieth century. Adoption of the International Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
strengthened the legal effect of these provisions. The development of 
legally binding regional human rights treaties and accompanying 
enforcement mechanisms like the European Court of Human Rights 
further facilitated the ability of the individual to gain access to the 
promise of international justice and redress.170 
164. Patrick Keyzer, Vesselin Popovski, & Charles Sampford, What is ‘access to 
international justice’ and what does it require?, in ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1, 2 
(2015). 
165. For an account of this development and international law’s growing recognition of
the individual subject, see ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANCADO TRINDADE, THE ACCESS OF 
INDIVIDUALS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 3-8 (2011). See generally BRUNO SIMMA, FROM 
BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (1994). 
166. Keyzer et al., supra note 164, at 3. 
167. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 2, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948). 
168.  Id. art. 8, 10. 
169. For an account of these developments, see Keyzer et al., supra note 164, at 1-5.
170. Id. at 3; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 
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Narrowly, access to international justice, like its domestic 
counterpart, can be understood as “the right to a judicial remedy 
before an independent court of law.”171 While it is not the purpose of 
this paper to trace the development of the concept of access to 
international justice, it is employed here in its broadest sense. This 
holds that under international law, respect for principles, provisions, 
and individual rights receive meaning and actualization through the 
ability of individuals to engage with them through formal and 
informal, state and non-state, systems or regimes. 
As commonly employed, the accusation of lawfare serves to 
justify interference, or attempted interference, with this ability. It does 
not represent an ontological challenge to international law. Those who 
scream lawfare loudest and denounce the role and influence of 
international law rarely (if ever) intend their denouncement to 
discount the totality of ways which international law can be engaged. 
Often, their response to lawfare draws upon international law, at least 
in part and not always convincingly. But equally, they  are actors 
under international law who engage and apply it accordingly. 
The claim of lawfare, the perceived threat of international law 
that constitutes many of lawfare’s popularized usages, as they have 
developed, serves to limit particular forms of legal engagement. Most 
of these are by or on behalf of individual subjects or are directed 
towards state actors. Lawfare serves to resist or delegitimize these 
particular engagements. It serves to justify legal measures or policies 
that discount these engagements. Despite self-evident examples of 
international legal engagements that appear vastly preferable to 
warfare or the use of force, when one suggests that we have every 
reason to embrace lawfare it is necessary to understand what lawfare 
often means for the function and efficacy of international law, and the 
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HOW STATES PERSUADE: AN ACCOUNT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT
UPON THE USE OF FORCE 
David Hughes* 
How States Persuade presents a theory of international legal communication. It considers and maps how 
persuasion, through international legal argument, shapes legal change and influences notions of compliance. 
Commonly, international law is portrayed as a medium for debate. Within the resulting debates, 
persuasion is understood as a tool to induce compliance. Yet this is only one side of the conversation. 
Persuasion is a two-way discourse. Efforts to alter the behavior of a “non-compliant” state through cogent 
communication are often met with or preempted by legal arguments put forth by the state. This is perhaps 
most apparent in the deliberative environments that accompany the use of force and the conduct of warfare. 
Built around a series of case studies in which states offer legal arguments in support of actions that, prima 
facie, extend beyond the limits of legal permissibility, this article presents a theory of persuasion and legal 
communication that differs from how legal argument and international law are commonly understood. It 
offers the first detailed and theorized account of the processes through which the non-compliant state argues, 
persuades, and employs international law. By mapping and conceptualizing persuasive techniques, I suggest 
that international law must be considered both in compliance and in violation. Switching emphasis and 
considering the actions and arguments offered by the “non-compliant” state facilitates a novel and complete 
understanding of the diplomatic, informal, and daily interactions that more commonly and more 
consequentially define how international law is understood, practiced, and altered.  
I. INTRODUCTION
Barack Obama arrived at Oslo City Hall in December 2010 to deliver the Nobel Lecture and receive 
the Peace Prize. The President recalled the legacy of Henry Dunant.1 In 1901, Dunant became the 
Prize’s inaugural recipient. He had founded the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and oversaw the adoption of the first Geneva Convention. The call for humanity that Dunant brought 
forth from the fields of Solferino initiated the legal regulation of warfare. Resulting efforts did not 
outlaw hostilities. They began an arduous process of codification, dictating both when and how states 
may use force. A legal vocabulary emerged in concurrence. This structured the discourse 
accompanying war. It provided a means to contest when force is justifiable. Legitimacy demanded 
transparency. In a later address, President Obama cited the need to publicly explain and justify US 
military actions. The inability to provide reasoning, the President warned, encouraged international 
suspicion, eroded legitimacy, and reduced accountability.2  
States have long coupled the use of force with contestations of legitimacy.3 As the international legal 
framework governing both jus ad bellum and jus in bello matured, states increasingly harnessed a legal 
* Grotius Research Scholar, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to Steven Ratner, Craig Scott, and Yahli Shereshevsky. This
article benefited from and developed through their insights and comments. 
1 Barack Obama, “A Just and Lasting Peace” (Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, delivered at Oslo City Hall, Oslo, 10 December
2009) [Obama Nobel Lecture].
2 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony” (delivered
at U.S. Military Academy – West Point, New York, 28 May 2014).
3 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Terrorism: The Persistent Dilemma of Legitimacy” (2004) 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 299 at 299.
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vernacular.4 Diplomatic communications accompanied military forays. The battlefield expanded from 
the frontline into international fora. David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, described the 
institutional relationship between his nation’s Defense and Foreign Ministries. Ben-Gurion succinctly 
elucidated that, “the Minister of Defense is authorized to make defense policy; the role of the Foreign 
Minister is to explain that policy.”5 
The turn to legal rationale increased following the Second World War. The prohibition of the use of 
force and the proliferation of international humanitarian law (IHL) were a global response to war’s 
unmitigated horror. These developments further facilitated the embrace of legal argument which 
would become, “one of the staple features of state practice on the use of force, so that when states 
use force against other states, they also use international law to define and defend, argue and counter-
argue, explain and rationalise their actions.”6 
As the nature of warfare evolved, as states perceived new dangers, the post-war legal vernacular was 
understood as incomplete. Responses to the altered nature of warfare feature inventive (and, at times, 
dubious) legal claims. These address the gaps, where the laws of war fall silent and fail to directly 
contemplate evolving scenarios and emerging threats. These discussions influence conceptions of 
permissibility, they establish new standards, and they formalize through state practice, opinio juris, 
authoritative argument, and the recognition of custom. States have, however, altered the ways that 
they invoke international law.7 Sophisticated legal appeals have moved the discourse accompanying 
the use of force beyond assertions of legal conformity. The use of force is coupled with appeals that 
attempt to persuade the international community that inventive legal arguments constitute an 
acceptable interpretation or application of international law. Legal arguments may be offered in good-
faith, in response to a lawmaking moment. They may also accompany events that clearly violate 
international law. Legal arguments supplement state behaviour that stretches or exceeds the 
boundaries of legal permissibility. International law is invoked to persuade audiences that a particular 
action, interpretation, or policy is acceptable.  
Yet the relationship between international law and persuasion is understood differently. Law is often 
portrayed as a medium for debate and agreement.8 Within this debate, persuasion is assigned a 
particular purpose. Steven Ratner explains that “for those international actors seeking to promote 
respect for international law, persuasion is at the core of the enterprise.”9 Thus persuasion becomes a 
means to encourage fidelity towards international law. It forms a subset of the broader discussion 
4 See, Michael Byers, War Law (New York: Grove Press, 2006) at 3, 43 [Byers War Law].  
5 Dan Horowitz, “The Israeli Concept of National Security” in Avner Yaniv, ed, National Security and Democracy in Israel 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) 11 at 12.   
6 Dino Kritsiotis, “When states use armed force” in Christian Reus-Smit, ed, The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 45 at 47.  
7 Yahli Shereshevsky, “Back in the Game: The Re-Engagement of States in International Humanitarian Lawmaking,” 36 
Berkeley J. Int’l L. [forthcoming in 2018] [Shereshevsky Back in the Game].  
8 Harlan Grant Cohen, “Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community,” (2011) 44 N.Y.U. J. Int'l 
L. & Pol. 1050 at 1067.
9 Steven R. Ratner, “Persuading to Comply: On the Deployment and Avoidance of Legal Argumentation” in Jeffery L.
Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, eds, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 568 at 568 [Ratner Persuading to Comply].
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regarding compliance. Through a communicative process, reliant upon legal argument, the non-
compliant state is convinced to alter its behaviour and adhere to legal dictate.10  
This is only one side of the conversation. Persuasion is a two-way discourse. It is both a means to 
ensure compliance and a method to define how international law should be understood. Efforts to 
alter the behaviour of a non-compliant state through cogent communication is often met with or pre-
empted by legal argumentation put forth by the state. These pages consider how states employ 
persuasion upon or following the use of force. I emphasize instances in which states offer legal 
arguments in support of actions and legal interpretation that, prima facie, extend beyond the limits of 
legal permissibility. Persuasion is understood broadly. The state becomes not only the “engine and the 
target” of compliance but a participant actively engaged in defining what compliance means.11     
Section two of this paper poses the question: why do states persuade? This section begins abstractly 
before moving beyond the contestations of compliance that often frame considerations of persuasion. 
It explores reasons why a non-compliant state, devoid of obligation and absent coercion, may employ 
legal argument and engage in a persuasive discourse. These reasons vary and are non-exhaustive. A 
state – whose actions are broadly understood to be in violation of international law – may employ 
persuasive legal argument to supplement a lie (e.g. we did not do what you claim that we did). The 
state may appeal to persuasion in support of a particular legal interpretation (e.g. what you said 
happened but it is not illegal or the law is unclear). Or the state may invoke persuasive legal argument 
to generate legitimacy for its general policies or purposes (e.g. military action is a necessary response 
to an emerging threat).  
Section three asks whom do states persuade? This section considers the audiences that states engage 
through legal argument. The target of persuasion alters alongside the form and purpose of persuasion. 
The target may be broad (e.g. the international community) or narrow (e.g. interpretative communities, 
another state, a key ally).  
Section four considers how do states persuade? It provides an account of the communicative process 
that states employ when engaging in this particular form of legal argumentation. The described process 
– also non-exhaustive – offers five broad phases of engagement. First, the state identifies a “common 
lifeworld.” Second, the state establishes itself as a general norm-acceptor. Third, the state 
demonstrates its authority to interpret the law. Fourth, it establishes a standard of compliance based 
on the “acceptable legal argument.” And fifth, the state draws upon precedent and commonalities. 
Through these phases, the state forwards a particular form of legal argument. This argument intends 
to influence understandings of law and fact. It seeks to generate legitimacy for state action and policy. 
And it justifies the use of force in ways that often extend beyond previously endorsed limits.  
Section five merges the question of why with the question of how. It presents a series of case studies. 
These correspond with the abovementioned categories, describing a state’s motives and methods of 
persuasion. Within, descriptive accounts chronicle uses of legal argumentation. The first case study 
describes Russia’s appeals to international law following the annexation of Crimea. It traces Russia’s 
reliance upon international law to supplement various lies that denied, excused, and then explained 
10 Ibid, at 573. See also, Nicole Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the 
ICC Case” (2009) 63 International Organization 33.  
11 Ratner Persuading to Comply, supra note 9 at 570.  
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Russian actions in Ukraine. The second case study chronicles the United States and the United 
Kingdom’s employment of international legal argument to persuade selected audiences of a particular 
legal interpretation’s validity. Situated within the war on terror, this study retells the interpretative 
development of the unwilling and unable standard in accompaniment of the use of force against a 
non-state armed group in Syria. The final case study demonstrates the use of international law to 
legitimize a particular, controversial, use of force. It details Israel’s reliance upon legal argument both 
during and in the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza war. In each instance, legal arguments, persuasive 
endeavours, are offered by a state whose actions are deemed non-compliant with conventional legal 
understandings. In each instance, the non-compliant state exhibits a similar persuasive methodology. 
Section six concludes. It identifies challenges in evaluating the effectiveness of persuasion and legal 
argumentation.   
In A Memory of Solferino, Henry Dunant described the furious violence that defined nineteenth century 
warfare.12 The nature of war has changed in the 108 years between Dunant’s receipt of the first Peace 
Prize and President Obama’s acceptance of the award. As violence assumes new forms and manifests 
through novel challenges, international law increasingly structures the discourse that accompanies the 
use of force. Often it prescribes limits and instills a standard of compliance. Yet, we remain in a 
constant conversation about the moments when the use of force is permissible. We evolve the 
boundaries that define acceptable conduct once force is invoked. Persuasion and legal argument 
assume a significant role within this debate. They become an invaluable resource for those who 
demand greater adherence to the laws governing war. Yet, considerations of the extent to which and 
the means by which states employ persuasion in response to the call for greater compliance – to define 
the moments and to set the boundaries – are often absent from these conversations.  
II. WHY DO STATES PERSUADE? 
Contemporary considerations of compliance are frequently premised on Louis Henkin’s oft-quoted 
aphorism that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of 
their obligations almost all of the time.”13 International law’s influence is disregarded by realists and 
neo-realists who view compliance as an unimportant by-product of unitary state interest.14 But beyond 
these dismissive understandings, Henkin’s premise is widely embraced.15 Proponents of a liberal 
approach accentuate the role of domestic actors within the international sphere. Interactions amongst 
these groups and with national governments influence state policy and preference compliance with 
international law.16 The institutionalist approach seeks to explain the influence of international 
organizations (or regimes) on state behaviour. States are perceived as “utility-maximizers.” 
International regimes contribute towards legal compliance by facilitating agreements that conform 
with or further the particular interests of states.17 And several prominent theories emphasize 
12 See generally, Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1959).  
13 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) at 47.  
14 See generally, Kenneth W. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979).  
15 For an overview, see, Oona A. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” (2002) 112 Yale L.J. 1935.  
16 See, Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law in a World of Liberal States”, (1995) 6 Eur. J. Int’l L. 503.  
17 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002).  
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international law’s normative force. They posit that compliance stems from a state’s acceptance and 
internalization of law’s inherent features.18 
Compliance is thus assumed. It is prevalent but it is not universal.  Andrew Guzman notes, compliance 
mostly occurs, “in situations with many repeated interactions, each with relatively small stakes…the 
topics that have traditionally held center stage in international law – the laws of war, neutrality, arms 
control, and so on – are precisely those in which international law is least likely to be relevant.”19 
Observers quickly identify instances of non-compliance, violations of international law that exhibit 
legal disregard and precede or accompany tragedy. In response to these legal violations, it is clear why 
certain actors – both state and non-state – embrace persuasion as a means to secure legal adherence. 
A non-compliant state (or other powerful entity) becomes the target of persuasion.20 To this extent, 
international law is a project, a form of advocacy. The persuader employs a familiar language of rights, 
obligations, incentives, and norms to convince the state to alter its behaviour.21 Persuasion’s influence 
upon this process is either minimized (through focus on the fixed traits of parties or norms) or 
accentuated (by examination of the communicative process between the persuader and persuaded).22 
Persuasion, however, remains linked to compliance. Communicative interactions move from those 
seeking to ensure adherence towards those whose behaviour is deemed impermissible.  
Yet moments of non-compliance also produce instances of persuasion. A legal violation may question 
international law’s efficacy but it does not discount law’s relevancy.23 Law is more than a constraint 
on state power. It is a discursive medium.24 Constructivist scholars contend that, “actors assume the 
existence of a set of socially sanctioned rules, but international law ‘lives’ in the way in which they 
reason argumentatively about the form of these rules…”25 Within this discourse, persuasion is not 
only a means to influence state behaviour. It is a form of interaction that accompanies the discussions 
and debates exhibited by law’s transformative potential.26 George Brandis, the Attorney General of 
Australia, explained that “it is vital that States (and their international legal advisers) have the courage 
18 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Thomas M. 
Franck, “Legitimacy in the International System,” (1988) 82 Am. J. Int’l. L. 705; Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, 
The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995) 
[Chayes & Chayes The New Sovereignty]; Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” (1993) 47 
International Organization 175; Harold Hongju Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” (1997) 106 Yale L. J. 
2599 at 2600.  
19 Andrew T. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,” (2002) 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823 at 1828 [Guzman 
A Compliance-Based Theory].  
20 Ratner Persuading to Comply, supra note 9 at 570.  
21 See generally, David Kennedy, “Lawfare and Warfare” in James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi, eds, The Cambridge 
Companion to International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 158.  
22 See, Ratner Persuading to Comply, supra note 9 at 571. 
23 Frédéric Mégret, “International Law as Law” in James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi, eds, The Cambridge Companion to 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 64 at 77. 
24 Ibid, at 8.  
25 Christian Reus-Smit, “The politics of international law” in Christian Reus-Smit, ed, The Politics of International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 14 at 41. See also, Charlotte Peevers, The Politics of Justifying Force: The Suez 
Crisis, the Iraq War, and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 5 [Peevers Politics of Justifying Force].  
26 Ibid, at 10. 
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to explain and defend their legal positions.”27 The state – so often the target of persuasion – engages 
in this communicative process. It too employs persuasive argument.  
The assumption that international law is least relevant in areas where its weaknesses are apparent and 
compliance illusive encourages the present focus. Daniel Reisner, when head of the Israel Defense 
Force’s (IDF) International Law Division (ILD), claimed that:  
“If you do something for long enough, the world will accept it. The whole of international 
law is now based on the notion that an act that is forbidden today becomes permissible if 
executed by enough countries…After we bombed the reactor in Iraq, the Security Council 
condemned Israel and claimed the attack was a violation of international law. The 
atmosphere was that Israel had committed a crime. Today everyone says it was preventive 
self-defense. International law progresses through violations.”28 
The laws governing the use of force provide compelling examples of law’s persuasive function. They 
illustrate myriad ways and reasons that a state – whose actions or policy preferences are deemed 
inconsistent with legal requirements – employs international legal argument and persuasion. Despite 
periodic violation, the norm prohibiting aggression has become so entrenched that states are 
compelled to justify military incursions. International law may appear as an ineffective constraint yet 
legal argument is ever present. States, upon the use of force, read international law permissibly. They 
argue that the world faces unforeseen threats. IHL, when drafted, failed to foresee these emergent 
dangers and must be interpreted to facilitate necessary responses.29 Sir Daniel Bethlehem, the former 
legal adviser to the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), noted in defense of his efforts 
to reform the jus ad bellum that, “if the law is to influence, it must descend from the heights of broad 
principles to engage with the reality of particular circumstances that requires its attention.”30 
Humanitarians, acutely aware of law’s destructive potential, offer a restrictive reading of these same 
laws. They wish to limit the state’s ability to use force and constrain the forms of violence that are 
employed.31 This creates a deliberative environment. Within this environment, the prevalence, 
diversity, and purposes of a more expansive conception of persuasive legal argument may be better 
understood.  
The willingness of states to offer legal argument is predictable. If we assume that international law is 
important, that states exhibit a propensity to comply, then persuasion becomes a form of justificatory 
discourse. It aligns the state’s tendency to couple uses of force with legal reasoning.32 Ryan Goodman 
has termed this the politics of justification. This entails, “the political mobilization of support for 
27 George Brandis, “The Right of Self-Defense Against Imminent Armed Attack in International Law” (25 May 2017) 
(blog), online: EJIL: Talk! <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-right-of-self-defence-against-imminent-armed-attack-in-
international-law/> [Brandis The Right to Self-Defense]. 
28 Yotam Feldman & Uri Blau, “Consent and Advise” Haaretz, 29 January 2009, online: <http://www.haaretz.com/con 
sent-and-advise-1.269127> [Feldman & Blau Consent and Advise].  
29 See generally, Michael P. Scharf, “How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law,” (2016) 48 Case West Reserve 
J. Int’l L. 1 [Scharf The War Against ISIS]. See also, Victor Kattan, “Furthering the ‘war on terrorism’ through international 
law: how the United States and the United Kingdom resurrected the Bush doctrine on using preventive military force to 
combat terrorism,” (2018) 5 J. on the Use of Force & Int’l L. 97 [Kattan Furthering the War on Terrorism]. 
30 Daniel Bethlehem, “Principles of Self-Defense – A Brief Response,” (2003) 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 579 at 581.  
31 See generally, David Luban, “Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law,” (2013) 26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 315.  
32 Ibid, at 47. See also, Oscar Schachter, “In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force,” (1986) 53 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 113 at 117-120.  
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escalating hostilities.”33 Often, this process is internalized. The state’s justificatory discourse targets 
domestic audiences. International norms are cited and governments employ legal vocabularies to 
establish policy preferences, explain undertaken initiatives, and justify institutional changes.34 
Of course, this process of justification goes beyond the domestic sphere. It occurs within international 
institutions, amongst allies, and in response to adversaries.35 Here, as Chayes and Chayes demonstrate, 
questionable actions are explained and justified by foreign ministries which rationalize state behaviour 
through diplomatic exchanges. It is, “almost always an adequate explanation for an action, at least 
prima facie, that it follows the legal rule. It is almost always a good argument for an action that it 
conforms to the applicable legal norms, and against, that it departs from them.”36 However, the 
discursive process, described by Chayes and Chayes, is primarily understood as a tool to influence 
state behaviour and, “as a principle method of inducing compliance.”37 
This underappreciates persuasion’s prevalence. For a variety of purposes and through a diversity of 
forms, legal argument extends beyond efforts to compel or demonstrate state compliance. Its uses are 
greater and more sophisticated then the justificatory tones habitually offered by states upon the use 
of force. When George Brandis called upon states to “explain and defend” their legal positions, the 
Attorney General clarified that this ensures that “states maintain control over the development of 
international law.”38 Though state appeals to persuasion vary, exhibiting numerous motives, I identify 
three reasons why states persuade – to supplement a lie; to posit a preferred interpretation of law; or 
to legitimize a situation or establish policy involving the use of force. These are non-exhaustive, may 
be subjectively distinguished, often overlap, and only constitute broad categorizations. Commonly, 
the first two categorizations lead to the third. A state will lie. It will interpret the law. Or, it will do 
both to reach a determination that a particular situation is legitimate. Persuasive interactions may be 
more limited, singularly focuses on an episodic event, negotiation, or interpretative moment. Through 
confluence or as independent legal interactions each of the identified reasonings demonstrate how a 
state – in defense or in furtherance of a legal position or policy that is broadly held to be legally 
impermissible – employs persuasion and legal argument in ways that extend beyond a compliance-
violation binary.  
A. To Substantiate a Lie: 
On 31 August 1939, Heinrich Himmler initiated a series of events that began the Second World War. 
Under Himmler’s direction, members of the German SS and SD undertook a false flag operation. 
Donning Polish military uniforms, they attacked German radio stations, railways, and custom posts. 
Reinhard Heydrich, then head of the SD, instructed his operatives to manufacture evidence of the 
attacks, “for the foreign press as well as for German propaganda purposes.”39 Prisoners from a 
concentration camp were dressed in Polish apparel, killed, and left at the site of the raids. A radio 
33 Ryan Goodman, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Pretexts for War,” (2006) 100 Am. J. Int’l. L. 107 at 116.  
34 See, Andrew P. Cortell & James W. Davis, Jr., “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research 
Agenda,” (2002) 2 Int. Stud. Rev. 65 at 70.  
35 Peevers Politics of Justifying Force, supra note 25 at 47.  
36 Chayes & Chayes The New Sovereignty, supra note 18 at 118-119.  
37 Ibid, at 25-26.  
38 Brandis The Right to Self-Defense, supra note 28.  
39 Lord Russell, The Scourge of the Swastika: A History of Nazi war Crimes During World War II (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 
2008) at 11-12.  
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station in Gleiwitz was overtaken. A Polish-speaking SD officer broadcast a call to arms, announcing 
that the time for conflict had arrived and that the Polish, “should unite and strike down any German 
from whom they met resistance.”40 The following day Adolf Hitler commenced the invasion of 
Poland, citing the fiction of Polish aggression and the previous night’s events in justification of a 
“defensive” German response.41  
Political leaders appear more willing to mislead domestic constituencies then they are international 
audiences.42 Within international affairs, Ian Johnstone explains that “purely self-serving arguments, 
or those seen as arbitrary or beside the point, are simply not persuasive. For that reason, they are rarely 
heard when public policy choices are being debated.”43 Although true in most deliberative scenarios, 
distinguishable examples exist. States – in neglect of even a semblance of good-faith – may present 
legal arguments that are posited on a demonstrable falsehood. Such instances recall Hans 
Morgenthau’s sceptical assertion that states can always offer a legal argument to justify their policies.44  
These legal appeals constitute disingenuous misuses of law. However, they need not be understood 
singularly. A state, willing to violate international law, that feels compelled to offer a legal argument, 
reveals a broader purpose of persuasion. Legal argument allows the violating state to supplement a lie 
with legal language and attempt to persuade a particular audience that the state’s actions are not as 
they seem or meet some standard of permissibility. A liberal state may lie to justify or dismiss 
behaviour that contradicts the values that they otherwise espouse.45 The British insistence that the 
bombing of Dresden targeted military installations – and the subsequent American claim that the 
operation constituted a strategic necessity – are irreconcilable with accounts of the civilian sites that 
were directly targeted during the campaign.46 
A state, outwardly committed to liberal values but that seeks an alliance or military partnership with 
an illiberal nation or group, may present a similar lie. The state will employ international legal rhetoric 
to excuse the illiberal behaviour of the strategic partner.47 The United States has maintained numerous 
advantageous relationships with such regimes. From its efforts to portray Stalin’s Soviet Union as an 
aspiring democracy to its more recent interest-driven affiliation with Aliyev’s Azerbaijan, the United 
States has coupled a legal vernacular with misleading claims regarding the domestic reality of certain 
strategic partners.48 
40 Ibid, at 12.  
41 See, Adolph Hitler, “Address to the Reichstag” (delivered at the Reichstag Building, Berlin, 1 September 1939).  
42 John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011) at 6 [Mearsheimer Why Leaders Lie].  
43 Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
at 5 [Johnstone The Power of Deliberation].  
44 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1978) at 282.  
45 Mearsheimer Why Leaders Lie, supra note 42 at 77-79.  
46 See generally, Alexander McKee, Dresden, 1945: The Devil’s Tinderbox (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1982). See also, Dominic 
Selwood, “Dresden was a civilian town with no military significance. Why did we burn its people?”, The Telegraph (13 
February 2015) online: < https://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-two/11410633/Dresden-was-a-civilian-town-
with-no-military-significance.-Why-did-we-burn-its-people.html>.  
47 Mearsheimer Why Leaders Lie, supra note 42 at 78-79. 
48 Ibid, at 78-79. See also, Samuel Ramani, “Three reason the U.S. won’t break with Azerbaijan over its violations of human 
rights and democratic freedoms”, Washington Post (20 January 2016) online: <https://www.washington 
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/20/3-reasons-the-u-s-wont-break-with-azerbaijan-over-its-violations-of-
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Actors may lie to dismiss a legal accusation. Following the April 2017 sarin-gas attack in Khan 
Sheikhoun, President Bashar al-Assad denied the use of, or intent to deploy, chemical weapons.49 
Russia furthered this narrative. Supplementing the Syrian denial with legal argument, Russian officials 
contended that the airstrike featured conventional weapons. Syrian warplanes, Russia claimed, directed 
the strike against legitimate military targets and thus acted consistently with legal requirements.50  
These invocations of international legal argument are often dismissed as abuses of law. Whether they 
wish to shift the discourse from a controversial event to an abstract legal discussion, illustrate a 
commitment to normative values, or simply provide the most expedient option, states may invoke 
legal argument to supplement a lie. These uses of legal argument are often aimed at a limited audience. 
They are intended to substantiate assertions of compliance. More commonly, however, persuasive 
legal argument is employed to influence conceptions of compliance. It is employed to preference a 
particular interpretation of law, to determine what precisely compliance entails.  
B. To Posit a Preferred Interpretation of Law: 
The Israel Defense Forces launched Operation Cast Lead in December 2008. Israel insisted that the 
22-day military offensive was designed to eliminate Hamas’ rocket-launching capacity and 
infrastructure.51 Officials immediately offered legal justification.52 Within Gaza, growing death tolls 
and mounting hardship caused many within the international community to amend their response to 
the hostilities. Initial calls for restraint and affirmations of Israel’s right to self-defense were replaced 
by condemnation of IDF actions.53 An international law-based discourse emerged in concurrence. The 
Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority (PA) presented an array of factual and legal 
assertions. Beyond common assurances of compliance, persuasive appeals were offered to support 
novel, often unsound, interpretative claims. Daniel Reisner, the former head of the ILD, described 
how military lawyers were tasked with forwarding such legal appeals: “we defended policy that is on 
the edge: the “neighbor procedure” [making a neighbor knock on the door of a potentially dangerous 
house], house demolitions, deportations, targeted assassination...”54 The PA acknowledged that 
launching rockets at civilian populations violated international law. It, however, excused Hamas’ 
human-rights-and-democratic-freedoms/?utm_term=.32517b2ee3 b9>. See generally, Ernest R. May & Phillip D. 
Zelikow, eds, Dealing with Dictators: Dilemmas of U.S. and Intelligence Analysis, 1945-1990 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).  
49 Laura Smith-Spark, “Assad claims Syria chemical attack was a ‘fabrication’, in face of evidence”, CNN (13 April 2017) 
online: <https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/13/middleeast/syria-bashar-assad-interview/index. html>. 
50 See, Robert Lawless, “A State of Complicity: How Russia’s Persistent and Public Denial of Syrian Battlefield Atrocities 
Violates International Law” (2018) 9 Harv. Nat. Sec. J. 180 at 187-188.  
51 The State of Israel, The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects, July 2009, at para. 
16 [The Operation in Gaza 2009].  
52 See, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Operation Cast Lead – Israel Defends its Citizens, 27 December 2008, online: < 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/GazaFacts/Pages/Operation-Cast-Lead-Israel-Defends-its-Citizens. 
aspx>. See also, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Background Paper, Responding to Hamas Attacks from Gaza – Issues of 
Proportionality, December 2008, online:  <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA_Graphics/MFA%20Gallery/Documents/Responding 
_to_Hamas_Attacks_from_Gaza_december_2008.pdf>. 
53 See, Joel Peters, “Gaza”, in Joel Peters and David Newman, eds, The Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
(New York: Routledge, 2013) 196 at 203.  See also, Colin Shindler, A History of Modern Israel, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) at 379-380. 
54 Feldman & Blau Consent and Advise, supra note 28.  
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actions. They were not, the PA claimed, violations of the principle of distinction because the Gazan 
militants only possessed crude weaponry and were unable to control the projectiles.55  
States appeal to international legal argument to posit interpretative claims. Claims may follow a 
particular action that exists within a legal grey-area or that formally requires a legal response. This 
recalls Rebecca Ingber’s notion of an “interpretation catalyst.”56 An interpretative assertion may be in 
response to a legal accusation. It may follow a clear violation. The state does not deny the factual 
context within which the interpretative claim arises. Instead, it suggests that the law is unclear or that 
it differs from that which is broadly assumed.  
Interpretation is traditionally understood as a technique to discern meaning from legal texts.57 More 
broadly, however, it constitutes a “persuasive phenomenon.”58 The interpreter’s motives will range. 
They may simply wish to extract certainty from an imprecise legal formulation. This allows the state 
to operate in accordance with legal dictate or predict the intentions of other actors whose behaviour 
will be similarly influenced by the “correct” meaning of the legal text. Alternatively, as Martti 
Koskenniemi suggests, the interpreting state may wish to impose a subjective political position onto a 
broader policy or legal debate. Interpretation, Koskenniemi concludes, is not a method to discover 
meaning but instead a means to create it.59 
Interpretation becomes a game. The objective, “is to persuade one’s audience that [a particular] 
interpretation of the law is the correct one.”60 The form of the interpretative appeal is determined by 
the intended audience. An interpretative claim presented to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
will likely be grounded in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.61 A broad assertion that a 
military action conforms with IHL may exhibit fewer rigid invocations of legal principles. Thus, uses 
of persuasion to interpret the law vary from official formulations of textual meaning to casual legal 
avowals.  
The present focus is less concerned with the formal interpretative process. Instead, the invocations of 
persuasion, described throughout, emphasize legal argument’s demotic appeal. Iain Scobbie explains 
that in domestic and international law alike, persuasive and interpretative arguments exist “in activities 
55 General Assembly, 64th Session, Second follow-up to the report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict: 
Report of the Secretary General, 11 August 2010, UN Doc. A/64/890 at paras. 19, 65, 69 in Annex II.   
56 Rebecca Ingber, “Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking,” (2013) 38 Yale J. Int’l L. 359.  
57 This is prescribed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and offers such concepts as good-faith, ordinary 
meaning, context, object, and, purpose. See, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 at Art. 
31. See also, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor, “Playing the Game of Interpretation: On Meaning and Metaphor in 
International Law” in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor, eds, Interpretation in International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015) 3 at 3.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid, at 12-13. See also, Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 18, 531.  
60 Andrea Bianchi, “The Game of Interpretation in International Law: The Players, the Cards, and Why the Game is Worth 
the Candle” in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor, eds, Interpretation in International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015) 34 at 36 [Bianchi The Game of Interpretation].  
61 Ibid, at 44.  
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such as advising clients, engaging in negotiations, research and the construction of academic 
arguments, or the presentation of a proposed text or its interpretation to non-judicial bodies.”62  
Less-formal interpretative appeals to international law are constant features of the broader 
deliberations that accompany the use of force. States employ such rhetoric for a variety of reasons. 
The state may offer an interpretative legal appeal to illustrate that a particular action conforms with 
international law. When, on 14 May 2018, IDF snipers killed over sixty Gazan protesters – participants 
in mass demonstrations near the border fence – the international community demanded answers.63 In 
response to a joint petition by a group of Israeli NGOs, the Government offered an inventive legal 
appeal.64 The mass protests were defined as part of an armed conflict between Israel and Hamas.65 
Israel claimed that a law enforcement paradigm, inspired by human rights law but applied under IHL, 
governed the applicable use of force. The protestors, constituting a mass of individuals, had become 
collectively active in hostilities. In response, the IDF’s use of live fire was deemed proportionate.66   
Such invocations of legal argument occur in response to a particular event. Similar interpretative appeals 
may also be presented to validate a general policy objective. Often, the policy has been received 
skeptically, as a violation of international law. The state, however, wishes to implement or justify the 
policy and engages in interpretative appeals to persuade a broader audience of the policy’s legality. In 
2010, the Obama Administration detailed its legal support for the use of drones to aid in the United 
States’ global response to terrorism. The legality of using weaponised drones for targeted killing was 
increasingly questioned.67 Harold Koh, then the Legal Adviser to the State Department, addressed the 
American Society of International Law’s Annual Meeting. Koh detailed the Administration’s claim. 
The US drone policy was limited to military targets. Koh assured that civilian casualties were 
proportionate to the military advantage gained. The general policy was thus a legitimate act of self-
defense and consistent with IHL.68 
By interpreting international law to either exhibit compliance or validate a controversial policy, the 
state relies on persuasive legal appeals. These arguments identify an international legal question and 
62 Iain Scobbie, “Rhetoric, Persuasion, and Interpretation in International Law” in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew 
Windsor, eds, Interpretation in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 61 at 74 [Scobbie Rhetoric 
Persuasion and Interpretation].  
63 UN Human Rights Council, 28th Special Session, Violations of international law in the context of large-scale civilian protests in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 18 May 2018, UN Doc. A/HRSC/S-28/L.I. See also, Amir Tibon, “U.S. 
Blocks Security Council Statement Calling for Investigation Into Gaza Violence”, Haaretz (15 May 2018) online: < 
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65 This was said to be because the weekly protests displayed high levels of violence and furthered Hamas’ operational 
interests. See, Eliav Lieblich, “Collectivizing Threat: An Analysis of Israel’s Legal Claims for Resort to Force on the Gaza 
Border” Just Security (16 May 2018) online: <https://www.justsecurity.org/56346/collectivizing-threat-analysis-israels-
legal-claims-resort-force-gaza-border/>. 
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interpret a particular point of law. An established doctrine or treaty provision is read in accordance 
with the desired outcome. Beyond appeals to specific interpretative questions, states will also invoke 
international law broadly. These legal appeals may be independent acts or the end-product of a legal 
contention premised upon a lie or a counterintuitive interpretation. Similar to the interpretative 
arguments addressed here, the state employs international legal rhetoric and reasoning to persuade 
various audiences that a military action or particular use of force is legal and thus legitimate.  
C. To Legitimize a General Situation or to Advance a Particular Policy: 
During the 2002 State of the Union, President George W. Bush began building the case for war against 
Iraq. Hostile against the United States, the Iraqi regime was portrayed as a security threat. It was a 
source of regional and international instability. Saddam Hussein, the President explained, had 
committed egregious human rights violations and had expelled weapons inspectors. Indifference, in 
response to this mounting threat, would be catastrophic.69 In the wake of the 11 September attacks, 
appeals to security – links to terrorism – carried significant currency.70 In the United Kingdom, 
however, British participation in a US led coalition was framed as a “war of choice.” Policymakers 
accepted this. They sought to, “persuade public opinion that that choice was necessary to ensure 
freedom and security.”71 
Throughout Whitehall, within the FCO, and across British society, questions of the pending war’s 
legality assumed prominence. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Labour Government employed legal reason 
in justification of the use of force against Iraq. Following much internal debate – and staunch 
opposition from the FCO’s own lawyers – military action was initially premised on United Nations 
involvement.72 A weapons inspection regime would be re-imposed through the UN. When the Iraqis 
rejected or violated the initiative, the British could build a legal case justifying the use of force.73 
Internal deliberations adhered to traditional legal structures.74 Doctrines and texts were interpreted 
and debated. Lex lata declarations were advanced alongside lex ferenda assertions.  
States employ legal argument to exhibit legitimacy. Diplomats, military commanders, and elected 
officials all invoke legal vernacular as a persuasive and strategic asset.75 Such legal arguments share 
much with the tendency of states to offer interpretative claims. However, where the aforementioned 
category comprises inventive assertions of specific legal meaning, the current designation captures a 
less intricate, redolent use of law. Of course, there is much overlap between these categorizations. 
Disparate arguments may be simultaneously employed. Either collectively or exclusively, a state may 
use either or both forms of legal argument to persuade diverse audiences.  
69 George W. Bush, “The President’s State of the Union Address” (The United State Capitol, Washington, D.C., 29 January 
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70 Peevers Politics of Justifying Force, supra note 25 at 134-135. See also, Herbert W. Simons, “Rhetoric’s Role in Context, 
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71 Peevers Politics of Justifying Force, supra note 25 at 134.  
72 For an example of such internal dissent, see, The UK Iraq Inquiry, Statement by Sir Michael Wood to the Iraq Inquiry 
(15 January 2010), online: <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160512094556/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk 
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73 Peevers Politics of Justifying Force, supra note 25 at 142.  
74 Ibid, at 143-152. 
75 See, David Kennedy, Of Law and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 8, 41.  
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Understood independently, this final purpose of persuasion occurs when states attempt to legitimize 
a general situation or policy through ill-defined legal (or legal-sounding) language. Such appeals are 
reminiscent of what Naz Modirzadeh has termed folk international law: “a law-like discourse that 
relies on a confusing and soft admixture of IHL, jus ad bellum, and [international human rights law] 
(IHRL).”76 The use of such legal vernacular to exhibit legitimacy can be present for a variety of reasons. 
It may offer a persuasive argument that insists a military action is justifiable. It may facilitate a sui generis 
legal claim. This legitimizes a particular situation but denies the extension of broader meaning or 
precedential value. The use of general legal argument also enables the establishment of emergent 
norms through novel legal claims. The development of and appeals to humanitarian intervention 
illuminates each invocation of this form of persuasive legal argument.  
The NATO military campaign in Yugoslavia began in 1999 and lasted for 78 days. It was justified in 
response to Serbian policies in Kosovo where Slobodan Milosevic was leading efforts to ethnically 
cleanse the Albanian majority. The North Atlantic Council defended its decision to use force with 
reference to the “massive humanitarian catastrophe” that resulted from an unrestrained assault by 
Yugoslav forces against Kosovo’s civilian population.77 NATO members consistently cited 
humanitarian considerations. Explaining the collective use of force, the aversion of an atrocity 
provided legal and moral justification.78 Canada’s Ambassador to the United Nations asserted that, 
“humanitarian considerations underpin our action.”79 Similarly, the Dutch noted that military action 
found legal basis in prevention of the pending humanitarian crisis.80 However, as Nicholas Wheeler 
notes, these actors did not specify the nature of this legal basis. They did not provide legal reasoning 
beyond generalized avowals of humanitarian interests.  
The British Government offered further uses of legal language to persuade that the use of force was 
justifiable. Initially, Prime Minister Blair framed military action as a “battle for humanity.” Accordingly, 
it is, “a just cause, it is a rightful cause.”81 The British Secretary of Defense would later expand, noting 
that, “our legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme 
circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe…The use of force in such circumstances can be 
justified as an exceptional measure in support of purposes laid down by the Security Council, but 
without the Council’s express authorization, when that is the only means to avert an immediate and 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”82  
This directly implied that international law permitted a humanitarian basis for the use of force – a 
proposition that, devoid of Security Council authorization, is uncertain.83 While this exhibits the 
tendency of states to make persuasive assertions of legitimacy through non-specific legal claims, the 
76 Naz K. Modirzadeh, “Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transformation of the Law of Armed Conflict 
to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance,” (2014) 5 Harv. Nat. Sec. J. 225 at 229.  
77 NATO, The Situation in and around Kosovo, 12 April 1999 (Press Release N-NAC-1(99) 51) online: <https://www. 
nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-051e.htm>. See also, Scharf The War Against ISIS, supra note 29 at 42. 
78 See, Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Reflections on the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo,” (2000) 4 Int’l 
J. Hum. Rts. 145 at 153.  
79 Ibid. See also, UNSCOR, 54th Year, 3988th Mtg, UN Doc. S/PV.3988.  
80 Ibid. See also, Scharf The War Against ISIS, supra note 29 at 43.  
81 Ibid, at 42-43.  
82 Ibid, at 43. See also, UK HC, Parliamentary Debates, vol 328, col 616-617 (25 March 1999) (Secretary of Defense George 
Robertson).  
83 See generally, Harold Hongju Koh, “The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention,” (2016) 53 Hous. L. Rev. 971.  
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United Kingdom and the United States would subsequently amend their argumentative focus. States 
recognize that their legal arguments contribute to the formation of international law.84 When justifying 
the Nixon Administration’s use of force against the North Vietnamese in Cambodia, Legal Adviser 
John Stevenson argued that, “it is important for the Government of the United States to explain the 
legal basis for its actions, not merely to pay proper respect to the law, but also because the precedent 
created by the use of armed forces in Cambodia by the United States can be affected significantly by 
our legal rationale.”85 
In Kosovo, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was reluctant to provide precedential support for 
unrestricted humanitarian intervention.86 Wishing to maintain claims that NATO action was 
legitimate, Albright argued that the military campaign was, “a unique situation sui generis in the region 
of the Balkans.”87 Prime Minister Blair reversed assertions regarding humanitarian intervention’s 
normative potential. Instead, the Prime Minister argued that the Kosovo operation was exceptional.88 
NATO members made an explicit distinction. They differentiated between specific legal arguments 
(that would carry legal weight and give precedential value) and a general claim that employed legal 
language to imply that the particular event was legitimate but of no greater legal significance.89 Michael 
Matheson, the State Department’s Legal Adviser, would later note that, “we listed all the reasons why 
we were taking action and, in the end, mumbled something about it being justifiable and legitimate 
but not a precedent. So in a sense, it was something less than a definitive legal rationale – although it 
probably was taken by large parts of the public community as something like that.”90  
Finally, a state that wishes to legitimize a general policy – and that may seek to foster the development 
of an underlying norm – may also appeal to non-specific legal language. When the United Kingdom 
had initially argued in favour of a norm permitting the unilateral use of force in response to 
humanitarian crisis, they offered general legal affirmations. Michael Scharf explains that how, “a 
custom pioneer describes a new rule of customary international law can greatly impact its international 
acceptance.”91 When a Canadian-led initiative answered Kofi Annan’s call to reconcile the traditional 
conception of sovereignty with collective efforts to prevent atrocity crimes, the resulting responsibility 
to protect (R2P) doctrine employed legal language to persuade. Borrowing from the jus ad bellum and 
just war theory, R2P would only justify military action that was based upon “right authority, just cause, 
right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.”92 
The persuasive use of legal language by states may further good-faith efforts to progressively advance 
a policy or develop the law. They may constitute manipulative attempts to secure state interests. 
84 See generally, Harold Hongju Koh, “The Legal Adviser’s Duty to Explain,” (2016) 41 Yale J. Int’l L. 189 [Koh The 
Legal Adviser’s Duty].  
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87 See, U.S. Department of State, Press Conference, “Press Conference with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov” (26 
July 1999) online: <https://perma.cc/EGX5-GGEF>. 
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1999) (Prime Minister Tony Blair).  
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Regardless of motivation, persuasion is employed and international legal argument is ubiquitous. The 
motivation that accompanies these persuasive appeals may appear obvious. In many instances they 
will be subjective. In 2013, when the Al-Assad regime launched a chemical weapons attack in eastern 
Damascus, the United Kingdom invoked the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.93 The UK 
provided a general legal argument to justify the use of force without Security Council authorization. 
This required evidence of significant humanitarian distress; the absence of alternative methods; and 
the necessary, proportionate, and limited use of force.”94 This may be received as an attempt to provide 
a legal basis to achieve a necessary humanitarian objective. Russia’s invocation of humanitarian 
intervention and R2P in 2008 assumed a similar argumentative structure. Yet, this justification of 
Russia’s incursion into South Ossetia and Abkhazia was largely perceived as buttressing an increasingly 
aggressive foreign policy.95 Often, the intention of the legal arguments forwarded by states, the extent 
to which persuasion is offered and received in demonstration of legality and legitimacy, is directed by 
the particular audience addressed by the state.  
III. WHOM DO STATES PERSUADE? 
Chaim Perelman explains that every argumentation is addressed to an audience. The audience may be 
large or small; competent or less competent.96 Always, according to Perelman, it consists of “the 
ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence...”97 States, upon the use of force, direct 
persuasive argument towards a variety of audiences. The form and purpose of the argument corelates 
with the target of persuasion. The state may wish to persuade both domestic and international 
audiences. They may seek to convince the Security Council that a particular military action is legitimate. 
Or, they may hope to assure an interpretative community that a certain tactic, policy, or choice of 
weaponry is permissible. Persuasion’s boundaries are broad and its intended audience varies. Most 
often, though, the use of legal argument targets a definable group.  
Upon or in advance of the use of force, domestic constituencies become a target of persuasion. Legal 
argument is employed when a state wishes to advance a military policy. It is offered if the use of force 
is contingent upon the formal approval of a legislative body. As per Article One, Section Eight of the 
US Constitution, Congress possesses the power to declare war.98 Though the Executive often employs 
force without congressional approval, persuasive appeals regarding the legality of military action 
commonly feature when a President builds the case for war.99 These appeals also target broader society. 
A controversial military action, a war of choice, a foreign intervention will accrue significant costs. 
93 See, United Kingdom, Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime – UK Government Legal Position (29 August 2013) online: 
<http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2013/images/08/29/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-posit 
ion.pdf>. 
94 Ibid. See also, United Kingdom, Further supplementary written evidence from the Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Minister of State, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect (14 January 2014) online: 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Letter-from-UK-Foreign-Commonwealth-Office-to-the-
House-of-Commons-Foreign-Affairs-Committee-on-Humanitarian-Intervention-and-the-Responsibility-to-Protect.pdf> 
95 See generally, Vladimir Baranovsky & Anatoly Mateiko, “Responsibility to Protect: Russia’s Approaches” (2016) 51 The 
International Spectator 49.  
96 Chaim Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London: Routledge, 1963) at 100.  
97 Chaim Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1969) at 19.  
98 See, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8(11).  
99 See generally, David J. Barron, Waging War: The Clash Between Presidents and Congress 1776 to ISIS (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2016).  
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Lives will be lost and huge sums of money will be spent. Governments employ legal argument to 
persuade the public that a military action is necessary and legitimate.100 The action may be framed as 
a response to an immediate or existential threat. Devoid of an obvious defensive element, it may be 
presented as within the state’s broader interest. In both instances, the state speaks to domestic 
audiences through the language of international law. In 2015, following a series of attacks by members 
of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, the Indian Army conducted airstrikes inside Burma. 
Indian officials employed a legal vernacular to offer domestic justification. Rajyavardhan Singh 
Rathore, the Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, invoked the notions of necessity and 
“hot pursuit” to validate the counter-insurgency operation.101  
Often, however, when states employ a legal vernacular to profess legitimacy or assert the legality of a 
particular initiative, they engage in a two-level game.102 Arguments are advanced for both domestic 
and international purposes. Robert Putnam explains that within the domestic sphere, local groups and 
elected officials compete to advance interests through the mechanisms of government. Internationally, 
states “seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse 
consequences of foreign developments.”103 International legal arguments target either or both 
audiences. When Bashar al-Assad deployed chemical weapons in 2013, the Obama Administration 
considered responding through military action. The proposed use of force, however, experienced 
domestic and international resistance.104 In reply, the White House Counsel appealed to the 
international norm prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. They sought to influence both levels of 
opinion:  
 
“[t]he president believed that it was important to enhance the legitimacy of any action that 
would be taken by the executive ... to seek Congressional approval of that action and have 
it be seen, again as a matter of legitimacy both domestically and internationally, that there 
was a unified American response to the horrendous violation of the international norm 
against chemical weapons use.”105 
 
A state that attempts to persuade an international audience will target its arguments generally or 
specifically. Often, the audience’s composition corresponds with the form of argument offered by the 
persuading state. When officials address the international community and claim that the state’s actions, 
upon the use of force, adhere to international law they offer broad claims of legitimacy or legality. 
Persuasion is presented generally (i.e. towards the international community as a whole). Arguments 
that target general audiences may be formal. This will include official statements presented on behalf 
of the state, often through their foreign ministry or a diplomatic delegation to an international 
100 Michael J. Butler, Selling a ‘Just’ War: Framing, Legitimacy, and US Military Intervention (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2012) at 9.  
101 “Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore lauds army operation in Myanmar, says it is beginning”, The Economic Times (10 June 2015), 
online: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/rajyavardhan-singh-rathore-lauds-army-operation-in-
myanmar-says-it-is-beginning/articleshow/47606435.cms>. See also, Deepak Raju & Zubin Dash, “Balancing the 
language of international law and the language of domestic legitimacy – How well does India fare?” (2017) 57 Indian J. 
Int’l L. 63.  
102 See generally, Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” (1988) 42 
International Organization 427.  
103 Ibid, at 434.  
104 Koh The Legal Adviser’s Duty, supra note 84 at 204-206.  
105 Ibid. See also, Charlie Savage, “Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict”, New York Times (8 September 2013) 
online: < https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/world/middleeast/obama-tests-limits-of-power-in-syrian-conflict. 
html>. 
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organization. Informally, states will also attempt to persuade an array of additional actors. These will 
include social movements, media, and transnational civil society.106  
 
Specific audiences will be targeted through both broad and narrow legal arguments. Broad assertions 
– of legitimacy or legality – may be employed to influence the opinion of key allies. The persuading 
actor may target particular states with which they hope to form a military alliance or whose cooperation 
they desire to facilitate a military objective (e.g. to gain access to airspace).107 Broad arguments may be 
directed towards members of a regional organization or bloc that hold particular influence (e.g. a P5 
member of the Security Council). While the audience’s identities vary, these persuasive engagements 
present broad claims of legal compliance. They target specific audiences whose influence is sought. 
Pnina Sharvit Baruch, the former head of the IDF’s ILD contends:  
 
“it is important on a diplomatic level – to be able to give good answers to allies like the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Now it is also important, with the potential of 
[international] criminal investigations, to demonstrate the legitimacy of actions and also 
be able to give good answers. Beyond criminal proceedings, however, it is necessary to 
respond to international organizations, NGOs, and others who are critical of military 
actions.”108 
 
Specific audiences are also the target of intricate legal claims. These concern specific issues or 
interpretative contentions (e.g. the legal status of detainees within a non-international armed 
conflict).109 They look to influence common legal assumptions or seek to develop new legal 
understandings (e.g. who constitutes a direct participant in hostilities).110 These arguments are directed 
towards strategic audiences. Identified audiences may exist within international organizations. Treaty 
regimes become persuasive venues.111 A state that wishes to forward a legal position or defend a 
particular action – often one that challenges consensus or exceeds conceptions of permissibility – 
directs persuasive assertions at a particular audience. These audiences – which include other states, 
norm influencers, or regional and international organizations – overlap with the broad audiences 
targeted through general legal claims. Often, however, the persuading entity communicates directly 
with specific groups or communities that exist within the identified audience (e.g., members of the 
International Law Commission; foreign legal advisers, specific diplomats).  
 
Persuasion is likely to be most prevalent when directed towards small groups that share common 
identities.112  Interpretative or epistemic communities become the primary targets of narrow persuasive 
106 Johnstone The Power of Deliberation, supra note 43 at 43-44. 
107 In a 2016 address to the American Society of International Law, State Department Legal Advisor Brian Egan described 
the importance of illustrating international legal compliance for, inter alia, building and maintaining international coalitions. 
See, Brian Egan, “International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign: Some Observations” (110th 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, delivered in Washington, D.C., 1 April 2016) [Egan 
International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign].  
108 Interview with Colonel (Ret.) Adv. Pnina Sharvit Baruch, (Tel Aviv, 20 March 2017).  
109 See e.g., U.S. Department of State, Response of the United States of America to Inquiry of the UNCHR Special 
Rapporteurs Pertaining to Detainees at Guantanamo Bay (21 October 2005), online: <https://www.state.gov/documents 
/organization/87347.pdf>.  
110 See e.g., UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (1 July 2004) at §§ 2.5.2., 5.3.2., 5.3.3.  
111 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, “How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law,” (2004) 
54 Duke L.J. 621 at 665-666 [Goodman & Jinks How to Influence States]. 
112 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” (2001) 45 Int. Stud. Q. 487 at 509 
[Johnston Treating International Institutions].  
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arguments.113  These communities are “involved in the creation, implementation, and application of 
norms. Where both communities offer “knowledge and policy advice,” interpretative communities 
also present judgments regarding the meaning and actualization of norms. Ian Johnstone explains that 
“interpretative communities” describe the nature of interpretation and not the composition of 
interpreters. However, commonalities exist amongst the involved parties. When states direct 
international legal arguments towards interpretative communities, they first attempt to influence the 
individuals and entities “responsible for the creation and implementation of norms.”114 This includes 
those individuals, government agents, and organizational representatives that possess “expertise in 
international law and/or special knowledge in the relevant field.”115 Johnstone recalls that this will 
include, “political leaders, diplomats, government officials, international civil servants, scholars, and 
experts who participate in some way in the particular field of international law or practice.”116 Next, 
states that forward legal arguments will address a narrow network. This consists of governmental and 
inter-governmental representatives who “share a set of assumptions, expectations, and a body of 
consensual knowledge.”117 
 
The membership of these communities is informally defined and often overlapping. These states, 
organizations, individuals, groups, and professional networks become the targets of persuasion. 
Interpretative communities are the preferred focus of these persuasive efforts because they possess 
expertise and have the ability to influence or determine legal meaning. Collectively, members of the 
interpretative community – including the persuading state – partake in “a shared enterprise with 
broadly similar understandings of what they are doing and why they are doing it.”118 Legal arguments 
or interpretations that concern the use of force often appeal to “security communities.”119 Initially a 
description of an informal unity amongst states grouped by their willingness to ensure that differences 
between parties were solved without resort to force, the notion of security communities has 
developed.120 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett describe security communities as consisting of states 
that share common values and agree to formal cooperation.121 These may form through regional 
groupings, as with the Association of South East Asian Nations. They may actualize through an 
international organization like NATO or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
And they may result from bilateral relationships between certain states.122 Prominent security 
communities, both within and among states, will be more likely to accept arguments from partners 
with which they share a common identity. They will be open to explanations of behaviour and 
interpretations of law if they believe that they may face similar security challenges to the persuading 
entity; that they too may be required to use force in similar circumstances and for similar purposes.  
 
113 See Section IV generally, Shereshevsky Back in the Game, supra note 7.  
114 Johnstone The Power of Deliberation, supra note 43 at 41.  
115 Ibid, at 42.  
116 Ibid.  
117Ibid.  
118 Ibid.  
119 See, Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett, “Security communities in theoretical perspective” in Emanuel Adler & Michael 
Barnett, eds, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 3 at 3-4 [Adler and Barnett Security 
Communities].  
120 See, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical 
Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957) at 5. 
121 Adler and Barnett Security Communities, supra note 119 at 4.  
122 For example, see, Sean M. Shore, “No fences make good neighbors: the development of the US-Canada security 
community, 1871-1940” in Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett, eds, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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Former Bush Administration Legal Adviser John Bellinger addressed both general and specific 
audiences. Bellinger was motivated by the contemptuous reception that many of the Bush-era policies 
received throughout the international community. In response, the Legal Adviser engaged in a process 
of “international legal diplomacy.”123 This, Bellinger recounts, involved promoting the US 
commitment to international law.  As Legal Advisor, Bellinger would travel extensively to conduct an 
international legal dialogue. Interlocutors – allies, international organizations, individuals, and NGOs 
– were targeted. In multilateral forums, through bilateral meetings and speeches, across the pages of 
legal blogs, newspaper op-eds, and law review articles, Bellinger addressed these various audiences.124  
 
This process of legal diplomacy, however, offered more than rebuttals of the Bush Administration’s 
perceived hostility towards international law. Bellinger lobbied members of the international 
community to adopt particular legal constructions. Positions and policies were advanced and 
advocated. Amongst allies, Bellinger promoted an extensive reading of the jus ad bellum pertaining to 
the US-led war on terror.125 Legal arguments, the use of persuasion, were initially directed generally. 
At the regional level, Bellinger sought to convince European allies that the United States was in full 
compliance with international law. He proposed increased cooperation to determine the appropriate 
legal framework necessary to combat non-state armed groups.126 Victor Kattan traces the resulting 
legal diplomatic process. When a schism emerged regarding the classification of the ongoing conflict 
in Afghanistan, Bellinger pivoted to a specific target audience.127 This consisted of “a smaller but 
geographically more diverse group of countries who face serious terrorist threats and also engage in 
international military operations.”128 Legal arguments were directed towards security communities. 
These, Kattan explains, consisted of members of the defence, intelligence, and security establishments 
of “a smaller, more select, group of legal advisers from states that rely on US military aid and 
technology.”129 
 
Brian Egan, who would become Legal Adviser in 2016, continued the process of international legal 
diplomacy. At the American Society of International Law’s Annual Meeting, Egan explained that “legal 
diplomacy builds on common understandings of international law, while also seeking to bridge or 
manage the specific differences in any particular State’s international obligations or interpretations.”130 
Continuing, Egan acknowledged the necessity of persuasive legal engagements:  
 
“It is important that our actions be understood as lawful by others both at home and 
abroad in order to show respect for the rule of law and promote it more broadly, while 
also cultivating partnerships and building coalitions. Even if other governments or 
populations do not agree with our precise legal theories or conclusions, we must be able 
123 Ibid, at 135. See also, Kattan Furthering the War on Terrorism, supra note 29 at 115.  
124 Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of International Law and the State 
Department Legal Adviser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 137, 145 [Scharf & Williams Shaping Foreign 
Policy].  
125 See, Kattan Furthering the War on Terrorism, supra note 29 at 114-117. See also, Scharf & Williams Shaping Foreign 
Policy, supra note 124 at 135-146.  
126 See, Kattan Furthering the War on Terrorism, supra note 29 at 119-120.  
127 Ibid, at 122.  
128 John B. Bellinger III, “Remarks to the Rule of Law Symposium” (International Bar Association Meeting, delivered in 
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to demonstrate to others that our most consequential national security and foreign policy 
decisions are guided by a principled understanding and application of international law.”131 
 
The dynamic of a state, articulating the legality of its action, of positing preferred interpretations of 
international law, or of presenting policy through an international legal lens is familiar. The substantive 
process that accompanies such appeals is, however, underexplored. The question thus becomes, how 
do states persuade? 
 
IV. HOW DO STATES PERSUADE? 
In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, persuasion and speech exist:  
“to affect the giving of decisions – the hearers decide between one political speaker and 
another, and a legal verdict is a decision – the orator must not only try to make the 
argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own 
character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of 
mind.”132  
State conduct – behaviour evoking controversy, that which is interpreted as a violation, or which 
occurs within a grey-area – must be explained and justified.133 Yet, invocations of international legal 
argument are not often subject to formal adjudicative processes. In most instances, an independent 
decisionmaker does not evaluate contrasting assertions. Still, in the absence of an authoritative verdict, 
legal vernacular buttresses the justifications offered by states before or upon the use of force. The 
argumentative pattern employed by states reflects the Aristotelian form. Through a process of 
justificatory discourse, Ian Johnstone explains, “claims are made and criticized, actions approved and 
condemned, actors persuaded and dissuaded in an often cacophonous discursive interaction where 
legal norms loom large.”134 
Arguments are structured around these norms and a legalized discourse emerges. Assertions and 
exchanges, by and between states, employ the language of international law to convince and to justify. 
Chayes and Chayes note that the resulting “diplomatic conversation” constitutes an essential function 
of international relations.135 These efforts “make up the ordinary business of foreign ministries as they 
seek to generate support for policy positions or to elicit cooperative action.”136 Such observations, 
however, are commonly presented to explain state behaviour. The need to justify certain actions to 
both domestic and international audiences compels legal appeals and, through a process of 
internalization, induces compliance.137 
Persuasion is understood singularly. It constitutes a means to ensure desirable state behaviour. Martha 
Finnemore explains that being persuasive entails “grounding claims in existing norms in ways that 
emphasize normative congruence and coherence.”138 When normative claims are persuasive they 
131 Ibid, at 247.  
132 Aristotle, Rhetoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts (London; Aeterna Press, 2015) at Book II, Ch. 1 [Aristotle Rhetoric].  
133 Chayes & Chayes The New Sovereignty, supra note 18 at 118.  
134 Johnstone The Power of Deliberation, supra note 43 at 7.  
135 Chayes & Chayes The New Sovereignty, supra note 18 at 119.  
136 Ibid.  
137 Ibid, at 118. 
138 Marta Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) at 141.  
205
become a powerful means of influencing state behaviour.139 The persuasive process is understood to 
result in the internalization of new norms. This affects the behaviour of states – the targets of 
persuasion – by redefining their interests and identities.140 For Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “the 
touchstone of this approach is that actors are consciously convinced of the truth, validity, or 
appropriateness of a norm, belief, or practice.”141 The actor “changes its mind” and state behaviour is 
altered.  
Beyond dismissive realist accounts, the discursive process is widely assumed. However, the substance 
of this process – the function of legal argumentation and persuasion – remains underexplored.142 
Steven Ratner explains that even the dynamic theories, those that emphasize the role of persuasion, 
do not “amply address the invocation of legal norms during the conversation about compliance.”143 
Offerings that provide accounts of the microprocesses of persuasive legal engagements focus on how 
law can affect state behaviour and ensure compliance.144 I wish to complement these considerations 
by understanding how the non-compliant state – so commonly the target of persuasion – invokes legal 
argument within this discursive process. The state will become not merely the subject of persuasion 
but an actor whose diplomatic appeals and communicative actions are laced with legal justification. 
Compliance is not the only end sought by persuasive legal appeals. To lie, to interpret, and to 
legitimize, states employ legal argument.  They too become persuading entities. The framework that I 
identify and suggest captures how the non-compliant state employs legal argument upon the use of 
force proposes five phases of persuasive engagement: (i) identification of a common lifeworld; (ii) 
establishing the state as a general norm-acceptor; (iii) demonstrating the authority to interpret; (iv) 
instilling the standard of the acceptable legal argument; and (v) drawing upon precedent and 
commonality. These phases will be considered in turn.  
A. The Identification of a Common Lifeworld 
In Rhetoric, the concept of topoi denotes shared ideas.145 These common ideas exist amongst the 
proponents, the opponents, and the audiences that present and evaluate argument. The persuasiveness 
of a particular argument has since been understood as contingent upon the ability of the speaker to 
successfully appeal to these shared ideas.146 The common ideas and beliefs that are held amongst states 
139 Ibid. 
140 Goodman & Jinks How to Influence States, supra note 111 at 635. See also, Johnston Treating International Institutions, 
supra note 112 at 488.  
141 Goodman & Jinks How to Influence States, supra note 111 at 635.  
142 Ratner Persuading to Comply, supra note 9 at 568. 
143 Ibid, at 572.  
144 Steven Ratner explains that to “attempt a successful outcome regarding compliance, the persuading entity must base 
the contours of its communication strategy on four factors: the nature of the dispute; the nature of the parties, the nature of 
the persuasive setting, and the nature (as well as its sense) of its own identity. See, Ibid, at 575. Elsewhere Ratner notes that the 
persuading entity’s deployment of legal norms requires choice regarding four core elements of legal argumentation – the 
publicity of legal argumentation; the density of legal argumentation; the directness of legal argumentation; and the tone of 
legal argumentation. See, Steven R. Ratner, “Law Promotion Beyond Law Talk: The Red Cross, Persuasion, and the Laws 
of War,” (2011) 22 Eur. J. Int’l L. 459 at 492. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks wish to understand the microprocess of 
persuasion as a means to understand how norms influence actors. They accentuate two techniques – framing and cuing – 
to determine the “persuasiveness of counterattitudinal messages.” See, Goodman & Jinks How to Influence States, supra 
note 111 at 636-637.  
145 Aristotle Rhetoric, supra note 132 at Book I, Ch.2.  
146 Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) at 201.  
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and referenced during legal argumentation are often obvious. A familiar language of shared norms – 
opposition to aggression; a commitment to rights; the sanctity of humanitarianism – structures 
persuasive engagements. Universally endorsed values become stock phrases of international legal 
argument. Yet states do more than appeal to a recurrent vocabulary of values and beliefs. The non-
compliant state that undertakes persuasive endeavours often begins by identifying a common premise. 
This will be shared amongst interlocutors. It provides the context against which the state’s legal 
assertions will be presented and received.  
Jürgen Habermas contends that society may be conceived “as the lifeworld of the members of a social 
group.”147 The lifeworld complements communicative action and is understood as “the context-
forming background of processes of reaching understanding.”148 Thomas Risse, who applies 
Habermasian communicative theory to international relations, describes the argumentative process 
undertaken by states. Effective communication, Risse contends, requires that actors “share a common 
lifeworld.”149 The common lifeworld “consists of shared culture, a common system of norms and 
rules perceived as legitimate, and the social identity of actors being capable of communicating and 
acting.”150 By appealing to the common lifeworld, states access “a repertoire of collective 
understandings to which they can refer when making truth claims.”151 Though international law 
provides a prosaic vocabulary, allowing states to articulate common norms and appeal to shared 
standards, the advancement of non-conventional or non-adherent legal argument often begins 
through the re-establishment of a non-legal, empathetic context.  
The notion of the lifeworld, as applied here, departs significantly from Habermas’ usage. As Risse 
acknowledges, an anarchic conception of international relations is antithetical to a shared lifeworld.152 
As initially conceived, the lifeworld is “holistically structured and unavailable (in its entirety) to 
conscious reflective control.”153 Within these pages, however, the lifeworld is used to capture the 
identified commonalities, the shared understandings, truisms, and uncontroversial assumptions that 
undergird many persuasive interactions. Where Risse and Harald Müller contend that the lifeworld 
may be constructed as a means to build trust and authenticate exchanges, I employ the term to describe 
a prerequisite communicative phase that identifies and accentuates shared understandings.154   
The preliminary identification of a shared and relatable context, that tells of more than legal rules, 
precedes substantive legal contentions. The presumption that the state’s actions or policy – upon or 
following the use of force – violates international law, distances the state from the common (legal) 
norms described by Risse. A state that applies force, in a seemingly offensive fashion, may not 
plausibly appeal to the familiar language of non-aggression and Article 2(4). A state whose military is 
accused of systematically violating the principle of distinction can not credibly describe their 
147 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, Vol.2, translated 
by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987) at 204. 
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151 Ibid, at 10-11.  
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commitment to the protection of persons not partaking in hostilities. Instead, a state favouring a broad 
or inventive interpretation of international law, that has perhaps proposed using force in a manner 
deemed inconsistent with legal standards, accentuates non-legal experience. The non-compliant state 
identifies a relatable framework within which its actions are contextualized and shared amongst the 
target audiences that the state wishes to persuade.  
Effective persuasion builds upon “propositions or premises [with] which the audience already 
agrees.”155 Legal assertions that, for example, support the use of force against non-state actors establish 
a narrative concerning the global threat posed by terrorism and the susceptibility of states to an 
emergent danger that exceeds legal categorization and defies conventional defensive responses. They 
do not begin by supporting the resulting military action through a strict reading of the jus ad bellum. 
Such narratives, however, are not forwarded within an ideational vacuum.156 The further a legal 
interpretation stretches conventional understandings or the extent to which a military policy appears 
contrary to legal dictate positions the persuasive claim in opposition to well-established legal norms. 
The premise developed by the non-compliant state “must compete with other norms and perceptions 
of interest.”157  
Constructivist scholars emphasize the usefulness of framing. Normative advancement is centred upon 
the ability of actors to “reinterpret” or “rename” a particular issue in a compelling way. Constructivists 
associate this process with norm entrepreneurs. The construction of cognitive frames is identified as 
an essential component of norm development. The norm entrepreneur is successful when “the new 
frames resonate with broader public understandings and are adapted as new ways of talking about and 
understanding issues.”158 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks insist that framing is the “first and most 
important technique of persuasion.”159  
As with broader conceptions of persuasion, framing is presented as a means to influence state 
behaviour. It is a method to achieve compliance, to gain endorsement of an emergent norm, or to 
coax the state to embrace or repudiate a particular policy. Identification of a common lifeworld, while 
similarly focused on accentuating a relatable premise, allows for broader development. It becomes a 
technique employed by a non-compliant state. When states develop legal arguments upon the 
common lifeworld, they preference appeals to shared culture and familiar challenges. Rules and norms 
assume a significant role throughout the persuasive process. The state is not, however, immediately 
fixated on forwarding a particular norm or grounding its argument within a formal legal framework. 
Persuasive engagements by non-compliant states necessarily push against established norms. Upon 
developing a broad and relatable premise upon which a prohibited action can be reconceived as 
something other than a legal violation, the state moves to establish its credibility. Though the state 
may be in violation of a particular legal provision, it continues the persuasive process by emphasizing 
its general commitment to international law.   
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B. Establishing the State as a General Norm-Acceptor 
States strive to be perceived as compliant with international law. The state emphasizes its deference 
to legal norms. It professes respect for the rule of law. And the state positions itself as a member, in 
good-standing, of the post-war international order. A state whose behaviour betrays this outward 
projection of legal fidelity often continues to situate itself as in general acceptance of international law. 
A violation is an exception, not the standard. If, as Oscar Schachter suggests, international law 
provides a common language, states covet fluency.160 An action that appears non-compliant, a 
favoured interpretation that stretches conventional understanding is explained through reiteration of 
the state’s broad legal commitment. In alignment with the Aristotelian conception of persuasion, the 
non-compliant state builds its legal contention upon efforts to “make [its] own character look right.”161 
Harold Koh, drawing upon the perspective of the government lawyer, contends that public officials 
“almost always believe their actions are necessary, correct, and lawful.”162 The state, Koh suggests, 
must provide public justification so that others will accept the resulting assertion of legal compliance. 
The justificatory discourse is understood as a necessary factor in establishing both domestic and 
international legitimacy.163 Also, however, these legal articulations allow the state to cultivate its 
standing as a general norm-acceptor. States wish to maintain this standing within the international 
community and undertake efforts to avoid the perception of chronic legal disregard.164 Where legality 
denotes legitimacy, persuasion builds upon more than the directly applicable legal norms. Persuasive 
efforts, in defense of a questionable action or in furtherance of a non-compliant policy, are established 
upon professed adherence to “the general values and principles of international law” that the state 
purports to cherish.165  
International lawyers do not question the proposition that states hold an interest in “maintaining a 
reputation for good faith compliance with the law.”166 This is understood to facilitate reciprocity and 
international cooperation. States desire predictability. Stability is associated with legal amenability.167 
A good reputation is maintained, Andrew Guzman explains, “as long as a country honors all of its 
previous international commitments.”168 A state’s reputation appears more durable than this 
suggests.169 While continued instances of legal violation erode credibility, a state may present its 
reputation to signal that a novel legal contention – one that strains interpretative likelihood or 
proposes illicit military action – is a marginal disagreement about the meaning of a legal norm. It is 
not, the state will suggest, an ontological claim regarding the validity of a dominant value. As Thomas 
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Risse notes, the more a non-compliant state accepts the validity of international norms, the more it 
engages with others over the minutiae of a legal proposition.170 
Game theorists understand a player’s reputation as a “summary of its opponents’ current beliefs about 
the player’s compliance strategy or set of strategies in connection with various commitments.”171 States 
actively develop their reputation for general legal fidelity. They seek to nurture conceptions that they 
comply with law and honour undertaken commitments. In turn, the state promotes this reputation as 
a warrant when the state’s actions deviate from its professed affinity to international law. A 
controversial policy, an assumed violation, is juxtaposed with the assertion that the state is a norm-
acceptor. Prior to engaging in substantive accounts – in defense of a particular military action, in 
explanation of a permissive legal interpretation – the state recites its liberal credentials. A strong 
reputation, emphasizing legal like-mindedness, dampens the consequences of an action that betrays 
that affinity. It positions target audiences to receive and take seriously the state’s legal assertions. And 
it further establishes a communicative context, upon which the non-compliant state may continue to 
build and to persuade by demonstrating its ability to provide authoritative legal interpretation.   
C. Demonstrating the Authority to Interpret 
Legal disputes often feature competing assertions of competence. Opposing legal propositions are 
supplemented with declarations accentuating the respective parties’ capacity to make an authoritative 
legal claim. Beyond the core substantive question, competing actors contest expertise and authority.172 
This form of persuasion assumes particular salience within international law. The sources of 
international law – treaties between states; customary international law; general principles; judicial 
decisions; and the writing of the most highly qualified publicists – compel interpretation.173 These 
sources facilitate a range of possible meanings and can be applied in a diversity of ways.174 Treaties are 
drafted in broad, agreeable language.175 Customary international law is identified through an ill-defined 
and imprecise process.176 Judicial decisions and the works of legal scholars are interpretative exercises 
that produce varying opinions.177  
As most international legal contentions are not subject to formal decision-making, their persuasive 
value is influenced by an actor’s ability to exhibit authority and expertise. Efforts to accentuate the 
speaker’s expertise further builds upon the Aristotelian notion of affecting the giving of a decision 
through making one’s character look right.178 As Charlotte Peevers demonstrates, “the authority to 
speak the law is often determined by the status of the speaker of the invocation or imposition. Some 
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actors appear to hold greater legitimacy in claiming powers than others.”179 Often, a speaker’s 
authoritativeness is inherent or institutionalized. A particular state’s foreign ministry is understood to 
possess high-level expertise in a certain area or field. A specific court is deemed competent to 
determine particular legal questions that have repeatedly come before its docket. A jurist is recognized 
as a leading authority on a body of law. 
The ability to demonstrate authority and expertise is a formative aspect of the persuasive process. 
Expertise, Peevers explains, are conveyed by lawyers, diplomats, academics, and technocrats to 
influence the justificatory discourse that accompanies uses of force.180 In part, the turn to expertise 
was a reaction to the belief that “traditional approaches to international governance and the traditional 
institutions of international law would be ill-equipped to deal with the problems of a globalised 
world…”181 Expert networks provided an obvious means to ensure technocratic solutions.182 Also, 
however, they would become a means of exhibiting credibility. An actor brandishing expertise, whose 
foreign ministry and government lawyers wilfully engage in legal processes and offer a rarefied body 
of knowledge is better positioned to persuade. Alistair Iain Johnston notes that persuasion is 
contingent upon the authoritativeness of the messenger.183 When a state proposes a counterattitudinal 
interpretation, when it engages in a military action that is perceived as a violation, the state couples 
accompanying legal rhetoric with an accounting of interpretative authority.  
The demonstration of expertise bolsters this sense of interpretative authority. It facilitates state efforts 
to form or contribute to existing epistemic communities.184 These groups, as defined by Peter Haas, 
are “networks of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and 
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”185 Interpretative 
legal avowals are well received when addressed by an actor to an epistemic community of which the 
actor is a member or from which the actor may derive credibility. Whether the state wishes to engage 
with an epistemic community or make a broad claim, international legal assertions are built upon the 
professed expertise or authority of the speaker.   
States actively cultivate authoritativeness and expertise. This enables access to and ensures influence 
within epistemic communities. It increases the persuasiveness of the state’s legal avowals when it 
targets general, non-expert audiences. As Yahli Shereshevsky details, states employ various persuasive 
strategies as they engage with formal and informal lawmaking processes.186 States send legal experts to 
partake in international law conferences. They draw upon the professional reputations of their legal 
representatives.187 Written outputs that convey the state’s legal positions are made accessible and 
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widely distributed. When relevant, they are translated into English. These outputs are presented in a 
“quasi-academic style” that relies upon extensive footnoting and elaborate legal reasoning.188 This both 
draws upon and exhibits the state’s legal expertise. It places the legal contention, Shereshevsky notes, 
within an existing persuasive discourse as opposed to presenting a simple declaration of opinio juris.189 
Within this discourse and throughout these persuasive appeals, the state seeks to apply its expertise to 
a permissively established standard that permits the acceptable legal argument.  
D. Instilling the Standard of the Acceptable Legal Argument 
States project legal fidelity. They wish to maintain “a reputation for good faith compliance with the 
law…”190 Yet, when a state employs legal argument to explain or to justify, it is often content to meet 
a minimum level of compliance or present only a plausible legal argument. A state whose actions are 
widely-assumed to violate international law will struggle to dislodge consensus legal opinion. In 
response to legal opposition – within the international community, throughout civil society, and 
amongst independent legal experts – the non-compliant state acts to instill and to meet the standard 
of the acceptable legal argument. Legal interpretations, applications of international law to complex 
fact patterns, move from the objective of persuading an audience that an argument is correct to 
suggesting that the legal contention is plausible.191 By establishing a reduced legal burden, the state’s 
persuasive appeals become more effective. The state benefits from the perception that it has engaged 
with the international legal process. Sometimes engagement alone is sufficient to project legitimacy. 
Recalling Daniel Reisner’s contention that international law advances through violations, the non-
compliant state may begin to alter legal thresholds to further align legal requirements with state 
prerogatives.192  
As identified by the New Haven School, a discursive understanding of international law suggests that 
legal meaning is derived from argumentative reasoning.193 The rhetorical nature of the reasoning 
process features a permissive standard of interpretative validity. Interpretations, Peevers identifies, 
“no longer need to make the claim of ‘truth’: rather they have to be ‘acceptable’.”194 As Ian Johnstone 
explains, states rarely dismiss international law’s relevancy. Instead, when an action is deemed contrary 
to international law, the state responds that “this is how we interpret the law, and our interpretation 
is correct.”195 Behind this discourse, however, states look to stretch the boundaries of plausibility. 
Though every legal or legal-sounding statement will not meet an amended standard of reasonableness, 
persuasive efforts appeal to a permissively constructed conception of what constitutes an acceptable 
legal argument.  
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Much international law – as practiced by its institutions, as defined within its instruments, and as 
construed through its arbiters – favours broad and permissive legal formulations. International treaties 
are drafted in multivalent language. Human rights agreements converge around “the lowest common 
denominator.”196 Such regimes are amenable to an expansive set of legal interpretations that result 
from the “diverse cultural and legal traditions embraced by each Member State.”197 Though many 
treaties contain dense rules, broad legal arguments are typically removed from legal minutiae. Instead, 
arguments reference general principles. This facilitates a panoply of potential interpretations. States 
actively encourage the development of legal systems that tolerate an array of legal reasoning. The 
European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) margin of appreciation, for example, provides member 
states discretion in fulfilling their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).198 The margin, first referenced in a 1958 European Commission report, is intended to ensure 
a minimum level of human rights protection while permitting a range of interpretative contentions.199 
Similarly, the ICJ has “rejected any assertion that in any given situation, only one action could possibly 
be considered reasonable.”200 
The notion of reasonableness is used in international lawmaking to ensure discretion in the 
interpretation and application of legal rules. States include the term ‘reasonable’ in legal instruments 
to introduce a degree of flexibility.201 Reasonableness is read into the judgements of international 
courts – often despite its textual absence – to ensure “adaptability” and to facilitate a diversity of state 
interpretations.202 Interpretations of broadly constructed legal rules employ reasonableness to fill the 
legal lacunae that results from textual ambiguity and to support a preferred articulation.203 States 
preference interpretative flexibility and advocate for the acceptance of diverse legal responses. Within 
armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is subject to the assessment of the “reasonable military 
commander.”204 Citing the conclusion of the Committee Established to Review NATO Bombings in 
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Yugoslavia – which held that a human rights lawyer and a military commander will likely posit 
opposing interpretative results – states endorse a standard of legal permissibility based upon the latter’s 
assessment.205 
Efforts to instill the standard of the acceptable legal argument draw upon international law’s perceived 
subjectivity.206 Former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw argued, in a correspondence debating the 
legality of the Iraq war, that “everyone knew that international law was uncertain and that, therefore, 
reasonable and honestly held differences of opinion could be held.”207 Parameters do, however, exist. 
Johnstone notes that, “there are limits to which any language, including the language of the law, can 
plausibly be stretched.”208 Good and bad legal arguments are advanced by states. Interpretative 
communities, Johnstone suggests, distinguish between these arguments and assess their credibility.209 
Non-compliant states, however, target both narrow and broad audiences. Their legal contentions are 
often directed beyond interpretive communities. Legal arguments, dismissed by experts, may resonate 
amongst broader audiences. Dominant propositions that make legal claims may hold little salience 
within the international legal community but still drive public debates. When attempting to persuade, 
the non-compliant state draws upon legal ambiguity, an expansive notion of reasonableness, and the 
willingness (or necessity) of legal institutions to accept a plausible explanation. Upon this permissively 
construed interpretative foundation, the non-compliant state completes the persuasive process by 
appealing to precedent and commonality when applying law to fact.  
E. Drawing Upon Precedent and Commonality
Effective speech, Aristotle claimed, requires the speaker to demonstrate that a contention is worthy 
of belief.210 Worthiness is exhibited through the persuasive pull of past agreements, decisions, or 
actions. States appeal to precedent and commonality as they apply the law (that they interpret) to the 
facts (that they frame). Precedent’s appeal is unaffected by its formal status. As per Article 59 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, decisions of the Court are held to have “no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”211 The Statute embodies the general legal 
principle that “international courts are explicitly not bound by precedent.”212 Judicial decisions are 
recognized as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”213 
Notwithstanding precedent’s formal status, appeals to past decisions, established legal principles, and 
existing patterns of behaviour foreground international legal contentions. By invoking precedent, an 
actor implies that a legal contention is part of a tradition. It is an established tenet and not merely a 
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(July 2009) at para. 332.  
206 See, e.g., Pnina Sharvit Baruch, “Operation Protective Edge: The Legal Angle” in Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, eds, 
The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2014) 65 at 66 [Sharvit Baruch 
Operation Protective Edge]. 
207 Letter from Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to Sir Michael Wood, 29 January 2003, “Iraq: Legal Basis for Use of Force”, 
cited in Peevers Politics of Justifying Force, supra note 25 at 146.  
208 Johnstone The Power of Deliberation, supra note 43 at 25.  
209 Ibid, at 34.  
210 Aristotle Rhetoric, supra note 132 at Book I, Ch.2. 
211 See, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 (26 June 1945) at Article 59 [ICJ Statute].  
212 Krzysztof J. Pelc, “The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network Application” (2014) 108 Am. 
Political Sci. Rev. 547 at 548 [Pelc Politics of Precedent].  
213 ICJ Statute, supra note 211 at Article 38 (1)(d).  
214
self-serving claim. Harlan Grant Cohen explains that across international law, practitioners invoke, 
and tribunals apply, precedent. Continuing, Cohen explains that “reports from international 
investment arbitration, international criminal law, international human rights, and international trade 
all testify to precedent’s apparent authority.”214  
Precedent’s authoritativeness is, however, described as “informal.”215 States deny – often vehemently 
– the binding force of past legal decisions.216 Within international affairs, states value flexibility. 
Despite predictability’s appeal, states resist officially recognizing the lingering constraint of legal rules 
derived from the decisions of international tribunals. Yet, states often appeal to precedent. 
Individually, these legal appeals willingly recall supportive judicial decisions. Often, however, the use 
of precedent is not confined by a formalist application of stare decisis. States exhibit a persuasive 
tendency to recall legal measures that present as analogous to the contention or policy that the state 
wishes to advance.  
Precedent becomes a means of persuasion. An advantageous past decision by a judicial or appellate 
body will be cited by a state that argues before that same body. Cross-fertilization occurs when a 
persuasive entity is cited in an alternative forum. Cohen notes that “decisions by international courts 
or tribunals with general jurisdiction over international law broadly or an area of international law 
specifically might be invoked as precedential with regard to that area of law regardless of the forum 
for the current argument.”217 Applied expansively, a state’s use of precedent may accentuate a prior or 
similar interpretation of a legal rule.218 The pre-existing interpretation may have been offered by 
another state or by a legal expert. Non-binding decisions by UN bodies are commonly invoked as a 
form of precedent.219 States accentuate the interpretations of what Sandesh Sivakumaran terms “state 
empowered entities.”220 These include the decisions, judgements, or reasoning of organizations and 
bodies that include the International Law Commission, the ICRC, and the Human Rights Committee.  
Understood broadly, precedent derives from a diversity of sources. Moving beyond the opinions of 
decision-making entities, Cohen notes that state behaviour is amongst the oldest forms of international 
precedent.221 By recalling past acts, a non-compliant state may defend a controversial event as 
consistent with a pattern of state action. This lessens the potency of formal legal discourse. If a 
majority view the controversial event as a violation, recalling past state behaviour alters the analysis. 
Tangibility precedes abstraction, emphasizing what states do and not simply what the law requires. As 
Michael Reisman explains, “inferences about what other actors think is acceptable behavior are not 
derived from international judgments or from constitutional documents, statutes, or treaties. They are 
almost entirely derived from the responses of key actors to a critical event.”222 If law is identified in 
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the ways that states interpret and apply norms in particular cases, the persuading state will accentuate 
those cases.223 A state bolsters the persuasiveness of its contention when it displays that analogous 
actions have been undertaken and implicitly or explicitly received by the international community.  
Similarly, the persuading state may accentuate the commonalty of a particular event. When a state 
pursues a military action or proposes a particular policy it may draw upon a shared (sometimes 
hypothetical) scenario. It challenges the target audience to consider how it has or would react in a 
comparable setting. If a dangerous non-state armed group were amassed on your border – the 
persuading state asserts – you too would be compelled to act in pre-emptive self-defense.224 If an 
attack against a major urban centre caused thousands of deaths and altered a city’s landscape you too 
would disregard legal formality.225 Appeals to commonality allow for variances in the analogy. Within 
a formal system of stare decisis, precedent’s effectiveness is contingent on the similarity between the 
past fact pattern and the current context.226 By illustrating commonalities, persuasion becomes a 
thought-experiment. Legal texts that support the consensus view that a particular action is illegal are 
presented as in tension with necessity. A particular incident becomes a “norm-indicator” or a “norm-
generator.”227 Past actions and assumed responses provide persuasive licence to the non-compliant 
state.  
Appeals to precedent encourage a target audience to accept a counterattitudinal message. A 
controversial military action, an expansive interpretation accentuates past practice to both illustrate a 
pattern of similarity and imply a broader sense of international acceptance. Through the creation of a 
common lifeworld, by positioning the state as a general norm-acceptor, in demonstrating the authority 
to interpret, instilling the standard of the acceptable legal argument, and when drawing upon precedent 
and commonality the non-compliant state applies law to fact. It engages in a persuasive process to lie, 
to interpret, or to legitimize. Legal arguments follow familiar patterns. International law provides an 
often-reiterated language and a set of discursive conventions. Mostly, states display a recognizable 
argumentative structure. When a state addresses a broad audience, it relies upon lofty contentions and 
recurrent themes. When the state targets its arguments narrowly, towards or within an interpretative 
community, it becomes more technocratic. It references favoured sources and a hierarchy of legal 
authority. However, persuasive engagements display idiosyncrasy. The phases discussed above are 
non-exhaustive. A particular use of legal argument, by a non-compliant state, will not necessarily 
invoke each of these phases or apply them in a linear fashion. These phases of engagement represent 
an amalgamation of the persuasive practices that states undertake. Application is necessarily specific 
to the context within which the non-compliant state wishes to persuade. This application will now be 
described.  
V. WHEN STATES PERSUADE: ACCOUNTS OF LEGAL ARGUMENT UPON THE USE OF FORCE 
The Caroline affair began in 1837 when British forces suspected that a privately-owned steamship in 
the Niagara River aided Canadian rebels in opposing British rule. Two British officers, leading a 
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contingent of volunteers, seized the ship. They burned and then sank the vessel. The Caroline was 
moored in American water and was owned by Buffalo native William Wells. During the raid a US 
citizen was killed. Anglo-American relations deteriorated.228 Amidst calls for reparations, reprisals, and 
the increasing prospect of war, a diplomatic discourse began between British and US officials.229 Legal 
explanations were offered in concurrence. The British argued that the Caroline’s destruction was a 
public act justified under the law of nations.230 The US responded that the Caroline was not engaged in 
piracy, operated as a freight and passenger ship, and had been flying the US flag.231  
Harold Koh identifies this discourse as initiating a tradition of public explanation.232 From the 19th 
century, US officials increasingly coupled actions with international legal justifications.233 Legal 
reasoning, assertions of compliance, reveal much about how international law is understood. Also, 
however, this conversive process provides opportunity for law to be formed, developed, or altered. 
The Caroline affair is paradigmatic. Following a letter sent by the US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, 
to the British Ambassador, Henry Fox, a set of legal criteria were established. These required that the 
“necessity of self-defense was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no movement 
of deliberations.”234  The requirements of imminence, necessity, and proportionality were identified 
and now inform the classic definition of self-defence under international law.235 
The following case studies describe the discursive process accompanying the use and application of 
force by states. Each considers the role that persuasion and legal argument assume within the resulting 
discourse. The first study describes the use of international legal argument by the Russian Federation 
following its annexation of Crimea. This provides an example of the use of persuasive legal appeals to 
supplement a lie. The second study details the US and British advancement of the “unwilling or 
unable” test within the context of the “war on terror.” This constitutes an example of a state employing 
persuasive argument to establish a legal interpretation. A third case study describes the use of legal 
argument by Israel both during and after the 2014 Gaza war. This illustrates how a state employs 
international law to legitimize a particular action or event.  
Despite the assigned motives – to lie; to interpret; to legitimize – I do not suggest that states use legal 
argument for a singular purpose. States appeal to international law in multifaceted ways. They are 
motivated, often simultaneously, by a diversity of reasons. The legal responses evoked by an incident 
or series of incidents as broad and enduring as, for example, the “war on terror” facilitate myriad legal 
engagements. These will overlap, contradict, and evolve. In one instance a state may employ 
international law to supplement a lie. Later, that same state will recall law to advance a good-faith legal 
interpretation. Whether a state is lying, whether it is offering a good-faith interpretation, or advancing 
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New York to enforce American neutrality laws had justified destruction of the boat wherever found.” This draw upon 
international law as the Ambassador recognized that by labelling the ship “pirate” all concerned states were entitled to 
capture and destroy. See, Ibid, at 495-497.  
231 Ibid.  
232 Koh The Legal Adviser’s Duty, supra note 84 at 193.  
233 Ibid.  
234 Daniel Webster, “Letter to Henry Stephen Fox” in K.E. Shewmaker, ed, The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, 
Vol. 1, 1841-1843 (Dartmouth, NH: Dartmouth Press, 1983) at 62.   
235 Ibid. See also, Jan Kittrich, The Right of Individual Self-Defense in Public International Law (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2008) at 153.   
217
a self-serving legal argument will evade agreement. Motives may be obviously transparent but are often 
difficult to discern. The purpose of these categorizations is not to assess the validity of the particular 
legal arguments. Instead, it is to demonstrate how the persuasive process is employed in a diversity of 
scenarios to achieve generalizable purposes.   
A. To Supplement a Lie: The Use of Persuasive Legal Argument following the Russian Annexation of Crimea 
Almost without warning, Ukraine moved from the cusp of European integration and into Moscow’s 
sphere of influence. President Viktor Yanukovych’s tenure on Bankova Street commenced with 
familiar calls to ensure the requisite reforms necessary to facilitate EU membership.236 In early 
September 2013, President Yanukovych chaired a fractious meeting amongst members of his political 
party.237 The East-West divisions displayed by party loyalists became the harbinger of a tumultuous 
year that altered Ukraine’s political trajectory. Following the suspension of a pending EU association 
agreement, thousands of protestors gathered in Kiev’s Independence Square. The “Euromaidan” 
protests spread across the country. To quell opposition, Yanukovych employed increasingly anti-
democratic tactics. His support dwindled. Members of the Rada passed legislation stripping 
Yanukovych’s legal powers. Police abandoned their guard of the Presidential offices and the Rada 
voted to impeach.238 
The disposed President called the events a coup.239 Pro-Russian, anti-government groups countered 
the Euromaidan protests. Violent outbreaks and large demonstrations began in Donetsk and Luhansk 
but attention soon turned to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. As protests mounted throughout 
Ukraine, Sergei Aksyonov began forming a paramilitary force. Aksyonov led the Russian Unity party, 
a minor political faction in the Crimean State Council that held three seats in the regional legislature. 
Days after Yanukovych’s impeachment, the State Council was seized by two dozen armed militants. 
Aksyonov mediated.240 Hours later, a quorum of parliamentarians was gathered and – under uncertain 
circumstances – Aksyonov was appointed as Crimea’s Prime Minister.241 
On 6 March, under Aksyonov’s stewardship, the State Council adopted a decree establishing the 
parameters of an “All-Crimean Referendum.” Voters would indicate support for reunification of 
Crimea with the Russian Federation or favour restoration of the 1992 Crimean Constitution.242 Five 
days later, the Crimean legislature and the Sevastopol City Council passed a joint resolution. This 
declared Crimea’s independence and stated that, if voters choose to succeed, the State Council would 
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//www.brookings.edu/articles/external-influences-on-ukraines-european-integration/>.   
237 Elizabeth Piper, “Special Report: Why Ukraine spurned the EU and embraced Russia” Reuters (19 December 2013), 
online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-russia-deal-special-report/special-report-why-ukraine-spurned-the 
-eu-and-embraced-russia-idUSBRE9BI0DZ20131219>. 
238 Kevin Bishop, “Ukrainian MPs vote to oust President Yanukovych” BBC News (22 February 2014), online: <https:// 
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26304842>.  
239 Interfax-Ukraine, “The Prosecutor General’s Office probes coup in Ukraine in 2014 under Yanukovych’s application” 
Kyiv Post (29 November 2017), online: <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/prosecutor-generals-office-probes-
coup-ukraine-2014-yanukovychs-application.html>.  
240 There has been speculation that the armed groups that seized the Parliament were acting under Aksyonov’s command. 
Aksyonov, however, claims that the group acted “spontaneously.”  See, Simon Shuster, “Putin’s Man in Crimea Is 
Ukraine’s Worst Nightmare” Time Magazine (10 March 2014), online: < http://time.com/19097/putin-crimea-russia-
ukraine-aksyonov/>. 
241 Ibid.  
242 Thomas D. Grant, “Annexation of Crimea” (2015) 109 Am. J. Int’l. L. 68 at 68-69 [Grant Annexation of Crimea].  
218
declare total autonomy from Ukraine and move to join the Russian Federation.243 The referendum 
was held on 16 March 2014. The official results reported that 96.7% chose unification.244  
Ukrainian officials denounced the events in Crimea.245 International observers added to the mounting 
condemnation.246 The General Assembly pronounced that the referendum had no validity.”247 For a 
single day Crimea claimed sovereign status. Then, on 18 March, President Vladimir Putin informed 
the relevant Russian institutions that Crimean authorities sought accession into the Russian 
Federation.248 Immediately, a treaty was drafted and signed to formalize the annexation of Crimea.249 
The United States announced that Russian actions in Crimea constituted a “brazen military incursion” 
and that annexation amounted to a “land grab.”250 Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Ukraine’s interim-Prime 
Minister, stated that events had moved from the political to the military stage.251 The British held that 
“it is completely unacceptable for Russia to use force to change borders on the basis of a sham 
referendum held at the barrel of a Russian gun.”252 A dominant narrative emerged.253 Crimea was 
assumed by Russia in violation of the prohibition on the forceful acquisition of territory. 
Moscow contended that Yanukovych’s impeachment was illegal. The succeeding interim government 
was illegitimate.254 Russian officials claimed that Ukraine had come under the control of extremists 
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who threatened the nation’s Russian population and disrupted regional stability.255 Kremlin officials 
began building an international legal argument. A series of bilateral treaties – reached between Russia 
and Ukraine to, inter alia, ensure Ukraine’s territorial integrity – were dismissed.256 Russia argued that 
regime change in Kiev created a new state with which Russia had not concluded formal agreements. 
Russian officials characterized Crimean “reunification” as the result of two independent legal acts.257 
First, following a legitimate referendum, Crimea lawfully separated from Ukraine. Then, annexation 
was realized through a bilateral treaty between Russia and Crimea.258 Self-determination featured 
prominently within the Russian narrative.259  
Initially, Russia denied using force.260 Claims that Russian militants were operating in Crimea, to 
bolster Aksyonov and to facilitate annexation, were rejected.  In the weeks preceding the referendum, 
President Putin insisted that “no Russian troops – apart from those already stationed at the Russian 
Navy base in Sebastopol – were present anywhere in Crimea.”261 Substantiated reports that hundreds 
of armed soldiers in “unmarked Russian uniforms” were positioned at military sites and government 
buildings throughout Crimea were dismissed.262 Putin insisted that these individuals were “self-
organized local forces” whose uniforms could have been “purchased at any store.”263 Information 
Strategic Research Policy Paper No. 2 at 2 [Berzņiš Russia’s New Generation of Warfare]. See also, Howard Amos, Shaun 
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spread through media reports.264 In the lead up to the referendum, these groups – the members of 
whom were dubbed “little green men” – began conducting military functions.265 NATO and American 
officials insisted there was a definitive connection between Russia and the armed groups.266 President 
Putin denied accusations that Russia acted in violation of international law, claiming “Russia’s Armed 
Forces never entered Crimea.”267 
Putin’s claim proved false.268 The discourse shifted from questioning whether Russia maintained a 
presence in Crimea to interrogating the legality of that presence.269 In response to mounting 
accusations of wrongfulness, Russia offered a series of international legal arguments concerning the 
use of force. Broadly, Russia asserted that: (1) the interim Ukrainian government was illegitimate. 
Russian forces only entered Crimea upon invitation by President Yanukovych and the local Crimean 
authorities.270 (2) Intervention was justified in response to a mounting humanitarian crisis and to 
ensure the human rights of Ukraine’s Russian minority.271 And, (3) the enduring political chaos posed 
a threat to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and to Russian forces stationed in Sevastopol.272  
Roy Allison contends that Russia’s legal appeals facilitated a “deniable intervention.”273 By appealing 
to international law, Allison notes that Russia blurred “the legal and illegal, to create justificatory 
smokescreens, in part by exploiting some areas of uncertainty in international law, while making 
“unfounded assertions of facts.”274 The contours of Russia’s legal appeals are now well-known. They 
have been dismissed and deconstructed by an array of international lawyers.275 Samantha Power, the 
US Ambassador to the UN quipped that Moscow “had just become the rapid response arm of the 
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Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights” and that the legal assertions presented by the 
Russian Federation “are without basis in reality.”276 The British Ambassador told the Security Council 
that Russian claims were “fabricated to justify Russian military action.”277 Also, however, the series of 
legal arguments presented by Russia illuminate how legal discourse moves beyond assessments of 
validity. These arguments illustrate how a non-compliant state employs international law to 
supplement a lie as it works to persuade audiences about the acceptableness of a military action.  
1. The Identification of a Common Lifeworld  
Russia formulated a shared and relatable context in the weeks preceding the formal annexation of 
Crimea. A lifeworld was identified. This was grounded in a historical narrative. Russian officials drew 
upon the notion of national identity as they accentuated Russia’s deep connection to Crimea. In a 
widely broadcast speech, President Putin announced that “in people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has 
always been an inseparable part of Russia.”278 Putin presented a historical account. Following the 
Bolshevik Revolution, large parts of Russia’s south were added to Ukraine. This occurred, Putin 
claimed, without “consideration for the ethnic make-up of the population.”279 In 1954, Nikita 
Khrushchev transferred Crimea and Sevastopol to Ukraine. The Communist Party, Putin continued, 
violated constitutional norms. Naturally, “in a totalitarian state nobody bothered to ask the citizens of 
Crimea and Sevastopol.”280  
Following annexation, the Russian Ambassador to the UN furthered this narrative. Events in Crimea 
were said to have “restored historical justice.”281 Vitaly Churkin told the General Assembly, “historical 
justice has triumphed. For ages Crimea has been an integral part of our country, we share history, 
culture, and the main thing, people. And only the voluntaristic decisions by the USSR leaders in 1954, 
which transferred Crimea and Sevastopol to the Ukrainian Republic, although within one state, has 
distorted this natural state of affairs.”282  
The historical connection between Russia and Crimea, the conveyed sense of national identity, 
established a foundation upon which a lifeworld would further be described. Allison explains that this 
coupled a domestically-targeted, ethno-territorial evocation of the past with a statement of strategic 
intent.283 Restoration of a historical injustice was presented as both a security necessity and an 
expression of self-determination. Sevastopol was described as “a fortress that serves as the birthplace 
of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.”284 Crimea was presented as a symbol of military glory and strategic 
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necessity.285 Russia possessed a historical duty, Ambassador Churkin told the Security Council, to 
guarantee regional stability and protect the ethnic population in the “near abroad.”286  
Russia insisted that it was compelled to intervene. Appeals to the lifeworld told of universal values. 
Within, liberal norms were displaced by fascist tendencies and Ukraine descended into anarchy. 
President Putin framed events as a violent coup d’état. Those who perpetrated the events in Kiev, Putin 
declared, “were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would 
stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes 
and anti-Semites executed this coup.”287 Russian officials documented alleged human rights violations 
and disseminated reports depicting post-revolution Ukraine as lawless.288 This facilitated subsequent 
legal assertions that evoked the sentiment of the responsibility to protect, claimed that intervention 
followed invitation, and asserted the right of states to protect nationals abroad.289 Invocations of a 
lifeworld – exhibiting an illiberal decline, marked by escalating violence and the persecution of a 
vulnerable ethnic group – contextualized Russia’s substantive legal arguments.  
Russia professed that intervention was required to realize legitimate legal aims, to provide protection, 
and to ensure preservation of the threatened liberal norms. Legal arguments favouring self-
determination were compromised by an anarchic society. Russian insistence that annexation was a 
legitimate expression “of the people of Crimea” was built upon the identified lifeworld. Russia held 
that:  
“Following the unlawful and violent coup in Ukraine the possibility to exercise the right 
to self-determination within the Ukrainian state was eliminated. There was a spate of 
killings, mass violence, abductions, attacks on journalists and human rights activists, 
politically motivated imprisonments, egregious incidents with racist motives (including 
anti-Russian and anti-Semite), committed upon instructions or with the tacit approval of 
the Kyiv authorities. Moreover, a group of people supposedly controlled by the illegal 
authorities of Kyiv attempted to overthrow the legal government of Crimea. The 
authorities in Kyiv do not represent the Ukrainian people as a whole, especially the 
population of Crimea; they do not exercise effective control over the territory and do not 
maintain law and order.”290 
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When Yanukovych was deposed and Crimea voted to secede, Russia faced mounting condemnation. 
This told of foreign interference, unlawful annexation, and the use of force in contradiction of the 
most fundamental international norms.291 In response, Russia developed a legal narrative. Substantive 
legal engagements were premised upon the identified lifeworld. This exhibited shared ideals and 
relatable fears. Persuasive endeavours and the subsequent development of contrarian legal arguments 
were built upon this context and would facilitate Russian insistence that its actions were reflective of 
a general commitment to international law.  
2. Establishing the State as a General Norm-Acceptor  
Expressions of legal fidelity featured throughout the Russian discourse that accompanied events in 
Crimea. Russian actions – the deployment of armed forces to facilitate annexation – were presented 
as both consistent with and in furtherance of international law. Prior to acknowledging that Russian 
forces were operating in Crimea, President Putin offered pre-emptive legal arguments. These insisted 
that Russian involvement in Crimea would either constitute a “humanitarian intervention” or an 
“intervention by invitation.”292 In forwarding these arguments, Russian officials accentuated their 
general commitment to international law. President Putin declared:  
“We proceed from the conviction that we always act legitimately. I have personally always 
been an advocate of acting in compliance with international law. I would like to stress yet 
again that if we do make the decision, if I do decide to use the Armed Forces, this will be 
a legitimate decision in full compliance with both general norms of international law, since 
we have the appeal of the legitimate President, and with our commitments...”293 
Substantive legal arguments were coupled with general expressions of international legal alacrity. 
Attempts by Russian officials, to persuade varied audiences, drew upon international law’s rhetorical 
centrality in the foreign policies and strategy documents of the post-Soviet era.294 Since the mid-1980s,  
international law was afforded a prominent position in the reformist discourse that marked 
perestroika.295 Under the banner more international law, Mikhail Gorbachev recognized that expressions 
of legal devotion facilitated the transition from autocracy.296 The pivot toward international law was 
reflected in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Article 15 dictates that “the universally-
recognized norms of international law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian 
Federation shall be a component part of its legal system.”297 
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The centrality of Russia’s formal commitment to international law was offered in defense of Russian 
actions in Crimea. These purported efforts – intervention by invitation, for humanitarian purposes, or 
to facilitate self-determination – were not merely consistent with legal dictate.298 They were in defence 
of legal norms, disregarded by Ukrainian actors and their western enablers. Speaking in Sochi, 
President Putin announced that the international system had become “seriously weakened, fragmented 
and deformed.”299 International relations, Putin continued, “must be based on international law, which 
itself should rest on moral principles such as justice, equality and truth.”300 Russia recalled its enduring 
commitment to law to impress that contemporary actions aligned with traditional commitments. This, 
Putin suggested, positioned Russia to become a world leader in “asserting the norms of international 
law.”301 
A general milieu – of legal reverence – preceded Russian claims that its actions in Crimea were not an 
unlawful use of force. On 3 March, Russia convened a meeting of the Security Council. Ambassador 
Churkin announced that President Yanukovych had formally requested Russia to “use the armed 
forces of the Russian Federation to establish legitimacy, peace, law and order and stability in defence 
of the people of Ukraine.”302 Explicitly rejecting allegations of aggression, Churkin told the Security 
Council that the events in Ukraine must be redressed “in accordance with international obligations, 
including most importantly those related to international humanitarian law, in defence of human rights 
and the rights of national minorities.”303  
On the eve of the referendum, Ukraine’s interim-Prime Minister travelled to New York. Yatsenyuk 
told the Security Council that Russian actions violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and asked the 
Russian Federation whether it sought war.304 Churkin replied that Russia did not view events in 
Ukraine as an armed conflict but as a means of ensuring “the fundamental norms of international 
law.”305 Russia endorsed the scheduled referendum as an expression of equal rights. This, the Russian 
Ambassador insisted, was an extraordinary measure that was reflective of Russia’s general 
commitment to territorial integrity and the requirements of self-determination.306  
3. Demonstrating the Authority to Interpret  
The Russian narrative advanced controversial legal claims. Arguments that intervention followed 
invitation, was motivated by humanitarianism, or that succession constituted a legitimate expression 
of self-determination were factually contentious and relied upon uncertain legal assumptions. Russian 
officials paired contrarian legal interpretations with expressions or displays of competence. The role 
of legal experts was accentuated. Appeals to expertise are emblematic of the persuasive process. They 
provide a means for the state to demonstrate interpretative authority.  
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When Russian officials began building legal arguments justifying intervention, observers recalled the 
series of agreements that Russia and Ukraine concluded during the 1990s.307 A Russian incursion 
would breach the resulting territorial assurances.308 Facing such questions, President Putin 
supplemented an inventive legal argument with an appeal to expertise. Asked whether Russian military 
involvement would violate the Budapest Memorandum, Putin responded:  
“In such a case it is hard not to agree with some of our experts who say that a new state 
is now emerging on this territory. This is just like what happened when the Russian 
Empire collapsed after the 1917 revolution and a new state emerged. And this would be 
a new state with which we have signed no binding agreements.”309  
Putin’s rejoinder drew upon Soviet-era legal scholarship. Leading international lawyers, from the 
USSR, had developed a counterintuitive argument regarding revolution’s influence on statehood.310 
Putin recalled how legal experts coalesced around the notion that the Bolshevik revolution heralded 
“a new subject of international law.”311 The absence of continuity, severed by revolutionary 
transformation, implied that the emergent state was not subject to agreements formed under the 
former (deposed) government. 
Russia often invokes the expertise of its international lawyers. Foreign policy decisions are supported 
through consensus legal pronouncements. These commonly adhere to the state’s position.312 This 
process of reliance and adherence was exemplified during Russia’s opposition to the US led invasion 
of Iraq. A symposium, convened at St. Petersburg State University, featured a meeting between 
President Putin, President Chirac of France, and German Chancellor Schröder. The heads of state 
met with leading members of the Russian legal academy. Putin told the gathering: “Now as never 
before it is important to rely on the opinion of the expert community – lawyers, political scientists, 
specialists in different fields of international relations…We, of course, will impatiently wait for the 
results of your works, fresh ideas, suggestions.”313  
As events in Crimea transpired, a series of professional documents were offered to support Russia’s 
legal arguments. Purportedly independent, these supplementary avowals sought to accentuate the 
speaker’s interpretative authority and, by association, the endorsed argument’s validity. The Russian 
Association of International Law circulated a detailed letter.314 This was addressed to the worldwide 
community of international lawyers and signed by Anatoly Kapustin, perhaps Russia’s foremost 
international legal expert.315 The letter refuted allegations that Russian actions in Crimea breached 
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international law. It sought to clarify “the basic facts, history and legal foundations” of the Russian 
incursion.316 It offered an account that closely aligned with official state discourse.317 In turn, this 
would be cited in support of Russia’s varied legal positions.318 Elsewhere, Russian officials relied upon 
the “White Book on violations of human rights and the rule of law in Ukraine.”319 This was published 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, at least outwardly, shared stylistic similarities with the US State 
Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Published in English, these Russian 
documents sought to establish, endorse, and persuade. They advanced particular legal arguments while 
associating authoritativeness and professional competence with what were widely-received as 
contentious interpretative appeals.  
4. Instilling the Standard of the Acceptable Legal Argument 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine were certain to evoke a legal response. When Russian military forces 
became active in Crimea, when annexation was formalized, officials in Moscow were accused of 
violating a foundational tenet of the international legal order. The pervasive assumption that Russia 
employed force to acquire territory fuelled condemnation.320 In reply, the legal narrative that Russia 
presented was unlikely to sway a plurality of non-Russian international lawyers.  It would not dislodge 
the consensus western belief that Russia had acted unlawfully.321 However, as Christian Marxsen 
acknowledged, “since Russia is powerful enough to pursue its interests anyway, it does not need an 
ultimately convincing legal justification. A justification that is at least not totally absurd, but somehow 
arguable, is already good enough for making a case in the international political sphere.”322 
Russia’s legal contentions – while straining credibility – targeted diverse (often non-legal) audiences.323 
Inherent in Russian claims were efforts to impose or expand evaluative legal standards. Broad 
understandings of the use of force and aggression were advanced thus lessening the persuasive burden. 
These assertions moved beyond existing doctrine and forwarded permissive standards that lent to 
favourable legal assessments. Article 3(a) of the Definition of Aggression instructs that the unlawful 
act includes “the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or 
any military operation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation 
by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof.”324 Russia equated the use of force 
with active belligerency.325 The fact that Russia’s involvement in Crimea did not result in an exchange 
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of hostilities was presented as lessening legal responsibility. This implied that an act of aggression was 
contingent upon “a significant military confrontation or the actual use of arms.”326 President Putin 
dismissed the charge of aggression based upon this lessened standard of compliance. Putin noted: 
“they keep talking of some Russian intervention in Crimea, some sort of aggression. This is strange to 
hear. I cannot recall a single case in history of an intervention without a single shot being fired and 
with no human casualties.”327 
5. Drawing Upon Precedent and Commonality  
Russia invoked the Kosovo precedent. Legal contentions – that framed events in Crimea as an 
expression of self-determination and a lawful example of state succession – recalled western support 
for the Kosovo Assembly’s 2008 Declaration of Independence. They referenced the ICJ’s resulting 
Advisory Opinion that held the Declaration did not violate international law.328 Russia accentuated the 
legal and factual similarities between events in Crimea and the reaction and legal reasoning offered by 
various states and institutions in response to earlier occurrences in the Balkans. The Supreme Council 
of Crimea invoked the Kosovo precedent in its Declaration of Independence. The document premised 
succession on “the confirmation of the status of Kosovo by the [ICJ] …which says that [a] unilateral 
declaration of independence by part of the country doesn’t violate any international norms.”329 
President Putin made extensive use of the Kosovo precedent.330 In presenting the case that Crimean 
succession was an expression of self-determination that accorded with democratic procedures, Putin 
stated: 
“the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent – a precedent that 
our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they 
agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing 
now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s central 
authorities. Pursuant to Article 2, Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter, the UN 
International Court agreed with this approach and made the following comment in its 
ruling of July 22, 2010, and I quote: ‘No general prohibition may be inferred from the 
practice of the Security Council with regard to declarations of independence’.”331  
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Russia directly cited the US written submission to the ICJ which asserted that “declarations of 
independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does not make them 
violations of international law.”332 
When Russia was accused of using force to unlawfully acquire territory, officials pivoted to the Kosovo 
precedent. Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister, stated that when western nations reproach Russia 
“we tell them that in Kosovo their policy was quite different.”333 Historical examples and instances of 
state behaviour were presented as analogous with or justifying Crimea’s accession to the Russian 
Federation. Putin likened the process of Crimean “reunification” to amalgamation of the Democratic 
and Federal German Republics.334 When the Russian narrative forwarded humanitarian justifications, 
officials linked Russia’s actions in Crimea with what they purported to be parallel state behaviour.335 
Since its conflict with Georgia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia claimed it was the victim of a 
legal double standard: “we can’t understand why those who are talking about the responsibility to 
protect and about security of the person at every turn, forgot it when it came to the part of the former 
Soviet space where the authorities began to kill innocent people, appealing to sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.”336  
Officials consciously “mimicked” the justificatory language that western states employed in defence 
of the NATO-led interventions in Kosovo and Libya.337 Moscow reasoned that a “looming 
humanitarian catastrophe” would cause 675,000 Russian-speakers to flee from Ukraine and into 
Russia.338 Roy Allison explains that since the Georgian war, Russia has made strategic use of legal 
arguments by “selectively mimicking western humanitarian discourses.”339 By drawing upon the 
Kosovo precedent, by phrasing legal contentions in a humanitarian vernacular and through the 
language of human rights, Russia insisted that it too was entitled to act in Crimea as the west had 
elsewhere.340  
6. Conclusion  
The discursive process began with a Russian lie. Soon, however, the affirmation that Russian forces 
were not active in Crimea was altered. Intricate legal justifications replaced factual dismissals. These 
arguments constructed an environment, often unsubstantiated, in which chaos had replaced order. 
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They accentuated Russia’s general commitment to international law and justified intervention as a 
manifestation of that commitment. Legal arguments were doctrinally weak. Beyond Russia’s legal 
community, they carried little sway. Understood singularly, Russia’s legal contentions were ineffective. 
Falsehoods were exposed.341 International lawyers quickly deconstructed Russia’s substantive 
assertions.342 Various European institutions insisted that Moscow’s formulations lacked legal 
validity.343  Russia’s reasoning was rejected by numerous states as little more than efforts to sanitize a 
land grab.344  
A majority of states held that Russia’s territorial acquisition was unlawful and denied legal 
recognition.345 It is, however, unlikely that Moscow sought or assumed acceptance from such states. 
Persuasion’s effectiveness is contingent upon whether the intended audience is moved or the desired 
objective is achieved. Innumerable legal and non-legal factors influence determinations of how the 
non-compliant state’s persuasive appeals are received. Thomas Grant demonstrates that the responses 
of states facing secessionist movements are guided by local experiences.346 Nigeria, which had settled 
a boundary dispute with Biafra through adjudication, endorsed a similar process to address the 
Crimean crisis.347 The Indonesian experiences with Aceh and Western New Guinea influenced its 
strong affirmation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.348 Argentina, whose claim to the Falkland Islands 
risked being undermined if a nexus was established between self-determination and referendum, 
described the Crimean process as “worthless.”349 
Russia did, however, achieve identifiable objectives. Beyond the particularities of Russia’s varied legal 
contentions, Roy Allison explains that Moscow sought to position itself at the forefront of states that 
sought differentiation from the western liberal order.350 Designed to increase global influence and 
regional control, Russian officials followed events in Crimea by proposing an international conference 
to reformulate international law since “there are no agreed rules and the world may become an 
341 Andrew Higgins, Michael R. Gordon & Andrew E. Kramer, “Photos Link Masked Men to East Ukraine to Russia” 
New York Times (20 April 2014), online: < https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/europe/photos-link-masked-
men-in-east-ukraine-to-russia.html?hp&_r=0>. 
342 See generally, Grant Aggression Against Ukraine, supra note 275. See also, Borgen Law, Rhetoric and Strategy, supra 
note 286. 
343 See, Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, “Situation in Ukraine”, 1195th mtg. (19-20 March 2014). See also, 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1988 (9 April 2014); Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 
Resolution 1990 (10 April 2014); European Council, Statement of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine 6 March 
2014).   
344 “Ukraine: UK Condemns Russian ‘land grab’ of Crimea” BBC News (18 March 2014), online: < 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-26632857>. See also, “Biden: Russia Violated International Law With Crimea 
Annexation” NBC News (18 March 2014), online: <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/biden-russia-
violated-international-law-crimea-annexation-n55511>. 
345 Grant Aggression Against Ukraine, supra note 275 at 64. See also, See statements by the United Kingdom and France, 
UNSCOR, 69th Year, 7244th Mtg, UN Doc. S/PV.7144 (2014) at 14-16, 20. See also the statement by the European 
Union, UNGA, 68th Sess, 80th Plen Mtg, UN Doc. A/68/PV.80 (2014) at 4-5; and by the United States, UNSCOR, 69th 
Year, 7144t Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.7144 (2014) at 10. 
346 Grant Aggression Against Ukraine, supra note 275 at 67-68.  
347 See, UNGA, 68th Sess, 80th Plen Mtg, UN Doc. A/68/PV.80 (2014) at 18-19.  
348 Grant Aggression Against Ukraine, supra note 275 at 67.  
349 Ibid, at 68. See also, “Crimea vote as worthless as Falklands poll – Argentina president” Reuters (19 March 2014), online: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-falklands/crimea-vote-as-worthless-as-falklands-poll-argentina-
president-idUSL6N0MG3ZW20140319 
350 Allison Deniable Intervention, supra note 270 at 1267.  
230
increasingly unruly place.”351 Such developments are unlikely. But events in Crimea did allow Russian 
officials to herald the end of US hegemony and tell regional partners and strategic allies that the 
Russian Federation was pursuing a new world order that better reflected the interests of emergent 
powers.352  
Many of Russia’s legal contentions appear designed to appease China.353 Legal arguments, references 
to process, and the historical connection between Russia and Crimea sought to pacify Beijing’s unease 
with “territorial revisionism.”354 China was deferential. It, alongside several strategically significant 
states including India, Brazil, and South Africa, abstained from the General Assembly Resolution that 
affirmed “commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine.”355 Only 52% of UN membership favoured the resolution. This prompted Vitaly Churkin to 
declare a “moral and political victory.”356 
Russian actions in Ukraine received domestic support. Arguments that pulled upon national identity 
and historical bonds increased popular sentiment. Contentions that Russia’s claim to Crimea would 
ensure the safety and rights of a related ethnic group generated legitimacy in Russia, Crimea, and 
amongst the Russian-speaking population in Eastern Ukraine.357 These elements of Russia’s legal 
reasoning appealed to populist sentiments. They provided political consolidation as President Putin’s 
approval rating reached its zenith.358 Within the near abroad, Russia’s desire to extend its sphere of 
influence was reflected through its legal contentions. Appeals to humanitarian motives, democratic 
process, and western hypocrisy targeted Russian speaking populations in the former Soviet states. 
Russian efforts to position itself as a regional guardian, to ensure stability, and to protect vulnerable 
groups may appeal to various demographics within the near abroad.  It, however, received a mixed 
reception from regional actors.359  
The effectiveness of persuasion is most often intangible. Russia’s principle contention – that Western-
led interventions in Kosovo and Iraq – have altered the international legal order was sympathetically 
received by select states. However, the collective efficacy of these efforts can not be understood 
episodically. As Roy Allison notes, while Russia will be unable to shift broad support for the 
prohibition on the use of force, it will attempt to persuade strategic allies and challenge the “right of 
the United States and other western powers to act as the privileged custodians and interpreters of core 
principles of international order.”360 The effectiveness of Russia’s legal engagements is inseparable 
from this broader context. It is contingent upon myriad factors, personalities, and interests. This is 
perhaps best illustrated by what Allison identifies as a new tactical opportunity – unknown upon 
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Crimea’s annexation – in which Russia may influence a US Administration that has received the 
Atlantic Alliance skeptically, softened its condemnation of Russia, and may be amenable to a 
transactional relationship that would further empower Moscow to pursue the objective of “compelling 
Ukraine to accept a neutral status between Russia and NATO.”361 
B. To Posit a Preferred Interpretation: The Use of Persuasive Legal Argument to Apply and Advance the Unwilling 
or Unable Standard 
President Obama declared that initial military action against ISIS would be limited to Iraq. The scope 
and duration of the airstrikes, that would begin in August 2014, were intended to “protect American 
personnel in Iraq by stopping the current advance on Erbil … and to help forces in Iraq as they fight 
to break the siege of Mount Sinjar and protect the civilians trapped there.”362 The US rationale alluded 
to self defence, intervention by invitation, and humanitarian motives. The preceding year’s events – 
the rise of ISIS, the fall of Mosul – compelled a military response. In accompaniment, this required 
legal justification.363 Strategically, the US would conduct airstrikes in Iraq, arm Syrian factions 
combatting ISIS, and form an international coalition to continue counter-terror efforts.364 US officials 
offered a firm legal basis for military action in Iraq. President Obama, in a nationally televised address, 
insisted that the use of force was in response to a direct “request of the Iraqi government.”365 Formally, 
intervention was predicated upon invitation.366 
During the following month, ISIS militants increased their gains in Syria. Soon after, the US expanded 
its scope of operations. President Obama announced that as part of a “comprehensive and sustained 
counterterrorism strategy,” coalition forces would pursue ISIS within the Syrian theater.367 On 22 
September, in the early morning hours, the US led a series of strikes against ISIS targets in Raqqa and 
to the west of the Iraq border in Deir ez Zour and Al-Hasakah.  
The Syrian expansion was presented as a necessary evolution of the international effort to combat 
ISIS. However, where the Iraqi phase of operations claimed a firm legal basis, realpolitik and a 
confluence of diplomatic and strategic considerations denied a similar extension of the intervention 
by invitation justification. Syria, though consenting to a Russian and Iranian presence, insisted that an 
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invitation was not extended to the US led coalition.368 Neither would US officials or members of the 
coalition seek Syrian consent. Following the Syrian civil war – which began in 2011 when Bashar al-
Assad violently supressed anti-government protests – many western states viewed the Damascus 
authorities as illegitimate. They supported al-Assad’s departure.369 The US plainly stated, “we’re not 
going to ask for permission from the Syrian regime.”370 
When Samantha Power, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, presented the Secretary General 
with an Article 51 letter, military operations in Syria were predicated on an inventive legal justification. 
The US stated:  
“ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, but also to many 
other countries, including the United States and our partners in the region and beyond. 
States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, when as is the case here, the government of the State where the threat is located is 
unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks.”371  
The legal argument advanced by the US and select members of the coalition, had gained salience 
amongst some international lawyers.372 The unwilling or unable test was not, however, grounded in 
clear legal doctrine. Neither the relevant legal instruments or ICJ jurisprudence reference the test.373 It 
is instead identified through a lineage of select state practice.374 Appeals to some variant of the 
unwilling or unable test has long featured within US foreign policy though its prevalence increased in 
the wake of the 11 September attacks.375 States – notably the US, Israel, Russia, and Turkey – have 
explicitly invoked the unwilling or unable test to justify cross-border force against non-state actors.376 
368 See, Bannelier-Christakis Military Intervention against ISIL, supra note 365 at 767.  See also, UNSC, Identical letters dated 
17 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General 
and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/719 (21 September 2015).  
369 Bannelier-Christakis Military Intervention against ISIL, supra note 365 at 767.  
370 See, Anne Gearan, “U.S. rules out coordinating with Assad on airstrikes against Islamists in Syria” The Washington Post 
(26 August 2014), online: < https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-rules-out-coordinating-with-
assad-on-airstrikes-against-islamists-in-syria/2014/08/26/cda02e0e-2d2e-11e4-9b98-848790384093_story.html?utm_ter 
m=.57997b360442>. 
371 See, UNSC, Letter dated 23 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (23 September 2014) [emphasis added] [US 23 September Letter].  
372 See, Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense” (2012) 
52 Va. J. Int’l L. 483 [Deeks Unwilling or Unable]. See also, The Chatham House, “Principles of International Law on the 
Use of Force by States in Self-Defence” (2006) 55 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 963; Nico Schrijver & Larissa van den Herik, 
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L. 777 at 778-779 [Corten Unwilling or Unable Test].  
374 See, Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, “Who is on Board with Unwilling or Unable?” Lawfare (10 October 2016), online: 
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-board-unwilling-or-unable#UnitedKingdom> [Chachko & Deeks Who is on 
Board]. 
375 Ibid. See also, Paulina Starski, “Silence within the process of normative change and evolution of the prohibition on the 
use of force: normative volatility and legislative responsibility” (2017) J. on the Use of Force & Int’l L. 14 at 61.  
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As Monica Hakimi notes, “third states, for the most part did not endorse the legal claim, but they 
tacitly condoned the actual operations.”377 
Despite the test’s prevalence – and with several notable exceptions – states remain reluctant to legally 
endorse the unwilling or unable test.378 The ICJ has declined to embrace broad interpretations of the 
right to self-defence against non-state armed groups.379 And, proponents of the unwilling or unable 
test concede its legal formulation is ill-defined and that it may not constitute customary international 
law.380 Where the US and select coalition allies did not experience legal opposition to their military 
operations against ISIS in Iraq, the legal rationale accompanying the use of force in Syria required a 
persuasive account to posit their preferred legal interpretation.  
1. The Identification of a Common Lifeworld  
Ambassador Power’s Article 51 letter recalled the perils of terrorism.381 Advancement of the unwilling 
or unable test – in justification of US operations in Syria – built upon a relatable context. The general 
menace of international terrorism and the particular threat posed by ISIS were accentuated. A 
common lifeworld was identified. This was premised upon three contentions. ISIS’s actions in Iraq 
and Syria – around Mount Sinjar and toward the Yazidi population – were framed as genocide or 
ethnic cleansing.382 ISIS’s existence – their origins and their contemporary function – were linked with 
al-Qa’ida and the constant threat of transnational terrorism.383 And ISIS’s methods – the beheadings, 
mass rape, crucifixions, and public floggings – were presented as uniquely brutal.384  Collectively, the 
lifeworld evoked a conception of terrorism that was ever-present, extensive in reach, familiar yet novel, 
and that warranted a military reply.  
Articulation of the lifeworld began before operations against ISIS extended into Syria. In mid-August 
2014, Ambassador Power addressed the Security Council. ISIS were defined as greater than a regional 
issue. Power told the Council that ISIS and other al-Qa’ida affiliates threatened the people of Syria and 
Iraq but also endangered the world-at-large.385 Power illustrated the humanitarian consequences of 
ISIS’s advancement. Having seized Iraqi and Syrian infrastructure, ISIS possessed “the ability to block 
377 Ibid. 
378 Following an exhaustive reading of the letters sent to the Security Council from August 2014 to January 2016 and after 
analysing relevant UN debates, Olivier Corten concludes that, “it would be excessive to contend that the unwilling and 
unable standard has been accepted by the international community of states as a whole.” See, Corten Unwilling or Unable 
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Non-state Actors” (2018) 87 Nordic J. of Int’l L. 1 at 7 [Lehto The Fight Against ISIL]. See also, Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 19 December 2005, 116 I.C.J. Reports at para. 147.  
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Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors” (2012) 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 770 at 773 [Bethlehem 
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381 US 23 September Letter, supra note 371.  
382 See, e.g., UNSCOR, 69th Year, 7271st Mtg. UN Doc. S/PV.7271 at 6 [UNSC 7271 Meeting]. See also, Obama 10 
September Speech, supra note 367.  
383 See, US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Press Briefing on Operations in Syria by Lt. Gen. Mayville 
in the Pentagon Briefing Room (23 September 2014), online: <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript 
-View/Article/606931/>. 
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the flow of electricity and to control access to the water supplies on which people depend.”386 Recent 
ISIS attacks, Power noted, “have displaced an estimated 200,000 people, bringing the total number of 
internally displaced persons in Iraq since January to a staggering 1.4 million.”387 ISIS sought to 
eradicate the Yazidi population. “Yazidis have been buried alive, beheaded or killed in mass 
executions. Thousands were forced to flee to Mount Sinjar, where many ultimately perished from 
thirst or exposure to the elements.”388 Elsewhere in Syria, ISIS militants were evidenced to have 
purposefully exacerbated a humanitarian catastrophe by confiscating aid destined for civilians in the 
country’s east.389   
President Obama furthered this theme in a national address. ISIS had “threatened a religious minority 
with genocide.”390 The President continued that if ISIS’s advancement continued unabated, “these 
terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond [the] region, including to the United States.”391 This 
threat – ISIS’s ever-expanding capacity and global reach – recalled the war on terror. President Obama 
referenced the 11 September attacks.392 Terrorism was identified as a global menace, the source of 
collective fear, and the recipient of unconditional condemnation. The argumentative process, 
embraced by US officials did not simply identify cause for defensive action. It acknowledged a 
lifeworld, emphasizing that ISIS was an affront to universal values, had committed the most egregious 
atrocity crimes, and sought departure from the shared ideals that coalition members would act to 
uphold. Retrospection structured current debates as old threats and common fears were repurposed 
as the “new front” in the global war against terrorism.393  
These reflections did not preclude novel claims. Throughout the framing process, ISIS were 
represented as uniquely brutal. Their methods were presented through anecdotes and conveyed to 
various audiences. Ambassador Power described to the Security Council a meeting with a Bishop from 
Mosul who witnessed ISIS attack a hospital: “a Christian patient who refused to convert was shot in 
the head. Two who agreed to convert, denounced as infidels, had their throats slit.”394 Ambassador 
Power conveyed that 500 Yazidi women and children had been abducted, systematically raped, 
trafficked, or killed.395 President Obama would later note that “in a region that has known so much 
bloodshed, these terrorists are unique in their brutality. They execute captured prisoners. They kill 
children. They enslave, rape, and force women into marriage…”396 
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British Prime Minister David Cameron presented a similar narrative. When the British began airstrikes 
late in 2015, ISIS’s devastating reach had been felt throughout Europe. Addressing Parliament, Prime 
Minister Cameron referenced recent attacks in Berlin, Istanbul, and at the Bataclan and Stade de France 
in Paris. The threat posed by ISIS became vicarious. It reached people in Europe and threatened those 
across the UK as they wended their way through their daily routines. The Prime Minister explained 
that ISIS “has already taken the lives of British hostages, and inspired the worst terrorist attack against 
British people since 7/7, on the beaches of Tunisia—and, crucially, it has repeatedly tried to attack us 
right here in Britain.”397 
When the US (and later the UK) expanded operations into Syria, legal justifications were premised 
upon the shared ideas and collective understandings evoked through this pre-established context. The 
US was leading a global effort to combat terrorism. Regional and international actors were working to 
ensure a “common security.”398 Following the 22 September airstrikes, President Obama convened a 
Security Council meeting. The President emphasized terrorism’s commonality, its enduring threat: 
“the tactic of terrorism is not new. So many nations represented here today, including my own, have 
seen our citizens killed by terrorists who target innocents.”399 ISIS was presented as a unique 
manifestation of a shared experience. Initially, broad appeals did not delineate a specific threat that 
would amount to an armed attack.400 Instead, they exhibited a group whose cruelty was limitless and 
whose potential displayed extensive reach.401 They appealed to the common fears and vulnerabilities 
of a diverse collective of states that faced or perceived the threat of terrorism.  Military force – formally 
justified through an interpretative appeal to the unwilling or unable test – was a necessary response, 
one that would reflect a general commitment to international law.  
2. Establishing the State as a General Norm-Acceptor 
Elucidation followed assuredness. Within a year, US officials provided a comprehensive legal account 
of the unwilling or unable standard. State Department Legal Advisor Brian Egan, addressed the 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (ASIL). Before detailing the Obama 
Administration’s legal rationale for the use of force in Syria, Egan began by presenting the US as a 
general norm acceptor:  
“the United States complies with the international law of armed conflict in our military 
campaign against ISIL, as we do in all armed conflicts. We comply with the law of armed 
conflict because it is the international legal obligation of the United States; because we 
have a proud history of standing for the rule of law; because it is essential to building and 
397 UK HC, Parliamentary Debates, col 1491 (26 November 2015) (Prime Minister David Cameron) [Cameron 26 November 
Speech]. 
398 The White House, Statement by the President on Airstrikes in Syria (23 September 2014), online: <https://obama 
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400 In his 10 September address, President Obama noted that “While we have not yet detected specific plotting against our 
homeland, ISIL leaders have threatened America and our allies.” See, Obama 10 September Speech, supra note 367.  
401 Continuing, the President noted that “Our Intelligence Community believes that thousands of foreigners -– including 
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maintaining our international coalition; because it enhances rather than compromises our 
military effectiveness; and because it is the right thing to do.”402  
The legal rules governing non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) were enumerated.403 Egan told 
the gathered legal experts that these rules, regarded as customary international law, received close 
scrutiny within the US Government and through domestic courts.404   
Egan described the US as a leader in international legal compliance. Its general commitment to legal 
norms ensures that coalition members, as well as US forces, exhibit the highest standards of 
compliance. This commitment to legal order, Egan explained, “also extends to promoting law of 
armed conflict compliance by our partners…When others seek our assistance with military operations, 
we ensure that we understand their legal basis for acting. We also take a variety of measures to help 
our partners comply with the law of armed conflict and to avoid facilitating violations through our 
assistance…”405  
Professions of legal fidelity were further bolstered. Egan explained that the US commitment to legal 
compliance surpassed that which was formally required. As a matter of international law, Egan 
insisted, the US is compelled to comply with IHL. In practice, however, the US “imposes standards 
on its direct action operations that go beyond the requirements of the law of armed conflict.”406 As 
US officials furthered the interpretative assertions undergirding operations in Syria, they accentuated 
the state’s reputation. From a position of legal fidelity and leadership, the US drew from a general 
sense of norm acceptance to illustrate the credibility of a specific interpretative claim.  
British officials exhibited a similar approach. Prime Minister David Cameron told Parliament that the 
expansion of airstrikes into Syria constituted collective self-defence. They were legally permissible 
because the “Assad regime is unwilling and/or unable to take action necessary to prevent ISIL’s 
continuing attack on Iraq, or indeed attacks on us.”407 The ensuing process mirrored occurrences in 
the US. The British Attorney General addressed an expert audience at the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. In a speech titled “The Modern Law of Self-Defence”, the Rt. 
Hon. Jeremy Wright expanded upon the Government’s invocation of the unwilling or unable test.408 
The Attorney General began, asserting that the UK “is a world leader in promoting, defending and 
shaping international law.”409 British legal contributions – to the slave trade’s eradication; to the 
formation of the imminence requirement; to the founding of the League of Nations; and to the UN 
402 Egan International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign, supra note 107 at 236.  
403 Egan noted the principle of distinction; the definition of military objects; the need to take precautions; targeting 
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– were recounted. The UK’s role in drafting, and its willingness to sign, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the 
Ottawa Treaty, and the Rome Statute were recalled.410 By engaging with the legal questions that 
resulted following the use of force in Syria, the Attorney General pledged to continue the British 
tradition of “advocating, celebrating and participating in a rules-based international order.”411 The UK 
“should and will only use armed force, and will only act in self-defence, where it is consistent with 
international law to do so.”412 These parallel persuasive appeals, offered by US and UK officials, would 
next move to establish the credentials of the respective actors forwarding the inventive interpretative 
claim. 
3. Demonstrating the Authority to Interpret  
Both speeches targeted a specific epistemic community. The venues for each address – the IISS and 
at ASIL’s Annual Meeting – were indicative of a particular professional class. Interpretative appeals, 
to the applicability of the unwilling or unable test, were directed toward influential communities of 
international lawyers. They sought expert approval – that the justifications for the use of force in Syria 
were legally tenable. As Peter Haas suggests, interpretative claims are efficaciously received when 
directed towards a community from which the speaker derives credibility.413 By addressing academic 
conferences, by emphasizing interpretative sources, and by accentuating the speaker’s reputation and 
credentials the persuading entity bolsters its authoritativeness.414  
Legal scholars initiated the interpretative advancement of the unwilling or unable test.415 Academic 
endorsements of the standard were, however, closely linked with state practice.416 The actions of states 
informed scholarly articulations of an amended self-defence doctrine.417 States then emphasized 
academic contributions supportive of interpretations that departed from a strict reading of Article 
51.418 Most prominently, Sir Daniel Bethlehem published a list of principles intended to address the 
“scope of a state’s right to self-defense against an imminent or actual armed attack by nonstate 
actors.”419 When such attacks emanate from a third state, the victim state may intervene without 
consent when the third state is, inter alia, “unwilling to effectively restrain the armed activities of the 
non-state actor” or when there is a reasonable basis “for concluding that the third state is unable to 
effectively restrain [these] armed activities…”420 
Brian Egan’s interpretative endorsement of the unwilling or unable test drew heavily upon the 
Bethlehem Principles. Egan told the ASIL Annual Meeting, “when considering whether an armed 
attack is imminent under the jus ad bellum for purposes of the initial use of force against a particular 
non-State actor, the United States analyzes a variety of factors, including those identified by Sir Daniel 
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Bethlehem.”421 Similarly, Attorney General Wright extensively cited the Bethlehem Principles when  
describing how the UK interprets “the long-standing rules of international law on self-defence to our 
need to defend ourselves against new and evolving types of threats from non-state actors.”422 The 
Attorney General recognized Sir Daniel’s role as the former Legal Adviser to the FCO and that his 
principles were informed by “detailed official-level discussions between foreign ministry, defence 
ministry, and military legal advisers from a number of states who have operational experience in these 
matters.”423  
Both the Legal Adviser and the Attorney General noted that the Principles were published in the 
American Journal of International Law. Repeated references to the Bethlehem Principles, allusions to 
the prestige of their author, exemplify authoritativeness.  They, along with references to The Chatham 
House Principles on International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence and the Leiden Policy 
Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and International Law accentuate the role of expert opinion in the 
drafting process of the respective documents. Invocations of these documents were both lauded as 
professional sources supporting a particular interpretative position and as the work product of 
influential epistemic communities. Appeals to the latter ensure that the documents’ source, their 
associated esteem, become indirect efforts to influence the justificatory discourse.424  
To advance the favoured interpretation of the unwilling or unable test’s applicability, US and British 
officials conveyed their own professional competence. They noted their membership within the 
interpretative community that they now sought to influence. Brian Egan offered professional 
credentials. Egan told the Annual Meeting that prior to “my confirmation, I served as a Deputy White 
House Counsel and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council for nearly three years. Based on 
my experience in that position, I can tell you that the President, a lawyer himself, and his national 
security team have been guided by international law in setting the strategy for counterterrorism 
operations against ISIL.”425 The professional competence of the respective speakers, the 
authoritativeness of the documents that they would cite, became factors that lent credence to the 
particular interpretative claim.  
4. Instilling the Standard of the Acceptable Legal Argument 
The interpretative advancement of the unwilling or unable test is an effort to alter a legal standard. It 
is an attempt to expand the strictures of Article 51. Acceptance of a novel formulation facilitates 
subsequent legal arguments that accompany the use of force against non-state actors. The 
persuasiveness of legal appeals, claims of legitimacy, are bolstered when evaluated in accordance with 
this broad notion of legal compliance. Brian Egan explains that “if [a state] must rely on self-defense 
to use force against a non-State actor on another State’s territory, [they must] determine that the 
territorial State is “unable or unwilling” to address the threat posed by the non-State actor…”426 
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Reconstructed as positive international law, the imposed reading was presented as a certain legal 
standard. Egan continued:  
“in some cases international law does not require a State to obtain the consent of the State 
on whose territory force will be used. In particular, there will be cases in which there is a 
reasonable and objective basis for concluding that the territorial State is unwilling or 
unable to effectively confront the non-State actor in its territory so that it is necessary to 
act in self-defense…”427  
The Article 51 letter that Ambassador Power presented to the Secretary General was the outcome of 
an ongoing attempt to amend the jus ad bellum.428 Transnational efforts, amongst aligned states, 
advocated in accordance with Attorney General Wright’s contention that “international law is not 
static and is capable of adapting to modern developments and new realities.”429 Several states long-
favoured reformulation of the law governing the use of force. These states interpreted the 11 
September attacks as urgent demonstrations of the need for legal reform.430 The military response to 
international terrorism featured numerous efforts to impose permissive legal standards.431 
Articulations of pre-emptive self-defence, application of the unwilling or unable test, constituted 
efforts to instil facilitatory legal standards.432 Appeals to these imposed standards, notwithstanding 
their uncertain legal status and in several instances broad rejections, provided states the ability to 
exhibit an, at least, plausible legal argument.    
Formulations of reduced burdens identified legal ambiguity. They emphasized the lack of consensus 
surrounding the legal standards relevant to the contemporary challenges posed by the use of force. A 
particular legal interpretation may not be doctrinally entrenched but would constitute an acceptable 
legal argument. John Bellinger, when serving as Legal Advisor, reminded European interlocuters that 
legal rules governing conflict with non-state actors were uncertain. Bellinger insisted that the lack of 
clarity regarding the relationship between international law, self-defence, and non-state actors 
“provided impetus for cooperation in determining the appropriate legal framework.”433 US actions, 
justified through inventive legal reasoning should not, Bellinger insisted, be construed as legal 
disregard. The US was not “violating clear legal norms” as “legal experts differ on the interpretation and 
implementation of [the] laws of war.”434 Ambiguity created potential. An array of feasible legal 
arguments, offered as acceptable if not certain, justified uses of force that appeared to go beyond a 
formalist reading of the UN Charter. These allowed the state to exhibit commitment to a legal process 
and provided members of the international community with an argument that could be received in 
satisfaction of a broad, but acceptable, legal standard.  
5. Drawing Upon Precedent and Commonality  
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Invocations of precedent featured throughout Brian Egan’s ASIL address. An expansive reading of 
the self-defence criteria recalled a lineage of state behaviour. The use of force against non-state actors 
was presented as a commonality that long pre-dates the global war on terror. Contemporary legal 
arguments, preferred interpretations, were not inventive responses to a modern threat but instead 
manifestations of familiar state practice. Egan noted:  
“the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense recognized in the U.N. Charter 
is not restricted to threats posed by States. Nor is the right of self-defense on the territory 
of another State against non-State actors, such as ISIL, something that developed after 
9/11. To the contrary, for at least the past two hundred years, States have invoked the 
right of self-defense to justify taking action on the territory of another State against non-
State actors. As but one example, the oft-cited Caroline incident involved the use of force 
by the United Kingdom in self-defense against a non-State actor located in the United 
States…”435 
Two centuries of supportive state behaviour were emphasized. Appeals to the Caroline incident 
associated applications of force against non-state actors operating on a third state’s territory with the 
origins of the self-defence doctrine.   
Advancement of the unwilling or unable test accentuated the prevalence of similar state practice. Egan 
identified the increasing number of states that had offered legal justifications in support of the use of 
force against ISIS in Syria. Egan demonstrated that, “the United States is not alone in providing such 
public explanations. Over the last eighteen months, for example, nine of our coalition partners have 
submitted public Article 51 notifications to the UN Security Council explaining and justifying their 
military actions in Syria against ISIL.”436 While minimizing divergencies in legal reasoning, Egan 
continued, “though the exact formulations vary from letter to letter, the consistent theme throughout 
these reports to the Security Council is that the right of self-defense extend to using force to respond 
to actual or imminent armed attacks by non-State armed groups like ISIL.”437 These instances of 
similar state behaviour and the alike legal reasoning provided by a diversity of states were presented 
as “the clearest evidence” of the unwilling or unable test’s relevancy.438  
Earlier efforts to formalize the unwilling or unable test made similar use of precedent. John Bellinger 
told an audience at the London School of Economics that “over a century of state practice supports 
the conclusion that a state may respond with military force in self-defense to such attacks, at least 
where the harboring state is unwilling or unable to take action to quell the attacks.”439 Bellinger also 
would trace the origins of this interpretative account to the Caroline incident. As Victor Kattan 
identifies, Bellinger’s appeal to state practice evoked the language advanced in the 2002 National 
Security Strategy.440 This too alluded to precedent, noting that “for centuries, international law 
recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend 
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.”441  
435 Egan International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign, supra note 107 at 239. 
436 Ibid, at 244.  
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British appeals to precedent – in advancement of the unwilling or unable test – offered greater 
specificity. Attorney General Wright noted that the UK’s interpretative approach was common 
amongst several states who “have also confirmed their view that self-defence is available as a legal 
basis where the state from whose territory the actual or imminent armed attack emanates is unable or 
unwilling to prevent the attack…”442 In support, the Attorney General referenced a Lawfare post by 
Elena Chachko and Ashley Deeks cataloging state articulations of the unwilling or unable test.443 The 
published version of the Attorney General’s speech includes an annex that links readers to the Article 
51 letters of ten states that provided legal justifications favouring the use of force against ISIS targets 
in Syria.  
6. Conclusion
The decision to use force in Syria demanded an innovative legal justification. The United States was 
required to distinguish from the rationale that supported coalition efforts in Iraq. The persuasive 
discourse accompanying operations in Syria advanced a preferred legal interpretation within a familiar 
justificatory framework. Despite acknowledging legal ambiguity, the unable or unwilling test was 
presented as a firm legal standard. This preferred interpretative position sought to both influence 
understandings of the jus ad bellum and legitimize a particular use of force. Collectively, this advocated 
approach derived persuasive value by positioning a legal interpretation as a necessary reformation 
within the war on terror, a reflection and formalization of state practice, a direct response to the rise 
of ISIS throughout the Levant, and a safeguard against an emergent threat that emanated from the 
eastern Mediterranean and into the western world.  
The effectiveness of a persuasive claim is influenced by the broader policy objective that the specific 
legal argument wishes to further. Ambassador Power’s articulation of the unwilling or unable test is 
inseparable from efforts to justify and advance the legal framework regulating the war on terror. It 
must be considered alongside general, state-led efforts to expand the jus ad bellum to permit the use of 
force against non-state armed groups.444 The multitudinous factors that influence evaluations of this 
broad policy inevitably shape how the specific legal articulation is received. Accordingly, persuasion’s 
effectiveness is best considered incrementally.  
The Article 51 letter in which the United States justified its decision to use force in Syria was not the 
first formal invocation of the unwilling or unable standard. While it has been periodically invoked 
since the 1960s, the test, as noted, does not “appear as such in any legal instrument, including recent 
ones, nor was it employed in relevant existing case-law, particularly by the ICJ.”445 Early articulations 
of unwilling or unable – by Israel in response to attacks by armed groups operating within Lebanon – 
were explicitly rejected by the Security Council and denounced throughout the international 
community.446 From absolute rejection, articulations of an unwilling or unable standard received 
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sequential support. As states identified the threat posed by transnational terrorist networks, legal 
contentions expanding restrictive readings of the jus ad bellum gained salience.447 
Within the post-9/11 context, following explicit Security Council recognition of the lawful use of 
force against a non-state armed group, the unwilling or unable test became evermore prevalent.448 
Appeals to the standard are increasingly accepted.449 They are not, however, universally endorsed.450 A 
majority of states have rejected both a general articulation of the test and its specific application in 
justification of US-led actions in Syria.451 Amongst international lawyers, the test’s formal legal status 
remains controversial.452 Notwithstanding, the aforementioned persuasive appeals assuaged many 
coalition partners. Though the US’s persuasive efforts have not altered the jus ad bellum, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Turkey have each cited some variant of the test in justification of 
the use of force (and in furtherance of US objectives) against ISIS in Syria.453      
As with many persuasive contentions, the effectiveness of a particular claim is context dependant. 
When the US offered the unwilling or unable test in justification of its military operations in Syria it 
drew upon a cause many deemed just and a threat many believed visceral. A desired outcome, the 
perceived utility of a particular policy, and a sense of moral certitude all influence the reception, and 
thus effectiveness, of persuasive legal appeals. When, in 2002, Russia evoked the unwilling or unable 
standard to justify military action against Chechen groups positioned in the Pankisi Valley, the United 
States denounced the violation of Georgian sovereignty.454 Rwanda’s incursion into Eastern Congo 
was justified in response to the DRC’s inability to disarm and disband the Interahamwe.455 The 
international community’s response was mixed. The Security Council recognized that the Interahamwe, 
perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, were “a source of instability, a threat to civilian populations 
and an impediment to good neighbourly relations.”456 Sovereignty was, however, deemed sacrosanct 
as the international community condemned Rwanda’s unauthorized cross-border forays.457 
When the US invoked Article 51 and cited the unwilling or unable standard in justification of the use 
of force against ISIS in Syria, the international response remained mixed. It had, however, moved 
considerably from the near unanimous denunciations of the late 1960s, demonstrating greater 
acquiescence to both the test’s utility and legal status. The effectiveness of these persuasive 
engagements, whether the unwilling or unable standard has achieved legal status, remains unsettled. 
However, as Olivier Corten notes, there is a sense amongst commentators that the test will be 
“increasingly accepted in practice and [in] supporting statements of governments and international 
organizations.”458 Determining whether and how US contentions influence the test’s formalization, 
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requires a long-term perspective. It is nevertheless clear that the unwilling or unable standard has 
entered the legal, political, and justificatory lexicon that states employ to use force in response to the 
threat posed by non-state armed groups.  
C. To Legitimize a General Situation or to Advance a Particular Policy: The 2014 Gaza War
In 2001, Hamas first aimed mortars beyond the Gaza Strip. They detonated in Nahal Oz, a kibbutz 
near Sderot. On 10 February 2002, the first rockets were launched towards communities in Israel’s 
south.459 These early attacks were limited. They did not garner the same level of attention as the suicide 
bombings that had become the hallmark of the second Intifada. Still, Israel’s response was considerable 
– striking Hamas and PA targets throughout Gaza.460 Israel framed its actions as a military necessity.
Since the commencement of the second Intifada, Israel altered the defensive legal paradigm used to
engage with non-state armed groups – from a law enforcement model to a military framework.461
Daniel Reisner, who oversaw this policy shift when head of the IDF’s ILD, recalled:
“when we started to define the confrontation with the Palestinians as an armed 
confrontation, it was a dramatic switch, and we started to defend that position before the 
Supreme Court. In April 2001, I met with American envoy George Mitchell and explained 
that above a certain level, fighting terrorism is armed combat and not law enforcement. 
His committee [which examined the circumstances of the confrontation in the territories] 
rejected that approach. Its report called on the Israeli government to abandon the armed 
confrontation definition and revert to the concept of law enforcement. It took four 
months and four planes to change the opinion of the United States…”462 
The rockets continued, summarily preceded by strong military actions.463 Following Israeli 
disengagement from Gaza and the 2006 Palestinian elections – in which Hamas won 74 of the 
Legislative Council’s 132 seats – inter-communal violence peaked. Hamas militants feuded with 
Fatah’s security forces. In June 2007, Hamas assumed full control of the Gaza Strip.464 Within months, 
Israel listed Gaza as a “hostile territory.”465 Sanctions against the Hamas-controlled territory were 
instituted and so began the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of Gaza that continues to this day.466 A series of 
large-scale military operations followed. Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09 and, with predictable 
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regularity, Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012. Israel presented the ensuing uses of force in Gaza as 
direct responses to the cascade of rockets launched by Hamas. A familiar pattern of actions and 
counteractions solidified what continues to resonate as Gazan rockets precede Israeli airstrikes which 
precede Gazan rockets in a ferocious carrousel of violence and escalation buttressed by purported 
legal justifications.   
Operation Protective Edge, in 2014, was the third military offensive that Israel launched against 
Hamas. The 2014 Gaza war was initiated by a series of events that began with the abduction and 
murder of three Israeli yeshiva students – Eyal Yifrach, Gilad Shaar, and Naftali Fraenkel – and the 
immolation of Mohammad Abu-Khdeir, a sixteen-year old Palestinian from East Jerusalem.467 Again, 
Israel framed its military operation as a defensive response to the increase in rocket attacks emanating 
from within Gaza.468 The war lasted for 51 days. It was of greater duration and brought higher 
casualties than preceding escalations.469 The international community reverted to many of the habitual 
postures assumed in response to violent outbreaks between Israel and Hamas. The right to self-
defence received familiar avowals. Calls for restraint resonated. And, as the conflict continued, Israel 
would face mounting international criticism.470   
Israel presented what it asserted to be a paradigmatic appeal to self-defence.471 It cited assurances by 
world leaders that had spoken of Israel’s inherent right to protect itself from the threat of terrorism.472 
However, Israel acknowledged that much of the ensuing criticism – that followed Operations Cast 
Lead and Protective Edge – addressed the jus in bello. Pnina Sharvit Baruch, who headed the ILD 
during the 2008-09 war, later noted: “the more significant claims concern the manner in which the 
IDF used force in the operation and the application of the laws of warfare (that is, the area of jus in 
bello).”473 An international legal discourse accompanied each conflict. Israel faced increasing 
accusations of legal wrongdoing. In reply, Israeli officials harnessed the language of international law. 
In an effort to persuade varied audiences of the military operations’ legitimacy, Israeli officials 
presented detailed legal narratives. They engaged in ongoing efforts to, as Prime Minister Netanyahu 
declared, “delegitimize the delegitimization.”474 
1. The Identification of a Common Lifeworld  
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Israeli officials referenced a lifeworld that was both general and specific. Situated on the frontline of 
the war against terrorism, they described two relatable contexts. Each context correlated with a series 
of arguments that appealed respectively to the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. The first told of the 
threat of terrorism. The second conveyed the challenges of combatting this threat. During and in the 
aftermath of the 2014 Gaza wars, Israel grounded its legal appeals within these contexts. The struggle 
against Hamas, the realities of asymmetrical warfare, were positioned as reminiscent of the global war 
against terrorism and as a particular challenge that Israel was forced to confront.  
Protective Edge began on 8 July 2014. Israeli F-16s targeted 200 sites across Gaza. Hamas launched 
upwards of 150 rockets into Israel.475 The operation’s commencement was accompanied by a legal 
discourse. Initial appeals to Article 51 were supplemented. Officials conveyed a broader context. 
Within, Israelis were subject to the prolonged barrage of rocket and mortar fire. Gaza was aggressively 
consumed by Hamas, a designated terrorist organization that “violently seized control of the Gaza 
Strip and transformed it into a terror fortress.”476 When hostilities commenced, the Israeli Permanent 
Representative to the UN addressed the Security Council. Ambassador Prosor identified a lifeworld 
besieged by terror:  
“there is a storm of rockets being fired by the Hamas terrorist organization in Gaza. 
Hamas is indiscriminately threatening the lives of 3.5 million innocent men, women and 
children in Israel from the south to the north – from Beersheba to Tel Aviv and Haifa. 
In the past three days, 442 rockets have been fired into Israel. That is one every 10 
minutes. Fifteen seconds is how much time one has to run for one’s life. Imagine having 
only 15 seconds to find a bomb shelter. Now imagine doing that with small children, 
elderly parents or an ailing friend.”477  
Terrorism’s threat was not limited. It was presented as an everlasting and inescapable reality predating 
the current military operation. Gaza was described as raucous. A place where public squares and 
hospitals took the names of terrorists. Where children dress as suicide bombers and chant death to 
Israel.478 Ambassador Prosor explained that a “generation of Israeli children [are] growing up under 
the shadow of that threat. Such an abnormal way of life has become the norm for many Israelis.”479 
Operation Protective Edge was presented within this context. It was a purely defensive exercise, a 
struggle to alter the intolerable reality caused by the culminative effects of Hamas’ terror.  
Efforts to control the international law-based narrative continued following the cessation of hostilities. 
The discourse coalesced around a lengthy report published by a UN Fact Finding Commission. Israeli 
and Palestinian officials were accused of significant legal violations.480 In response, the Israeli 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence prepared a series of reports.481 Reverting to a practice that 
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began following Operation Cast Lead, Israeli officials presented a comprehensive “factual and legal 
account” of the war. Legal analysis, assurances of IHL conformity, were posited upon a relatable 
context. Hamas and the dangers emanating from Gaza were manifestations of the global threat posed 
by terrorism. Since its inception, Hamas orchestrated countless attacks – suicide bombings, 
abductions, rockets, and cross-border raids. The report continued, noting that Hamas “had killed at 
least 1,265 Israelis, wounded thousands more, and terrorised millions.”482  
The lifeworld told of vulnerability. Though the incessant rocket attacks were specific to Israel, the 
report conveyed a relatable sense of susceptibility to what was framed as a common threat.483 In detail, 
it described Israel’s long history of subjection to terrorism. Pictures of children seeking shelter from 
rockets accentuated the report. The effects of the attacks were conveyed in a detailed chapter that 
described “life under the threat of terrorist rockets and cross-border tunnel attacks.”484 The report 
cited medical studies that “show that large percentages of Israeli citizens in range of Hamas fire suffer 
from long-term symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and other impairments to personal, social, 
and occupational functioning, including intense anxiety, flashbacks, feelings of powerlessness, and 
hypervigilance.”485 
Likened to ISIS and al-Qa’ida, Hamas sought “to impose an extreme version of Sharia law.”486 They 
were presented as an affront to liberal values – the agents of gender-based oppression; an armed group 
who had banned displays of Christian symbols, called for the execution of the LGBT community, 
harassed journalists, and persecuted political opponents. Hamas were aligned with Syria, Iran, and 
Hezbollah. They were not confined to Gaza. Hamas had planned “attacks out of Turkey and Qatar” 
and viewed “Europe as a crucial arena for its jihadist movement.”487 
Necessity demanded a military response. Additional aspects of the lifeworld were identified as Israeli 
officials addressed specific claims of legal disregard. Required defensive actions were juxtaposed with 
the challenges of asymmetrical conflict. A shared experience – albeit one that was limited to states or 
militaries engaged in conflict against non-state armed groups – was recalled.488 Israel described the 
environment in which it was required to confront Hamas. Identifiable challenges, long acknowledged 
by states engaged in such forms of warfare, were offered.489 Hamas was described as having cultivated 
an arena of belligerency within which increased civilian casualties became tragic inevitabilities but not 
legal wrongs. Ambassador Prosor told the Security Council that, “Hamas exploits our concern for 
human life by hiding in Palestinian homes, schools and mosques and by using the basement of a 
hospital in Gaza as its headquarters. They are committing a double war crime, targeting Israeli civilians 
while hiding behind Palestinian civilians.”490 As the fighting continued, the Foreign Ministry attributed 
civilian deaths in Gaza to Hamas’ legal disregard. They developed a narrative, drawing upon the shared 
experiences of states that confront non-state armed groups in urban centres. Hamas were accused of 
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willfully placing their own population in danger by launching attacks from densely populated areas, by 
using human shields, and by transforming civilian sites into military targets.491  
The post-war Israeli report documented this supplementary feature of the identified lifeworld. Hamas 
were adjudged to have aggravated their own citizens’ suffering for political gain. Common operational 
challenges, that resulted in heightened death tolls, property damage, and the optics of razed civilian 
sites, were presented as inevitabilities: “despite the extensive precautions taken by the IDF to avoid 
or minimise damage to civilian life and property, the strategy of conducting hostilities from densely-
populated civilian areas significantly exacerbated damage.”492 The report recalled the challenges of 
urban warfare. It evidenced Hamas’ strategy. A combat manual recovered from the al-Qassam Brigade 
was replicated to illustrate that Hamas militants embedded within civilian populations to, as the manual 
stated, “raise the hatred of our citizens towards the [IDF] and increase their support [for Hamas].”493 
Specific incidents were described. Satellite images showed Hamas conducting operations from 
protected sites. These familiar challenges of asymmetrical warfare were presented throughout the 
report. In great detail, Israel purported, that the war took place within a context, manufactured by 
Hamas, that was “directly responsible for the scale of the civilian casualties and property damage.”494 
Evaluations of the war’s legitimacy were to be situated within this context. Notwithstanding the 
described challenges, Israeli officials claimed that the resulting military response was guided by 
international law. 
2. Establishing the State as a General Norm-Acceptor  
“No other country and no other army in history have gone to greater lengths to avoid casualties among 
the civilian population of their enemies,” said Prime Minister Netanyahu.495 Having traveled to New 
York to address the General Assembly following the conclusion of Operation Protective Edge, the 
Prime Minister told the gathered dignitaries, “this concern for Palestinian life was all the more 
remarkable given that Israeli civilians were being bombarded by rockets day after day, night after night. 
And as their families were being rocketed by Hamas, Israel’s citizen army…upheld the highest moral 
values of any army in the world.”496  
Israel’s efforts to assert legitimacy were premised upon claims that the IDF’s actions throughout the 
Gaza war reflected Israel’s commitment to international law. Affronts to this supposed commitment 
were subject to investigation and presented as anomalies.497  While Israeli officials acknowledged that 
Protective Edge’s legitimacy would be contested, the subject of intense legal scrutiny, Israel’s intricate 
legal arguments, interpretative contentions, and assertions of compliance were preceded by claims of 
general legal fidelity. During the war, the Foreign Ministry disseminated real-time accounts of the 
IDF’s legal conduct. These asserted that Israel was bound by IHL and “committed to limiting itself 
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to a lawful response.”498 Continuing, the Foreign Ministry described Israel’s dedication to the 
principles of distinction, proportionality, humanity, and precaution. These legal tenets guide 
operational decisions. Israeli officials conveyed, that in accordance with these requirements, the IDF 
uses “the most sophisticated weapons…in order to pinpoint and target only legitimate military 
objectives and minimize collateral damage to civilians; advance notice is given to the civilian 
population located in the vicinity of military targets; [and] attacks are called off in cases in which a 
sudden civilian movement [occurs] in the targeted areas…”499 
General claims of legal compliance featured throughout the conflict. Ambassador Prosor told the 
Security Council: “throughout Operation Protective Edge, Israel has been committed to upholding 
international law. Our army is a moral army like no other in the world. It does not aspire to harm any 
innocent person. We are operating only against terrorist targets and genuinely regret any civilian 
loss.”500 Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon – in response to the publication of the Fact-Finding 
Commission report – accused the UN body of delegitimizing Israel. The IDF had “acted in accordance 
with international law in Operation Protective Edge, and did all it could to prevent harm to 
civilians.”501 
Public justifications became declarations of legal intention. These affirmations of Israel’s commitment 
to both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello were conveyed through the Foreign and Defence Ministries 
report. Presentation of intricate legal arguments, direct responses to varied legal accusations, began by 
recounting Israel’s general commitment to international law. The report signalled acceptance of the 
norms governing the use of force and the conduct of hostilities. The IDF, “maintains binding policies, 
procedures and directives that implement Israel’s legal obligations…[and] ensures that its forces 
receive adequate training on these obligations.”502 Legal accountability, officials claimed, demanded 
that, “the IDF sought to achieve the goals set by the Government of Israel [during Operation 
Protective Edge] while adhering to the Law of Armed Conflict.”503 Efforts and policies, presented in 
accordance with Israel’s legal commitments were described throughout the report.504  
The use of force was designated as a last resort. The report conveyed what officials claimed were 
efforts to deescalate and employ diplomacy to avoid military confrontation.505 Detailing the threat 
posed by Hamas, the report tells of a general commitment to the jus ad bellum process. Only when such 
efforts were exhausted, Israel asserted that it was left with “no choice but to launch a broader military 
operation in order to protect Israel’s civilian population.”506 Upon reaching this conclusion, Israel 
announced its commitment to the rules regulating the conduct of warfare.  
A detailed chapter of the Israeli report – professing legitimacy through case-specific accounts and 
describing the IDF’s actualization of IHL – begins with a generalized avowal: “Israel conducted its 
military operations during the 2014 Gaza Conflict in accordance with the rules of the Law of Armed 
Conflict governing both international and non-international armed conflicts, including the rules 
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relating to distinction, precautions and proportionality.”507 The report continues to describe Israel’s 
commitment to the international conventions governing armed conflict and its compliance with “all 
rules of customary international law, including rules embodied in conventions to which [Israel] is not 
party.”508 The report attempts to persuade audiences, that Israel exhibits a general sense of legal 
fidelity, through further substantiation. It details “strict procedures and oversight for compliance with 
the Law of Armed Conflict.”509 The IDF’s training procedures are explained over several pages.510 A 
sub-section of the report recounts how “IDF military lawyers regularly provide advice on international 
law at all levels of command.”511 Operational regulations, directives, and orders – that “implement 
applicable rules of the Law of Armed Conflict” – are extensively cited.512  
3. Demonstrating the Authority to Interpret 
Post-war legal contentions were coupled with displays of competence and authoritativeness. The style 
and presentation of the Foreign and Defence Ministries report; accentuation of the contribution made 
by military lawyers in the planning, conduct, and justification of Protective Edge; and the role 
attributed to independent experts supplemented Israel’s interpretative avowals. These persuasive 
appeals recall Charlotte Peevers’ suggestion that professional expertise is conveyed to influence the 
legal justifications offered upon the use of force.513 
The legal contentions – both general and specific – made throughout the Foreign and Defence 
Ministries report present in a “quasi-academic” style. The report is published in English. It contains 
extensive footnoting and elaborate legal reasoning.514 Particular legal arguments, interpretative 
positions, are supported in a familiar manner. Experts are cited. Affirming legal materials are 
displayed.515 The report itself is presented as the authoritative account of the war. It is framed as an 
“unprecedented effort to present the factual and legal aspects concerning the 2014 Gaza Conflict.”516  
The report’s thoroughness, the ability of its authors to draw upon intelligence briefings, access satellite 
images and interview witnesses, and to receive experiential accounts from decision-makers purport to 
lend credence to the report’s legal and factual contentions. Officials claim that the Israeli report is “far 
more comprehensive than reports issued by other organisations, including international organisations 
and non-governmental organisations, and is also unparalleled in its access to information from Israel, 
including information regarding the conduct of the terrorist organisations and the reasoning and 
details behind Israel’s conduct.”517 The report’s professional composition, access, and substantiation, 
each demonstrate what Israeli officials present as authoritative accounts of legal legitimacy.   
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The role of legal expertise is accentuated. A chapter of the report – describing the IDF’s internalization 
of international law – details the influence of lawyers. Military commanders receive IHL training from 
the IDF’s legal experts. Legal advice is available when operations are planned, in real-time, and upon 
their conclusion.518 The report prefaces its legal defense of Operation Protective Edge by informing 
that “the Military Advocate General [MAG] Corps deploys specially trained military lawyers at various 
levels of command in order to improve access to legal advice and enhance the implementation of 
international law during operations, as well as to assist with [the] ‘lessons-learned’ process following 
operations.”519 Legal trainings are described, suggesting interpretative expertise. The resulting legal 
advice, the report notes, receives elevated status:  
“IDF military lawyers regularly provide advice on international law at all levels of 
command. These lawyers…are not subordinate to the commanders they advise, because 
the [MAG] has an independent status outside the military hierarchy in relation to all legal 
issues…By positioning military lawyers in this manner within the IDF, Israel ensures that 
they can provide frank and professional advice. Legal opinions of the MAG Corps are 
binding upon the IDF, including with regard to the legality of individual attacks.”520 
The ILD, upon the commencement of hostilities, is staffed by “dozens of additional Law of Armed 
Conflict experts.”521 Functioning independently from the military command, the report explains that 
the legal experts advise the General Staff Command. They are deployed to provide IHL advise at the 
regional and divisional levels by assessing the “legality of decisions regarding rules of engagement, 
targeting, use of weapons, detainee treatment, and humanitarian efforts.”522 
The endorsements of independent legal experts are accentuated. The capacity of Israel’s post-conflict 
accountability mechanisms is described and corroborated with reference to recommendations offered 
by the Turkel Commission – the independent expert body that evaluated Israel’s investigatory 
procedures.523 Prominent experts, having endorsed Israel’s legal capacity or proffered comparable legal 
interpretations were listed, their credentials provided in accompaniment.524  The IDF extended 
“unprecedented access” to Michael Schmitt and John Merriam to evaluate whether Israel’s “systems 
and processes for engaging in attacks promote compliance with the [Law of Armed Conflict].525 
Schmitt, a prominent IHL expert, and Merriam, a Major in the US Judge Advocate General’s Corps, 
were accompanied by IDF officials on a “staff ride” of the Gaza Strip. They were permitted to inspect 
an Israeli operations center that oversees combat missions, to see a “Hamas infiltration tunnel,” and 
to review “IDF doctrine and other targeting guidance… [they received] briefings by IDF operators 
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and legal personnel who have participated in targeting.”526 Schmitt and Merriam published a law review 
article, in the University of Pennsylvania’s Journal of International Law, conveying the IDF’s targeting 
procedures and associated legal positions.527 This was presented as the “first look inside Israeli 
targeting.”528 Schmitt and Merriam continued, evaluating Israel’s contentions, and concluding that in 
many instances, “the IDF imposes policy restrictions that go above and beyond the requirements of 
the [law of armed conflict].529 Israel’s interpretative contentions are deemed conventional. However, 
as with many states that forward persuasive appeals of legal legitimacy upon the use of force, these 
contentions often appeal to permissively construed legal standards.  
4. Instilling the Standard of the Acceptable Legal Argument  
Much of the international community denounced Israel’s conduct during the 2014 Gaza war. 
Mounting civilian casualties, the damage and displacement incurred from constant bombardment, 
caused significant segments of the international community to replace calls for restraint with 
accusations of legal violations.530 The UN Fact Finding Commission report charged that Israel’s 
targeting selection “did not take into account the requirement to avoid, or at the very least minimize, 
incidental loss of civilian life.”531 Illustrating the sentiment – that states rarely dismiss law’s relevancy 
but instead make interpretative contentions – Israeli officials promoted permissive readings of IHL in 
response to accusations of legal violations. 
Efforts to alter international law’s application accompanied formal affirmations of law’s relevancy.532 
Prime Minister Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, when serving as Minister of Defence, endorsed 
restructuring the legal standards that regulate hostilities between states and non-state armed groups. 
Barak noted that while Israel cannot change international law it could advantageously develop it.533 
Following Operation Protective Edge, contestations of legitimacy were displayed through assertions 
that IDF conduct complied with broadly constructed legal standards. Favoured interpretations of IHL 
principles were offered. Premised upon expansive conceptions of reasonableness, Israeli officials 
sought to instill and then satisfy these faciliatory legal standards.  
Israel asserts that it “scrupulously observed the principle of distinction.”534 Grounded in 
reasonableness, adherence and legitimacy were professed. The report claimed that the IDF limited 
targeting to “persons where there was reasonable certainty that they were members of organised armed 
groups or civilians directly participating in hostilities, and only [targeted] structures where there was 
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reasonable certainty that they qualified as military objectives.”535 Accentuating IHL’s most permissive 
features, an attack, the report noted, against an intended military target but which unintentionally 
struck a civilian object did not render the action unlawful.536 Israel professed that its precautionary 
measures were unprecedented in scale and rigor.537 Roof knocking – a method devised by the IDF 
during Operation Cast Lead to provide final warning of an impending attack – was described as 
exceeding the requirements of international law. It was deemed highly effective and would later be 
employed by US forces in Syria.538 The practice – the legal status of which remains contentious (even 
legally dubious) – imposed an uncertain legal standard in substantiation of an Israeli narrative of 
compliance and legitimacy.539 
Proportionality is presented as an operational mandate.540 The Foreign and Defence Ministries report 
stresses that proportionality does not “forbid incidental harm to civilians and civilian property. Rather, 
under customary international law, this principle prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects…that would be excessive 
in relation to the military advantage anticipated.”541 Determinations, assessments of whether an attack 
meets this standard, could not be made in hindsight. Israel claimed that proportionality analysis was 
adjudged against the standard of the “reasonable military commander.”542 The excessiveness of 
collateral damage and the anticipated military advantage are assessed in accordance with “the 
information reasonably available to [the military commander] at the time of the attack.”543 If the 
damage incurred becomes excessive, “the attack is nevertheless lawful as long as, when the attack was 
launched, the commander reasonably expected the collateral damage to be proportionate.”544 
The Israeli report alters the burden of the proportionality assessment. Contending that because “third 
parties lack information about the aims, intelligence, operational circumstances and means of an 
attack,” they are ill-suited to discern “the military advantage anticipated by an individual 
commander…”545 The acceptableness of legal arguments – grounded in unattainable information – is 
altered.546 Plausibility replaces validity. Assessments of proportionality, corresponding assertions of 
legitimacy, become reliant upon particular valuations. This suggests that “only a military commander 
can properly make proportionality assessments.”547 An acceptable legal standard is imposed. 
Lieutenant Colonel Roni Katzir, in a paper presented to the IDF International Conference on the Law 
of Armed Conflict and published in a special issue of the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
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states that reasonableness implies that “the law accepts that assessing excessiveness is not a matter of 
reaching the one and only answer to a determination. It would be a mistake to think that in each and 
every case of a proportionality assessment there is a single point on a scale where each and every 
reasonable military commander agrees that a proportionate attack becomes excessive.”548 This 
evaluative standard – that of the reasonable military commander – is not found in the First Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.549 It is not deduced from international case law.550 Instead, Israeli 
officials draw upon select international precedent to persuade audiences that IDF actions in Gaza 
should be evaluated through this permissive legal standard.  
5. Drawing Upon Precedent and Commonality  
Israeli officials appealed to precedent and commonality. Efforts to legitimize Operation Protective 
Edge drew upon analogous legal interpretations to persuade varied audiences. The standard of the 
reasonable military commander – the imposed means of assessing (and subsequently asserting) 
conformity with IHL – derives from the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review 
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.551 Israel’s initial efforts to establish 
this evaluative standard began before the 2008-09 Gaza war and drew heavily upon the ICTY 
Prosecutor’s report.552 Following Operation Cast Lead, Israeli officials extensively cited the report.553 
The Prosecutor’s report, Israel contended, provided credence to the claim that “international law 
confirms the need to assess proportionality from the standpoint of a reasonable military commander, 
possessed of such information as was available at the time of the targeting decision and considering 
the military advantage of the attack as a whole.”554 
Further attempts to impose an expansive notion of proportionality can again be traced to the 
discursive exchanges that followed the 2008-09 Gaza war. State practice was cited. The military 
manuals of various nations referenced. Statements by individuals who inhabited select epistemic 
communities were recalled. Israel recounted that Australia’s Defence Force Manual holds that 
“collateral damage may be the result of military attacks. This fact is recognised by [the Law of Armed 
Conflict] and, accordingly, it is not unlawful to cause such injury or damage.”555 Canada’s Law of 
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Armed Conflict Manual and the US Naval Handbook were referenced in substantiation.556 General 
A.P.V. Rogers, the former Director of British Army Legal Services, was cited at length. Israeli officials 
noted a lecture, delivered at the Lauterpacht Center for International Law, during which General 
Rogers stated that: “civilians and civilian objects are subject to the general dangers of war in the sense 
that attacks on military personnel and military objectives may cause incidental damage…Members of 
the Armed Forces are not liable for such incidental damage, provided it is proportionate to the military 
gain expected of the attack.”557 
Writing after Operation Protective Edge in a publication by the Institute for National Security 
Services, Pnina Sharvit Baruch again recalled the reasonable military commander. With reference to 
the ICTY Prosecutor’s report, Sharvit Baruch reiterated that: “the laws of warfare state that the 
standard [to assess proportionality] is that of a reasonable military commander.”558 This preferred 
standard was referenced within a discussion regarding the challenges Israel would face when asserting 
legal legitimacy.559  
6. Conclusion 
The Foreign and Defence Ministries report, published following Operation Protective Edge, made 
extensive use of precedent. Legal contentions and factual assertions were supplemented with 
supportive materials. Israel’s responses, the series of reports, the diplomatic interactions, public 
declarations, and targeted addresses, are demonstrative of the ways that states appeal to international 
law to legitimize and to persuade. Persuasive appeals will, however, become fragmented. 
Considerations of effectiveness must account for the constitutive parts of an overall legal strategy. 
They must evaluate the varied receptions that correspond to a particular legal assertion or 
argumentative objective.  
Israel’s legal narrative contained appeals to both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. Initial contentions 
– of defence against a persistent barrage of rockets and terror – received broad support. Partially, these 
familiar reactions were guided by ideology and partisanship. Reliable allies including the US, the UK, 
Australia, France, and Canada indicated their support of Israel’s military initiative.560 Israel’s staunchest 
critics denounced IDF aggression in Gaza.561 Unexpected reactions featured alongside these 
predictable diplomatic postures. Egypt and Saudi Arabia condemned Hamas’ actions, accusing the 
Gazan group of exacerbating Palestinian suffering.562 Following several meetings, the Security Council 
issued a balanced statement that called for an immediate ceasefire. This neither endorsed or denounced 
Israel’s actions.563 
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Certain states were influenced by Israel’s legal appeals. Canadian officials accepted a near verbatim 
account of the jus ad bellum arguments that Israel presented through its public pronouncements.564 
Often, however, strategic and non-legal considerations affect the reception of a legal narrative. 
Egyptian and Saudi officials, offering unprecedented criticisms of Hamas’ actions and aberrant silence 
in response to Israel’s use of force, sought tactical benefit. Officials in Cairo and Riyadh viewed Hamas 
as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood, a beneficiary of Turkey and Qatar, and as acting in the 
furtherance of Iranian interests.565 Political calculations, ever-present, affected the reception of the 
Israeli narrative and guided the responses of key regional actors.566  
Support for or indifference towards Operation Protective Edge was not, however, absolute. 
Considerations of the cause of war were replaced by deliberations regarding military conduct. The jus 
in bello arguments presented by Israel were less impactful. Acquiescence dwindled. As the campaign 
continued, regional leaders and key allies altered their endorsements.567 King Abdullah claimed that 
Israeli actions in Gaza constituted war crimes. Jordan stated that mounting civilian casualties 
contradicted Israel’s claim that the war was justified. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry denounced the 
inhumane blockade of Gaza.568 US officials would also adjust their often-steadfast support. While 
reaffirming Israel’s right to use force against Hamas attacks, US officials became increasingly critical 
of particular Israeli actions.569  
The war’s optics – the scores of dead, the seemingly heedless destruction that marked Gaza’s 
landscape – drove sentiment. Many critics remained unmoved by Israel’s legal contentions. Others, 
however, accepted varying aspects of the Israeli narrative. Evaluations of persuasiveness must attempt 
to reconcile the fragmentation of both legal contentions and diplomatic receptions. Audiences will 
pick and choose which aspects of a broad legal appeal that they accept, that they understand as morally 
imperative, as strategically advantageous, as plausibly acceptable, or as materially insignificant. 
Assessments of persuasion’s effectiveness, or whether legal argument influenced the perceived 
legitimacy of a particular military operation often evades a singular response. It necessitates long-term 
perspective, acknowledgement of sought objectives, and identification of the conspicuous and 
inconspicuous ways that legal discourse can affect non-legal considerations as a state contends that a 
particular use of force was, in fact and in law, legitimate.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Persuasion is a means to induce change.570 Whether employed by a non-compliant state seeking 
legitimacy, an international lawyer furthering her client’s interest, a norm entrepreneur that desires 
social adaptation, or a non-governmental organization promoting a favoured interpretation, 
persuasion exemplifies international law’s function. The relationship between persuasion and 
international law is often framed around questions of compliance. How can a non-compliant state be 
persuaded to act in accordance with legal dictate? The importance of this question is clear. Successful 
efforts to ensure compliance enable international law’s ability to reform, to protect, to limit the use of 
force, to promote human rights, and to contribute to a stable world order. The preceding pages 
attempt to move considerations of persuasion beyond its common affiliation with compliance. They 
do not dismiss the relevancy of these questions or the view, assumed by many lawyers, that persuasion 
is an essential element of the trade. I instead offer a broader conception of international law’s purpose. 
Within, persuasion becomes a two-way discourse between the non-compliant entity and a wider 
audience. It is both a means to promote compliance and to define what compliance means.  
Compliance serves as a marker of international law’s success. Yet compliance is a limited measure of 
international law’s relevancy.571 Persuasion’s effectiveness is not only assessed by adjudging legal 
fidelity. While evaluating effectiveness is a natural corollary to understanding the methods of legal 
change, ruminations must consider a host of legal and non-legal factors. Multitudinous considerations 
– beyond the merits of a legal contention and the skill with which an argument is delivered – affect 
the reception of an international legal claim. Such factors will include: (i) economic considerations; (ii) 
strategic and/or security alliances; (iii) the value or desirability of precedent; (iv) effects on regional 
stability; (v) self-interest; (vi) political personalities and leadership; (vii) domestic political 
considerations; (viii) the anticipated reactions of other states; (ix) values that the state wishes to 
project/believes it represents; (x) whether the proposed legal action affects states or non-state actors; 
(xi) implications for sovereignty; (xii) emotional appeal; (xiii) framing and context; (xiv) whether the 
appeal facilitates a ‘winning’ approach; (xv) available information; (xvi) public perception; (xvii) media 
portrayal; (xviii) lobbying and private influence; (xix) history and the state’s sense of its place within 
the global order; (xx) power politics and whether the persuading entity can pressure the state to accept 
its legal contention.  
It is difficult to discern the effectiveness of a legal contention. Yet questions regarding factors, both 
legal and non-legal, that influence the reception of a persuasive appeal are unavoidable. In certain 
instances where multiple considerations interject and a decisionmaking process lacks transparency, 
considering how an international legal argument motivates responses and contributes towards 
outcomes will be an arduous, even improbable, task.572 Such ambiguity is unavoidable even when a 
particular persuasive episode is articulated through a legal vernacular.  The preceding case studies have 
only touched on the question of effectiveness. In concluding, each case study alludes to different 
factors that affect the reception of the respective persuasive appeals.  
The legal arguments offered by Russian officials tell of the strategic significance of non-legal objectives 
and differentiated audiences. The demonstrable falsity and legal flaws in Russia’s contentions resulted 
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571 See generally, Lisa L. Martin, “Against Compliance” in Jeffery L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, eds, Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
591.  
572 Rachel Brewster, “The effectiveness of international law and stages of governance” in Wayne Sandholtz & Christopher 
A. Whytock, eds, Research Handbook on the Politics of International Law (Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing, 2017) 55 at 61.  
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in their broad dismissal. However, evaluations of these appeals must consider more than their legal 
cogency. Assessments of persuasiveness must understand what the desired outcome of a legal appeal 
is and whether the associated appeal achieves or furthers this objective. The effectiveness of Russia’s 
legal approach may be dismissed by the legal academy or international bodies but is also contingent 
on how it is received by BRIC nations, key allies such as China, and certain demographics within the 
near abroad.  
Legal contentions, offered by US and British officials in justification of military action in Syria, tell of 
the influence of context and the necessity of incrementalism. Direct legal considerations ask whether 
the unwilling or unable test has achieved legal status. Did US and British arguments contribute towards 
the test’s legal standing? Yet the extent to which the described arguments are effective, the manner by 
which they are received and contribute to the sought objective is inseparable from the war on terror 
and the motives, sentiments, and policies that it induces. Equally, evaluations of the argument’s 
effectiveness cannot only be understood in relation to a specific military action. While the response 
of states in the Security Council and General Assembly are important indicators of an argument’s 
effectiveness, full evaluation requires long-term perspective. It is necessary to understand how the 
particularities of one argumentative episode contribute to the gradual acceptance of a persuasive 
contention’s political legitimacy as well as legal certainty.  
Israel’s attempts to justify its actions during the 2014 Gaza War tell of fragmentation. Assessments of 
persuasion’s influence must consider how the component parts of a cohesive legal argument will 
pursue varying objectives, target disparate audiences, and be selectively received. The surety of an ad 
bellum contention will not necessarily equate to in bello acceptance. A state’s argumentative strategy will 
pursue multiple objectives. Israel’s efforts to legitimize its military actions in Gaza sought legal 
affirmation but also intended to maintain and develop diplomatic relations, shape a media narrative, 
and avoid scrutiny by the International Criminal Court.573  
Further questions need to be asked. The purpose here has been to identify and map persuasive 
techniques. I suggest that international law matters. However, within deliberative environments 
understandings of persuasion and legal argument must look beyond conceptions of compliance and 
towards notions of effectiveness to further comprehend international law’s influence and potential. 
Though this paper describes particular forms of legal argument, these core claims are generalizable 
beyond the contexts of the use of force and IHL. Questions regarding the successes and failures of 
persuasive appeals, though alluded to, require additional attention. This exceeds the current scope. A 
fuller understanding of international legal argument’s ability to persuade should move to consider how 
persuasive efforts can be evaluated, what constitutes success, how to adjudge influence, and how to 
differentiate between the many factors that influence a legal appeal’s reception. By asking such 
questions and observing such processes we can further our understanding of international law’s 
broader function while better harnessing its strongest potentials and resisting its worst impulses.  
573 See generally, David Hughes, “Investigation as Legitimisation: The Development, Use and Misuse of Informal 
Complementarity” (2018) 19 Melbourne J. Int’l L. 84.  
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